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
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# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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NUMBER I

## JOHN KNOX AS STATESMAN.

It was unfortunate that the recent celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Knox should have taken place in the midst of a discussion as to the accuracy of the hitherto accepted date of that event. There is no longer much room for doubt that the challenge of Dr. Hay Fleming was well founded, and that the Reformer was born, not in 1505, but in 1515, and died at the age of fifty-seven. The commemoration, nevertheless, was highly successful, and revived the impression of Knox's great personality and his unique services. It called forth also some excellent additions to the literature of the subject, among which Professor Cowan's contribution to an American series of admirable monographs on the *Heroes of the Reformation* is one of the best. Mr. Andrew Lang's extraordinary outburst has affected no reputation but his own.

We propose in the present paper to consider Knox in one aspect only—that of statesman. That a man, who was simply parish minister of Edinburgh, and who never but for a few months in an emergency undertook any political function, should nevertheless be classed as a statesman, and one of the most capable and successful statesmen of his time, will seem strange to no one who really knows the history of Scotland during Queen Mary's reign.



Knox's political creed, which was nearly as definite as his theological creed, comes out casually, but emphatically, in many passages of his writings, as well as in his interviews with the Queen. The most compendious statement of it occurs in the sketch of a tract that was never written—a second and supplementary 'Blast' on female government. It consists of the following propositions:

'(I.) It is not birth only, nor propinquity of blood, that 'makes a King lawfully to reign above a people professing 'Christ Jesus and his eternal verity; but in his election must 'the ordinance which God hath established in the election of 'inferior judges be observed.

'(II.) No manifest idolater, nor transgressor of God's 'holy precepts, ought to be promoted to any public regiment '(rule), honour or dignity, in any realm, province, or city, 'that hath subjected itself to Christ Jesus and to his blessed 'Evangel.

'(III.) Neither can oath nor promise bind any such people to obey and maintain Tyrants, against God and against 'his truth known.

'(IV.) But if either rashly they have promoted any such 'wicked person, or yet ignorantly have chosen such a one 'as after declareth himself unworthy of regiment above the 'people of God—and such be all idolaters and cruel persecutors—most justly may the same men depose and punish 'him that unadvisedly before they did nominate, appoint 'and elect.'

These propositions, expressed in the theological and somewhat archaic language of the period, will be better appreciated if we translate them into the secular tongue of our own day. If for 'a people professing Christ Jesus', and similar phrases, we read a Protestant people; for 'manifest idolaters and persecutors', and the like, members of the Church of Rome; and for 'Tyrants', Kings who set themselves above the laws, we get their meaning in modern terms. Political theories in the sixteenth century, and long

<sup>1</sup> Laing's *Knox*, IV, p. 539.

before it, generally arose out of religious questions, and Knox's, like the rest, bears the traces, if not of its origin, at least of its application. There is, however, nothing theological about these propositions in themselves; they are purely political.

The first asserts, in opposition to the legitimist theory,—the theory of absolutism, and of the divine right of kings—then becoming common, that hereditary successions is not an absolute or invariable rule; that every sovereign at his accession requires, for his legitimation, the consent and recognition of his people, by formal or tacit election. It is hardly necessary to remind students of our great constitutional historians—Stubbs, Freeman, and others—that this is precisely the doctrine and practice of the English constitution (of which the Scottish is an offshoot) from the earliest times, under Saxon and under Norman kings. "The old English kings", says Freeman, "were anything but absolute rulers—the nation chose them and the nation could depose them—they could do no important act without the national assent".<sup>2</sup> Again: "Men never forgot that the king was what his name implied' (as derived from *King* and its cognates), 'the representative, the impersonation, the offspring of the people. It was from the choice of the people that he received his authority to rule over them, a choice limited in all ordinary circumstances to the royal house, but which, within that house, was not tied down by a blind regard to any particular law of succession. Moreover, when the royal house failed to supply a fitting candidate, they could boldly fix their choice on the worthiest man of the whole people.'<sup>3</sup> "Under the Norman Kings", says Stubbs, "the Crown is still elective; and the theory that, by the renunciation of homage—by a declaration that the rights conferred by consecration had been forfeited—the person so chosen could be set aside, was, owing to the existence of competition for the throne, kept prominently before the eyes of the people."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Growth of the British Constitution*, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Constitutional History*, I, p. 338.

The second proposition asserts that no Catholic should be admitted to rule over a Protestant people. This seems a new maxim. But it is quite in harmony with the old idea, which required that sovereign and subjects should be in the same relation to the Catholic Church, and to its head, the Pope. Knox might very well regard his proposition as simply the adaptation of the old idea to the new light. The Head of the Church, in Protestant eyes, was no longer at Rome; the Pope was His rival and enemy; a Catholic on the throne of a Protestant State would introduce a schism into its government, where unity was indispensable to its safety and efficiency. It should not be forgotten that, on grounds of experience, after a century and a half of troubles, Knox's maxim became, and still remains, the law that governs the succession to the throne of Great Britain.

It will help us to see the reasonableness of this demand, in Knox's day, if we recall the political machinery by which the government of Scotland (as of England) was then conducted, and the manner of its working. Constitutional government had not yet anywhere found the means of realising itself with efficiency. The executive power was in the hands of the sovereign, advised by a Privy Council, which in Scotland usually consisted of about a dozen nobles, with half a dozen officials. Every one of these, nobles and officials alike, owed his selection to the Crown, and could at any time be superseded by the same authority. The sovereign presided at the meetings of the Council, and could allow or disallow its advice at discretion. What are now called ministers were only favoured Councillors, to whom the sovereign gave a confidence which could at any time be withdrawn, and transferred to others. However strongly supported by the public opinion of the nation, they had no means of coping with the royal will, however far it might stray into arbitrary or dangerous courses. The sovereign was in practice, though not in theory, absolute; he could be restrained only by physical force, or the fear of it. The power of the purse, that potent weapon of the Com-

mons of England, had no existence in Scotland; there was no general taxation to grant or refuse. These considerations must be carefully borne in mind when estimating the conduct of Knox, and of all who at any time opposed the proceedings of Queen Mary.

The third and fourth propositions, which are really one, assert the right of the nation to depose a tyrannical or persecuting sovereign. We have already quoted the definition of a tyrant as conceived by Knox and Buchanan—a sovereign who refuses to be governed and restrained in the exercise of his prerogative by the laws of his kingdom. He is what James VI., with unconscious humour, called 'a free King'—that is, a King who is free to do what he thinks right, untrammelled by law or precedent. And we have seen from the highest authorities how accordant Knox's propositions are with the doctrine and practice of the English constitution.

A single additional quotation from Knox's writings (out of many of like import) will complete the outline of his political creed. In his *History*,<sup>5</sup> we have the narrative of his interview with the Queen at Kinross, and the following is a part of the dialogue:

'And therefore', said Knox to Mary, 'it shall be profitable to your Majesty to consider what is the thing your Grace's subjects look to receive of your Majesty, and what it is ye ought to do unto them *by mutual contract*. They are bound to obey you, and that not but in God; ye are bound to keep laws unto them. Ye crave of them service; they crave of you protection and defence against wicked doers. Now, Madame, if ye shall deny your duty unto them, think ye to receive full obedience of them. I fear, Madame, ye shall not.'

The Mutual Contract between people and sovereign was the basis of Knox's political system, as of many later ones. It followed that loyalty—that equivocal term which has been so grossly abused, though it carries its real meaning

<sup>5</sup> Vol. II, p. 373.

on its face—is by no means a one-sided thing. It is mutual and reciprocal as between sovereign and subject, and is conditioned by the exemplary conformity of both, in letter and spirit, to the laws that govern both. And in the nature of things it must be proportionate, as between them; if there is failure of loyalty to the laws (or constitution) on the part of the sovereign, there will be corresponding diminution of loyalty to the sovereign on the part of the subject, and a schism in the body politic must ensue.

Such in outline is the political creed of Knox. Can it be said that there is anything unreasonable in it? Yet it fully explains, and if its truth be admitted, entirely justifies, in all essentials, the attitude and conduct of Knox towards the Queen, throughout her short and troubled reign, as we propose briefly to point out.

It would be interesting, did space permit, to inquire into its origin and history. Like Buchanan, who expounded it in more classic form in the *De Jure Regni*, he doubtless owed it in part to their common teacher, the Gallican Major, who was quite as pronounced a liberal as either of them<sup>6</sup>—perhaps in part to Boece and others like him—but most of all to a national tradition which went back to the Wars of Independence. It was really the implicit creed of Lowland Scots, derived from their Saxon ancestors; and it has persisted, with little variation, from that day to this. It has leaped to light, and proved its power, at every crisis of the national history. The whole Protestant party of Knox's time was actuated with it.

It would be no less interesting to compare these four propositions with the four questions put and answered in the celebrated *Indicia contra Tyrannos*, and with the other writings of the great Huguenot publicists, Hotman, Languet, and Duplessis-Mornay. We should see how the austere precept of Calvin and the first generation of Huguenots, in favour of passive obedience, passed in the second,

<sup>6</sup> See especially his *History of Greater Britain*, published by the Scot. Hist. Socy., 1892.



under the fiery trials of the Wars of Religion and the Bartholomew massacre, into a political doctrine hardly distinguishable from the Scottish liberalism of Knox—a doctrine less self-denying, but surely more manly, and perhaps not less godly, than the ascetic, and indeed slavish, precept which Calvin was so unwilling to relax.<sup>7</sup>

On these political principles Knox acted unflinchingly, from the day of his final landing in Scotland to the day of his death. It is his distinction that, alone among the Scottish statesmen of his day, he vividly realised the critical character of the contest with the Queen; the immense issues that hung upon it; and the fatal danger of compromise. In consequence, the history of her active reign is, in substance, the history of a prolonged duel between John Knox and Mary Stuart. Every other figure in it is subordinate.

It would be untrue to assert that he alone perceived, or suspected, the designs of the Queen. Neither Lethington nor Lord James could shut his eyes to them. They were, in fact, comparatively transparent, from her own frank avowals, made to Throckmorton before she set foot in Scotland. They had all been described in anticipation by Lethington, on the eve of her return, in one of those luminous despatches which he alone among contemporary statesmen could indite.<sup>8</sup> They were quite obviously dictated by her creed; by her connections with the leaders of the militant Catholic party, the Guises and Philip of Spain; and by her personal ambitions. By all these, she seemed plainly marked out as the chosen vessel of the Counter Reformation, the most valuable asset of the Catholic powers, the lever by which the Protestantism of England, Scotland, and France, might be made to roll in the dust. Mary, with her precocious intelligence and the tutoring of her uncles, was well aware of her value on the political chessboard of Europe, and she meant to make full proof of it in the service of her ambition. From the outset of her reign, she

<sup>7</sup> See the admirable work of Prof. Baird of New York, *The Rise of the Huguenots*, 1880.

<sup>8</sup> Keith, *App.* 92.

kept up a secret correspondence with the Pope and the Catholic powers, by which she was able from time to time to remind them—as in the letter to the Council of Trent<sup>9</sup>—that she was ready for any combination that would serve their purposes and her own.

Yet in face of these obvious dangers, all these Scottish statesmen—Lord James, Lethington, Morton—misled in part, no doubt, by high aims, which Mary was to be their instrument for securing—the Union of the Crowns and the honorable ending of the conflict of centuries—allowed themselves to be drawn into compromises which wrecked themselves, and would have wrecked the Reformation, both in Scotland and in England, but for the heroic firmness and the decisive influence of Knox. He opposed them at every step of their downward course, and in a few years brought them to his feet.

In illustration of this statement, we shall briefly consider his action at each successive crisis of the Queen's reign.

It is hardly necessary to go back to the time preceding Mary's arrival in Scotland, when Knox, along with the whole Protestant party, promoted the Arran-Elizabeth marriage scheme, as a natural and legitimate safeguard against the coercive power of France and the Guises. It is unlikely that Knox, at least, had any settled intention of superseding Mary on the Scottish throne. But, unquestionably, he meant to find in the alliance a lever by which they might exact from her, under a very obvious penalty, the conditions necessary for a genuinely Protestant administration; and only in the event of a definite refusal would he have consented to her deposition, just as in the similar case of the Queen Regent. When at length Elizabeth declined the suit, Knox, like the rest, was piqued, on national as well as on religious grounds; and at Arran's request, though probably not without misgivings, favoured Arran's suit to Mary herself, now a widow, and shorn of most of her power. Had Arran been a man of any capacity, and acceptable to the

<sup>9</sup> Labanoff.

Queen, the solution would have been a very satisfactory one. It would have secured a Protestant King, and Protestant heirs to the throne, with a minimum of friction. But Arran was weak, and Mary hated him; she had other and higher views, and a capacity for pursuing them unsuspected by any of those who were proposing to dispose of her hand. She was quietly maturing her own plans in consultation with her uncles. She meant to return to Scotland; to work with Lethington and Lord James, of whose scheme she was already apprised; and to take advantage of their influence with Elizabeth and Cecil to gain the English succession. This was the first part of her programme, and the foundation of all the rest. Philip of Spain was unwilling to marry his son to "a process". It was necessary, therefore, to finish the process—to secure her position at home—before she could hope to go further.

The first crisis of her active reign was coincident with her arrival in Scotland. When, in the spring of 1561, Lord James was preparing to carry out the commission entrusted to him by the Scottish nobility to invite Mary to return to Scotland, he had made up his mind to guarantee to her the private exercise of the Catholic rites. In accordance with the ideas of the time (as to which we shall have something to say presently), these had been universally prohibited under severe penalties by the legislation of the Parliament of 1560—a Parliament of whose legal competence Knox had not a shadow of doubt. He opposed the intention of Lord James, and warned him of the probable consequences. Strictly speaking the proposed guarantee was illegal, as no authority lower than that of Parliament itself could grant exemption from its own enactment. But Knox's objection was much more than legal or technical. He objected to it because it implied that the Queen was to remain an avowed Catholic after being received as the head of a Protestant State—a concession which he held, as we have seen, to be *wrong* in principle, and likely to prove impracticable and disastrous in result. Dangerous at any time, it seemed

doubly so in the actual circumstances. The religious revolution was not yet nearly completed. Only in principle had it been decided. The four Acts of the Parliament of 1560—approving the Confession of Faith, abolishing the Pope's jurisdiction and the old Heresy Laws, and prohibiting the saying or hearing of Mass—were no more than the first steps in it. There remained to be dealt with all those questions raised in the Book of Discipline, prepared by Knox and his colleagues at the Parliament's request, and now for some time under its consideration—the questions of the Church's patrimony, of the extent to which the new Church, still in its infancy, was to become the heir-at-law of the old one, of what was to be done with the surplus endowments, which Knox claimed for education and the poor, of the constitution and powers of the Reformed Church which were to be recognised and protected by the State. There was also the question of the alliance with England, which was vital to the safety of both realms and to which Mary and all her kindred were deadly enemies. To bring a Catholic sovereign, armed with the powers we have already described and with a guarantee for her Catholic faith, into the seat of sovereign authority and influence in order to carry out a Protestant revolution so imperfectly developed, and that in the face of enemies who would be her natural allies in thwarting it, seemed to Knox an act of rashness and folly.

It is true that Lord James and Lethington flattered themselves that the anomaly would be only temporary, that they had 'plenty of means' of bringing Mary round to the Protestant interest. Knox knew little as yet about Mary, but he knew much about her uncles, her tutors and her advisers, and he thoroughly distrusted these sanguine expectations. He was unwilling to allow issues of national, and even of European, importance to hang on hopes which might never be realised. The concession, once made, would be hard to revoke, should Mary persist, as was by no means unlikely, in her adherence to Rome. It was better that she should

face the requirements of the situation at the outset. If she found herself unable to accept them, it was open to her to remain in France, and to appoint a Regent to represent her, as she had done before. The Regent would, of course, have been Lord James, who had practically ruled Scotland since the death of Mary of Guise.

Knox probably hoped for this easy solution of the difficulty. The Queen was known to be passionately attached to France and to her uncles, and she had a position and revenues there to which Scotland could offer no equivalent. He must, however, have more or less pondered all the alternatives between which she would be compelled to choose, when confronted with the constitutional demand. These were (besides the one we have mentioned), (1) a latitudinarian acceptance of the situation, and an official conformity to the national establishment, like that of Henry IV of France in similar circumstances a little later; or (2) the renunciation of the crown, for which she could not in conscience pay the price demanded; or (3) an invasion of Scotland in force to secure the throne unconditionally. Even if threatened with the last of these alternatives, Knox would not have renounced his demand; and with the offered alliance of England, to be presently mentioned, Scotland could have stood firm without serious risk. Elizabeth was as anxious as Knox to 'stay' the return of Mary, at least until the Scottish Reformation should be so consolidated as to be out of danger at her hands.

The thought of this alternative seems to have become familiar to the imagination of Knox. It was probably to it that he referred in the well known saying, so constantly misquoted, that '*that* one Mass' (the Queen's) 'was more fearful to him than if ten thousand armed enemies were landed in any part of the kingdom, on purpose to suppress the whole religion'. It simply meant that he would have preferred to face an invasion, rather than voluntarily admit a Catholic sovereign.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The words are usually quoted as if he had said '*that* (my) one



Lord James Stewart, in intention as faithful to the Reformation as Knox himself, had fallen in too readily with the scheme of Lethington. This able and versatile statesman, on the failure of the Arran-Elizabeth match, and the almost simultaneous death of Mary's husband, Francis II, in December 1560, had promptly propounded to Cecil and Elizabeth a new scheme. Piqued in his national pride by the English Queen's rejection of the Scottish overture, and relieved from his worst fears by the fall of Mary from the French throne, dragging down the Guises with her, he turned to a purely Scottish policy, independent of Elizabeth's, and by no means in harmony with it. The proposals of the English Queen at this moment deserve to be clearly stated, for they are not well known. We learn them from a later statement of Lethington to Quadra, the Spanish ambassador in London, a statement which seems to have hitherto been overlooked.<sup>11</sup> Elizabeth, while declining, for personal reasons, the hand of Arran, offered instead to renew the Treaty of Berwick, which would otherwise lapse within a year, on condition that the Scottish Estates should undertake, in virtue of their right to control Mary's marriage (secured by the Treaty of 1558), to require her to choose a British consort, Arran or another, in order to avert from both realms the danger of foreign and Catholic complications. It was a fair offer, and one that Knox would gladly have accepted. One cannot but wish that Knox had been at this juncture in Lethington's place as Secretary of State. The temptation to a compromise with Mary would have been averted, and the future of Scotland assured. The proposal was in fact simply to prolong the

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Mass was more fearful', etc. Knox never said anything so foolish. The context shows that the 'that' is demonstrative, and that the Mass he referred to was the Queen's. Many Masses were said, as he knew, then and for long afterwards, in quiet places; but these were the acts of transgressors, for which they alone were responsible. The peculiarity of the Queen's Mass was that it was sanctioned by the nation, which thus 'joined hands with idolatry', and became responsible for it, and for all its consequences. Knox, II. p. 276.

<sup>11</sup> *Calendar, Simancas*, I. p. 305.



existing alliance, which had delivered Scotland from the French occupation, and restored self government to its people. It is difficult to see why it was rejected, at least by Lord James. It may be assumed that Lethington, who was more devoted to the Union than to the Reformation, saw that, from his point of view, the proposal of Elizabeth was no sufficient substitute for the Arran marriage, the offspring of which, when Mary had been set aside, as he probably intended, would have inherited both crowns; that while it would safeguard the Scottish Reformation, it would do nothing to guarantee the Scottish succession to the English throne. He preferred therefore to turn to Mary as a more promising instrument for his purpose, to take advantage of her refusal to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh—a refusal really based on Catholic grounds—to support her in that refusal, till Elizabeth and the English Parliament should consent to recognize her right to the succession, as the next heir to the English crown.

This was the great scheme which, as Lethington boasted, was to 'salve all interests', those of England, of Scotland, of the Union, and of legitimacy, and to bring Mary over, by the brilliant prospect it held out to her, to the side of the Reformation. It was not a very honorable proceeding. Scotland had been delivered from the jaws of death by the Treaty which Scottish statesmen were now to join its enemy in refusing to ratify, until a price should be paid by the deliverer which might endanger her throne. It failed, as we know, at least so far as Mary was concerned, and it deserved to fail; and the clever strategist who conceived it, and pursued it for years, was caught in his own net. He thought to make use of Mary for ends which she would never willingly have fulfilled, and he himself was made the dupe of Mary for purposes to which he was entirely opposed. Had their joint efforts been successful, Mary intended to use the position to gain a higher and more immediate prize than any that he or Elizabeth could offer. She meant, as her correspondence shows, with the help of Eng-

lish and Scottish Catholics, backed by Spain and the Pope, to supersede Elizabeth, who in Catholic eyes was an illegitimate usurper, to add the British isles to the dominion of Philip, and to reign, as the wife of Philip's heir, over an Empire which would dominate two hemispheres. This was unquestionably the vision which floated before the eyes of Mary during the first years of her active reign. It was resumed after her fall, and was never in substance abandoned till the day of her death, of which indeed it was the cause.

Lord James, a large-hearted, magnanimous man, was misled by the natural bias of a Stewart; by his distaste for the religious coercion of a woman, and that woman his own sister; and by his sanguine hope that better influences would tell upon her when removed from the influence of her uncles. He really knew little of her, and, quite naturally, he underestimated the force and ability of this remarkable young woman of nineteen, as did they all, till it was too late to repair his error. Lord James obviously looked forward to something like a constitutional government of the modern type, in which the action of the Queen would be that of the ministers by whom she undertook to be guided. He did not know that Mary, like the Cardinal of Lorraine in France, and Granvelle in the Netherlands, scouted that form of government, called it a republic, in which ministers took the crown from the royal head, and put it on their own. This charge, afterwards put forward in her proclamations—assisted perhaps by the similar suggestion of her mother in 1559—is the root of all the idle stories of Moray's ambition to be King.

Knox appears to have been somewhat taken by surprise when, on Mary's arrival, he found that the concession had actually been made. The fact seems to have been kept secret even from most of the nobles. When therefore on the Queen's first Sunday in Edinburgh preparations for Mass in the Palace chapel became apparent, there was much excitement, quite naturally, as in those days the religious

question included every other interest of the national life. Romanism and Protestantism stood for two different ideals of civilization. The excitement was soothed by the finesse of Lethington, who assured a remonstrant deputation that the indulgence was only temporary; and by a royal proclamation, issued on the following day, which guaranteed the *status quo* in religion. The guarantee, however, was only provisional, till a Parliament could be assembled 'to take a final order', and it forbade any interference with the Queen's Catholic services. Both provisions were backed by the usual penalty of death to the transgressor.

Knox was thoroughly dissatisfied, but for the sake of peace he advised his brethren to await the issue of the ministerial experiment. If it should give them within reasonable time the assurance of a Protestant government, well and good. But if, as he greatly feared, it should prove only the beginning of an insidious attack on the Reformation settlement—the first step in a process of undermining it, and preparing its overthrow, it would then be their duty to stand upon their legal rights, and to insist on the enforcement of the law, even as against the Queen. It might not now be easy to obtain satisfaction, but their duty was to assert and to maintain the principle, leaving it to the ministers, who at the proper moment had pattered with the situation, to find out the way of rectifying their mistake. That course would, at all events, help to stay any further retrogression.

Knox's fears were abundantly fulfilled. Almost from the outset the Queen evaded the obligation of privacy in the exercise of her religious rites. She threw open the doors of the palace chapel to all comers, and courted the attendance of the nobles. She held pompous services which attracted attention, and soon made it plain to all concerned that a ready way to court favour lay through the royal chapel. She tried by artifice and evasion to secure in practice equal rights for the Catholic worship. Had she sincerely aimed at a genuine and equal toleration, she might have claimed our sympathy, however impracticable the at-

tempt must have proved. Toleration, in the modern sense, was then unknown anywhere, most of all under Catholic rulers. And we hardly need the evidence of Mary's secret letters to the Pope and the Catholic powers, in which she avowed and protested her real intentions, to assure us that it was a mere pretence—'a hypocritical pretence', says Phil-ippson, who is by no means her enemy,—intended to pave the way for exclusive Catholicism. She starved the Protestant establishment by means of her profuse expenditure of the Thirds, the fund out of which the parish ministers got their meagre stipends only after her needs had been supplied. She seems, by and bye, to have issued written permits to individual Catholics to transgress the law—the first appearance, so far as we are aware, of that dispensing power which proved so fatal to her descendants. In short, by every means in her power, she laboured to promote a Catholic reaction, and she succeeded to a remarkable degree. It was only because, after all her triumphs over statesmen and courtiers and the inert masses of which all countries have their full share, she at every point found herself at last face to face with the solid phalanx of Knox and the party of the Reformed Church, undismayed and ready to renew the civil war rather than give up the rights they had won, that the back of her resolution was finally broken.

It will not be supposed that in thus stating the case from the contemporary point of view, we are homologating the principle of intolerance. Even if we admit, as we surely must, that, in the conditions of the sixteenth century, a genuine and equal toleration of both religions in any one State was impracticable, we are not therefore disloyal to the Christian ideal, to which, it is fair to remember, only a long and painful education, and a great change in the conditions of the problem, have enabled us to attain. The circumstances of the sixteenth century were very different from those of any succeeding century, most of all from our own. Should we find it easy to tolerate fellow-citizens who refused to tolerate us, to give equal powers and opportuni-

ties to those who claimed the right, and asserted the duty, of using them to suppress and exterminate us, as the pests of Christendom; and who were ready to join with foreign powers to carry out their threats? Yet this was the language and the temper of Rome all through the sixteenth century, which it acted on unflinchingly, wherever it had, or could gain, the power, and which it called on its adherents in all countries to imitate and exemplify.<sup>12</sup> And it had the zealous sympathy and coöperation of nearly all the great Catholic powers, especially of the great empire of Spain, then in the zenith of its power. The autos-de-fe in Spain, the fires in the Netherlands, the butcheries in France, and the brutal persecutions in nearly all Catholic countries, were the object lessons which Knox and his contemporaries had constantly before their eyes. Knox's continental residences had brought him into intimate relations with the Huguenots of France, and with the Protestant refugees of Geneva, drawn from nearly all the Catholic countries of Europe; and probably no European statesman had a better or truer appreciation of the methods and effects of Roman diplomacy. Moreover he and his party were not without personal experience of persecution. The cruel years of Cardinal Beaton's power in Scotland could not easily be forgotten. And it was little more than three years since his successor had dragged the aged Mylne to the stake at St. Andrews. Nor could they fail to remember their almost desperate struggle with the Queen Regent and the power of France and the Guises, which only the help of England had enabled them to overcome.

These were hardly the circumstances in which the theory and practice of toleration could be expected to flourish. No Protestant State was safe from the machinations of Rome, and of its international militia. Its Briarean arms were

<sup>12</sup> The publication, during the last half century, of large collections of State Papers and political correspondence relating to the sixteenth century, from the archives of our own and continental nations, has brought home to the historical student the deadly character of the conflict as it never has been before.



everywhere; and especially after the rise of the school of Loyola, it was only by hermetically excluding its emissaries, and by disarming the native elements on which they worked, that any Protestant State could count on reasonable peace and security. What Knox said of the concession to Mary—that her liberty would ere long prove their thralldom—applied with little reservation to the whole field of conflict. It is true that towards the end of the century a modified toleration was established in France by Henry IV in favor of the Huguenots; but it was successfully imposed only by using the despotic power of the crown to clip the claws of Rome. Its success after all was imperfect and temporary, and its end was a tragedy which has few parallels.

But apart altogether from apologetic considerations, it is only a truism to say that, in studying the history of past centuries, we are bound to deal with each period on the footing of its own standards of thought and action. Only on this basis can we judge equitably either individuals or communities, or even rightly understand them. The history of Scotland in the sixteenth century can only be fairly understood and appraised when read in connection with that of contemporary Europe; and it is because this condition is so often neglected that we have so many misleading and really unhistorical estimates of it. Historical perspective no less than comparative history is ignored, and the ideas of the present are applied without discrimination to the judgment of a past which is wholly unfamiliar to us, and which only long and sympathetic language so often applied to the Hence the exaggerated language so often applied to the Scottish Reformation is really a kind of parochialism. The Acts of the Scottish Parliament of 1560, however repellant to us, were in line with the contemporary legislation of other Protestant States. That which prohibited the saying or hearing of Mass under the graduated penalties of confiscation of goods for the first offense, banishment for the second, and death for the third, was mainly a reproduction of the corresponding statute of the English Reformation,



the Act of Supremacy (Sec. 14), passed two years before. The same idea prevailed everywhere, due to the same general causes. In the German empire, a Catholic native of a Protestant State was compelled to remove into another of his own confession, and *vice versa*. In Geneva, the irreconcilable opponents of the Calvinistic Reformation were banished from the city. In France, the Huguenots after being hunted and burned till they could no longer be restrained from rising in rebellion, waged a civil war in which both parties held the same intolerant principles; and even l'Hospital and the *Politiques*, who, to their honour, tried to stay the fratricidal strife, regarded the toleration of more than one religion in the State only as a sad necessity, a *pis aller*, to avert the ruin and dismemberment of the kingdom.

Moreover, it is only fair to remember, (1) that Protestant intolerance in Scotland, severe as it looks, was a faint shadow of that of Catholic lands; (2) that it was mainly due to the dread of Rome, to the memory of its fires, and to the fear of their rekindling; and (3) that the penalties denounced by the Act were rarely enforced. There is no authenticated case of the infliction of the death penalty, and few traces of either of the others, apart from charges of treason. They were not intended for everyday use. The Act simply armed the executive with powers to be used at discretion as the state of public affairs might require. Its purpose was essentially defensive—to safeguard the State and all its members from the machinations of Rome in a time of storm and stress, when their very existence was threatened. And the spirit of the Evangel which the Reformation proclaimed profoundly modified the spirit of intolerance, as we see from many indications. The heart touched with the Evangel was in conflict with the head, and increasingly triumphed over it, with happy inconsistency.

Knox saw with sorrow and indignation, during the next two years the progress of reaction nursed by the Queen's proceedings, the increasing weakness of her Protestant min-

isters, and the sure approach of a crisis. In his correspondence with Cecil, he spoke warmly of the danger, which threatened Scotland first and England next. As to the Succession question, to which all else was being sacrificed, he urged that countenance should be given to Mary's claim only in exact proportion to her conformity to the Protestant interest in both realms. Cecil was entirely with him, for at heart he did not want Mary under any conditions; and Elizabeth, though she privately favored her candidature, was determined to keep her dependent during her own lifetime. The crisis came in 1563. The Parliament promised in the proclamation of August, 1561, which was to take a final order in religion, was long overdue. It could hardly any longer be evaded. The Queen's ministers required it for the confirmation of the forfeiture of Huntly and the rebels crushed at Corrichie in October, 1562. Knox and the zealous Protestants eagerly awaited it, expecting from it the tardy ratification of the Reformation settlement. The latter was what Mary dreaded, and wished to prevent. She gave her ministers to understand that the Parliament would only be summoned on condition that the religious question should be further postponed. They had, as we have seen, no means of forcing her hand without civil strife, and they were weak enough to give way. Knox and his party could not be so easily dealt with. It was necessary to put Protestant suspicion to sleep, or he and the Barons of 1560 might give trouble. They had recently been getting restive. Provoked by the Queen's favour to the Catholics, and fearing the triumph of reaction, the Barons of Kyle had been taking advantage of the powers conferred on them by the Act of 1560, to enforce the law in their own local jurisdiction, by way of 'daunting the Papists'. The general adoption of the plan would have shattered the Queen's policy. Mary sent for Knox to Lochleven, where she was visiting, and asked him to put a stop to it. He declined, and reminded her, in the words we have already quoted, of the reciprocal duties of sovereign and subject, and the obligations of both to

the law. She was offended, and left him abruptly. But she soon thought better of it, and the brilliant idea occurred to her of disarming Knox and the Barons, and at the same time smoothing the path of the Parliament, by a shining demonstration of favor to the Protestants. The Archbishop of St. Andrews, the former primate of Scotland, the Abbot of Whithorn, son of a Lord Fleming, the parson of Sanguhar, a noble Crichton, were among the transgressors. Knox and the Barons hardly daring to touch such highborn personages, had only threatened them. The Queen was bolder. She summoned them all before the Court in Edinburgh, presided over by the Chief Justice Argyle, and sent them all to prison. The effect was marvellous. Who after that could doubt the Queen's good faith? The Parliament met within a day or two, and by common consent the religious question was postponed.

Knox was thunderstruck when he heard of the agreement. He suspected the theatrical character of the Queen's *coup*, and was indignant at the weakness that gave way before it. Hot words passed between him and the Queen's ministers. Without Moray's great influence the Queen's game could not have been so long played. In his anger, Knox broke off all relations with him. He discharged himself from 'all further intromission with his affairs.' It was a painful moment for both. Their friendship had been intimate, and of long standing. They had been closely linked all through the Reformation struggle, and neither could have dispensed with the help of the other. They were united by still deeper bonds, which both alike acknowledged, even amid differences and alienation. The keenness of Knox's disappointment, his conviction of the folly of Moray's course, and his apprehension as to the final issue of such repeated acts of weakness, found expression in a letter, in which anger, sorrow, and affection, are strangely mingled. 'I praise my God', so it ends, 'I this day leave you victor of your enemies, promoted to great honors, and in credit and authority with your sovereign. If so ye long continue, none

within the realms shall be more glad than I shall be. But if that after this ye shall decay, as I fear that ye shall, then call to mind by what means God exalted you, which was neither by bearing with impiety, neither yet by maintaining of pestilent Papists.' Never was forecast more promptly fulfilled. Insight is the mother of foresight.

Knox's anger found another outlet. While the Parliament sat, he had most of the nobles among his hearers in St. Giles. The Queen's marriage was on all their tongues, and strange rumors were in circulation as to Lethington's doings in England and France, where he had now for four months been negotiating. It was known that the hand of an Austrian Archduke had been formally offered to the Queen, and there seems also to have been some inkling of Lethington's dealings with the Spanish ambassador in London for the hand of Don Carlos. Here was another fatal danger in prospect. A Catholic king was to be brought in, a member of one of the great Catholic houses, to aggravate the anomalous situation already existing, and to strengthen the hold of the Catholic powers on Scotland. Could the Protestant nobility be relied on to prevent it (they had the right as we have said by the Treaty of 1558) after the weakness they had just displayed. Full of indignation and alarm, Knox could not refrain from 'pouring out the sororws of his heart' from the pulpit. It was his only available organ, and the question was a religious one of the last importance. In that strangely piercing strain to which he rose when deeply moved, he recalled the history of their marvellous deliverance from the yoke of France and Rome, the dangers they had shared and surmounted together, and the divine protection they had enjoyed. 'Shall this be the thankfulness ye shall render to your God'—this is the application—'when ye have it in your hands to establish it as ye please. The Queen, say ye, will not agree with us. Ask of her that which by God's Word ye may justly require, and if she will not agree with you in God, ye are not bound to agree with her in the Devil. . . . And now, my Lords, to put an end

to all, I hear of the Queen's marriage. Dukes, brothers to Emperors and Kings, all strive for the best game. But this, my Lords, will I say (note the day and bear witness after); Whensoever the nobility of Scotland consent that an infidel, and all papists are infidels,' (i. e. unfaithful), 'shall be head to your sovereign, ye do as far as in you lieth to banish Christ Jesus from this realm, ye bring God's vengeance on the country, a plague upon yourselves, and perchance ye shall do small comfort to your sovereign.'

The Queen, of course, soon heard of this outburst, and the scene which followed, the same evening, at the palace is well known. 'What have ye to do with my marriage, or what are ye within this commonwealth?' 'A subject born within the same, and albeit I be neither Earl, Lord, nor Baron within it, yet has God made me, however abject I be in your eyes, a profitable member within the same.' It was her last attempt to overbear Knox by personal influence, and it was the most dismal failure of all. His next appearance before her was on a charge of treason. She thought she had him at last in her power, but again she failed.

It need hardly be added that as soon as the Parliament was dissolved and the Queen's object had been served, the prison gates of the Archbishop were thrown open, and he and his friends released, in spite of the opposition of the Council.

Knox and Moray remained alienated, unwillingly on Moray's part, for more than eighteen months, till the development of the Queen's policy drove him, and most of the Protestant Lords, to toe the line which Knox had drawn from the first. At a Convention in June 1565 they formally adopted Knox's demand for the ratification of the statutes of 1560, and their universal enforcement, as the indispensable condition of a permanent and peaceful settlement, and of the approval of the Darnley marriage. But they were too late. Mary had now something like a party behind her; and by dint of superior energy and resource, and endless proclamations of her innocence of all designs against the



Protestant establishment—proclamations which it is hardly necessary to say were consciously false—she succeeded in paralysing their forces, and driving the leaders across the border into England.

This brings us to the third crisis of her reign. Mary had hoped against hope for the coveted marriage with Don Carlos. When it was at last found to be unattainable, she turned to Darnley, whom she had kept in reserve from the outset of her reign. He was the next heir after herself to Elizabeth's crown, and, after Don Carlos, the favorite candidate of the English Catholics for the hand of Mary, and the succession to Elizabeth. It was obviously expedient to join their claims, and thus unite the whole Catholic party in their interest. The match was entirely political in its inception, just as much as the Spanish one had been, though for a few brief months after Darnley's arrival in Scotland it appears to have been something more.

Moray and Lethington, since the end of 1564, had been practically superseded in the Queen's councils. They had failed to gain for her the English succession, and she had little further use for them. She was now bent on extorting it by force, and for that enterprise she knew that their help was not to be had. For a policy which aimed at overturning Elizabeth's throne by means of Elizabeth's own Catholic subjects, backed by Spain and the Pope, and at seating herself upon it, she required Catholic agents. Even Scottish Catholics were hardly to be trusted, for they had Protestant friends. Riccio, the Italian adventurer whom she had promoted from her choir to be her private Secretary for foreign correspondence, and who had now blossomed into a statesman and a prospective Lord Chancellor, became her chief adviser and her confidential minister. Knox might well have felt a certain grim satisfaction in the speedy fulfilment of his forecast. He was too generous to remain aloof from them in their distress, and he and Moray were fully reconciled. But the long-continued schism in the Protestant party had done irreparable mischief. Its polit-

ical cohesion had been lost, and could not all at once be recovered. The Kirk, focussed in the General Assembly, and led by Knox, alone remained compact and defiant. Knox did what he could by its means. But the Protestant nobles remained divided. A part of them favoured the Darnley marriage, blindly led by kinship and interest. The Queen made use of them to triumph over the rest, and the incipient insurrection, which could alone have extorted terms from her, ended in the exile of its leaders. But the heart of Scotland was with them, all the more that Elizabeth had betrayed and abandoned them; and when Mary adopted the resolution to ruin them forever, she provoked a decisive response. She had summoned the Parliament that was to decree their forfeiture, and to do something for the restoration of the Romish hierarchy. Had it sat its term and carried out the programme assigned to it by the Queen and her foreign minions, the ruin of the exiled Lords must have been followed by a Catholic revolution, perhaps in England as well as in Scotland, for the Queen's operations covered both. It was anticipated by a counter-revolution. Whatever was its precise origin, and whoever were the prime movers in it, the substance of the plan was the restoration of Protestant ascendancy by the return of Moray and the exiled Lords, their investment with power under Darnley as a Protestant King, and the coercion or deposition of Mary. The execution of Riccio, as a traitorous conspirator, was a subordinate provision, to which no one but Darnley attached much importance. In himself he was utterly insignificant, and with the success of the revolution must in any case have disappeared. That he deserved death was the conviction of all, and the only question was as to the manner of it. The nobles desired it to be preceded by a more or less formal trial, for the sake of legality, but Darnley dictated their procedure, and was not sufficiently resisted. For the barbarous circumstances of his seizure and death, the King was almost wholly responsible, though Ruthven and Morton, and probably Lethington, who remained in the background, were not wholly blameless.



The Protestant revolution was foiled by the wiles of Mary, who succeeded in detaching Darnley from his allies. But so also was the Catholic revolution. The result was a drawn battle, in which neither party gained its end. But it was a lesson to the Queen, and opened her eyes, for the time at least, to the hopelessness of her undertaking. She was fain to abandon her aggressive policy, to make peace with Elizabeth, and to admit Moray and Argyll to a share of power, balanced by Bothwell and Huntly, who, though both Protestants, were her personal partisans.

It is not proved that Knox had any direct hand in this attempted revolution. Morton and Ruthven, driven in their turn into exile, denied that he had been taken into their counsels. It must have been a mere matter of expediency. They could have no doubt whatever of his sympathy and general approval. He remained their friend and advocate in their exile, and condemned those who had forsaken them. On the eve of Mary's return from Dunbar, he left Edinburgh, where his sympathies must have been notorious, and his liberty, if not his life, in constant danger. He doubtless judged that, after such extreme measures on both sides, the crisis was postponed rather than ended, and that peace was impossible till the battle was fought to a finish. He looked forward with unshaken faith and fortitude to the issue, which was nearer and more astounding than he imagined. He retired to Kyle and worked at his *History*, keeping a careful watch, and reappearing when required.

He had not long to wait for the final crisis. Mary became rapidly demoralised by the failure of all her high ambitions, especially by the last and worst of her frustrations, because it came from the man whom she had made the sharer of her throne. He was a permanent danger. While he lived she could attempt nothing with security. His murder followed, and three months later she married the murderer. The belief in her complicity in the crime was universal, at home and abroad, among friends and foes. Knox and the General Assembly, supported by the national voice, de-

manded her trial. They refused to recognize any distinction, in the matter of private crime, between sovereign and subject. Elizabeth by her intervention probably saved Mary from the fate of her grandson, only to become herself her executioner, after twenty years of unceasing troubles and alarms, on substantially similar grounds. The milder penalty of deposition was adopted. Knox officiated at the coronation of her infant son, who was handed over to Mar and Buchanan, to be trained as a Protestant and constitutional king. Moray became Regent; the Statutes of 1560 were reenacted; permanent provision was made for the Reformed Church. Knox's great constitutional battle was at last won, and he might have sung his *Nunc dimittis* had the sky been unclouded. But Mary still lived, though a prisoner in Lochleven, and more than half the nobles were in mutiny, not really on her behalf, though they made use of her name, and professed to desire her liberation. Then came her escape, the brief hour at Langside, and her flight into England, followed by endless intrigues for her restoration. The Regent's assassination, at the age of thirty-nine, came as a cruel blow to Knox's heart and to his cause. 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord', was the text of the sermon over his remains, with which he drew tears from the great assemblage in St. Giles, and gave his final testimony to the real character of 'the good Regent'. The civil confusion increased when that powerful hand was withdrawn. The Castle, in charge of his old friend, Kirkcaldy of Grange, now gone over to the enemy, became the stronghold of the mutineers, who filled the land with disorder, and with alarms of foreign intervention. Knox's friends compelled him to leave Edinburgh for St. Andrews, to get out of reach of the motley crew whom Grange entertained. But he returned to die at his post. Once again the old fire flashed out, when the news of the St. Bartholomew massacre reached the Scottish capital. He ended his 'long battle' on the day that proclaimed Morton Regent, the man who, whatever were his personal shortcomings, and they

are often exaggerated, closed the civil war, put an end to all attempts at Mary's intervention, and consolidated the peace and order of reformed Scotland, supported by the great body of public opinion which Knox had created.

The politics, as well as the religion, of Knox continued to form the main stream of Scottish life and history. The whole period from 1560 to 1688, with all the unspeakable oppressions and cruelties of its later years, was simply a prolonged battle for self government in Church and State, in opposition to the absolutism which Mary claimed and bequeathed to her descendants—a battle for the representative government which had found its natural expression in the Presbyterian organisation of the Church, and to which, with time and opportunity, it would have assimilated the State. It achieved a substantial triumph at the Revolution, on the way to further triumphs in more modern times. The spirit of Knox, with the modifications which the education of three centuries implies, is still the essential spirit of the Scottish people, as even recent events have helped to show, and lives in many who do not recognize the debt.

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## EZEKIEL AND THE MODERN DATING OF THE PENTATEUCH.\*

The usefulness of Ezekiel for the higher critic of the Pentateuch centers in three things: the book, the man and the time.

1. The *book* of Ezekiel, with one exception the largest of the prophets, is undisputed as to either its genuineness or its integrity. Here is a great mass of literature, filling over 80 pages of our Hebrew Bibles, about which there is no critical "problem" beyond that afforded by the correction of its text. For the purposes of the higher criticism the whole book is a *datum*. The contrast between this condition of affairs in the case of Ezekiel, and the state of confusion and division in the case of almost every other book of the Old Testament, is sufficient in itself to point to Ezekiel as worthy of a special place in this difficult field.

2. The *author* of this book was a prophet, with a prophet's interest in the history of Israel's political, social and moral life. But Ezekiel was also a priest, with a priest's interest in the history of Israel's sanctuary, hierarchy and ceremonial. Now the two elements that combine to make the subject-matter of the Pentateuch are just these two phases of Hebrew religion: *viz.*, the record of God's dealings with the fathers of the nation, first, in founding, organizing and establishing this people of Israel as a political unit, as a social organism, and as a moral force in the world; and second, in instituting and regulating a certain system, in which the religious life of this people should express itself in outward, universal, obligatory observances. We should therefore expect that to be true of Ezekiel which

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examination abundantly verifies,—that for this exiled prophet-priest every phase of the system of traditions and laws embodied for us in the Pentateuch possessed the deepest interest.

3. The *time* when Ezekiel lived was the exile, that transitional period when the older Israel was being transmuted into the younger Judaism. It is to this period that the Graf-Wellhausen school of criticism refers the impulse that eventually produced the largest of the documents or groups of documents into which divisive criticism sunders the Pentateuch, the so-called Priests' Code (P). If the Priests' Code is of post-exilic origin, it is younger than Ezekiel. If it is of pre-exilic origin, it is prior to Ezekiel. If it is of Mosaic origin, even then the first logical step in the argument to prove this, is to establish its priority to Ezekiel,—then to the earlier literature. For if it be not pre-exilic, it cannot be Mosaic. Whatever, therefore, be the view maintained by any critic of the Priests' Code, it is clear that the book which should possess for him the primary place of interest and investigation is the book of Ezekiel.

Such a book, written by such a man at such a time, affords the most favorable opportunity for putting to the objective test of facts, an hypothesis which asserts that this largest constituent element of the Pentateuch, the Priests' Code, was written subsequently to Ezekiel's day. It is to this test that attention is specifically directed.

In investigations that are to determine the priority of Ezekiel or of the Priests' Code, the same caution must be observed as every problem of literary resemblance requires for its solution. In any given instance, after the preliminary question has been answered, Is this a genuine case of literary relationship, or is the resemblance accidental? there remain the further questions, (1) Does the resemblance point to identity of authorship or to literary dependence? and (2) If to the latter, which document is dependent on the other? The answer to this last question is always one



of peculiar delicacy, though even here there are degrees of difficulty, and excessive distrust of this line of argument is as much to be deplored as are undue haste and confidence.

The history of criticism affecting the relation of these two productions is worthy of note for two reasons: first, because it exhibits every variety of opinion on the subject defended by some critic; and second, because it marks the successive steps in a progression from views least favorable, toward those most favorable, to the traditional date and authorship of the Priests' Code.

The resemblances between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code are so striking, numerous and pervasive, that after Graf had suggested a late origin for P, the first opinion to find defenders was the identification-theory. Several critics, including Graf himself, maintained Ezekiel's authorship of the Priests's Code. This is of course the easiest and most natural explanation of the many points of contact between them, and it is not strange that it should have found adherents. The difficulty with it, however, is so obvious, that we are not surprised to find that after Klostermann thirty years ago had once pointed out the inexplicable differences between Ezekiel and the author of P, the identification-theory was quite abandoned. This same critic, whose independent reasoning thus turned the tide, was also the first to set forth clearly the characteristics of that group of chapters in Leviticus (xvii-xxvi), which since his time has been called the "Law of Holiness" (H). It is in this section of the Priests's Code that its resemblance to Ezekiel culminates, and it is therefore natural to find the discussion of their mutual relationship thenceforth taking the form of comparisons between Ezekiel on the one hand and this "Holiness-Code" on the other. Wellhausen and Kuenen, approaching the subject from the standpoint of the Pentateuch, and Smend, approaching it from the standpoint of Ezekiel, argued the priority of Ezekiel to the Law of Holiness, and *a fortiori* to P in general; while Horst analyzed



the Law of Holiness into a code and its redactor, identifying the latter with Ezekiel.

Though critics like Delitzsch, Dillmann, Klostermann and others steadily maintained the priority of P to Ezekiel, the school that followed the lead of Wellhausen have during the past twenty-five years regarded the reverse order as proved from those general historical considerations that lie at the basis of their reconstructed history of Israel. Their attitude towards literary difficulties arising from a comparison of Ezekiel with the supposedly earliest stratum of P, the Holiness-Code, may be illustrated by a remark of Kuenen. The author of H, he says, "follows the older tradition", in a matter where Ezekiel is clearly the more highly developed and therefore on his principles should be the later. This apparently innocent remark, that H "follows the older tradition", is worthy of note, because its real significance is the surrender of comparison with the prophets as a sure method of dating the law.

The work of Klostermann and Horst bore fruit at last in the confession of Baentsch (1893), then an adherent of the Wellhausen school, that the detailed comparison of H with Ezekiel requires the priority of H in its characteristic nucleus.<sup>1</sup> Only its minute analysis into a bewildering array of codes and redactions permits Baentsch to preserve for H as a finished product that dependence on Ezekiel which is a cardinal doctrine of the adherents of Wellhausen. It remained only for Paton (1896) to restate the arguments of Klostermann in the light of Baentsch's analysis of H, to prove the fallacy of Baentsch's reasoning wherever he made Ezekiel earlier than H.<sup>2</sup> In this verdict Paton has been

<sup>1</sup> B. Baentsch, *Das Heiligkeitgesetz*, Erfurt 1893. Baentsch in his recent work, *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus* (Tübingen 1906) has definitely broken with the Wellhausen school.

<sup>2</sup> Article in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1896, pp 98-115, entitled "The Holiness-Code and Ezekiel". Dr. Driver, in his *Introduction*, p. 147, footnote, refers to this as "the excellent article of L. B. Paton".

followed by Driver and such others as are open to conviction by the arguments of literary criticism.

The present state of opinion, therefore, regarding the literary relation between Ezekiel and the Law of Holiness is that there is no identity of authorship or redaction, that there is genuine literary dependence, and that this dependence is on the part of Ezekiel, not of the author or authors of H. So far as it goes, this historical movement of criticism is, as already remarked, favorable to the traditional date and authorship of P. But the only part of P concerned is that earliest stratum called the Law of Holiness. Clearly there is no sign here of a reversal of opinion regarding the rest of the Priests' Code. Its earliest stratum may indeed be earlier than Ezekiel; H, instead of Ezekiel, may represent the earliest stage in that evolutionary movement that led from the Deuteronomic Code to the finished Priests' Code. But in all this there is nothing to prove that the later strata of P are earlier than Ezekiel.

It would be apart from the present purpose to enlarge this historical sketch by a review of the discussions regarding the extent of the Holiness-Code, and the kindred subject, the extent of the earliest strata of P. It is sufficient to remark that considerable sections of P outside of Lev. xvii-xxvi have been sundered out of the Priests' Code as a whole, and either connected with H (Wurster, Cornill, Wildeboer), or put in a group apart, as isolated (or perhaps related) fragments of pre-exilic laws (Baentsch, Oxford Hexateuch). The climax is reached when, both from antecedent probability and especially from the consideration of Exodus vi. 6-8, Driver concludes that this early stratum of P "was prefaced by a short historical introduction, setting forth its origin and scope".

The particular bearing of these admissions upon the comparison of Ezekiel with the Priests' Code in general appears, when Driver shows the consequence of the admissions to be the complete dissolution of the entity represented by the symbol P. "There are other parts", he writes, "as well as

those including the Law of Holiness, which, when examined closely, seem to consist of *strata*, exhibiting side by side the usage of different periods. The stereotyped terminology may (to a certain extent) be the characteristic, not of an individual, but of the priestly style generally." "The phraseology of P, it is natural to suppose", he continues, "is one which had gradually formed; hence it contains elements which are no doubt ancient side by side with those which were introduced later. The priests of each successive generation would adopt, as a matter of course, the technical formulæ, and other stereotyped expressions, which they learnt from their seniors, new terms, when they were introduced, being accommodated to the old moulds. Hence, no doubt", concludes Dr. Driver, "the similarity of Ezekiel's style to P, even when a definite law is not quoted by him: although, from the greater variety of subjects which he deals with as a prophet, the vocabulary of P is not sufficient for him, he still frequently uses expressions belonging to the priestly terminology, with which he was familiar."<sup>8</sup>

If these modified views are those with which we have to deal, as the later, more cautious and apologetic representative of Wellhausenism, it is plain that, in order to test the hypothesis by the book of Ezekiel, it will not be sufficient to compare P and Ezekiel along broad and general lines merely. This too is useful. For it serves to strengthen the impression already made by Driver's words last quoted,—the impression of Ezekiel as an individual standing near the end of a long series of literary development, and dependent upon what is prior to him for what he has in common with the series. But this is not enough. All is in flux. If it is possible to get down to details, to fix upon definite passages or usages, and ask, In this representative detail, and this, and this, is Ezekiel the dependent mind or the creative?

<sup>8</sup> Driver, *Introduction*, pp. 151, 154, 156f. In the *Oxford Hexateuch* the analysis is effected, within the limits of the symbol P, into four strata. Mr. Harford, the author of these analytical tables, remarks, p. 427, "It is both safe and sufficient to follow the lines implied by the symbols . . . P<sup>a</sup> P<sup>b</sup> P<sup>c</sup> P<sup>d</sup>".

then there is something visible, tangible, concrete, on which to build an edifice of solid opinion concerning this elusive question of the Priests' Code.

If there can be found in Ezekiel a point of contact with some portion of the Priests' Code alleged to belong to its later strata; if this point of contact is of a representative nature, that is, differs in no respect from the thousand other points of contact between Ezekiel and the various Pentateuchal documents; and if it appears clearly that here also Ezekiel is the dependent,—there follows as the inevitable result a conviction that this Priests' Code too is pre-exilic; that in spite of all Wellhausen's arguments from the supposed course of evolution in Israel, and in spite of all Driver's chemical reagents of "strata", "schools", and "stereotyped formulae," the Priests' Code is the product of an earlier age than Ezekiel. It is to three such tests in detail, specific yet representative of the many similar points of contact from which these have been selected, that attention is now directed.

I. When a land is threatened by a prophet with the utmost visitation of divine wrath, there is in the situation itself a resemblance to the deluge that would make an allusion thereto quite natural. Ezekiel more than once addresses himself to the land of Israel, and once when he does so he expressly mentions Noah (xiv. 14, 20). It should therefore be no cause of surprise when, in chapter vii, in his most elaborate address to the land of Israel, we find verbal affinity with the deluge-story. Although the text of this seventh chapter affords some perplexities, there is no textual critic whose proposed emendations, however radical, remove from it these unmistakable literary relationships with the narrative of the flood. Thus, the "violence" mentioned in ver. 11 is echoed in ver. 23 in the parallelism, "For the land is full of judgment for blood, and the city is full of violence";<sup>4</sup> and in ver. 17 of the following chapter,

<sup>4</sup>In quoting the Old Testament the text of the Revised Version is used; departures from it are always in the interest of greater literalness.

"For they have filled the land with violence"; and in ver. 9 of the next chapter, "And the land is full of violence".<sup>5</sup> To this corresponds the reason assigned for the deluge, Gen. vi. 13, "For the earth is full of violence".<sup>6</sup> But in this same verse in Genesis, that effect for which this moral fact is assigned as the cause, is worded thus: "The end of all flesh has come before me." When now we turn back to Ezekiel vii and find the prophet's message to the land beginning (ver. 2) with these words, "An end: the end is come upon the four corners of the land."<sup>7</sup> Now is the end upon thee", and reiterating in ver. 6, where the prophet makes a fresh beginning, "An end is come, the end is come", these two convictions are forced upon us: first, that a mere chance resemblance of the two passages is an untenable position; and second, that it is Ezekiel, not the author of the flood-narrative, who is the dependent mind.

We have here, in fact, a situation similar to that which Paton has so well exhibited in the mutual relationship of Ezekiel xx and Leviticus xviii. 1-5. In Ezek. xx it is evident that the prophet has in his own mind, and presupposes as present in his hearer's minds, those succinct injunctions regarding Egyptian and Canaanitish forms of idolatry which are recorded in Lev. xviii. 1-5 and are assigned by the documentary analysis to H. Out of this brief hortatory section of H, less than 50 words in length, Ezekiel makes an extended homily of over 700 words. In the case of Ezek. vii compared with the deluge-story we have, not indeed a homily on a Pentateuchal text, but the kindred phenomenon (already recognized and formulated by critics of Ezekiel) of *the recurrent emergence of a favorite borrowed phrase first seized and cherished because of its appeal to a true sense of analogy.*

What now is the document to which these expressions

<sup>5</sup> So Baer's text, instead of דמים "blood" in the common editions.

<sup>6</sup> The English reader should note that "land" and "earth" render the same Hebrew word, so that the verbal correspondence is complete.

<sup>7</sup> Note the change from ארמה in ver. 2a to ארץ in ver. 2b.



in the deluge-story are assigned, when that story is divided between J and P? On the basis of the Wellhausen hypothesis we should confidently expect to find that J was the author. But in fact Gen. vi. 13, "The end of all flesh has come before me, for the earth is filled with violence," is unanimously assigned to P. But, to what stratum of P? we must ask at once, in the face of that dissolution of the symbol P which, as we have seen, is the latest phase of Pentateuchal criticism.

The Genesis-narratives of priestly origin are for the Wellhausen school an integral part of the Priests' Code as a whole. Graf, the first to put the legislation of P after the exile, left these P-portions of Genesis, where earlier criticism had placed them, in the pre-exilic period. But after Kuenen had demonstrated that P-history and P-laws belong together and cannot be thus separated, Graf himself was convinced, and his followers have ever since maintained this view as a necessary corollary of their principles of legal evolution. Nor do they place the historical narratives among the earliest strata of P. Beyond the slight concession of Driver, noted above, that in the light of Ex. vi. 6-8 the earliest stratum of P may have "been prefaced by a short historical introduction", nothing has developed in the way of a movement in this direction.<sup>8</sup> Even Driver's words mean little in this regard, and on the contrary direct assertions of a late origin for the P of Genesis (Wellhausen's Q) are everywhere to be found.

Our conviction that the P-narrative of the flood is prior to Ezekiel, once gained, is deepened by observing that the hypothesis of an underlying sense of analogy in Ezekiel

<sup>8</sup> Compare the naive remark of Carpenter, *Composition of the Hexateuch*, p. 273: "It seems safer to confine P<sup>b</sup> [-H] to a collection of laws and exhortations in the wilderness independent of any lengthy historical recital." This "safe" verdict concludes a discussion of the bounds of H, in the course of which it is granted that if the usual criteria for detecting H are permitted to determine its bounds, "it must have contained historical as well as legislative matter on an extensive scale".



between the contemporary situation in sinful Israel and the moral conditions at the time of the flood accounts for (1) turns of thought otherwise obscure, and (2) the recurrence of expressions prominent in the flood-narrative.

(1) To the first of these two categories belongs that little clause in chap. vii, consisting of the last three words of ver. 11, which has furnished so much difficulty for commentators of Ezekiel. Smend, Cornill, Bertholet, Kraetzschmar and Jahn, all give up the attempt to interpret these words  $\text{וְלֹא־נִהְיָה־בָּם}$ , which appear in our English Version as "Neither shall there be eminency among them", (margin, "wailing for them"). Yet they become the most natural expression in the world, if we suppose that Ezekiel had in his mind this underlying sense of analogy with the deluge-period, and remarked (compare xiv. 14, 20) that "there is no Noah among them", that is, among this "multitude" of "proud" and "violent" sinners in Israel, whose "time is come" and whose "day draweth near." Nothing could better express the completeness with which the impending doom is to sweep away "all the multitude thereof", without even one exception. And this too, whether we accept the reading  $\text{וְלֹא}$  preserved in eight Hebrew MSS and in the Syriac Version, or whether we prefer the reading  $\text{וְלֹא־נִהְיָה־בָּם}$  vouched for by all other authorities. For in the latter case the play upon the name Noah would be striking, no matter which of the several interpretations of this obscure word we adopt; and on this view the reading of the name Noah would have arisen through an all-too-literal abandonment of Ezekiel's paronomasia.

If any further evidence were desired to show Ezekiel's underlying analogical thought, it might be found in a comparison of the next two verses, the 12th and 13th, with what Christ says when he, like Ezekiel, compares the coming of Jehovah's day with the coming of the deluge. (Luke xvii. 26-29) "And as it came to pass in the days of Noah, even so shall it be also in the days of the Son of man. They ate, they drank, they married, they were given in marriage, until

the day that Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came, and destroyed them all. Likewise even as it came to pass in the days of Lot; they ate, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded; but in the day that Lot went out from Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all." So Ezekiel says: "The time is come, the day draweth near: let not the buyer rejoice, nor the seller mourn: for wrath is upon all the multitude thereof. For the seller shall not return to that which is sold, although they be yet alive: for the vision is touching the whole multitude thereof, none shall return".<sup>9</sup> (Ezek. vii. 12, 13).

(2) The second of those two classes of phenomena in Ezekiel, for which the hypothesis of an underlying feeling of analogy between his own times and the days of Noah best accounts, is the constant recurrence in Ezekiel of expressions prominent in the flood-narrative. There are about fifteen such expressions, several of them occurring from two to ten times, and with few exceptions these are expressions that in the story of the flood occur in P.<sup>10</sup> Some of these deserve mention.

In the third and thirty-third chapters, in Ezekiel's familiar allegory of the watchman, Jehovah says of the man who perishes unwarned, "His blood will I require at the watchman's hand." It is not hard to choose between the alternatives afforded here. Did Ezekiel twice make use, in his repeated allegory, of a divine constitution embodied in the deluge-story, Gen. ix. 5 (P), "Your blood, even your lives, will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it; and at the hand of man, even at the hand of every man's brother, will I require the life of man"? Or did some later

<sup>9</sup> Margin, "it shall not turn back".

<sup>10</sup> One of the J-expressions is רִיחַ נִיחָח "sweet savour", but as Gen. viii. is the only place where it is assigned to J, and as it occurs 38 times in P, it is of no value for the present discussion. Another word is טָרֵף "fresh", of foliage; this occurs only in Gen. viii. and Ezek. xvii. A third phrase is "cover one's nakedness", which besides Gen. ix. and Ezek. xvi. occurs only in Hos. ii.

author, in composing the Genesis-narrative, formulate his law of divine inquisition for shed blood in the very language of Ezekiel's allegory? Here again the natural choice is rendered more certain from the fact that the immediate context of this verse in Genesis furnishes other material for Ezekiel's repertoire of favorite phrases. The following verse, Gen. ix. 6, has the participial phrase "shedder of blood", which we find four times in Ezekiel<sup>11</sup> and nowhere else in the Old Testament.<sup>12</sup> And in the two preceding verses, (vv. 3, 4), Jehovah assigns food to man with the use of the phrase לֶאֱכֹל "for food", that occurs ten times in Ezekiel, who is particularly fond of this idea of the assignment of something or other as food to man or beast, exactly in the tone and language of the creation- and flood-narratives of P.

Again, in the theophany of Ezekiel's opening chapter, the divine glory is compared to the rainbow in these words, "Like the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain." (Ezek. i. 28). This is the only reference in the Old Testament to the rainbow, except that in Gen. ix. 14 (P). Now whether or not the rainbow-episode was an integral part of the deluge-story in its common Semitic form, it remains true (1) that the rainbow-episode in the Hebrew narrative belongs to P only; (2) that the rainbow is introduced in P as the center of the story, and in Ezekiel only as an object of comparison; and (3) that the wording of the two passages is identical not only in the name of the bow הַקֶּשֶׁת בַּעֲנָן "the bow in the cloud," but even in the expression accompanying this name,—in Genesis, "it shall be seen", "shall appear", יֵרָאֶה. In Ezekiel a noun from the same verb, "the appearance of", מְרֹאֵה. If it is natural to believe that these two passages, the only ones referring to the rainbow, and so similar in diction, are not independent of each other, it is equally natural to believe that Ezekiel, for the purposes of his comparison, used language familiar to

<sup>11</sup> Ezek. xvi. 38, xviii. 10, xxii. 3, xxiii. 45.

<sup>12</sup> Not even Prov. vi. 17.

him from the deluge-story, and it is more than equally difficult to believe that conversely P in framing his rainbow-episode was influenced in his wording of it by the reminiscence of this almost chance comparison in Ezekiel's theophany.

References to various orders and classes of animal life, which P in the creation- and flood-narratives has in common with Ezekiel, might be explained upon Driver's principle of inherited priestly functions and terminology, such for example as "creeping thing" רמש, "after its kind" למינה, "to swarm" שרץ. But is it reasonable to explain in this manner such remarkable collocations of words as these?—"every fowl of every wing" כל צפור כל כנף, which occurs thrice in Ezekiel<sup>13</sup> and but once besides in the Old Testament,<sup>14</sup> viz. in Gen. vii. 14 (P); "the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the heaven, and the beasts of the field, and all creeping things that creep upon the earth, and all the men that are upon the face of the earth" (Ezek. xxxviii. 20), a catalogue too familiar in the creation- and flood-narratives to need detailed comparison. Here again the question is worth weighing: is it more reasonable to explain this apparent literary dependence by assuming that the author of P worded his catalogues of the animal kingdom under the influence of Ezekiel's description of Jehovah's "shaking" of the land by means of God's army; or by assuming that, when Ezekiel wanted to particularize, in his word-painting of this great vision, he should consciously or unconsciously dip his brush in the familiar pigments of the creation-story and the deluge-story? Between these alternatives it seems not hard to choose, quite apart from the general psychological consideration that Ezekiel is admittedly the quoter *par excellence* among all the Old Testament prophets.

Before leaving this first detail of our comparison it seems desirable to make these two observations. (1) The priority of P is to be regarded as proved by Ezekiel's use of Gen.

<sup>13</sup> Ezek. xvii. 23, xxxix. 4, 17.

<sup>14</sup> Deut. iv. 17 and Ps. cxlviii. 10 lack the כל between the two nouns.

vi. 13 in his seventh chapter, and this proof, if valid, as confirmed by each added consideration and cumulatively confirmed by all taken collectively. And (2), the same kind and degree of correspondences with P in the Psalms are uniformly held by critics of this Wellhausen school to prove the lateness of the Psalm, *i. e.*, the priority of P. Witness, for example, the eighth Psalm, with its echoes of the creation-narrative.

II. The second of the details selected for this test of literary priority is to be found in the great theophanies of Ezekiel. The inaugural vision of chapters i-iii is repeated in chap. x in identical diction and phraseology. However obscure may be the meaning of portions of this detailed imagery, one thing is clear above all else, that the prophet is laboring to clothe in words the deepest impression made on his soul by the theophany. If Jehovah appeared to Isaiah supremely as the Holy One, and to Jeremiah supremely as the Almighty One, He awoke in Ezekiel supremely the sense of His glory. We feel as we read his record that he is seeking to emphasize in every possible way the indescribable glory of the divine Person who has appeared to him.

Now in his conscious or unconscious search for phrases, for the literary form in which to mold his description, there is no point of attachment to previous experience in Israel more natural than that supreme theophany, when Jehovah appeared at Sinai, at the founding of the nation which now to Ezekiel he seemed to have cast off. There too, as here, it was the overpowering glory of God that was most dwelt upon by its narrators. Hence it is no surprise to find in Ezekiel's description the same phenomena as are found in the JE-account of the divine apparition at Sinai. So *e. g.*, "the torches" הלפידים Ezek. i. 13, Ex. xx. 18 (E), the "lightning" ברק Ezek. i. 13, Ex. xix. 16 (E), the "sapphire" ספיר Ezek. i. 26, Ex. xxiv. 10 (J), and the word translated "work" מעשה Ezek. i. 16, Ex. xxiv. 10 (J).



There is nothing surprising in all this, and it is acceptable to all parties.

But in referring to this theophany in chap. viii, ver. 4, and again in chap. ix, ver. 3, and three times besides, Ezekiel uses a phrase which takes up elements of diction from both halves of Exodus, chap. xxiv. That chapter is always divided between J and P, the first eleven verses being assigned to J, and vv. 12-17 to P. In the 10th verse (the same in which the "sapphire" is mentioned), which belongs to the J-document, we read, "They saw the God of Israel". And in the 17th verse, which belongs to P, we read, "And the appearance of the glory of Jehovah was like devouring fire", etc.<sup>15</sup> Now Ezekiel's standing phrase, whenever he wishes to refer succinctly to the whole divine apparition already so lengthily described, is "the glory of the God of Israel". And in chap. viii, ver. 4, we have this phrase associated with the same word "appearance" *מראה*, which occurs in conjunction with "the glory of Jehovah" in Ex. xxiv. 17 (P). "The glory of the God of Israel, like the appearance which I saw," etc.—this entire phrase of Ezekiel is therefore made up of elements from the J-portion of Ex. xxiv enclosed between elements from the P-portion of the same chapter.<sup>16</sup> As surely as the admitted priority of J vouches for Ezekiel's dependence in this phrase-building on the Sinai-narratives, so surely does it draw with it the conclusion that these Sinai-narratives, as known to Ezekiel, already embodied material assigned to P.

Of this portion of the Priests' Code it is sufficient to say what has already been said in the case of the foregoing text, that it is in no way exceptional, and that it has never been put forward, in the way in which other parts of P in Exodus have been, as a part of an earlier stratum of P.

<sup>15</sup> Similarly, ver. 16 (P)

<sup>16</sup> The phrase "God of Israel", though it occurs numberless times in the Old Testament, is used as a supplementary title to some divine name preceding it, except in these passages in Exodus and Ezekiel, and twenty-five times besides. But in none of these other twenty-five occurrences is it connected in any way with the thought of a theophany.



III. We pass now to a third representative detail, to continue this literary test. One of the symbolic actions required of Ezekiel in the inauguration of his prophetic ministry to Israel (chap. iv), is that he should lie first upon one side, then upon the other, a fixed number of days, thus symbolically to "bear the iniquity" of the "house of Israel" and of the "house of Judah" respectively. Let it be noted at the outset that there is uncertainty with respect to two matters in this passage: first, the text, where the true number of days on the left side for the house of Israel is disputed; and second, the interpretation, where there is diversity of opinion as to the significance of these numbers. These uncertainties, however, do not affect in the slightest degree the following argument. For, whatever be the prophet's intention in the selection of the symbolical numbers, this at least is universally acknowledged, that the principle of selection was that formally stated in the 6th verse, *יום לשנה יום לשנה* a day for its year a day for its year, or as in our version, "each day for a year".

There is but one other place in the Old Testament where this principle, so often applied in the symbolism of the Bible, is thus expressly stated. This is Num. xiv. 34, in the narrative of the spying of the land of Canaan while Israel was in the wilderness of Paran. There we read that Jehovah punished Israel, with the exception of the two believing spies, by condemning the nation to wander in the wilderness forty years. And the choice of this number is thus explained: "After the number of days in which ye spied out the land, even forty days, a day for its year a day for its year, shall ye bear your iniquities, even forty years." This verse belongs to the document P by common consent. When now we turn back to Ezekiel, we find that the resemblance of his language to this verse in Numbers is not confined to the phrase above mentioned, but extends to every element of the verse. If P has, "After the number of the days in which ye spied out the land", Ezekiel has, "According to the number of the days that thou shalt lie upon it" (ver. 4),

and again, "According to the number of days" (ver. 5). If P has, "Forty days, a day for its year a day for its year", Ezekiel has word for word the same (ver. 6), and in the same order. And finally, if P has, "Shall ye bear your iniquities", Ezekiel has, "Thou shalt bear the iniquity of the house of Judah" (ver. 6).

Here there is obviously no room to question literary dependence of the most pronounced kind. This is admitted by all parties. Smend, for example, includes these passages in his list of the points of contact between P and Ezekiel. The sole question, therefore, is, which document is dependent on the other?

We have here an apparent case of inconsistency among the adherents of the school of Wellhausen. Pentateuchal criticism is for once either lost sight of, or ignored, when the critic becomes the commentator. In the two latest commentaries on Ezekiel by followers of Graf and Wellhausen, those of Bertholet (1897) and Kraetzschmar (1900), it is naively allowed that Num. xiv. 34 exerted an influence upon Ezekiel in this passage. Bertholet (p. 25) says: "It is also possible that Ezekiel had in mind an analogy with the forty-year punishment of the wilderness, Num. xiv. 34." And Kraetzschmar (p. 48), in explaining how Ezekiel came to fix upon forty years as the duration of Judah's punishment, remarks that this number "has its analogies in the forty years of the wandering in the wilderness, Num. xiv. 34, and in the forty days of Ezekiel's journey through the wilderness to the mount of God, 1 Ki. xix. 8"; by the collocation of these two examples Kraetzschmar clearly leaves the impression that the former, as well as the latter, is prior to Ezekiel and thus could influence his mind.

But after all the matter of real concern is not what this or that man thinks about the relative priority of Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6, but rather what these two passages themselves testify to us of their mutual relationship. And here there are two points of view for our comparison, ac-

ording as we approach it from the side of contents or from that of form.

From the former point of view, the comparison of contents, these alternatives emerge: which is the more natural, that the author of the P-narrative of the wanderings should fix upon forty days for the spying of the land, and then connect this period symbolically with the traditional<sup>17</sup> forty years of the wanderings,—all in imitation of Ezekiel's symbolic action of lying on his side forty days to bear the iniquity of the house of Judah, a day for a year; or that Ezekiel should, as Ewald long ago pointed out, have constructed his whole symbolic action of a penal "bearing of iniquity" for Judah during forty days, out of the suggestive material afforded him in this well-known wilderness episode, the penal character of which was brought out in just this verse in connection with an arithmetical symbolism?

Our immediate judgment in favor of the latter alternative is the more confirmed, the more closely we examine the consequences of adopting the one or the other. For if we were to adopt the former, that is, the view that Ezekiel here was prior to P, it would involve us in the absurdity of attributing to P not merely invention of historical facts—this is an essential part of the Wellhausen conception of P—and not merely a dependence on Ezekiel wholly uncalled-for under the circumstances of this case, but this invention and this slavish dependence without any assignable motive. Who will attempt the psychological riddle of such an author? And again, if we adopt the latter of the two alternatives presented above, and allow Num. xiv. 34 the priority, we at once find confirmation of our judgment in two ways: first, by observing, what no one disputes, that for Ezekiel and his hearers the wilderness-period of their nation's history held the foremost place of interest, owing to a real

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<sup>17</sup> Compare Num. xiv. 33 (JE according to Driver, Kautzsch, Strack, etc., P according to Oxf. Hex.); Amos v. 25 (though Marti excinds "forty years" he allows that Amos knew this traditional number).

analogy in the situation of the exiles;<sup>18</sup> and second, by noting that, as might be expected, Ezekiel elsewhere makes use of expressions common to him and to the story in Numbers. For example, in Num. xiii. 32 Canaan is described by the spies as a land that is a "devourer of her inhabitants"; and in Ezek. xxxvi. 13 we find the prophet addressing the same land as a "devourer of men".<sup>19</sup> And the divine designation of the murmuring Israelites in the incident of Num. xvii (P) as בְּנֵי מִרְי "children of rebellion" is echoed in Ezekiel's favorite phrase for Israel, בֵּית מִרְי "house of rebellion", which he uses twelve times.

When now we approach the comparison of these two passages, Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6, from the formal side, we observe the same phenomenon in this case as in the case of the deluge-narrative: that what in P is said once, and compactly, is in Ezekiel, (1) so divided as that elements of it appear in three consecutive verses (vv. 4-6); (2) repeated, *e. g.*, "number of days" twice, "bear the iniquity of" thrice; (3) varied, *e. g.*, "according to the number of days" is in ver. 4 מִסְפַּר הַיָּמִים without the preposition and with the article, in ver. 5 לְמִסְפַּר יָמִים with the preposition and without the article, and the passive idea of "bearing" iniquity is paralleled by the active notion of "putting" iniquity on one for him to bear, while even this modification is expressed now by the verb שָׂם (ver. 4) and now by the verb יָשָׂן (vv. 5, 6). But these phenomena, division, repetition and variation are the recognized characteristics of the quoter, whilst simplicity and compactness are marks of the original mind.

Whether, therefore, we compare Num. xiv. 34 and Ezek. iv. 4-6 with respect to form or to contents, the same conclusion is necessary, that P is earlier than Ezekiel. Here then we have a third section of P, in no way exceptional, and never suggested by any critic as belonging to the earlier

<sup>18</sup> See especially Klostermann, in *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1897, "Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Pentateuchs", 7, pp. 353-383.

<sup>19</sup> Note the participial form in each case, and contrast Lev. xxvi. 38, which besides is not said of Canaan.

strata of that hypothetical document, which proves itself, upon comparison with Ezekiel, to be pre-exilic.

Comparison of these three tests reveals the interesting fact that they are representative in a large way, being drawn, the first from the earliest, the second from the middle, and the third from the latest portion of the P-narrative of the Pentateuch.

If query be raised, why all three should be from the historical, and none from the bulky legal sections of the Priests' Code, it is sufficient to remind the inquirer that Dr. Driver's modified statement of the Wellhausen view of P, as given in his own words in the introduction to this investigation, challenges our right to use any word, phrase, institution or idea concerned with priesthood, sanctuary and ritual, to prove that P was pre-exilic. But these of course are just the subjects that make up the legal portions of the Priests' Code. Hence in the selection of representative tests from the mass of available material, one of the prevailing principles has been to choose points of contact as far as possible removed from Ezekiel's priestly functions and interests. And surely, references to his inaugural vision as a prophet, the description of a symbolic action performed in his prophetic character, and a prophetic address to the land of Israel, are three parts of his book which would be adjudged by all to be as free as possible from infection with distinctively priestly ideas or phraseology.

It should also be remarked that the student who is interested in this subject of the points of contact between Ezekiel and the Priests' Code will find, first, that there is considerable material ready for investigation along the same lines as those here followed; and second, that he will not be perplexed by irreconcilable results, for wherever a clear case of literary affinity is discerned and there are sufficient criteria to determine relative priority, the result will always be the same. Instead of finding that new tests contradict those here discussed, he will discover that each new test will



add fresh weight to the conviction we have here attained, that the Priests' Code is pre-exilic in its alleged later strata as well as in its earlier ones.

In the light of these results, many may find the question shaping itself in their minds, what can be said in answer to all this? Is there any way to escape the conclusion while not denying the incontrovertible facts?

There is one way to admit these facts and still believe in the Wellhausen dictum that P is later than Ezekiel. As it is not merely a theoretical way of escape, but has actually been resorted to by the latest commentator on Ezekiel, G. Jahn (1905), it will be best to let him state it in his own words. "Expressions from the Priests' Code and the Law of Holiness . . . are interpolated [into the text of Ezekiel], in order to make these writings appear prior to Ezekiel. This work of the Sopherim, like so many other forgeries, succeeded so well that to the present day commentators, both orthodox and liberal, such as Hengstenberg, Dillmann, Vatke, Nöldeke, conclude from these expressions that Ezekiel was acquainted with P. . . . The fact that P was interpolated in Ezekiel and Ezekiel thus appeared younger, was probably a leading motive for the admission of Ezekiel into the canon, that is, as a bulwark for P."<sup>20</sup>

It is unnecessary to make any comments upon this assertion, beyond the simple remark that it admits the validity of our result: Ezekiel, as it stands, proves the priority of P. No one could be better satisfied to see this line of reasoning urged, than the critic who believes in the antiquity of the Priests' Code, for it gives the finishing touch to his own arguments by furnishing a gratuitous *reductio ad absurdum* of the contrary opinion.

In conclusion there is something to be said of the state of the question as our argument leaves it.

On the one hand it is clear that nothing is decided as between the views of such representative scholars as Dillmann and Green. To determine whether P is Mosaic, or

<sup>20</sup> *Ezekiel*, preface, p. ix.



merely pre-exilic with a very ancient nucleus, other witnesses than Ezekiel have to be called and other lines of reasoning pursued.

And on the other hand it is equally clear that the great step from Wellhausen's position to the result we have reached *has already been taken*, when (to use Kuenen's symbol) a P<sup>1</sup> has been sundered out of the Priests' Code in general and assigned, even in part, to the pre-exilic age. This earliest stratum, P<sup>1</sup>, of undetermined size, starting with the little  $\pm$  H<sup>1</sup> of Baentsch, growing under Horst's treatment into the code of H, expanding in Paton into all H, and looming up in Driver and others as a vague but comprehensive bulk, proves in the event to be fatal to that concise, attractive theory of Wellhausen, which had at least the merit of self-consistency and knew where to draw its own sharp lines. Kuenen allowed room for strata in P but never consented to put even his P<sup>1</sup>, his earliest stratum, before Ezekiel. He apparently saw well the ultimate outcome of such an admission. How he got over the difficulties of comparison with Ezekiel, we have already seen in our introductory section. What we have done is in fact, in the light of the historical movement there traced, simply to take the next step, the step logically demanded; and this too by an extension of the same method which determined the earlier steps, the method of detailed literary comparison. It is still possible, of course, for a critic to sunder out of P as a whole this section or that, and to say of it, this is post-exilic, it belongs to a late supplemental stratum of P. But in doing so, the burden of proof will rest on him who asserts, not on him who denies, this exceptional lateness of (shall we say?) a golden altar, or a day of atonement.

Though little of the great mass contained in the Priests' Code can, from the nature of the case, receive direct confirmation from Ezekiel; though, on Jahn's interpolation-theory, the Scribes did their work so badly that but a small proportion of the laws and stories of P find the "bulwark" of their antiquity in Ezekiel; still, the discovery that when-

ever the test of comparison can be fairly applied, the Priests' Code stands the test, produces the conviction in every candid mind that it does not just happen so in these chance cases, but that by and large, from Genesis to Numbers, the Priests' Code finds its confirmation as a pre-exilic document from the way it stands comparison with the points of contact in the book of Ezekiel.

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## THE IDEA OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.\*

I. The name "Dogmatics" as used to designate a special theological discipline is of comparatively recent date. Its use was determined by the differentiation of the several theological disciplines, and especially by the distinction erected between Dogmatics and Ethics. It has been current, therefore, only since the middle of the 17th century, and widely only since the first half of the 18th century. In order to distinguish this department of theology from the other theological disciplines, such adjectives as didactic, systematic, and theoretic had been used. In 1659 L. Reinhart employed the name *Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae* to discriminate it from the historical and exegetical disciplines and also from Christian ethics. And he was followed by a number of other theologians.<sup>1</sup> It is now customary to use the term Systematic Theology to embrace both Dogmatics and Ethics. The name 'Dogmatics' lay ready at hand, since the Christian truths were called dogmas, and the distinction between Dogmatics and Ethics had already arisen. We shall not have time to enter into the merits of this distinction and its treatment. Recently there has been some reaction from too sharp a separation of these two disciplines.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless it represents a well understood dis-

\* Inaugural address delivered before the Board of Directors in Miller Chapel, December 17, 1907, on induction into the Assistant Professorship of Didactic and Polemic Theology in Princeton Theological Seminary.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Köstlin, Art. "Dogmatik", Herzog<sup>8</sup> IV., p. 736, and Bavinck, *Gerreformeerde Dogmatiek*, 1895, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> The practice of separating the treatment of Dogmatics and Ethics was taken up into modern theology. The distinctions between them made by Schleiermacher, F. Nitzsch, and Kaftan have recently been subjected to a searching criticism by H. H. Wendt, who calls his recent book *System der christlichen Lehre*, in order to include dogmatics and ethics under a closer treatment. Cf. Wendt, *Sys. d. chr. Lehre*, Teil I., 1906, pp. 15ff.

tion, and the term Dogmatics may be taken to denote what man must believe concerning God, and Ethics the duty which God requires of man.

The term "Dogmatic Theology", however, is preferable to the single term "Dogmatics", since the latter term describes this science from a more or less formal standpoint, whereas the term "Theology" gives it a distinct place in the total organism of the sciences by defining it from the point of view of its content or subject matter. By adding to this the adjective "Dogmatic", we bring out also certain fundamental characteristics of the science in question from the formal point of view.

In order to understand what we mean by defining this part of theology as dogmatic, it is necessary to determine what is meant by the term dogma.<sup>3</sup> The term is derived from *δοκεῖν*, meaning not merely that something seems true, but that one is fully determined upon it or is fully persuaded of its truth so that it has absolute authority and compels the trust of such a one. It denotes, therefore, something fixed, determined, authoritative, and publicly recognized as binding. Thus in the LXX the term *δόγμα* is used to translate the Hebrew words *חֹק, שֵׁפָט, מִשְׁפָּט, דִּין* and denotes a royal decree. For example, in Esth. iv. 8, though omitted in the earliest mss., it is found in *א*<sup>10</sup> inf. mg. translating the Hebrew text, and denoting a royal decree.<sup>4</sup> And in the margin of *א*<sup>10</sup> at Esth. ix. 1 it has the same significance and translates the same Hebrew word. Also in Dan. vi. 12 in the Chigi text, the term occurs to denote the laws of the Medes and Persians; in which sense it also appears in the Greek version of Daniel attributed to Theodotion in vi. 8, 12, 15. And again it is

<sup>3</sup> On the meaning of the term dogma *vid.* Bavinck *op. cit.* I, pp. 1-6. Kostlin *op. cit.*, Lobstein; *Einleit. in die ev. Dogmatik*, 1897, pp. 7-24. W. Schmidt, *Christliche Dogmatik*, I, pp. 1-19.

<sup>4</sup> Esth. iv. 8 *א*<sup>10</sup> inf. mg. *τὸ ἀντιγραφὸν γράμμα τὸ τοῦ δόγματος*. *א* A. B. om. *γρ. τὸ τ. δ*. Esth. ix. 1 *א*<sup>10</sup> mg. has *τὸ δόγ. αὐτοῦ ποιῆσαι*, *א* A. B. om. Cf. also Dan. LXX. vi. 12; Dan. Theod. ii. 13; iii. 10, 12; vi. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 26.

used to denote a royal edict or decree in the Theodotion version of Daniel at iii. 10, 12; iv. 3; vi. 9, 10, 13, 26. In the New Testament the word occurs five times. In Lk. ii. 1 it denotes the royal edict of the emperor, and also in Acts xvii. 7. It is used also for Apostolic ordinances or commands in Acts xvi. 4, and for the Mosaic ordinances twice in Paul's Epistles—Col. ii. 14, and Eph. ii. 15. In every case it denotes something fixed and authoritative.

This general meaning is found also in the use of the term in the writings of the ancient philosophers.<sup>5</sup> There the word is used of both metaphysical and ethical first principles and fundamental truths. Plato in his Republic speaks of fundamental principles or dogmas of right and good in which we were brought up, using the word *dogma* for these principles. In the Latin writers the word "decretum" was used for the Greek word *δόγμα*. In Seneca, for example, the word "decreta" is used to denote fundamental principles both ethical and metaphysical, and the section of philosophy which treats of these is considered the dogmatic, i. e. principal, part of philosophy, underlying the hortatory part. These principles Seneca regarded as fixed. In Seneca it is,

<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Repub.* Lib. vii. 538. ἔστι που ἡμῶν δόγματα ἐκ παλῶν περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθρέμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, παιδαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά. The Latin writers transl. *δόγμα* by "decretum". Seneca in *Epp.* 94 and 95 shows that fundamental principles (decreta) underlie particular precepts—*vid Ep 95, Op 4*. "Sed ut, omisso principio, rem ipsam aggrediar. Beata, inquiunt, vita constat ex actionibus rectis: ad actiones rectus praecepta perducunt. ergo ad beatam vitam praecepta sufficiunt. Non semper ad actiones rectus praecepta perducunt, etc. . . . Si honesta, inquit, actio ex praeceptis venit, ad beatam vitam praecepta abunde sunt: atqui est illud: ergo et hoc. His respondemus, Actiones honestas ex decretis (italics mine) fieri, non tantum praeceptis". "Praetera nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis suis est, quae Graeci vocant δόγματα κ. τ. λ." Also Cicero *Academ lib. ii. c 9*, Tauchnitz ed viii. p. 37. "Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? Quae neque de se ipsa dubitare debet, neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant δόγματα quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. . . . Non potest igitur dubitari quin decretum nullum falsum esse, sapientique satis non sit, non esse falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat: quod movere nulla ratio queat."

as Schmidt remarks, the question of the *a priori* defended against extreme empiricism.

In this way the word also came to be used for propositions which set forth fundamental religious truth resting on a divine revelation. Thus Josephus, writing against Apion, calls the contents of the sacred books of the Jews, dogmas of God.<sup>6</sup> In this sense also it is found in the Patristic literature, denoting authoritative truth of God. Thus Ignatius in his Epistle to the Magnesians speaks of the dogmas of the Lord and the Apostles, exhorting his readers to be established in them.<sup>7</sup> The word is used also of the fixed and fundamental Christian truths. Thus Clement of Alexandria speaks of the orthodox doctrine of the Apostles as a dogma in accordance with the Gospel.<sup>8</sup> Origen uses the term to denote fundamental Christian doctrine in distinction from philosophical speculation,<sup>9</sup> and fixed divine truth over against all human opinion.<sup>10</sup>

The use of the word shows that whether the term dogma was used for political decrees, philosophical first principles, or Christian doctrine, the idea which underlies all uses is that of *authority*. A dogma is a thesis or proposition which has absolute authority. That the use of the term in the New Testament is political is not significant, and Lobstein is incorrect in inferring from this that the reason the patristic writers applied the term to Christian doctrine was because of their adoption of the philosophical usage when they were transforming Christianity into a philosophy, the idea of authority being thus transferred to the doctrine.<sup>11</sup> The facts, on the contrary, show that the word denoted authority, and that the Fathers of the Church chose

<sup>6</sup> Josephus, *cont. Apion*, lib. i. § 8, Niese ed. v. 9— "ὁ δὲ λόγος δ' ἐστὶν ἐργαζομένης ἡμεῖς πρόσκειμεν τοῖς ἰσθμοῖς γράμμασι· τοσούτου γὰρ αἰῶνος ἤδη παρωχημένοι οὔτε ἀφελεῖν αὐτῶν οὔτε μεταθεῖναι τε τόλμημεν, πᾶσι δὲ σύμφυτον ἐστὶν εὐθὺς ἐκ πρώτης γένεως Ἰουδαίοις τὸ νομίζειν αὐτὰ θεοῦ δόγματα." κ τ. λ.

<sup>7</sup> Ignatius, *ad Magnes.* c. 13, Migne, v. 672

<sup>8</sup> Clement Alex., *Strom.* vii, Dindorf ed. iii. p. 343.

<sup>9</sup> Origen, *contra Celsum* i. 7, Migne xi. 668, also iii. 39 Migne xi. 971.

<sup>10</sup> Origen, *Commentary on Mt.*, Migne xiii. 1036.

<sup>11</sup> Lobstein, *op. cit.* pp. 21-24.



it for this reason to characterize the fundamental Christian doctrine, because they recognized that the Apostles claimed for it an absolute authority, although the word dogma was not used in that sense by them. Whence this authority is derived, the term of course does not say. In the case of philosophical dogmas the source of the authority is the rational or self-evidencing character of the truth itself; in political decrees it is the government; and in theological dogmas, it is ultimately the divine revelation or the witness of God. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that the theologian of the ancient Church never conceived of that Church as one among many schools of truth, nor did he think that Christian doctrine had right to recognition only in the Church. On the contrary, he recognized the absolute character of Christian truth as resting on the authority of the divine revelation, and so he spoke of the Christian doctrines as "dogmas of God". And when he defined them as "ecclesiastical", he did not mean that the Church gave them their authority. That was a later, and what Schmidt calls a "degenerative", conception.<sup>13</sup>

A doctrinal proposition, then, had authority in the Church because resting on a divine revelation. This is true even of the Romish position, for upon their view it would have to be added that the dogma was authoritative because the Church was the infallible bearer of the divine revelation.<sup>14</sup> In accordance with this it appears that Schleiermacher<sup>15</sup> and Rothe<sup>16</sup> overemphasized the element of recognition by the Church, in their conception of dogma. It was the divine revelation in the Scripture which gave to dogma its authoritative character. This was regarded as fundamental, and though the element of public recognition enters into the idea, doctrines are not dogmas so much because of this as because of their basis in the divine revelation. Accordingly a dogma does not rest upon any mere personal authority; nor is the

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Schmidt *op. cit.* p. 14; compare also Kostlin *op. cit.* p. 435.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Bavink *op. cit.* I. p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Schleiermacher, *Christliche Sitten, Werke*, I Abtheil. xii. p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Rothe, *Zur Dogmatik*, 1890, p. 10.

idea of public recognition the most essential element in the conception. Furthermore, certain distinctions sometimes claimed to have been inherent in the idea, are foreign to it. Thus the distinction given in a single sentence of Basil, according to which dogma is a secret doctrine or one not openly proclaimed, has probably been made too much of, for Basil was speaking of certain Church practices or mysteries.<sup>16</sup> Neither was a distinction made between dogma as a human conception of a divine doctrine and the divine doctrine itself, for it has been satisfactorily shown by Köstlin that the single statement of Marcellus of Ancyra to the effect that the name dogma relates to a human opinion, is quite contrary to the general usage, which saw in the doctrine as formulated by the Church, the truth of God. In fact, Lobstein acknowledges that, though there are a few passages in the Patristic literature which discriminate a human form in dogma as distinct from its divine content, these are the exceptions, and most of the Fathers used the term for revealed truths without distinguishing their human form as dogma.<sup>17</sup>

There is, however, also in the idea of dogma the element of social recognition or acceptance within a definite sphere. A doctrine might rest upon a Scripture basis and yet not be a dogma. Hence Bavinck makes a distinction between what he calls dogma *quoad se* and dogma *quoad nos*.<sup>18</sup> The former is a doctrine which rests upon the witness of God apart from its recognition in the Church. But this is not yet a dogma in the complete sense. For one thing, it must be stated in a logical or scientific form which it may not have in Scripture. Then again in order to avoid the danger of identifying the private opinion of a theologian with the truth of God, it is necessary to know Scripture truth as it has reached recognition in the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This is also necessary because

<sup>16</sup> Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, ad. *Amphil.* c. 27. Cf. also on this point Schmidt *op. cit.* pp. 9ff.; also Köstlin *op. cit.* p. 435.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Lobstein, *op. cit.* p. 13.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Bavinck, *op. cit.* I. p. 5.

God in all His fulness as revealed cannot be fully grasped by any individual or group of individuals. Accordingly the subject of theological knowledge must be, as Dr. Kuyper has so richly shown, regenerate humanity under the guidance and illumination of the Holy Spirit.<sup>19</sup> From this standpoint the Confession as the expression of the faith of the Christian Church is seen to be of the greatest importance for the dogmatician. But the theologian cannot limit himself to the Church's Confession. Her life is richer than can be comprised in a confessional statement. The whole history of doctrine must be contributory to the task of Dogmatics, and whether it be a doctrine of a theologian or a confessional dogma, in either case it must never be taken in a merely historical sense, but must be appropriated by the theologian, and set forth as his own belief and as absolutely valid truth. It is because dogmatics is a normative and not a merely historical discipline, that it presupposes the personal persuasion or belief of the dogmatician. Accordingly he must take his standpoint within the Christian Church and be fully persuaded of the truth of the Christian revelation. It may further be said that only from this standpoint and the experience involved in it, can Christian doctrine be understood. But it is a fatal exaggeration of this idea when the claim to the absolute validity of Christian doctrine is limited to this sphere and not maintained in relation to all scientific and philosophic thought. If this is not maintained, the absolutely objective validity of the Christian dogma cannot be maintained. It is also from this point of view, *i. e.* that Dogmatics is a normative science, that it becomes clear that the dogmatician must take his standpoint within the Confession of a single Church. For since he is not dealing with a comparative study of religions, it will not suffice to set forth the main characteristics of Christianity in which all Churches agree. Since he aims to set forth Christian doctrine as absolutely valid truth and in its entirety, he must stand upon the Confession which he be-

<sup>19</sup> Kuyper, *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*, E. T. 1898 pp. 297ff.

lieves sets forth the essential principle of Christianity in its purity. It is from this standpoint that we believe that the theologian should stand within the Reformed Theology as the purest expression of the essential religious principle of dependence on God in its theological and soteriological applications.

The main idea which emerges from this brief discussion is that of authority. Accordingly in qualifying theology by the adjective dogmatic, what we mean to affirm is that it is a normative science and not a historical one. This is being recognized by those whose idea of the nature of authority differs from the older or evangelical Protestant conception, as for example Kaftan and E. Mayer.<sup>20</sup> The aim of Dogmatic Theology is to set forth not what men have believed concerning God, but what they must believe if they would reach the truth. It is not a merely historical or critical treatment of dogmas which have been held by the Church. The importance of these we have seen, and also its ground, but any such treatment is not Dogmatics. Accordingly the majority of theologians are rejecting the view of Rothe, who, having thus limited the idea of Dogmatics, was naturally led to supplement it by a speculative theological system which claimed to set forth the final truth. On the contrary, Dogmatics must claim to set forth in scientific form absolutely valid truth, and to embrace the entirety of Christian doctrine. Hence from a formal point of view the definition of Köstlin is fairly adequate.<sup>21</sup> He defines Dogmatics as the "scientific exposition of the religious truth which is valid or fixed for the community, as known and recognized by it as springing from divine revelation". This, however, is too formal a definition, since it might embrace all views of authority, according as it conceived of the nature of the divine revelation. The Protestant doctrine held that authority was

<sup>20</sup> Kaftan, *Dogmatik* 3 u. 4 Aufl. 1901, § 1. § 10, and especially "Zur Dogmatik" Arts. in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1903. E. Mayer "Die Aufgabe der Dogmatik", in *Theol. Abhandlungen f. H. Holtzmann* 1902 pp. 183ff

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Köstlin, *op. cit.* p. 435.

external, and rested it on a supernatural revelation which was conceived as including the direct intrusion of God into the sphere of second causes, and as including the communication of truth directly by God to man. In other words, the revelation was regarded as supernatural not merely in its ultimate source in God, but in the mode of its communication. This idea so far from being conceived as inconsistent with the material principle of the Protestant Reformation, was always thought of as equally primary and essential. Indeed, the receptive attitude of Protestant piety involved in the reception of Justification by Faith, went together with the dependent attitude over against the principle of external authority in religious knowledge involved in this idea of revelation. This, moreover, was the Scripture doctrine of revelation, as is being recognized by the new school of comparative religions more fully than it was by the Ritschlians, since the attitude of the former to the authority of Scripture is freer.<sup>22</sup> The justification, therefore, of this position is a question of the evidences for the trustworthiness of Christ and the Apostles as teachers, which question resolves itself into the evidences for Christianity as a supernatural religion, which takes us beyond the limits of our subject.

The inner reason, however, for this view of revelation and authority can be seen when we take up the idea of Dogmatic Theology not merely from the formal standpoint, but from the standpoint of its content or subject-matter. This is brought out by calling this science "Theology". By thus defining it we mean that it is the science of God. In this way, and in no other, can it have a distinct place in the organism of the sciences. The distinguishing point in the definition of any science is found in its subject-matter, *i. e.* in the object with which it is concerned, rather than in its method. Only, therefore, by defining this discipline as the science of God, can it have a distinct place as a separate

<sup>22</sup> Cf. F. Doerr, "Religionsgeschichtliche Methode u. Bibelautorität" *Prot. Monatshefte*, VII Jahrg. H. 10. 1903, pp. 361-393.



science and as the highest of all sciences. If, on the other hand, we define it as the science of religion or the science of faith, it loses its place as a distinct science. If the terms religion and faith be taken in a subjective sense, it becomes a part of anthropology or religious psychology. If these terms be taken in an objective sense, and theology be defined as the science of the Christian religion or faith, then theology is still a branch of anthropology, and, if a special supernatural revelation be denied, becomes either a science of comparative religion or a philosophy of religion. If, on the other hand, a special revelation be admitted and theology be defined as the science of this revelation or of the Christian faith in this sense, even this is not adequate, since in the science of theology this revelation is not regarded from the standpoint of the light which it throws on religion, but the Christian religion is rather regarded as a revelation of the nature of God. Hence the only adequate definition of theology is that it is the science of God, and in defining it as dogmatic we distinguish it from historical disciplines as a normative science.

This also determines the way by which the theologian must obtain his knowledge. If Theology is the science of God, the knowledge of God can be had only by revelation. Man cannot investigate God; consequently the methods of observation and experiment as used in all other sciences are not possible in theology. God is a personal Spirit, and hence we can know Him only as He chooses to reveal Himself to us. This is true to a large extent of all personal life. The only way by which we can know finite persons is through their opening their inner life to us. When, further, we bear in mind the fact that God is an infinite Spirit and that we are finite, it is obvious that we can know God only as He reveals Himself. This is true apart from the effects of sin upon the knowledge of God. Apart from the noëtic effects of sin, revelation is inner in the religious nature of man apprehending God as revealed in man and nature. Hence apart from sin the authority of religious



knowledge would be an inner one. But sin has darkened the mind, and Scripture, history, and experience show that this effect must be counteracted. This involves a change in the method of revelation and consequently a change in the nature of authority. The nature of this change must be determined by the idea of natural or general revelation and the effect of sin upon it. The idea of revelation involves two factors—God revealing or as revealed in the mind of man and in nature, and the religious nature of man which apprehends this revelation. It is to be carefully noted that this twofold character belongs to the idea of revelation itself. Hence we cannot conceive of the matter as if we had two factors in the science of theology, which is the science of God revealed, viz., God as revealed and the apprehension of this revelation by the theologian. The revelation to be apprehended is itself twofold, involving God as revealed and the apprehension of this by man. And thus the effect of sin is twofold, defacing the image of God and clouding our apprehension of it. Consequently in special revelation we must have not only God's supernatural redemptive and revealing acts culminating in the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ, and thus restoring the divine image; we must have also an external and supernatural word-revelation to give us the authoritative and restored interpretation and apprehension of the supernatural fact-revelation, and this also must be in the same supernatural manner, involving the principle of external authority in religious knowledge. And all this is necessary in addition to the spiritual illumination of the theologian and the Church, *i. e.* of the subjects of theological science. Hence while this last mentioned illumination is necessary, it will not do to conceive of special revelation as simply the inner apprehension either of supernatural acts, as Rothe conceived it, or of the fact of Christ, as the Ritschlian conceives it. In this way it becomes an inner revelation subject to all the laws of psychic development and to the noëtic effects of sin which have not thus been corrected in their totality.

The inner authority and revelation is thus impossible for sinful man.

This same thing can be seen also from a slightly different angle. Dogmatic Theology intends to be Christian Theology, i. e. its very core is in a soteriological and historical religion, in a revelation in historic facts and an historic interpretation of these facts. If, then, Theology is to remain a normative science and not become a merely historical discipline, it must rest upon the presupposition that Christianity is not the product of an inner revelation which would make it simply the crowning product of human religious thought, but of a revelation supernatural in mode and distinct in kind from other religions. And finally, since Theology is the science of the object of Christian knowledge and faith, i. e. of God as revealed, and not of that knowledge or faith itself; if there is to be any science of Theology in this sense, revelation must be conceived of as the communication of truth by God to man in a supernatural manner, and consequently as involving the principle of external authority. And we shall see that if this idea of revelation and authority be changed to the inner or experimental view, the idea of Dogmatics must also be changed, and becomes the science of faith or the knowledge involved in faith.<sup>23</sup>

It is necessary at this point to discriminate the Protestant view of authority from that of the Roman Catholic Church, since they are identified by the Ritschlian theologians. We have seen that there is an element of public recognition involved in the conception of dogma. This was exaggerated by the Romish Church. The principle of authority is extended by them from the divine revelation to the human apprehension of it, and it is assumed that God would not have given to men an authoritative revelation without also having given an authoritative apprehension of it. This is found in the Church which, being infallible, excludes error and puts man in the possession of absolute truth. To believe, therefore, is to accept implicitly what the Church

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the ideas of Kaftan and Mayer *op. cit*

teaches. That this involves an extension of the principle of authority for which there is no warrant, we have not space to indicate. We must, however, point out in a word that it is essentially different from the Protestant view. The Protestant recognizes the place of the Christian Church in the sense that he regards her and not the individual as the subject of theological science. He does not, however, make the Church's apprehension of revelation the subject-matter of Theology. If he did, Theology must either become a historical science, or else must extend the principle of authority in a way for which there is no warrant.

We have sought to show that Dogmatic Theology is a normative science; that this its normative character involves the principle of external authority in religious knowledge; and that this latter depends upon and is determined by the nature of revelation which is supernatural in its mode, and consists in the communication of truth by God in a supernatural manner. The possibility and fact of such a revelation are questions for the Evidences of Christianity. The reason for the necessity of such a revelation, however, lies, as we have attempted to indicate, in the noëtic effects of sin, which necessitate a revelation supernatural in the above sense and as a consequence involve an external authority in religious knowledge.

II. There is now prevalent a new conception of dogma and of the science of Dogmatics in the Ritschlian school; and a denial of the possibility of a normative science of Dogmatics in the newer school of comparative religions.

Ritschlianism was a protest against rationalism and mysticism. The abandonment of the authority of Scripture had led to the undervaluation of the entire historic element in Christianity; so that both its historic facts and its doctrines were regarded simply as the husk of rational truth or the product of Christian feeling. In this way Christian Theology had become a philosophy of religion; or in a mystical reaction from this, the demand for an undogmatic Christianity threatened not only Christianity, which is not the

product of religious sentiment, but even the entire intellectual content of religion.<sup>24</sup> A protest against this neglect of the historical and dogmatic element in Christianity, has come from the members of the Ritschlian school. Thus Harnack and Herrmann have sought to defend the importance of the historic element in Christianity against Lessing and Kant,<sup>25</sup> and Kaftan in reply to Dreyer, and also Lobstein, have shown that dogma is essential to Christianity and that what is needed is a new dogma.<sup>26</sup>

This conception of dogma can be understood only in the light of the fundamental motives and principles of this school. The underlying motive of Ritschlianism is an apologetic one, viz., to find a ground of certitude in Christianity which shall be independent of the results of historical criticism and of metaphysics, and so to state the content of the Christian faith that it too shall be independent in both these respects.<sup>27</sup> In order to realize this, emphasis is laid on the revelation of God in the historic Christ. This revelation is held to be independent in both the above respects by means of the well-known sharp distinction between religious and

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the treatment of Christianity in Kant's, *Relig. innerhalb d. Grenzen d. bl. Vernunft*, and Fichte's, *Anweisung zum selig. Leben*; also the construction of Christianity in the philosophical works of E. Caird and T. H. Green; also the distinction between the Christian principle and Christ in the "liberal theology" *vid* Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II. § 815. For the mystical tendency cf. Dreyer, *Undogmatisches Christentum*, and the treatment of Christian dogma by the late Prof. Sabatier in his various works, especially the lecture on the "Vitality of Christian Dogma" in the *Esquisse d'une Phil. de la Relg. etc.* 1897.

<sup>25</sup> Harnack, *Das Christentum u. die Geschichte* 1896; Hermann, *Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschichtl. Thatsachen* 1884.

<sup>26</sup> Kaftan, *Glaube u. Dogma* 1889; Lobstein, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> It is true that both Hermann in his writings, and the late Prof. Reischle—"Der Streit über die Begründung des Glaubens auf dem geschichtl. Christus" in the *Zeitschr. f. T. u. K.* 1897—make a distinction between the ground and the content of faith, and are seeking an independent ground. Nevertheless, this ground once determined becomes a norm for the determination of the content of faith. Hence the effort to keep this content also independent of historical criticism and metaphysics becomes manifest. For a criticism of the Ritschlian position on this point *vid*. Kahler, *Der sogenannte historische Jesus u. d. geschl. bibl. Christus* 1896.

theoretic knowledge. The idea is that the historic Christ remains after historical criticism has done its work, and after a metaphysical dogma of Greek origin has been eliminated. But since this criticism is largely determined by an anti-supernaturalistic bias, the supposed independence of its results turns out to be a surrender of all that is difficult to defend against a criticism determined by naturalistic presuppositions. And since the idea of theology without metaphysics does not mean simply a theology which shall be free from a speculative reconstruction from a standpoint outside of the Christian revelation, but a theology without any metaphysical elements, *i. e.*, a dogma without any element which transcends and is not determined by religious experience, the new dogma vibrates between naturalism and phenomenism, *i. e.* when not admittedly naturalistic it becomes phenomenistic. It expresses itself, they say, in religious knowledge which springs from faith, and not in metaphysical propositions.

Not only is the nature and content of this new dogma thus quite different from that of the older Protestantism; the idea of revelation and consequently of the authority of the new dogma and of the science of Dogmatics is also fundamentally different from the older view. In order to understand this conception of dogma, we must set forth briefly how the Ritschlians conceive of the development of the old dogma and its contrast with the new. These theologians trace in the development of Christian doctrine a continuous approximation of Christianity to philosophical knowledge. It is held that under the influence of the Hellenic spirit, theology sought to transform religious truth into an objective and impersonal creed. Thus in conceiving the science of the Christian faith as an objective science of revealed things, the fatal error was committed of transferring to the religious sphere the method of metaphysical speculation. Moreover, the formation of the Catholic Church involved fatal consequences for the conception of Christian dogma. In order to defend Christianity against



error, the Church expressed her tradition in rules of faith, fixed the Canon of inspired books, and realized externally her unity in the episcopate, claiming for it unity, catholicity and apostolicity. In this lay the germs of the idea of infallibility and of a dogma to which attaches an external authority. Nevertheless, it is held, the Reformation principles are in direct contradiction to this idea of dogma. The religious principle of Protestantism and the old idea of dogma are opposed to one another. To show this they point us to the Protestant ideas of faith, of the Church, and of religious authority.<sup>26</sup> Faith according to the Protestant idea is not mere assent to truth on the basis of testimony external to consciousness. It is a personal conviction, an experiential trust by which we experience pardon and life. Hence there is a contradiction, we are told, between the Protestant view of faith and the idea that it terminates on truths supposed to be communicated by a supernatural revelation and possessing an external authority. Thus a divorce is made between faith and the religious life which involves a contradiction of the principle of Protestantism. Moreover, according to Protestantism the Church is not an organism of supernatural powers or the repository of infallible religious truths. Hence the notion of infallible dogma is appropriate only to the Roman Catholic conception, and in transferring the notion of authority from the Church to the Scripture, the Protestant theologians only adopted a Romish idea foreign to the genius of Protestantism. Hence we must change the old idea of authority, and instead of regarding Scripture as an external authority, containing a supernaturally communicated revelation, authority becomes inward, residing in the Gospel of Jesus with its compelling power. There is also held to be a contradiction between the traditional conception of dogma and the truly Protestant idea of authority. Hence the new dogma must be in harmony with

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Lobstein *op. cit.* ch. ii; Hermann, "Christlich protestantische Dogmatik," in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, Teil I Abt. IV Lief. 3, 1906, pp. 33-62, also "Die Lage u. d. Aufgabe der ev. Dogm.," *Zeitschr. f. T u. K.*, H. I, 1907, pp. 1-30.



these Protestant principles. It must express in a scientific or logical form the religious faith of the Christian community, and especially its content is found in the sphere of religious faith. It must seek to interpret the Protestant faith, and while it does not find its norm in modern thought but in the Gospel, it must, to use Lobstein's language, "correspond to the spiritual temper of our Christian consciousness". Accordingly its authority will not be attached to or derived from its intellectual form, but resides in its religious content, which is the Gospel.

This being the nature of the new dogma, the idea and task of Dogmatics is changed. The change is of course determined by the change in the idea of revelation. This is no longer conceived as the supernatural communication of truth about God and the objects of faith; revelation is the product of the religious life of man, or is the effect of Christ upon the religious life. Hence the task of Dogmatics is not to set forth doctrines which rest upon the authority of Scripture, but to give doctrinally formulated expression to the Christian faith, or to the revelation in Christ, or to the appropriation of that revelation, according as the subjective or objective tendency predominates in the individual theologian. That which is common to all is the rejection of the view that dogmatics is a science which has to do with the objects of Christian faith as with immediately given objects of knowledge, and the conception of dogmatics as the science of the Christian faith or the knowledge which springs from such faith.<sup>29</sup> Some define it as the science of faith or of the Christian faith.<sup>30</sup> To this general class

<sup>29</sup> Cf. especially Mayer, *op. cit.* pp. 185, 186; also Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, 3 u 4 Aufl. p 98.

<sup>30</sup> Lipsius: "Christian dogmatics is the scientific exposition of the Christian faith," *Lehrb. d. ev. prot. Dogmatik* 1893, p. 1. Lobstein: Dogmatics or *Glaubenslehre* is "the systematic exposition of evangelical faith (ev. Heilsglaubens)," *op. cit.* p. 59. F. A. B. Nitsch: it is "the scientific exposition and defense of the evangelical faith or consciousness in the forms of thought and expression of the present age (die evangelisch christliche Dogmatik ist die wissenschaftliche Darlegung und Vertheidigung des evang. christl. Glaubens- oder Bewusst-

belong the definitions of R. A. Lipsius (a member of the liberal school showing Ritschlian influence), Lobstein, F. A. B. Nitzsch (a theologian of speculative tendency but with marked Ritschlian characteristics), and Haering, in his recently published *Dogmatik*. Others define it as the science of the knowledge which results from or is involved in faith.<sup>31</sup> This is the view of Kaftan and of Wendt in his newly published *System der christl. Lehre*. Others, as, for example, Mayer, conceive of the task of Dogmatics as twofold, first to state the nature of Christian faith (subjectively), and second, to set forth the doctrines which are involved in this faith.<sup>32</sup>

In attempting a critical estimate of this idea of Dogmatics, it is necessary to go back to the fundamental ideas of this school. The assertion that the evangelical Protestant conception of faith is inconsistent with the principle of external authority has a certain amount of plausibility, which is no doubt enhanced by the too intellectualistic idea of faith in the works of some of the Reformers. It is true that faith is an attitude of personal trust springing from the heart. It

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senhaltes in den Denk- und Ausdrucksformen des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters), *Dogmatik*, 1892, p. 1. Haering defines Dogmatics as "the science of the Christian faith" (die Wissenschaft des christl. Glaubens, dessen zusammenhängende Darstellung die Glaubenslehre sein will), *Der christliche Glaube (Dogmatik)*, 1906, p. 145.

<sup>31</sup> Kaftan, although he defines Dogmatics as "the Science of the Christian truth which is believed and confessed on the basis of the divine revelation" (*Dogm.* p. 1), nevertheless in describing the task of Dogmatics, says that its chief task is to set forth the knowledge involved in the faith called forth by revelation—p. 92. (Die eigentliche Hauptaufgabe der ev. Dogmatik besteht darin, die Erkenntniss darzulegen, die sich dem Glauben aus der Aneignung der von der Schrift bezeugten Gottesoffenbarung ergibt). Wendt, *System der christl. Lehre*, I, 1906, p. 1, says that it is his purpose to unfold systematically the religious ideas which in their entirety make up the religious view and doctrine of Christianity,—by which he means, as his subsequent treatment shows, to set forth a knowledge involved in the Christian faith, his idea being similar to that of Kaftan. For a concise survey of the recent literature, cf. Titius, "Zur Dogmatik d. Gegenwart", *Theol. Rundschau*, 1907, pp. 365-379.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. E. Mayer *op. cit.* pp. 191. ff.

is also to be admitted that true faith in a certain sense implicates a certain doctrinal system. It is also true that spiritual truth must be spiritually discerned. All this was recognized by the theologians of the Reformation. But it does not at all follow that there is a contradiction between the psychological nature of faith and the principle of external authority. Nor does it follow from the fact that saving faith implicates a system of doctrine, that such a system can be deduced from the Christian consciousness under the control, in some way, of Scripture. This latter point need not detain us. The individually conditioned character of Christian experience, and the fact that regeneration does not remove all at once the noëtic effects of sin, make it evident that such an attempt must be unsuccessful. Nor would these theologians deny this. It is necessary, however, to show that faith may be an inner act of heart trust and at the same time its content of knowledge be received upon the basis of external testimony.

Because psychologically faith is an inner act of trust, it does not follow that either its ground or its content must be exclusively internal. Faith is grounded conviction. When it terminates upon the Person of the Saviour, it is personal trust. But the grounds of this trust may be external, and its knowledge-content enriched upon the basis of external testimony without the psychological character of faith being thereby affected. Plausible as it may sound, this contention of the Ritschlian school is not in accordance with the fact of the matter. When this is seen, their whole method of setting aside the Protestant doctrine of the rule of faith by simply identifying it with that of Roman Catholicism, loses its force. Moreover, according to the Ritschlian position, faith, whether taken in a subjective sense or conceived as an objective body of truth, is not grounded in a manner adequate to give to Dogmatics its normative character. Considered subjectively the act of faith is the act of a rational man who has innumerable experiences and theoretic opinions. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary

that the Christian believer and the Christian theologian have some clear idea of the relation which the content of his faith sustains to the rest of his experiences.<sup>33</sup> Still further, from the objective standpoint the sharp distinction between religious and theoretic knowledge, or rather the sharp separation of their respective spheres, gives an inadequate apologetic basis for the normative character of the science of Christian Dogmatics. At least it must be said that this is the logical tendency of the position, and though attempts have been made, notably by Kaftan, Wobbermin, and Wendt, to make good this defect, it cannot be said that they have been successful, because of their adherence to the Kantian separation between the theoretic and the practical reason.<sup>34</sup> Reason is one, and no reasonable certitude can be attained when the unity of its entire content is destroyed. Accordingly Kügelgen seems to have followed the logic of the situation in renouncing the scientific character of Dogmatics and the right of apologetics.<sup>35</sup>

The usual result has been, not an independence of philosophy, but a surrender to naturalistic modes of thought. This result is fatal to a normative science of Christian Dogmatics. We have left no supernatural Christ in any strictly metaphysical sense of the term. At least this is the logic of the fundamental ideas of the school, and even the Ritschlian theologians of the right wing fall short of a really divine Christ.<sup>36</sup> This being so, Christ can have brought no supernatural revelation in any strict sense of the term. Traub,<sup>37</sup> for example, admits that any idea of

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Lasson, *Zur Theorie des christlichen Dogmas*, 1897 p. 37.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Kaftan, *Wahrheit des Christentums*, Wobbermin, *Der christl. Gottesglaube*; Wendt, *Der Erfahrungsbeweis f. die Wahrheit des Christentums*.

<sup>35</sup> Kügelgen, "Aufgaben u. Grenzen d. luth. Dogm." *Hefte sur Chr. Welt*, No. 41, p. 23; compare Wendland's remarks on Kügelgen—"Das wissenschaftliche u. apologet. Recht d. prot. Dogmatik", *Pr. Monatsh.* IV Jahrg. H. 4, pp. 138-143.

<sup>36</sup> Vid. the uncertain and vague treatment of the question of Christ's pre-existence and relation to God by Haering, *op. cit.* pp. 443-453.

<sup>37</sup> Traub, Arts, "Aus d. dogmat. Arbeit d. Gegenwart," *Zeitschr. f. Th. u. K.* 1906, p. 476.

a revelation supernatural in its mode or in any causal sense must be abandoned and revelation be conceived as supernatural only from the standpoint of its spiritual content.<sup>38</sup> But Bousset is quite right in his criticism of this claim, for if there can be no revelation directly supernatural in its mode of occurrence, then the judgment by which one singles out the Christian revelation from the standpoint of its content is a purely subjective one; and in the light of a philosophy which denies the supernatural in any real sense, any claim that Christianity is more than the highest development of human religious thought is not to be allowed. Accordingly the Ritschlian claim as regards the absolute and final character of Christianity cannot be sustained. If God has not entered directly or immediately into the sphere of finite psychic events to communicate truth, then the Christian revelation is only the highest development thus far of human religious thought. In denying what he calls the old or mechanical supernaturalism, the Ritschlian cannot make good his claim that Christianity is the absolute and final religion, and members of the new school of comparative religions, notably Troeltsch and Bousset, have shown this clearly. This, of course, is disastrous for Christian Dogmatics as a normative science.

Not only is this theology not able to maintain the finality of Christianity and consequently of Christian doctrine. Another disastrous consequence for a normative Christian Dogmatics is its failure to establish an objective norm for its doctrinal statement, or for the determination of what is Christian. This question is simply that of authority. This idea, we have seen, is admittedly changed to a purely inner authority. But it involves a self-deception to suppose that the Gospel of Christ is the norm as well as the source of Dogmatics, as Wendt seems to do.<sup>39</sup> It is becoming more and more universally acknowledged that the Christ of a metaphysical dogma is the Christ not only of the Apostles but of

<sup>38</sup> Bousset, *Das Wesen der Religion*, 1903 pp. 257 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Wendt, *Syst. d. chr. Lehre*, I. 1906, pp. 44-54.



the Synoptists as we have them. It is evident, therefore, that there must be lurking behind this claim to find in "the Gospel of Christ" the norm of Christian dogma, some *a priori* norm to determine what constitutes this Gospel of Christ. Accordingly the usual position of theologians of this school as regards the source and norm of dogmatics is as follows: They all recognize in Schleiermacher the impulse to what they deem a more adequate view of this science. They criticise him, however, for finding the source of dogmatics in individual Christian experience. They find this source in what they call the Gospel or the revelation of Christ in the Scripture. But the norm of what is Christian is determined by their conception of authority which is admittedly inner or subjective, and is found in the Gospel as approving itself to Christian experience. Thus in each case the Scripture is after all really subordinated to Christian experience, and the normative character of Dogmatics in any objective sense rendered impossible.

This can be best seen by a very brief examination of the three most recent comprehensive treatises on Dogmatics which have come from this school—those of Kaftan, Haering, and Wendt, since they belong to the "right wing" and lay much stress upon Scripture. Thus Kaftan calls the Scripture the principle of knowledge in Dogmatics, and criticises Schleiermacher, Hofmann, and Frank for giving simply subjective reflections upon the Christian consciousness instead of normative doctrines.<sup>40</sup> Faith involves or is a knowledge of objective realities, and this faith-knowledge springs from revelation, and this revelation is recorded in Scripture. This sounds objective enough. In reality, however, Kaftan's position is not so far removed from that of Frank. Frank says that it is the chief task of systematic theology to set forth in their essence and relations the totality of the realities which have been certified to the Christian in

<sup>40</sup> Kaftan, *Dogmatik*, pp. 1-60; vid. especially Arts. "Zur Dogm." in *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. K.* 1903. Compare also Schian, "Der Begriff Erfahrung in d. ev. Dogm., *Pr. Monatsh.* Jahrg. II. H. 10 pp. 378-389.

the appropriate way.<sup>41</sup> In other words, Frank seeks to set forth the knowledge obtained through Christian experience. In the same way Kaftan, although he affirms that the Scripture is the sole principle of knowledge for Dogmatics, nevertheless affirms that the appropriation and evaluation of the content of Scripture is to be determined by faith, and that in dogmatics it is faith which mediates between Scripture and the dogmatic propositions. The real difference between Kaftan and Frank is after all one of relative emphasis on Scripture and Christian experience, the real norm being Christian experience. The same thing is true of Haering.<sup>42</sup> He affirms that the revelation of God in Christ is the norm of Christian truth; that this revelation is in the Scripture which is in a certain sense authoritative. The nature of this normative character of Scripture is determined by the idea of revelation which is after all conceived as the inner consciousness awakened by Christ. Consequently Haering holds that the authority of Scripture extends only to matters of faith, and to them only in so far as it approves itself to faith. Thus the revelation in Christ is not the norm for Christian doctrine, but out of the contact with Christ there springs what Haering terms an inner appreciation of the Gospel which becomes confessedly the final norm for determining the Christian elements in Scripture. Precisely the same thing is true of Wendt, as we have seen.<sup>43</sup> Thus the final norm of Christian truth in each case is Christian experience, and the result is a subjectivity which is frankly admitted and called a "subjectivity of life" by Haering, but which is none the less destructive of the normative character of Christian dogmatics. In fact Herrmann, a member of this school, has shown in an article published this year as well as in another last year, that these faith-doctrines spring from personal experience, are individually conditioned, and that it involves a self-deception to

<sup>41</sup> Frank, *Syst d. christl. Wahrheit*, § 1.

<sup>42</sup> Haering, *Der christl. Glaube (Dogmatik)*, 1906, pp. 145ff., 159ff., 172-179.

<sup>43</sup> Wendt, *op. cit.* pp. 44-54.

suppose that any normative doctrines can be drawn from Scripture, since those doctrines are the product of personal faith, and so individually conditioned.<sup>44</sup> Herrmann concludes that there can be no systematic statement of doctrine and no normative doctrines.

This again involves another serious consequence for Dogmatics. Not only is its norm found in Christian experience; this also becomes its subject-matter instead of God. It is true that God can be known only as He is revealed to faith. But the question is how God is revealed. Of course a theologian of the right wing of this school, such as Kaftan for example, emphasizes the fact that this faith-knowledge has to do with objects. Nevertheless the position logically results in conceiving of Dogmatics as the science of faith, thus doing away with its right to exist as a science distinct from religious psychology, a part of anthropology. For we have seen that Herrmann has shown the individually conditioned character of this faith-knowledge or faith-thought of Kaftan, and concludes that in so far as Dogmatics will claim any universality or normative validity for itself, it must cease to be the science of this so called faith-knowledge (*Glaubenserkenntnis*), and become the science of faith itself, whose chief task is, to use the language of Herrmann, "the comprehension of faith."<sup>45</sup> Dogmatics thus ceases to be a science distinct from certain branches of anthropology.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that if the principle of external authority in religious knowledge be abandoned, a normative science of dogmatic theology becomes impossible. It can not even continue within the meagre limits assigned to it by Herrmann. The logic of the situation must cut deeper still, as can be seen from the position of the school which follows the method of comparative religions.

<sup>44</sup> Herrmann, "Christl.-prot. Dogm.", *Kultur d. Gegenwart* I. Teil. Abt. 4. Lief. 3 pp 583-630. Also "Die Lage u. Aufgabe d. ev. Dogm." part II "Die Aufgabe", *Zeitschr. f. T. u. K.* Mai. u. Sept. 1907.

<sup>45</sup> Herrmann, *Ibid.* Art. cited in *Kultur der Gegenwart* p. 620.

III. This school of theologians has followed the logic of abandoning the principle of external authority, and has shown the untenability of the Ritschlian claim as regards the absoluteness of Christianity, the special character of Christian revelation, and the normative character of Christian Dogmatics. Troeltsch is the representative of this school who has devoted most attention to the questions of theological prolegomena. In a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* beginning in 1893 and covering about ten years, he has set forth his views over against the Ritschlians, especially Kaftan. In three works he has recently summed up and stated his views in opposition to the older Protestant apologetics and to that of the Ritschlian school, with a clearness and force which leave nothing to be desired.<sup>46</sup>

One of the chief merits of Troeltsch is that he sets in clear light the only alternative left if the metaphysical supernaturalism of the older evangelical theology be abandoned. The Ritschlian separation of Christianity and Christian theology from metaphysics and from history he regards as impossible.<sup>47</sup> The problem of the relation of science and philosophy to religion, no longer has to do with a compromise between two separate quantities, but with the subsumption of a developing inner religious life under the categories and method of all scientific and historical method. All compromise methods of dealing with science and religion must be abandoned. By the Ritschlian separation between them, "science" was limited to the world of nature, and all that was done was to cut off its old head of natural theology, while faith proceeded to a practical judgment, not adequately grounded, that Christianity is the absolute religion resting on a special revelation, and out of connection

<sup>46</sup> Troeltsch, "Ueber historische u. dogmat. Meth. d. Theol.," in *Theologische Arbeiten aus dem Rheinischen wissenschaftl. Prediger Verein*, N. F. H. 4, 1900, pp. 87-108. *Die wissenschaftl. Lage u. ihre Anforderungen an die Theol.*, 1900. *Die Absolutheit des Christentums u. die Religionsgeschichte*, 1902.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Wissenschaftl. Lage u. s. w.* pp. 44ff.

with the rest of history. In this way no real advance is made over the position of the older apologetic. Indeed, according to Troeltsch, the Ritschlian is worse off since he has no metaphysics or natural theology, which would strengthen his position against attack, and no strict doctrine of authority which could justify the claims made for Christianity. In this respect Troeltsch finds the old Protestant doctrine much more consequent, because it rested its claim as to the absolute character of Christianity and the supernatural revelation which grounded this claim, upon a supernaturalistic metaphysics without which, Troeltsch says, the claims as to the finality of Christianity and the supernatural character of its revelation are like a knife without a handle and without a blade.<sup>48</sup> It is only upon the basis of such a metaphysical supernaturalism as contrasted with the Ritschlian idea of the supernatural character of Christianity, that it can be separated from other religions. In giving up the idea that God has revealed Himself in a directly supernatural manner, and in reducing the idea of the supernatural character of Christianity to its superior content merely, the Ritschlian is prohibited from assigning to Christianity a distinct place and from separating it from other religions. From this point of view all human religion has its roots in religious intuition or a divine revelation,<sup>49</sup> and the philosophy of religion will discover a similar religious consciousness in all.<sup>50</sup> Hence to separate Christianity or Christ from history is but a remainder of the dogmatic method. Theology must follow the method of the history of religions which is simply the particular application of scientific historical method in general. This method makes use of three principles—the use of historical criticism, analogy, and the correlation and mutual dependence of all historical phenomena, including those in the psychic sphere.<sup>51</sup> Instead of a supposed independence of

<sup>48</sup> *Ueber hist. u. dog. Methode u. s. w.* p. 99.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>50</sup> *Wissenschaftl. Lage u. s. w.* p. 37.

<sup>51</sup> *Hist. u. dogmat. Meth. u. s. w.* p. 89.



historical criticism, we have the frank adoption of a criticism absolutely determined by an avowedly naturalistic philosophy. This criticism operates by analogy which lays it down as a canon that all past history is to be judged as to its truth or probability by its analogy with our present experience; while the principle of correlation, being also determined by naturalism, says that all historical phenomena form one continuous and unbroken stream to the exclusion of everything absolute or supernatural.<sup>52</sup> The scientific situation is expressed simply in the demand for the universal application of this method, which consequently must be applied to theology, and in its application makes three demands.<sup>53</sup> First, that Christianity be studied in its genetic connection with other religions. In this way a criterion will be obtained which will enable us to put all religions in an ascending scale with Christianity at the top. Secondly, that this historical and psychological study of religions advance from the comparison of religions to a philosophy of religion which will take a definite stand in regard to ultimate theological ideas. It is with these ideas that the real task of theology begins. It must show that religious faith is grounded in reality and that a divine revelation constitutes the kernel of all religions. Thirdly, that theology must state Christian faith thus determined in the light of modern science. In this way the old dogmas which were determined by the scientific culture of their age, are done away, and instead of an authoritative Dogmatics we have a religious metaphysic predetermined by the naturalism which lurked behind the rules of method. It is only a foregone conclusion, therefore, that the absoluteness of Christianity, supernatural revelation, and the deity of Christ must be abandoned, as is frankly done by Troeltsch.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 94.

<sup>53</sup> *Wissenschaftl. Lage. u. s. w.* pp. 47-56.

<sup>54</sup> In his earlier writings Troeltsch held that Christianity was the absolute religion in the sense of being the highest development of religious life. He has abandoned this position, and in his essay, *Die Absolutheit des Christentums u. die Religionsgeschichte*, 1902, he seeks to show that the term absolute is full of inner contradictions, and

The consequences of this upon the idea and task of Dogmatics are not difficult to see, although they have not been stated at length by Troeltsch. In the place of a normative Dogmatics must be placed a naturalistic evolutionary philosophy of religion. This will give us the fundamental religious ideas. Then it can be pointed out that they find their purest embodiment in Christianity, and out of this point of view and study of religion will grow a "simple exposition of the Christian faith."<sup>55</sup> The results also upon the content of Christian Dogmatics are equally plain. Bousset has drawn them for us most vividly and frankly.<sup>56</sup> Everything is in continuous progress and evolution. The idea of salvation in the Scripture and the Church, the dogma of the deity of Christ, the doctrine of the Trinity, the notion of satisfaction and sacrifice,—all are antiquated. What remains? The simple Gospel of Jesus, Bousset replies. But even this is not to be simply taken from Jesus; it must be translated into the language and symbols of modern culture. Thus we are told that the belief of Jesus in the heavenly Father is retained, but that we are to translate it into our modern notions about God. In a word, in the place of the Gospel of Jesus we are to have the Gospel of naturalistic evolution.

This conception of the method and task of theology has performed the service of making perfectly plain the issue, and the presuppositions of the science of Dogmatic Theology; and upon this issue the possibility of this science depends. It will not suffice to attempt to refute these theologians by simply pointing out their inconsistencies. Some of the things springs from the Hegelian attempt to find the complete realization of the Absolute Idea in Christianity. This Troeltsch regards as impossible, since all history is relative, and hence the kernel can never be separated from the husk. Bousset (*Wesen d. Relig.* p. 237ff) says that the future of Christianity is the future of religion, since the history of religion shows the "absolute superiority" of Christianity. But by this Bousset means simply with Troeltsch that Christianity is the highest point of the religious development of humanity.

<sup>55</sup> Troeltsch, Art. "Geschichte u. Metaphysik," *Zeitschr. für Theol. u. K.* 1898, p. 67.

<sup>56</sup> Bousset, *op. cit.* pp 258 ff, 261 ff.

which the Ritschlians have called inconsistencies are not really such. Thus Troeltsch knows perfectly well that his method of "evolutionary Idealism" is no mere historical method, but involves a faith in teleology. The norms, however, by which he judges this religious evolution are obtained from the comparative study of religion and thus claim to be more objective than those of the Ritschlians. Other objections, which are well grounded, have come from the Ritschlian camp, but they have not fully met the issue. Thus the late Prof. Reischle indicated the limits of this method, and also its dangers—among others, its tendency to haste in transmuting mere analogies into genetic and causal derivations, its overemphasis of the forms of religious life over against their content.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, he is perfectly justified in pointing out that a theology which departs so far from that of Christ can scarcely be called Christian. Nevertheless when he affirms that, allowing for the legitimate application of this so-called historical method, there still remains for Dogmatics the task of setting forth the eternal norms of Christian truth, he has simply reiterated the very point at issue. The possibility of such normative Christian truth depends upon the question of supernatural revelation. Has God intruded directly into the sphere of human life and thought in a supernatural manner? Has He spoken to man supernaturally and authoritatively by Prophets, Apostles, and by His Son? Or is revelation simply the product of the search after God by the human mind, to be called a divine revelation because God is revealed in all human thought, and because religion is not an illusion? This is the precise issue, and only upon the reality of a supernatural revelation in this highest sense is a science of Christian Dogmatics possible.

And not only is the issue here. Here also lies the real inconsistency of Troeltsch's procedure. The naturalistic metaphysic is made to appear as if it were not an *a priori* philosophy, but rather the result of the study of

<sup>57</sup> Reischle, *Theologie und Religionsgeschichte*, 1904, pp. 26ff.

comparative religion; whereas all along this naturalism was contained in the fundamental rules of method so that it was a foregone conclusion that it would again be read out of a so-called historical study which it had determined from the start. Why is it a fundamental postulate of historical science that the supernatural is excluded as impossible? Why is it assumed that all the theological sciences are historical disciplines? Why is it assumed that present experience is the absolute norm by which to judge of all the past experience of the human race? These are just the questions at issue, and they should not be assumed. In other words, this method which when applied is to yield as a result the naturalistic evolutionary idealism, is itself the product of an *a priori* metaphysical assumption. Troeltsch really acknowledges this, for he says that just as the dogmatic method proceeds upon a metaphysical basis, so the historical method springs from the metaphysical assumption of the "interconnection of the activities of the human spirit", by which he means simply to express the impossibility of supernatural revelation.<sup>58</sup> It is one thing for a scientific method to rest upon a metaphysical basis; it is quite a different thing for it to spring from an unwarranted *a priori* metaphysical assumption. Unless an absolutely naturalistic philosophy be true—and it cannot be true upon a truly theistic basis—the theology of this school is without adequate foundation.

Moreover, while we must agree with this school, as over against the Ritschlian rejection of natural theology, that the Christian revelation must find not only its starting point, but even the possibility of its being apprehended, in its organic relation to this natural theology due to man's religious nature which has been preserved by common grace, we believe that it is fundamentally wrong in supposing that there is a gradual evolution from lower forms of religion to Christianity. The lower forms of religion and religious knowledge do not represent a lesser degree of faith or knowledge merely, but are a degeneration wrought by sin in the natural knowledge of God. Dr. Kuyper has shown that

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Historische u. dogm. Methode* p. 99.

the Christian religion and Paganism do not stand related to one another as higher and lower forms of the same development, but that while the Christian religion is a correcting of the effects of sin and hence a positive supplement and correction of natural theology, Paganism represents the development of natural theology in a negative direction.<sup>59</sup>

Thus the vital question for Christian Dogmatics is whether a supernatural revelation is possible, and whether in Christianity and the Bible we have such a revelation. If these questions cannot be answered affirmatively, the principle of external authority must be given up, and we are left with a religious philosophy in place of the science of Dogmatic Theology.<sup>60</sup> Consequently Dogmatics presupposes and rests upon Apologetics, both philosophical and historical, and this latter science must give to the dogmatician the existence and knowability of God; the possibility of the directly supernatural mode of the divine activity; the supernatural character of the Christian revelation; and the Bible as the authoritative record of that revelation.

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<sup>59</sup> Kuyper, *op. cit.* p. 302.

<sup>60</sup> It should be noted, however, that the converse is also true, i. e., that if a supernatural revelation be admitted, it will not be possible to maintain that the principle of authority is internal. Hence the attempt of Th. Kaftan (*Moderne Theol. des alten Glaubens* 1906) to hold fast to supernatural revelation and at the same time conceive of the principle of authority as internal, is a mediating attempt which is not tenable. In the first place, we have seen how and why the correction of the noëtic effects of sin by supernatural revelation carries with it the principle of external authority; and in the second place, the form and content of Scripture revelation are inseparable, so that it is not possible for one who admits supernatural revelation in both facts and words to distinguish between the form and content, the human and divine, as Th. Kaftan does. Thus, the "old faith" of which there is to be a "modern theology" involves, as Kaftan himself states this faith, the "old theology". That Christ is the divine Son of God, the only mediator between God and man; that He rose from the dead and ever liveth; that we have His salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit,—what is all this but the "old theology"? For a criticism of Th. Kaftan and also of Grützmacher's "*Moderne positive Theol.*" as set forth in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschr.* 1904, *vid.* Bousset, *Theol. Rundschau*, 1906, pp. 287-302, 327-340; 1907, pp. 1-18.



## HEATHEN WONDER-BIRTHS AND THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.

The desire for a nexus, a common basis of unity in phenomena apparently diverse, constitutes one of the leading characteristics of the modern educated mind. This passion for unity dominates not only philosophy and physical science but also historic investigation. The evolutionary formula of Spencer, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel, the various monisms, materialistic, spiritual, ethical, of Haeckel, Fiske, Strong and Ballard; the religious definitions of Schleiermacher, Kant, Fichte, Ritschl, are all indications of this predominant trend. It is the same intellectual passion, that has, in large measure, furnished the impulse for the recent unexampled development of the comparative study of religions.

The search for hidden analogies, the bringing together of far-sundered conceptions, the exposition of underlying and unexpected unities, the exhibition of the unity of human nature and the continuity of human thought amid all divergencies—in a word, the discovery and interpretation of the common psychological basis of all religious faiths has clothed a complicated and difficult study with abundant interest and fascination. Almost the first fruits of this comparatively new study have revealed this impulse and motive. Indeed before the facts have been fairly collated from various parts of the vast field, sweeping generalizations such as that involved in the Pan-Babylonian propaganda, applied first to the Old and more recently to the New Testament, show unmistakably the general movement in the current of contemporary thought. It is always wearisome as well as unpopular to stem such a tide, but it is surely not out of place to urge that a grave peril to exact thinking lurks in

"an overdone principle of identity". Careful discrimination of differences is just as necessary to substantial progress in the attainment of truth, as enthusiastic emphasis upon points of similarity.

The indiscriminate huddling together under the same categories of things which are fundamentally different may facilitate the building of hastily constructed theories but such theories are sure to come to grief upon the facts. Much recent work in comparative religion and mythology will have to be done over again because it is vitiated by the uncritical identification of statements and beliefs which in origin, history and significance are as wide asunder as the poles. Prof. Sayce in the preface to his Gifford lectures says:

"There are two facts which, I am bound to add, have been forced upon me by a study of the old religions of civilized humanity. On the one hand, they testify to the continuity of religious thought, . . . But on the other hand, between Judaism and the coarsely polytheistic religion of Babylonia, as also between Christianity and the old Egyptian faith, in spite of its high morality and spiritual insight—there lies an impassable gulf. And for the existence of this gulf I can find only one explanation, unfashionable and antiquated though it be. In the language of a former generation, it marks the dividing line between revelation and unrevealed religion."

This statement is doubly significant. It is significant as the utterance of mature conviction on the part of an able and deeply thoughtful student of a great subject. It is even more significant as indicating the status of present opinion on this subject. So long as he is emphasizing the continuity of human thought, Prof. Sayce feels himself on a traveled highway and in a goodly company, but when he feels constrained to point out "dividing lines" and "gulfs" between various systems and is compelled in candor to state his conviction as to the explanation of these differences, he is at once conscious of being alone in an unfashionable and anti-

quoted by-path of opinion; he becomes the contemporary of a "former generation". Such being the case, it is high time that attention should be called in detail to the manifold and undeniable facts, which justify an opinion that can be called unfashionable and antiquated only because contemporary thought has become bewildered and has lost its way in the mazes of conjecture.

Having made the statement,<sup>1</sup> in the face of many assertions to the contrary, that ancient heathenism presents no true analogy to the New Testament account of the Virgin Birth of Christ, it is now proposed to exhibit, somewhat in detail, the induction upon which this statement rests. Incidentally the discussion will serve to illustrate the confusion into which, under the unchecked leadership of the passion for unity, and study of comparative religion and mythology is apt to lead. It is, of course, impossible within the limits of a single article to pass in review every such analogous instance but it is hoped that no important fact has been overlooked.

In the former treatment of this subject, attention was called<sup>2</sup> to the curious amalgamation made by Canon Cheyne of two contradictory uses of the word "virgin". It is only by means of this unconscious logomachy that he is able to establish any connection whatever between the "virgin" goddesses of the Babylonian mythology and the Virgin Mother of our Lord. The connection between these two conceptions is a disjunctive conjunction in a sense unknown to the grammarians. But this confusion of thought and terminology is no more flagrant than many another perpetrated in the name of Comparative Religion or Mythology: as, for example, the identification of a local and limited deity, for a time predominant over other deities of the pantheon, either conquered or absorbed, with the one God of an ethical monotheism; the confusion of the artificial ethnic triads which slip into each other with the facility of

<sup>1</sup> *Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

a conjuror's rings, with the Christian immanent Trinity; the identification of ethnic sacrificial systems, the root principle of which is the purchase by propitiation of venal favors, with the ethical sacrificial order of the Hebrews to which the pure heart and holy motive of the worshippers gave its only significance and value—all these are conspicuous examples of false identification and failure in careful discrimination. Another and in our judgment no more defensible case, is found in the alleged ethnic analogies to our Lord's miraculous birth. The unqualified thesis that both the fact as stated in the New Testament and the method of its statement are unique and solitary, we hold to be sane and justifiable at the bar of sound reason.

In order that our study of this subject may be thorough, we must begin it on the low level of popular folk-lore and with stories some of which are far from attractive. While broadening the induction by including facts which he does not give, we shall address ourselves particularly to the theoretical considerations urged by Mr. Sidney Hartland, in his laborious study of the *Legend of Perseus*. Since this writer has adopted an attitude positively polemic to the Christian belief in Christ's miraculous birth and as his conclusions are fairly representative of the mythological school in general we may properly subject his theories and arguments to careful analysis and criticism.

Mr. Hartland acknowledges that the problem of Christ's birth lies fairly outside his natural province, for "it is a question of apologetics, not of folk-lore" (Vol. I, p. 103f.). Nevertheless he has evidently found it impossible to maintain this judicial attitude, for in his third volume (p. 188) he says:

"If these legends be universal, if they must be rejected in every instance but one as the product of an inevitable tendency of the human imagination, then why not in the one case also? Assuredly that one case can be regarded as exceptional only if it stand upon historical evidence totally different from the others and of inevitable cogency. But,

can any one who sits down (as it is the duty of at least every educated man to do) calmly and, so far as he can, with scrupulous impartiality to weigh the evidence, say that the testimony of ecclesiastical tradition or even of our Gospels is different in kind or of a greater cogency than that which we reject, without hesitation, in the case of Sakyamuni or Alexander the Great."

This argument, like every other argument from analogy depends for its cogency upon the accuracy of the parallel. If the parallel be broken in any essential particulars, the argument becomes invalid. For in order to establish his conclusion it is necessary for Mr. Hartland to make clear that the central and formative idea in all the stories, including that of the New Testament, is the same. Unless all the stories are laid, so to speak, on the same keel, there can be no genuine analogy. Accidental resemblances in minor details do not constitute an analogy which indicates organic connection or justifies a common classification. We hold and hope to show that Mr. Hartland's argument breaks down at this point.

Again, in order to validate his conclusion, it is necessary that Mr. Hartland should exhibit a close approximation in the theoretical background, the theological and cosmogenic ideas which are embodied in the folk-lore stories, to those embodied in the narratives of the New Testament. Here, too, we feel that Mr. Hartland's discussion is singularly lacking. In short, our thesis is that judgments, such as Mr. Hartland and others of the mythological school advocate, have been arrived at by the constant and fatal confusion of things essentially different and can be held only while this continues.

Our justification for this statement must begin with an examination of Mr. Hartland's idea of evidence. In the statement quoted above, it is said that the Virgin Birth of Christ "can be regarded as exceptional only if it stand upon historical evidence totally different from the others and of inevitable cogency". This distinctly implies that, in order to



be totally different from that alleged in other instances, the evidence for the miraculous birth of Christ must be of "inevitable cogency". Of course, this alternative does not hold. The evidence in this case may be totally different without being of inevitable cogency. The evidence for any historical fact is rarely of inevitable cogency. Indeed, we do not often find such evidence outside the sphere of pure mathematics or of experimental demonstrations of the physical sciences. Most of us are well content to find a clear preponderance of evidence in favor of any given conclusion. In the case of our Lord's birth, the evidence is of exactly this nature; it consists of such a clear preponderance in its favor. But that it is of such inevitable cogency that every man, whatever his predilections, would be convinced by it, is not claimed and ought not to be expected by any reasonable man.

Mr. Hartland is, however, not very fortunate in his choice of concrete instances to support his position on the question of evidence. We gladly accept his challenge to show that the evidence for Christ's miraculous birth is totally different from that which may be adduced for Sakyamuni or Alexander the Great. Let it be noted, first, that Mr. Hartland is allowed to make his own *ex parte* statement as to the evidence in the case of Christ. The reader of his book is, of course, aware that his conclusion rests for one of its pillars on an extreme and exceedingly precarious theory of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels: that it ignores absolutely the question of written sources used in the composition of those Gospels and the probable relationship of the Infancy narrative to those sources; that the water-marks of age in the Infancy documents are not so much as mentioned; that these documents are made as late as the latest possible date for the completed Gospels—in short, that the Christian side of the argument has been stated not by a judge holding the scales level but by an advocate and special pleader. Even so, for purposes of comparison and argument, we accept his statement of the case. We have documentary

evidence for the exceptional birth of Christ promulgated by men who were acquainted with those who knew the personal disciples of Jesus and received their beliefs from them. The line of connection between the records and the events is at any rate definitely discernible. Let us now turn to the other side. What have we there? In the case of Alexander we have, for once, historical evidence which comes very near to being of "inevitable cogency" that Alexander was not supernaturally born. The testimony of history on this point is absolutely conclusive. Alexander's so-called supernatural birth was a fiction confined to Egypt and the origin of this fiction is not uncertain. In his own country Alexander was known as the son of Philip of Macedon and his wife, the beautiful Epirote, Olympias. Had not the documentary and other evidence been conclusive on this point, there might easily have been an upheaval in that kingdom. In the course of the great military expedition which made him master of the world, Alexander entered Egypt. After laying the foundation of the city which was to bear his name, he marched through the country even to the distant temple of Amon which stood in an oasis of the Libyan Desert. Egypt made no resistance to his march and when the temple was reached, the conqueror was met by an obsequious priest, quick to recognize the necessities of the case, who, then and there, greeted Alexander as the son of Amon, and therefore the rightful ruler of the kingdoms of the Pharaohs. The grave comparison of this episode with the birth of Christ is absurd if not grotesque.

The case of Sakyamuni or Gotama is scarcely better. No one knows within two hundred years when Gotama was born, lived or died. The oldest parts of the oldest extant documents of Buddhism passed through a century or more of oral transmission before they were committed to writing. These oldest documents contain sayings attributed to Gotama but no biographical material. The documents of primitive Buddhism do not allege a miraculous birth at all. As we shall see, the first appearance of the story delineates a

dream of his mother's which hinted at or symbolized a miraculous origin. The birth stories, inasmuch as they imply the existence of a soul and metempsychosis, are in contradiction to primitive Buddhism, which denies soul and affirms that each Buddha embodies simply the Karma (doing, deeds, perhaps character) of his predecessors. The birth stories clearly represent a much later growth. Whatever in them approximates the Christian belief about Christ's birth (and the approximation is by no means close) made its appearance in Chinese documents probably not earlier than 250 A. D. We shall examine these stories more closely later but enough has been said to meet Mr. Hartland's challenge to a comparison of evidences.

In all the realm of reasoning, no term should be used with greater care than the word "supernatural". Carelessly used it covers more sins of thought than the mantle of charity. Mr. Hartland's argument is vitiated by his total failure to discriminate various uses of the word "supernatural". Throughout his work the "incident"—namely, the so-called supernatural birth is treated as cognate and parallel in all instances. A supernatural birth is a supernatural birth and there is nothing more to be said concerning it. But altogether apart from its bearing upon the question of Christ's birth, such a method has unfortunate results even in the legitimate field of folk-lore study. These stories cannot properly be understood or interpreted apart from a careful consideration of the mode and quality of the "supernatural" involved in each. When it comes to a comparative study upon which important issues depend the consequences of such a treatment are absolutely disastrous.

One may disbelieve altogether in the possibility of the supernatural in the realm of physical fact but he will scarcely contend that the degree of reasonableness, in alleged instances of supernatural operation, does not differ in different cases. For example, the resurrection of Lazarus at the word of Christ spoken in reliance upon the power of an unseen and Almighty God and the revival of two men slain

by a spell through the magic touch of the "slackdan druidach" in the Scottish tale are not the same. One may reject the one as he does the other, but it is clear that the two do not stand on an equal footing in the court of reason. One may conceivably accept the one and reject the other on purely rational grounds. In the same way, the birth of Adonis by the bursting of the myrrh tree into which his mother had been changed and the birth of Christ by the creative power of an unseen and Holy God are not cognate instances. One may reject the alleged birth of Adonis and accept that of Christ on grounds of evidence. Granted that all these instances involve the supernatural, the mode and operation of the supernatural, the cosmological and theological postulates, the ethical and spiritual implications of the contrasted narratives put them in classes far apart. Merely for purposes of study, they must be considered separately. Any one who thinks that an argument which is sufficient to erase the Adonis birth story from consideration is therefore cogent against the Gospel story is simply deceiving himself, not advancing the cause of truth.

Another serious confusion of thought in this work is a failure to maintain the distinction which Mr. Hartland himself establishes between Märchen (stories told for amusement merely) and Sagas (stories believed in as representing real events). It is, of course, a difficult distinction to maintain as the two classes of stories shade into each other; but in an argument so important this distinction should be kept constantly in mind and the question should be raised in connection with every specific instance. It is illogical to draw conclusions on equal terms from the fantastic creations of the story-telling imagination, limited only by the necessity of retaining the interest of hearers, and serious attempts to interpret actual events, however imperfectly understood. Mr. Hartland seems to have recognized this distinction only to forget it — and this to such an extent

that at times he calls the same story Märchen and Saga (p. 123).

It will now be seen that if our positions are well taken, Mr. Hartland's theoretical conclusions are imperiled by serious confusions of thought which enter into the very substance of the argument. By way of illustrating what we consider to be the fundamental weakness of the whole contention of this school, we cite the following. The sixth chapter of the first volume is one of the most interesting of the entire work, as it describes the actual customs which are based upon the same ideas as have in turn contributed to the making of the stories. It is interesting in another respect, in that the theoretical consideration urged at the beginning of the chapter are contradicted, according to his own showing, by every instance cited save one. He argues that the spells, incantations, and drugs used by savages for the purpose of inducing pregnancy are looked upon as capable of bringing about this result without actual physical generation. In point of fact, in every instance physical generation is a component and necessary element of the ritual (pp. 149, 178, etc.). The one instance which, according to his statement, is an apparent exception is given in his own words:

"The mandrakes or love-apples, for which Rachel bargained with Leah, were believed to be possessed of power to put an end to barrenness and this, it appears by the record in Genesis, quite independently of sexual intercourse, for Rachel gave up her husband in exchange for them."

This we take to be a most remarkable bit of Scriptural exegesis. We wonder what version of Genesis Mr. Hartland had before him. It ought not to be necessary even to state the facts. There was no bargain between Rachel and Leah, and Rachel never had any of the mandrakes. She asked for a share of them and was curtly refused, whereupon she said, bitterly: "Therefore shall he lie with thee, to-night, for thy son's mandrakes." She never gave



up her husband. Moreover, the author or editor of the passage evidently took no stock in the mandrake superstition, for he attributes the children of Leah and Rachel to God, and it is expressly stated in the case of Leah and as clearly implied in the case of Rachel, that Jacob was the father of his children (as he definitely calls them) in the normal way. This instance in itself would shake our confidence in Mr. Hartland's power of discrimination; but it is only one of many. He confuses things entirely different when he says (Vol. I., p. 134):

"The Middle Ages, which believed that Anti-Christ, in rivalry with Christ, would declare himself born of a virgin, would have seen nothing impossible in the kind of birth claimed for Saoshyant."

It is not too much to say that this statement is untrue. The belief in a false claimant to the prerogatives and distinctions of Christ and the belief in the actual posthumous birth of a physical son to Zaratust have nothing in common, and belief in the one would not have the slightest tendency to predispose to belief in the other.

Our next step is to examine with some care the instances collected by Mr. Hartland and others in support of their theories. Mr. Hartland tells rather more than a hundred stories which he holds to be cognate with the classical Legend of Perseus. In examining these stories and many others, especially from the classics, in which supernatural births are found, we are impressed first of all with the materialistic basis of the entire cycle of tales. With a few merely apparent exceptions, in every instance which he brings forward, from Scotland to South Africa and from Mexico to India, some material substance produces the so-called supernatural result.<sup>8</sup> In the original classical form of the story, it was a magical shower of gold poured into the maiden's bosom, and through endless variations this same

<sup>8</sup> Vol. I, pp. 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 31, 40, 50, 73, 75, 76, 82, 88, 89, 92, etc., etc.

original feature persists. The scales of the king of fishes, the bones of dead men, a magic seed, a dragon's heart, an impregnated leaf, the ashes of a saint, etc. With monotonous iteration, the magic substance appears and reappears in story after story of this unique collection. The next most noticeable feature of the stories is that in the vast majority of instances there appears some lineal connection between the substance which causes the birth and the creature which is the result of it.<sup>4</sup> There is a quasi-parenthood attributed to the magical substance and a dim and distorted recognition of heredity in the characteristics of the offspring. Graveyard bones cause the birth of a spotted child; a mango seed results in a monkey-like child, etc. Again, abnormal conception results in an abnormal birth and some visible abnormality in the being thus born.<sup>5</sup> The period of gestation is unnaturally long or short, and the individual has stars in his forehead or strange marks on his body, walks or talks at birth, grows to maturity at once or attains gigantic size or assumes a monstrous form. The so-called life-token, to the consideration of which Mr. Hartland devotes a section of his book, is striking evidence of this peculiar feature of the stories. Concerning it Mr. Hartland says: "It is frequently a consequence of the supernatural birth; it is then inseparably connected with the hero whose well-being it indicates; it is not dependent on his will, but is, in fact, part of himself" (Vol. I., p. 271). It is safe to say that the normal birth of a person exhibiting the ordinary characteristics of humanity is unknown in these narratives.

Another outstanding characteristic of the stories is that in the vast majority of instances the subject of the supernatural experience is a married woman. In cases where she is not married, some explanation of her condition—some element of surprise—is always present (pp. 78, 116-117, etc.). Another amazing fact is that in many instances

<sup>4</sup>Vol. I, pp. 56-7; 75-6; 77; 86, 87; 88-9, etc.

<sup>5</sup>Vol. I, pp. 22, 27, 31, 40, 48, 50, 74, 82, 98, 104, 106, 122, 130, 131; also *S. B. E.*, Vol. V, p. 396.

the so-called supernatural birth is absent altogether or is present in a form so grotesque that it does not deserve to be called a birth at all.<sup>6</sup> There is no real birth; the being is hatched from an egg or found in a receptacle or taken from a hiding place or extracted from some part of a man's body.

The inferences to be drawn from these facts are unmistakable:

1. Since births from unmarried women enter into so small a proportion of the stories, it is evident that such births cannot represent any constant or universal element in this type of human thought. There is no definite and ascertainable law involved in the few sporadic cases of births from unwedded women. The general tendency of thought manifested in the stories is definitely in the opposite direction. If, then, stories of "virgin-births" occur, it is purely by accident and not because there is in a virgin-birth anything peculiarly characteristic of and satisfying to the human imagination.

2. We infer from the frequent absence and radical transformations of the birth idea, that the "supernatural" birth feature, inasmuch as it is detachable from the narratives, is not always or even usually the major item in the minds either of the narrators or of the hearers of the stories. It is secondary and incidental, rather than vital and essential. We shall have to look elsewhere for the features which represent a fixed and constant law of the human imagination.

We have now to consider the two most striking features of these stories: first, the significance of the material object or substance which is supposedly endowed with the power to produce pregnancy; and secondly, the connection between the object thus endowed and the being which is the result of its operation. A glance at the original Perseus story, of which these tales are supposed to be variants, will

<sup>6</sup> Pp. 58, 65, 68, 99, 115, 145, 165, 75, 81, 123.

furnish valuable suggestions toward the answers to both our inquiries.

According to the classical story, Perseus was the son of Jupiter and Danaë, daughter of Acrisius, to whom the god obtained access by changing himself into a shower of gold and pouring himself through the roof of the tower in which her father had imprisoned her. The gold was the temporary existence-form of a quasi-human being possessed of human parts and passions and having the power to change himself into any form which he desired to assume. The shower of gold was but one of many such changes which he made for like purposes. He was in no sense a spiritual being. He sought the presence of Danaë under the sexual impulse and her child was physically begotten. The equivalent of the magic shower of gold appears in all the tales of the cycle and always means the same thing. The phallic object or substance is always the existence-form or abode or physical instrument of some being looked upon as possessed, like Jupiter, of the procreative power. Physical generation is always implied in the story. This whole system of inter-related tales belongs to the stage of crassest materialistic polytheism. The bearing of this central fact upon our theme is apparent. These stories, inasmuch as they postulate physical contact and imply personal quasi-human agency, which, though often veiled, is none the less real, are at the farthest possible remove from the idea of a virgin-birth. The use of the term parthenogenesis to describe the impregnation of a woman (whether married or not) by physical means is simply a misuse of terms. A careful search of the classical birth-stories exhibits no case where physical generation under some form or other does not play a leading part. Except in nature myths, where the generation spoken of is causal and idealistic, the birth tales are tainted with phallicism. And if this be true of the Greek and Roman stories, how much more is it true of the semi-savages among whom such folk-tales originated. The materialistic basis of these stories is exhibited by the ideas

and customs of the same level of society to-day. It is to be remembered that, as known to us, these stories are usually far removed from their fountain head and that, in the course of time, they have been toned down. But when we come close to them their real significance is revealed. We have the authority of the late Dr. Curtiss,<sup>7</sup> of Chicago, who made careful personal investigations in the East, for affirming that ignorant Moslems and Christians to-day believe that God is possessed of a complete male organism. Even the women are heard to swear by God's phallus and show by their behavior that they understand the meaning of their coarse and blasphemous expression. It is also unquestionably true that people of this same low level of morals and intelligence ascribe sexual distinctions and procreative power to supposedly disembodied spirits. Dead husbands are supposed to be able to beget children. Barren women have been seen to rush up to the bodies of newly executed men in order to come into contact with the departing spirit. In connection with the sacred shrines, springs and rivers, the idea is the same. The local spirits of such places are looked upon as holding actual physical relations with the women who seek their aid and the children who are born after visits to such places are considered theirs. It is quite noticeable that only married women resort to these places. But the low physical level of their ideas is clearly exhibited in a song translated by Dr. Curtiss, which the Arab women sing when they resort to one of these shrines. The song is addressed to the presiding genius of the place:<sup>8</sup>

"Oh, Abu Rabah:  
 To thee come the white ones,  
 To thee come the fair ones:  
 With thee is the generation,  
 With us the conception."

One can easily imagine that alleged cases of birth, owing to these shrines, might be found among unmarried women,

<sup>7</sup> *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, pp. 113-119.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 119.



for nothing could be simpler, in a society so ignorant and debased, than for a girl who had fallen to attribute her condition to one of these beings, but whether the statement would be accepted even by her own people at its face value is, perhaps, questionable.

Dr. Curtiss calls attention to the significant fact that when the magic shrine of St. George, to which phallic power is ascribed, is mentioned, many natives shrug their shoulders and whereas, formerly, Moslems permitted their wives to visit it, they have latterly forbidden it. The story which Josephus (*Ant.* XVIII. iii. 14) tells of the Temple of Isis at Jerusalem and the ravishing of the matron Paulina, which has unnumbered parallels in ancient history, points in the same direction. Shrines and so-called sacred places to which phallic power is attributed lie in the realm of the fraudulent and the unclean.

In the same legend, we find another item of importance for this investigation. Jupiter was metamorphosed into a shower of gold without loss of individuality or power. He was the father of Perseus. Mr. Hartland says of the Perseus story and its variations in general: "At the root of these stories lies the belief in transformation. Flowers, fruit and other vegetables, eggs, fishes, spiders, worms and even stones are all capable of becoming human beings. They only await absorption in the shape of food or in some other appropriate manner into the body of a woman to enable the metamorphosis to take place."<sup>9</sup> This statement should be broadened to include those cases where there is no real birth from a woman, and the ultimate, underlying fact of the whole subject lies before us.<sup>10</sup> This fact explains the necessary physical contact and the connection between the substance touched and the birth resulting from it. And the explanation dissolves Mr. Hartland's contention into the thinnest mist. For if "transformation" lies at the root of these tales, then the so-called "incident"—namely, the super-

<sup>9</sup> Vol. I, p. 207. Cf. Curtiss, p. 106.

<sup>10</sup> Pp. 113, 120, 124, 182, 207, 208, etc.

natural birth —ceases at once to be a major and becomes a minor point. In all cases of metamorphosis, the mode of birth is a matter of absolute indifference. It matters not whether the starting point is from a married or an unmarried woman, from man or woman or egg or clot of blood or animal, so long as the change is accomplished. The emphasis is not upon birth or the mode of it, but upon change of form, showing that these birth-tales have no great interest in the births and none whatever in them by and for themselves. They do not even insist upon birth of any kind as necessary to metamorphosis, and, most important of all, they do not recognize the agency of the father as incompatible with a supernatural birth. They reveal no universal mental tendency toward the creation of wonder-births, and there would have been no wonder-birth stories apart from the idea of metamorphosis. But even as it is, the birth is a minor, secondary, ancillary, detachable element in stories told for another purpose and with a different interest.

A summary of the instances and a fair review of the evidence lead to the following conclusions:

1. These stories belong to people mentally on the level of believing that all forms of being are interchangeable;—to whom nature has no fixed and orderly processes, so that anything may become anything else.

2. The stories come from people who are imprisoned in the grossest materialism, so much so that purely spiritual existence in disembodied form, even of gods and departed souls, is inconceivable.

3. They belong, as Mr. Hartland admits, to a social status in which sexual promiscuity prevails, in which religious worship is tainted with phallicism, and in which parenthood, especially on the father's side, is a very vague and uncertain thing (pp. 180ff.).

4. A virgin-birth in anything approaching the New Testament sense is absolutely undreamed of in the whole cycle of these tales. A brief glance at the abysmal differences between these stories and the New Testament narra-

tive of the Infancy may well complete our survey of them.

The very first cosmogenic lesson taught the Hebrews was that every living thing, from the simplest to the most complex, brought forth "after its kind". There is nowhere in the Canonical Scriptures a single statement to show that the Hebrews believed in metamorphosis in the sense of these stories. If their remote ancestors had ever believed in it, they had left it far behind before the dawn of history. They had reached, also, at the beginning of recorded history, the stage of the developed family with the father at the head of the household. The savage promiscuity reflected in these birth narratives they looked upon with abhorrence. Fatherhood was not only recognized, but prized, and the emphasis laid in the Old Testament upon consecrated motherhood in the bringing into the world of a holy seed does not preclude a proportionate honor being paid to devout and faithful fatherhood. But the core of the matter is that all these determining features of Old Testament life are found most clearly in the Infancy narratives of the New Testament. Normal, sober ideas of birth, infancy and childhood as an orderly procedure and natural growth, the unity and sacredness of the family, and the rights and authority of fatherhood, the spirituality of God and the beauty of purity, trust and devotion, undimmed by any least taint of heathen grossness, mark and distinguish both the narratives. Not only is the central statement of Christ's conception different from these wonder birth, but the details, the social atmosphere and the spirit of the New Testament narratives are as high as heaven above them.

Leaving these rather unsavory folk-lore tales with no little relief, we turn next to the great religious systems of the ancient world, beginning with Zoroastrianism. We have, of course, no measurably authentic contemporary documents in the case. The dates for the life of Zaratusht vary nearly a millenium, and even Professor Jackson holds that his real historic existence is a matter of probability rather than of certainty. But, waiving the question of dates and consider-

ing the documents just as we have them in the sacred books, what do they tell of the birth of their hero? The narratives with which we are now concerned touch upon two episodes: the birth of Zaratust himself and the promised or prophesied birth of his posthumous children.

The whole cycle of events, in which these wonderful births are episodes, begins with the creator Ahura-Mazda and ends with Zaratust's son or Saoshyant, who is to be the restorer of all things. From Ahura-Mazda to Saoshyant, throughout an unbroken succession of leaders and rulers, there is one common element, the so-called "divine glory". Created by Ahura-Mazda, this substance or quality was started on its way to meet the material germ of Zaratust. The "heavenly glory" is an idealization or materialization (one hardly knows which to call it) of royal power. It is described as "most conquering, highly working, that possesses health, wisdom and happiness, and is more powerful to destroy than all other creatures".<sup>11</sup> It is also said that it "could not be taken by force",—that is, that it descends in the line of royal legitimacy. It has been well said that this book (*Tash*) in which the progress of the glory is described "would serve as a short history of the Iranian monarchy". In the *Dinkard*<sup>12</sup> we find an account of the creation of the heavenly glory by Ahura-Mazda and its transmission through endless light to the light of the sun, then to the moon, then to the stars and then to a self-feeding fire in the house of Zaratust's grandfather Zois. It then became blended with his mother at her birth and shone through her with visible splendor. This glory makes Duktaub so beautiful that it rouses the ire of the demons, who threaten with destruction the village where she lives. These threats frighten the villagers and even her father, so that she is banished from home and takes refuge with her intended husband. Soon after she is married. Then follows an account of the magical eating of the horn-plant which

<sup>11</sup> *Tā.* xix. 25-90.

<sup>12</sup> *Bk. VII, Chap. ii, S. B. E. Vol. xlvii, pp. 17ff.*

contains the fravasi (or spirit) of Zaratust by his father. After this, the two parents find a vegetable growth which contains the material substance of Zaratust. Cows are led upon this vegetation and are thereupon found in milk though unimpregnated. The parents drink of this milk and the elements are ready for the creation of Zaratust. Then follows an explicit and detailed statement of the coming together of the parents, who embrace twice with desire for a man child, but are hindered by jealous demons. The third time they succeed and Zaratust is conceived. Now, obviously, all this narrative is purely theoretical and dogmatic—an attempt to account for the presence in Zaratust of the three elements of personality according to the Zoroastrian psychology. It is most noticeable, however, that in spite of continuous miracle over ages of time up to and including his conception, birth and infancy, there is no hint of the idea that Zaratust was or could have been conceived without the concurrence of both parents in physical generation. A marvel of another kind meets us in the prophesied birth of Zaratust's posthumous son Saoshyant. In the *Bundahis* (Cap. xxii. 8-9) it is written thus:

"This too one knows that three sons of Zaratust, namely, Hushêdai, Hushidaimâh, and Soshyans were from Hvôv; as it says that Zaratust went near unto Hvôv three times, and each time the seed went to the ground; the angel Nêryôsang received the brilliance and strength of that seed, delivered it with care to the angel Anahid and in time will blend it with a mother."

The ambiguity of this truly remarkable statement is evident at once. If Hvôv was the mother of these children at all it could have been in this sense only—that she furnished the ovum which was impregnated by the seed of Zaratust. The children were not born for years, perhaps for centuries, and another mother was needed to complete the process. The part belonging to this second mother is correspondingly obscure—the only supposition that approaches reasonable-



ness is that she brings to maturity the impregnated seed. All this is grotesque enough and as incomprehensible as it is grotesque. But, whatever ambiguity may be attached to the motherhood involved in this strange coöperative scheme, there can be no question as to the actual physical fatherhood of Zaratust. Thus far nothing in the remotest degree akin to a virgin birth is discoverable. The continuation of the prophesy, however, raises the question anew. It is said<sup>18</sup> that "a maid bathing in the Lake Kasava will conceive by it and bring forth the victorious Saoshyant (Soshyos), who will come from the region of the dawn to free the world from death and decay, from corruption and rottenness, etc.". This is the basis of the so-called "virgin-birth" of Saoshyant. The grotesqueness of this wonder which is to take place in some far-off age and some dimly defined locality, we can lay aside and address ourselves to the question, "Does the statement imply a virgin-birth? It certainly does not, even if it is taken to mean that the maiden is to be unmarried at the time when the conception takes place, for she conceives by the actual transmitted material seed (in at least the enduring essence, the strength or brilliance of it) of Zaratust. Zaratust is looked upon as a being whose generative powers were as exceptional as his other faculties. The maiden's impregnation was due to an act of physical generation miraculously extended through time and space. The whole process was looked upon as continuous and physical.

But what reason is there for supposing that the birth of Saoshyant was to be any more miraculous or miraculous in any way different from that of Zaratust himself? The element in the seed of the prophet which is spoken of as the "brightness" is evidently that same "heavenly glory" which has been transmitted through so many ages and its transmission to the mother of Saoshyant and her conception by it no more implies that this is to take place without her marriage and without the coöperation of a father than in the case of Duktaub, Zaratust's own mother. At any rate, there

<sup>18</sup> *Th.* xix, 89ff. *S. B. E.* Vol. IV, p. lxxix.

is no suggestion of a virgin-birth in any legitimate use of the term. The emphasis in this myth is upon fatherhood, magnified, exaggerated, grotesquely miraculous, and yet fatherhood in the physical sense.

The close analogy between the Zoroastrian theory of transmitted "heavenly glory" and the Egyptian theory of transmitted "heavenly ichor" in the veins of the Pharaohs is evident upon the mere statement of them. Both are at once political and theological, and the theological element is scarcely able to keep pace with the political. Attention has already been called to the political element in the alleged miraculous birth of Amenhotep III. Tracing that story back to its origin brings into clearer relief this factor of the theory. In the Westcar papyrus dating from 700 to 1000 years later than the events to which it refers, we find a folk tale which gives a popular account of the supposed origin of the Fifth Dynasty. According to this story a certain magician told King Khufu of the Fourth Dynasty that three children soon to be born, by the wife of one of the priests of Re were begotten by Re himself and should become kings of Egypt. The names given to those children were the names of the first three kings of the Fifth Dynasty. This story indicates that a religious revolution, in which the worship of Re becomes the state religion, and a political revolution, in which a new dynasty gains the throne, took place simultaneously. It indicates further that this two-fold revolution was due to the successful scheming of the priests of Re. The story is the theoretical justification of a new dynasty and the expression of a new political theory. These priests contended that instead of being the son of Horus in the ideal sense, every Pharaoh must be the bodily son of Re, who should become incarnate in order to beget him. Professor Breasted well calls this a "state fiction".<sup>14</sup> In its strict meaning, each king was the offspring in the physical sense of the incarnate sun-god and a human mother. In Professor Breasted's opinion, "it is probable that this interpretation was

<sup>14</sup> *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 122ff. Cf. *An. Rec. of Egypt*, Vol. II, pp. 187-212.

pressed at first only by kings whose claims to the throne through their mortal parents was questionable.<sup>15</sup> It is interesting to note that this fiction was consistently maintained throughout the history of Egypt and that the pictures representing it became stereotyped and conventional, so that they are repeated in identical form in the case of Hatshepsut at Der-el-Bahir and of Amenhotep III at Luxor. Later when Alexander journeyed to the Oasis of Amon and was formally greeted as Son of Amon, he was taking the only path to a regular and legitimate occupancy of the throne of Egypt.<sup>16</sup> The supernatural origin of the Pharaohs, even accepting the story at its face value, implies nothing at all like a virgin-birth. The king is the bodily son of Re. In no recorded instance, is he supposed to be the offspring of an unmarried woman, and the proof is positive and unbroken that the agency of the human father is always implied. The sun-god becomes incarnate in the person of the reigning monarch and in his person begets the next in line. The underlying notion seems to be that the divine element in the king must be renewed in each generation.

As has already been stated, in the case of Gotama we have no contemporary documents, and, according to the usual judgment of scholars, nothing on the subject of Gotama's birth earlier than the Christian era. There is, to be sure, some clash of authorities on this point. Rhys Davids and Fauslööe hold that neither the Pitakas nor the ancient monuments mention Buddha's miraculous birth. Edmunds (*Buddhist and Christian Gospels*) claims that monument 89 contains a representation of the famous birth-story in its earliest form; namely, Gotama's mother dreaming of the descent of the white elephant. Granting the contested points and allowing what might be denied, that Maha-vasta antedates slightly the Christian era, it is at least certain that the developed birth-story of the Jakatas and, later still, of the Lalita Vistara, belong to a period well this side of the

<sup>15</sup> *An. Rec. of Egypt*, Vol. II, sec. 187.

<sup>16</sup> *An. Rec. of Egypt*, Vol. II, sec. 189.

beginning of the Christian era. Even here we have no virgin-birth. In the *Lalita Vistara*, a late document of Northern Buddhism, we find the statement that the mother of Buddha abstained from intercourse for thirty-two months before the advent of Buddha. Edmunds claims that this implies a birth without physical generation (p. 21). But does it? As we have seen, one recurrent feature of the birth stories in general is abnormal periods of gestation, extending all the way from a few moments to several years. The earlier stories fix the period of a Buddha at exactly ten months. A variation in this particular, under the influence of a general spirit of exaggeration which characterizes the later documents, is by no means improbable. According to Edmunds the germ of this later exaggeration is to be found in two statements of primitive Buddhism:

1. Abstinence during gestation.

2. The *gandarva* mythology, according to which "every human being is born by that conjunction of a spirit called a *gandarva* with the parents at that time of conception" (p. 22). This last sentence of Mr. Edmunds we take to be a misstatement of the doctrine, as we shall attempt to show when we come to the alleged parallel with Luke. Rightly understood, the doctrine of the *gandarva* has no bearing upon the later development. Professor Davids holds that the germ of this later modification is the statement of the Wonders and Marvels that the mother of Bodisat has no lustful thoughts toward men. Accepting either view, increasing asceticism is responsible for whatever developments Buddhism has made toward the denial or depreciation of physical generation in the production of a Buddha. Even so, that development stopped a long way this side of a virgin-birth.

The Buddhist birth-stories afford much interesting material for the student of this subject.<sup>17</sup> We note, first of all, that the birth-stories begin before his birth and in the

<sup>17</sup> The quotations and condensations which follow are taken from Rhys-Davids' *Buddhist Birth-Stories*.

remote celestial regions from which he comes. Upon hearing from angels that a new era is to dawn upon the earth and an omniscient Buddha to appear, the deities of the ten thousand world-systems assemble together and going to the living being who is to become Buddha they beseech him to do so. They tell him that now is the time for his Buddhahood. The great being reflects upon five important questions, (1) the time of his advent; (2) the continent and country for his appearance; (3) the tribe in which he should be born; (4) the mother who should bear him; (5) the time when her life should be complete. The most significant of these questions, historically speaking, is the third. In Gotama's own teaching (if we have it), his message to the people was: "Tell them that the poor and lowly, the rich and high, are all one, and that all castes unite in this religion as unite the rivers in the sea."<sup>18</sup> In the birth-stories, we come upon the fatal contradiction that of all the Buddhas, past, present and to come, no Buddha can be born in a low caste. In point of fact, as Oldenberg points out,<sup>19</sup> Buddhism inherited from Brahmanism a strong aristocratic tendency. Gotama's first converts were the "rich youth of Benares". The birth-stories state the meditations of the future Buddha thus:

"The Buddhas are not born in Vaisya caste, nor the Sudra caste; but either in the Brahman or in the Kshatriya caste, whichever then is held in highest repute. The Kshatriya caste is now predominant, I must be born in it and Suddhona the chief shall be my father."

We pause here to point out two striking contrasts with Christianity: (1) The Infancy narratives say nothing of Christ's preëxistence and in those passages of the New Testament in which it is taught nothing is said of His thoughts in the preëxistent state. (2) Though Christ was of the house of David He was born in the humblest cir-

<sup>18</sup> Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 309.

<sup>19</sup> *Buddha*, p. 151.



cumstances. More vital to our present purpose is the fact that Buddha chose his father with the greatest care. Evidently the father was just as essential to proper Buddhahood as the mother. In this, the birth-stories are perfectly consistent, for in every instance but one of the twenty-four or five Buddhas whose life stories are given, both parents are mentioned by name. The one omission is evidently due to haste.

Upon deciding these five points the Bodisat graciously yields to the entreaties of the deities and dismisses them. Thereupon, attended by the angels of joy, he entered the grove of gladness in the city of Delight, from whence he departed to become incarnate. It was at the time of the midsummer festival. Suddhona's wife, Mahā Māyā, after bathing in perfumed water and distributing a vast amount of money in gifts (contrast May's doves), puts on her most gorgeous robes, and, entering the beautiful chamber of the palace, lay down on her royal couch. She fell asleep and dreamed.<sup>20</sup> "The four archangels, the guardians of the world, lifting her up on her couch, carried her to the Himalaya mountains, and placing her under the great Lalatree, seven leagues high, on the Crimson Plain, sixty yojanas broad, they stood respectfully aside." She was next bathed in the sacred lake, perfumed, dressed in heavenly garments and decked with flowers. "Not far from there is the Silver Hill, within which is a golden mansion; in it they spread a heavenly couch, with its head toward the east. Then the future Buddha, who had become a superb white elephant and was wandering in the Golden Hill, approached her from the north. Holding in his silvery trunk a white lotus flower, and uttering a far-away cry, he entered the golden mansion, and thrice doing obeisance to his mother's couch, he gently struck her right side and seemed to enter her womb. Thus was he conceived at the end of the summer festival."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> It is to be noticed that the transformation of this dream into an actual experience is late and non canonical.

<sup>21</sup> *B. B. S.*, pp. 62ff.

The proof that this dream was purely symbolic and that Gotama was begotten in the ordinary way is to be found in what follows. The next day after this dream the Maha related it to her husband, and neither of them understood what it meant. The rajah then summoned sixty-four eminent Brahmans and, after feasting them royally, told his wife's dream and asked for an interpretation of it. This was their answer: "Be not anxious, O King! Your wife has conceived and the fruit of her womb will be a man-child; it will not be a woman-child. You (still addressing the rajah) will have a son. And he, if he adopts a householder's life, will become a king." Combining this statement with the deliberate choice of Suddhona as his father attributed to the Buddha, we have evidence unmistakable that the dream was regarded as nothing more than a symbol of the supernatural involved in the conception which took place under ordinary conditions. But the story does not end there. A succession of physical marvels at once took place, involving a general cosmic convulsion. In the book of *Wonders and Marvels*, certain general statements are made as to the coming of various Buddhas which exhibits very clearly the psychology of the birth-stories.

"Anando, the future Buddha, is mindful and conscious when he vanishes from Tusita and descends into his mother's womb."<sup>22</sup>

"Where the future Buddha vanishes there appears a splendor, limitless and eminent, transcending the angelic might of the angels," etc.

"Anando, when the future Buddha is descending into his mother's womb (that is, during gestation), she is pure from sexuality," etc.

Especial attention should be called to certain other items condensed from the full statements. When the Buddha is in process, his mother has no sickness at all, but is happy with her body free from pain and sees the future Buddha

<sup>22</sup> *Decease*, Bk. III. 15. Cf. Edmunds, *Op. cit.*, pp. 54, 60.

transparently in the womb in full possession of his limbs and faculties. Seven days after his birth the mother dies; ten months is the regular period of gestation; the mother brings forth standing; after his birth he is received first by princes, does not touch the earth, is miraculously clean; a miraculous warm shower greets his birth; he walks at birth, and with bull-like speech proclaims: "I am the chief in the world."

Reviewing the birth-stories as a whole, certain facts emerge with great distinctness:

1. The stories look upon the whole process of Buddhahood as miraculous; the descent of the Bodisat, the conception, the gestation, the birth, the infancy, *et al.*, but all without excluding the agency of the human father. There seems to be no contradiction in the mind of the Buddhists who accepted these stories between natural and supernatural generation.

2. The underlying notion of these stories, as of the folk-tales, is metamorphosis. The Bodisats appear in the birth stories in fifty-two different characters—they disappear only to reappear in another form. They even go to the length of metempsychosis, for twenty-two of these fifty-two forms are animal. The whole tendency of the stories is to make the births as little like births and as much like journeys or transitions as possible. The birth features are reduced to a minimum. One story curiously speaks of the "conception ceremony", as having been performed.<sup>28</sup>

The most careful and elaborate attempt to institute a parallel between Christianity and Buddhism with the idea of suggesting imitation has been made by Mr. Edmunds in his book, *Buddhist and Christian Gospels* (published in Tokyo). Passing over questions concerning date and concerning communication between the Jews and the far East, we propose to take up the central question: Is there a genuine parallel between the two? Mr. Edmunds urges four

<sup>28</sup> *B. B. S.*, Vol. I, p. xxii.

particulars in which he finds a parallel between the Buddhist narratives and the Infancy section of Luke:

1. The theory of a spiritual power overshadowing the mother. This is the doctrine of *gandarva* mentioned above.
2. The vision of a hermit (shepherds in Luke) of angelic hosts rejoicing.
3. The angelic hymn.
4. Prediction about the career of the Saviour by an aged hermit.

This alleged parallel exhibits as clearly as anything could the blinding influence of an enthusiasm which results in a positive inability to make the simplest distinctions. Mr. Edmunds' argument on this question appears learned and formidable, but when the actual parallel is examined as he sets it forth in the texts, its cogency vanishes completely. Dr. Kellogg, in *The Light of Asia and Light of the World*, handles the alleged parallel between Asito and Simeon with complete success. Even Mr. Edmunds seems to have been somewhat shaken by Dr. Kellogg's attack, though he pluckily stands to his guns. He says:<sup>24</sup> "Kellogg, in *The Light of Asia and Light of the World*, disparages the parallel between Asito and Simeon (Lk. ii.), destroying it detail by detail. But he overlooks the connection of Asito with the angelic heralds. It is this organic connection which establishes the parallel between the Nalaka Sutta and the Second of Luke." But Mr. Edmunds himself seems to overlook the fact that in Luke ii. Simeon has no connection whatever with the angels. In this "parallel" Asito the hermit has to do double duty; he represents or is represented by Simeon, who (so far as we know) was no hermit, and also the shepherds, who are not only plural, but are not hermits. Another objection to this alleged parallel is that in the Buddhist documents Asito and his experience fill the entire space. In Luke's account, the episode of Simeon is incidental to the presentation of Jesus in the temple and is combined with the witness of the shepherds and of Anna.

<sup>24</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 672.

Moreover, one of Mr. Edmunds' arguments is that the sequence of narrative is the same in the Buddhist infancy story and in Luke. But of four particulars urged in support of this conclusion, the first is from the *Questions of King Milindo*—the other three are from the *Suttas*. There is no evidence, so far as we can discover, that all the statements were even contained in any one continuous narrative—the sequence is therefore purely artificial.

But again, in regard to the first point, we think there is a still more fundamental break in this alleged parallel. We hold that Mr. Edmunds' statement involves a misinterpretation of the doctrine of the *gandarva*. The original statement of that doctrine is found in the "Middling Collection" (*Dial.*, 38):

"Conception takes place, O Monks, by the union of three. In this world the father and mother are united. The mother may be capable but the genius may not be ready. It is by the union of these three, O Monks, that conception takes place."

This statement alleges the presence of three elements as necessary to conception, and one of them is explicitly said to be that of the father. The narrative in Luke alleges two, that of the father being explicitly excluded. But apart from this there is absolutely no similarity between the *gandarva* in Buddhism and the Holy Spirit in Luke. The *gandarva*, if it is not as we should suppose from the Chinese text, something material akin to the "heavenly glory" of the Zoroastrians or the "divine ichor" of the Egyptians, is at least a constituent element of personality, inseparably blended with the new-born being, while the Holy Spirit in Luke is a divine personal energy, which, while it imparts life, remains forever distinct and numerically separate from that which it has created. When this clear distinction is recognized, all close and real resemblance between the two documents disappears.

We must now pause and gather up results. The unde-



nable fact that heathen systems contain no analogy to the Virgin-Birth, places the whole discussion upon a different basis. The existence of heathen analogies would not prove the derivation of the Christian statement from them; but the non-existence of such analogies is proof positive that it was not derived from an external heathen source. There is also an inherent improbability in the suggestion of heathen sources for Jewish ideas which can be overcome only by the most positive evidence. In this case, we have not only no positive evidence, but in a multitude of instances a clearly revealed tendency of mind in another direction. We may reasonably consider the case for heathen influence closed. Dr. W. C. Allen, in his recent *Commentary on Matthew*, referring to the crucial passage Isa. vii. 14 says: "There are signs that the view that Isaiah was using current mythological terms, and intended his *môlym* to carry with it the sense of supernatural birth, is rightly regaining ground" (p. 10). That the prophet meant his words to intimate a supernatural birth, we are not prepared to deny: that he was using current mythological terms, we hold to be more than questionable. For if he means that the birth of Immanuel was to be supernatural, it can have been only in the old Jewish sense, that is, supernatural with all the human factors present,<sup>25</sup> or else in the New Testament sense of a virgin-birth. If he uses the term in the historic Jewish sense, the heathen inference is unnecessary; if he means a virgin birth, the heathen reference is impossible. Heathenism had no virgin births. "God-begotten" in heathenism means always and everywhere the same thing—the physical offspring of a being capable of assuming human form and performing human functions. "Supernatural birth" in heathenism meant what it did among the Jews—an extraordinary divine activity coincident with the human factors and supplementary to them. When Professor Bacon<sup>26</sup> says that to the contemporary Jewish mind "Joseph might be,

<sup>25</sup> So Mr. Woods in *H. B. D.*, Art. "Virgin".

<sup>26</sup> Hastings, *D. B.*, Vol. I, p. 140a.

not merely the putative or adoptive father of Jesus, but the real father—at the same time that the birth was due solely to the 'power of the Most High' (Lk. i. 35)", he speaks the exact truth. That would be the natural Jewish statement of a supernatural birth. But, when we find a virgin-birth firmly intrenched in authentic documents of unquestionable Jewish origin, we are utterly at a loss to account for them on the basis of presupposition or mental bias. Moreover, Professor Bacon's statement is quite as true of the heathen as of the Jews. We have found in folk-lore, in Egyptian mythology, in Zoroastrianism, that a supernatural birth does not exclude the human factors, but, on the contrary, expressly includes them without a suggestion of incongruity. The Immanuel passage (in the Greek form) does not necessarily imply a supernatural birth in any other than the historic sense, and that the birth which it forecasts was supernatural in a hitherto unknown way must have given the passage an almost startling significance to those who first interpreted it in the light of the fact. Heathen influence either in the original passage or in the Greek translation is not traceable. No current mythological terms either of Isaiah's time or later in the time of the LXX can account for it. Heathenism does not account for the Isaiah passage, and the latter does not account for the New Testament statement. This statement still stands alone.

The one intrenchment of this "influence" hypothesis which we have not yet discussed is the writing of Philo Judaeus, and a few sentences on this subject may not inappropriately close this paper. At first blush, Philo's constant use and wide application of the terms virgin and virginity are startling. It almost seems as if we had reached the source of our New Testament statement, but a closer inspection blights this expectation almost before it has time to bud.

1. Philo does not share the Messianic expectation, and.

therefore, does not supply the connection between the "virgin" idea and Messiah's birth.

2. Philo (and presumably the same is true of his readers) seems not to have had any clearly defined or consistent notion of what he means to convey by the terms virgin and virginity. When he speaks of Sarah, Leah and Tamar as "virgins" and of the "virginity" of the graces, of memory, of numbers and of Moses' hands, we are at a loss to assign any definite and tangible meanings to his use of words. Indeed, one is strongly tempted to believe that they are cant words and do not mean anything upon which common sense can lay hold.

We find (a) that fatherhood in Philonian phraseology is nothing but a general symbolic solution of the difficult and perplexing problem of God's relationship to the people and things which he has created: (b) that begetting is also a symbolic term for God's efficient activity in the realms both of matter and of spirit: (c) that virginity has no connection whatever with what the New Testament means by it, since it is compatible not only with marriage but with unlawful sexual intercourse: (d) that Philo does not speak of any actual historic person as virgin-born in the sense of excluding or denying the human fatherhood. He speaks of the birth in the ordinary way both of Isaac and of Rebekah's children—while at other times he allegorizes them in his regular manner. Philo's peculiar use of terms, his confounding of natural and supernatural, and his extravagant allegorizing may be seen in the following passages taken from *Cherubim*:

"Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and if there be any of like zeal with them, are not represented as knowing their wives . . . for they who live with these men are in name, indeed, wives, but in fact virtues (*Cher. xii., cf. Allegories iii. xxviii. xxix.*).

"But it is not lawful for Virtues which are the parents of many perfect things to associate with a mortal husband, but, without having received the seed of generation from

any other being, they will never be able by themselves alone to conceive anything. Who then is it who sows good seed in them, except the Father of the Universe, the unbegotten God, he who is the parent of all things?" (τὰ σύμπαντα γεννῶν).

"And I will bring forward as a competent witness in proof of what I have said the most holy Moses. For he introduces Sarah as conceiving a son when God beheld her by himself, but to him who was eager to attain unto wisdom, and his name was called Abraham" (*Cher.* xiii).<sup>27</sup>

These statements and many others like them, reduced as far as possible to the form of common sense, mean simply that the sons of promise, ideally considered, come from God. Philo would not have denied—indeed, does not, but on the contrary affirms—that the physical human being known as Isaac was begotten by Abraham and born of Sarah. A scheme of thought which turns a woman into a virtue who brings forth, in a purely idealistic manner, various "perfect things", obviously has no place for the function of a human father whose begetting is literal and physical. The father suffers a change in Philo's thought by which he becomes a contemplative philosopher to whom the various perfect things are presented by the virtue who is known as his wife. The whole scheme is consistent and absolutely unreal. The philosophical father, the allegorical mother and, so to speak, the theosophical child belong together. Philo could not evaporate the mother into an allegory and the child into a principle and leave the father with flesh and bones. It is perfectly clear, however, that no such thing as an actual, historical virgin birth ever came within the range of Philo's thought. He first denudes the mother of reality and then attenuates the rest of the family into harmony therewith, making an abstract philosophy of human beings. We can see absolutely no reason for believing that any man educated enough to read Philo's writings could have understood him to teach a literal virgin birth or

<sup>27</sup> The facts upon which these statements rest have been brought together by Carman, *Am. Jour. of Theol.*, Vol. IV., pp. 491ff.

to mean by the supernatural birth of the sons of promise anything more than their teachers had always meant. Furthermore, if the New Testament statement was due to Philo's influence, there would be in connection with it some evidence of interest in other Philonian ideas, especially in the allegorizing of Scripture which formed the staple of Philo's thinking. The Philonian atmosphere is pervasive and the method full of charm to one who adopts it. But Matthew was a literalist rather than an allegorizer, and both Infancy narratives are pegged to the earth of actuality by matter of fact statements. Mary is no allegorized virtue (albeit assuredly virtuous); her character is too genuinely human, her task too difficult, her life too humble, and her experiences too poignantly real to be imaginary. Whether Philo's thought has influenced John's prologue or not, it has assuredly exercised no influence on the Infancy documents.

We do not feel that it is too much to say that after careful and candid search we have found no external starting point save in the actual occurrence for the New Testament statement concerning the Birth of Christ. Nowhere except here do we find the birth of a Being, normally human, apart from physical generation.

*Canandaigua, N. Y.*

LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET.



## REVIEWS

### RECENT LITERATURE

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#### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGION OF EVOLUTION. By CARMA. Braintree: C. Joscelyne, Bookseller, High Street. 1906. 8vo., pp. 305. Price 3/6 net.

This pamphlet is an attempt to show not merely that evolution is consistent with Christianity, but that Christianity is demanded by evolution and can be explained only on the basis of it. As such, while not the first or the solitary one of its kind, it is probably the best. Indeed, the discussion is marked by clearness and vigor of expression, by adequate information, by boldness and even originality of conception, and by a grasp of the whole subject, which are as admirable as they are rare in any department of literature, but particularly, perhaps, in that to which this essay belongs.

Who Carma is, we do not know. It is certain, however, that he is a Christian who has become enamoured of the modern theory of evolution rather than an evolutionist who has become interested in Christianity. His motive is more religious than scientific. It is certain, too, that he is a Protestant and an Arminian. It is in Protestant Christianity alone that he finds evolution continuing, and it is the Arminian doctrine of the will that he holds. It is certain also that he is a firm believer in the Bible as "the Word of God". It is the cause and not the result of the evolution of the Hebrew nation; it is from above, not from below; it is of God, not of man. Indeed, Carma's ultimate aim in writing would seem to be to show that the true theory of evolution, instead of supporting and even necessitating that destructive criticism of the Bible which it has undoubtedly inspired, is really fatal to it. To accept it, one must repudiate evolution utterly. For example, "nothing is gained by attempts to postulate a revelation. It is not explained or accounted for, but merely becomes an absurdity. If we attribute the New Testament to the Dark Ages, it is not more really natural or less miraculous, but has become completely irrational and incredible miracle. If we attribute the Law of Moses to the Exile, it becomes totally inexplicable. Possibly the master mind, which perceived that the Tabernacle was invented to explain the Temple, may eventually arrive at the equally reasonable conclusion, that the Old Testament was composed at the Council of Nicea in order to explain and account for Christianity. Theories which place the result before

the cause and the end before the beginning are literally as well as figuratively preposterous."

And yet, admirable as are Carma's spirit and aim, and striking as are many of his exposures of the fallacies of the destructive criticism of the Bible, we cannot escape the conviction that his own argument breaks down at precisely the two most vital points.

1. Evolution as he conceives it is not evolution as it is commonly understood. He admits that it is not Haeckel's theory. That is false because it is so materialistic as to leave no room for a rational evolution. Neither does he espouse Spencer's view. Though it substitutes force for Haeckel's matter, it involves equally the absurdity of "an eternal evolution rendered forever abortive by an eternal dissolution". Nor does even Le Conte please him much better. His theory Carma regards—and probably rightly—as essentially pantheistic. One and all, they find the cause of the progress of nature in nature. This is why their schemes are correctly termed evolutionary, whether it be an evolution of matter or of force or of the immanent God. They all conceive of nature as evolving what is in her and because of what is in her. But this is just what Carma is at most pains to deny. "The cause of this progress", he says, "cannot be found in nature." "It is impossible for anything to bring forth what it never contained, or to bestow upon something else a higher existence than its own." In a word, it is not evolution that Carma is championing, it is what Dr W. G. T. Shedd calls development and which he has described so clearly and beautifully in the opening chapter of his *History of Christian Doctrine*. It is, therefore, a view at the very opposite pole from the accepted theory of evolution. It traces the continuity of progress not to forces resident in nature, but to the Supreme Person who is the author of nature and who is independent of it and who is above it. Hence, to write as Carma does is misleading. What he has shown to be consistent with Christianity is not the theory of evolution, but the doctrine of development, yet the impression that he makes on the ordinary reader is that what is essential in what is commonly understood as evolution is consistent with the presuppositions of the Christian religion. This, however, is precisely what he does not believe and what he would deny most vigorously. His discussion, therefore, misses its point utterly. It is as if one were to commend boss-rule when what he meant was the authority of the civil magistrate.

2. Christianity as presented by Carma is not the Christianity of the Bible. Our limits keep us from mentioning all or many of the differences. Chief among them, perhaps, are these:

a. The doctrine of creation. This is best expressed in Carma's own words on p. 5: "Everything necessary for the perfecting of the universe must be included in the act of creation, but we must not suppose that the act was in time or instantaneous and that it is only the effect which is presented to us as a gradual development. It is the eternal act itself which is gradually presented to the finite mind in the evolution of the universe." . . . "Progress is one aspect of creation."

In a word, as evolution presupposes time and, therefore, a divine cause, so this cause operates or creates by means of evolution. That is, evolution is the process of creation. God creates the world by evolving it. Now this is pantheism pure and simple. God must either call the world into being out of nothing by the word of his power or he must evolve it out of himself. Unless the world were eternal, no other course is conceivable; and if the world were eternal, Carma's insistence on creation would be irrational. The Christianity, therefore, which he represents evolution as demanding and as alone explaining is just pantheism. If creation and evolution be but the eternal aspect and the temporal aspect of one and the same thing, this must be so.

b. Carma's position with regard to special creation and divine intervention. This is ruled out. "Since we must think of the process of becoming as a continuous development and a harmonious progress to one great event, it is evident that special creations are excluded. The partial acceptance of the principle is illogical. We cannot make man an exception. He is a part of the universe and must have been created with the universe and developed in due time by evolution" (p. 9). Now setting one side the particular question as to the origin of man, nothing is clearer than that Christianity presupposes special creations and divine interventions. It itself claims to be one. Whether as respects the race or the individual, it affirms itself to have come, not up, out of the creation, by evolution, but down, from heaven, by immediate creation. It is not that in redemption or in regeneration God acts more really, more personally, than he is conceived to do in evolution. It is that he acts otherwise. He puts out his own hand into the stream of evolution, and thus he brings about what through it alone even he never could have effected. The Christian man is first of all and above all "a new creature", the effect of a special creation, the result of a divine intervention. He who fails to see this misses the very point of the Gospel.

c. Carma's doctrine of man. As might be supposed, this would link man more closely with the creatures below him. Wholly the product of evolution, there must be no break between him and the other animals. Hence, Adam, who is so far removed from them as to give names to them, may not be regarded as the first man. He is the "first parent of civilized man, and his office was the redemption of humanity from barbarism". Nor is it true that man, as no other creature, has been made like God. That he was created "in his image" does not mean this. It means that, as does the whole creation, only more clearly, man "reflects and reveals" God. Hence, there is no suggestion even of a break between him and nature. What is highest in man is not as it were a ray from the glory of the Creator; it is rather the perfection of the glory of the creation. To some this may seem very pretty, but it certainly is not Christianity. This assumes that man differs from the whole creation in that he has been made like God. This is why the creation has been subjected to him. This is why he can know God. This is why it is not wrong for God to give

even his Son for his redemption. In a word, Carma's doctrine of man would make the Gospel, not a mystery, for it is already the mystery into which even the angels desire to look: but an absurdity that men, not to say angels, could not tolerate.

d. Carma's doctrine of Christ. This is distinctly humanitarian. "Christ, who is the embodiment of Christianity, may be described as the Man of Evolution, because he is at once the person in whom man attains perfection and the person in whom he is born again into a new and better existence" (p. 52). That is, our Lord, unique and high though the position is which is assigned to him, is of the earth and of man. Indeed, this is asserted "Christ is man and is developed out of man" (p. 152). But the New Testament makes him the Son of God and affirms that he came down from heaven.

This, however, is sufficient. Were there space, it would be interesting to show how in other respects, notably the fall and sin, Carma departs widely from the teachings of the New Testament. In a word, if his discussion proves anything, it is that "the religion of evolution must be a gospel quite other than that of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ".

Carma's initial and chief error would seem to be that he would make evolution the *only* mode of divine operation. It must explain everything or nothing (p. 9). That it is *a* mode of God's procedure, we freely admit, but that it is his *only* mode, we cannot deny too strenuously. God causes evolution. He calls the germ into being out of nothing and sets it evolving. He is immanent in the entire process of evolution, personally sustaining and directing it, bringing out of it by means of resident forces what he himself in the beginning put into it. But beyond all this, God interposes in the course of evolution. At critical epochs he puts into it, as he did when he originated it, something new something that would never have appeared in the course of evolution but for such interposition, something that does appear because, and only because, he has, not by means of resident forces but by the direct exercise of his own power, himself injected it. To deny such special creation is to repudiate Christianity at the outset, as to identify evolution with creation is to misrepresent evolution.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

#### THE PROBLEM OF FAITH AND FREEDOM IN THE LAST TWO CENTURIES.

By JOHN OMAN, M.A., B.D., D.Phil., Author of *Vision and Authority*. 8vo: pp. xxiv, 443. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth Street. 1906.

We have in this ample volume the sixth series of Kerr Lectures; and however we may differ from some of its conclusions, we must allow that it is not unworthy of its predecessors. Indeed, in grasp of the problem considered and in acquaintance with the literature bearing on it Dr Oman's discussion will bear comparison with the first series

of Kerr Lectures, "The Christian View of God and the World," by Prof. James Orr, and higher praise could scarcely be given. At the same time, we can not help feeling that the task which our author set himself is impossible within the limits permitted to him. Though he is a master of generalization and of concise and pregnant expression, even he hardly succeeds in so outlining the history of religious thought and effort during the last two centuries as to enlighten on the relation of these to the fundamental problem discussed those not already informed. In a word, though of necessity, too much is presupposed and omitted.

The problem which Dr. Oman considers, and which is "the ultimate problem of at least the last two centuries," is "the relation of Faith and Freedom, the problem of how Faith is to be absolute and Freedom absolute, yet both one." His review and criticism of the successive and various attempts of the last two centuries to solve this problem, as Jesuitism, English Deism, German Rationalism, Romanticism, the High Church movement, the Tübingen School's theory of Development, Ritschl's Theology of Experience—this historical review "emphasizes the significance of freedom." To be more specific, it shows that "the absolute distinctions of freedom are not affected by evolution," the governing conception of the 19th century as gravitation was that of the 18th. Thus the progress of the centuries has only brought out more clearly "the absolute distinction in morals," "absolute lives in history," the "absolute necessity of religion," the "absolute distinction between Christianity and other religions", the "absolute difference between Christ and other men." It suggests, too, "a basis for principles of criticism," it shows "the union of God's power and love," it "assigns its right place to the church," it "promises a philosophy of history." All these are highly desirable results: yet, whether because of the necessity of extreme condensation or not, our author has not convinced us that these are, in every case, actual results. For example, we can not see how the conception of evolution has not even obscured the absoluteness of the distinction between right and wrong. This might not be so, were the evolution only of the recognition of this distinction. It is true that as the slow development of eyes would not affect the light, so the evolution of a moral nature need not affect the right. Right is right, whether or not we see it to be so. But the point of the theory of evolution, at least as it has commonly been held, is that it is the moral ideal as well as moral discernment that is evolved. What constitutes right depends ultimately on our feeling of need as social beings and this feeling of social need has itself been evolved out of mere gregarious instincts. Hence, it does not appear how the absoluteness of the distinction between right and wrong can be maintained. Grant that it does emerge in consciousness like a flash. Grant that as such it does seem to be absolute. In the last analysis it is of a piece with everything else. In a word, the question of origin can not be set to one side. What a thing is is not independent of what it has come from or even of how it has come. The relative can never develop into the



absolute. To be absolute, the moral ideal must lie wholly outside of the process of evolution.

Yet while at this point as well as at several others we should be compelled to except to our author's position, we gladly acknowledge and would most heartily emphasize the nobility of the spirit and goal of his argument. As it seems to us, he does not always see to the centre of difficulties, but he never loses sight of "the glorious liberty of the children of God" as the true meaning of life and the real end of history. Religion is more than the church; it is more than religious services, and though men were never so ready to recognize this as to-day, no vigorous reaffirmation and clear reillustration of it can be excessive.

*Princeton*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

**CHRIST AND BUDDHA.** By JOSIAH NELSON CUSHING, D. D., Ph. D., Missionary for Forty Years in Burma, Late President of the Rangoon College. With an Appreciation of the Author by Henry Melville King, Pastor Emeritus of the First Baptist Church in Providence, R. I. 8vo., pp. 160. Philadelphia—American Baptist Publication Society—Boston, New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Atlanta, Dallas. 1907.

**SEMONS OF A BUDDHIST ABBOT.** Addresses on Religious Subjects by The Rt. Rev. Soyen Shaku, Lord Abbot of Engaku-ji and Kencho-ji, Kamakura, Japan. Including the Sutra of Forty-two Chapters. Translated from the Japanese ms. by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki. With portrait of the Author. 8vo.; pp. vii, 220. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. London Agents, Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

Two more interesting and illuminating books on Buddhism could scarcely have appeared. The former, by one of the ablest missionaries of the American Baptist Church, gives a singularly clear presentation of this most formidable of the religions of the East and an equally striking comparison of its teachings and results with those of Christianity. This comparison is all the more instructive because of the writer's eminently judicial temper and his evident sympathy with all that is true in the system which he is discussing. We are interested to note, that he regards Buddha, not as an antagonist, but as a quiet reformer of Brahmanism; that he considers the life and character of Buddha, so far as we can get a picture of them, as among the most lovely that have ever blessed the world; that while holding to the historicity of the chief events in his alleged career, he is at pains to point out the immense inferiority in this respect of the story of Buddha to the Gospels, that while he treats Buddhism as a religion on the ground that it is commonly taken to be such, he denies its right to be so considered; that he characterizes it as distinctly atheistic; and that he exposes the inconsistency between its doctrine of the soul and its teaching as to transmigration, and also the absurdity of its practice of prayer. It may be

added that not the least charm of the book is its chaste and elegant style.

The second of these two volumes might well be regarded as written in illustration of the first, were it not that it was published a few months earlier and that it expounds the eastern and, as the author would say, the "more developed" Buddhism. In spite of this, however, and in spite, too, of the fact that he writes to commend his creed to Americans, his sermons set forth fairly enough the more fundamental principles of the western and more orthodox Buddhism which Dr. Cushing presents. The sermons themselves are models of terse and clear exposition and the English into which they have been translated is fascinatingly good.

*Princeton*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIONS. By EDWARD BIERER. 8vo.; pp. xv, 385. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1906.

This is a comparative discussion of the different great religious systems of the world, and an argument for a universal religion. It is written from the standpoint of liberal Unitarianism, but not with the grace of many of that school or with the logical force and scholarship of some. Indeed, it is neither convincing in argument nor attractive in style. It will, however, serve one purpose, whether useful or not is another question. It is really a thesaurus of the stock objections to orthodox Christianity, of the frivolous ones quite as much as of the serious.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE ORIGIN AND PERMANENT VALUE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. "Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo.; pp. xii, 270. \$1.00 net.

OUTLINES FOR THE STUDY OF BIBLICAL HISTORY AND LITERATURE. By FRANK KNIGHT SANDERS, Ph. D., Sometime Dean of the Theological Faculty and Professor of Biblical History and Archæology, Yale University, and HENRY THATCHER FOWLER, Ph. D., Professor of Biblical Literature and History, Brown University. With Maps and Charts. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo.; pp. xiv, 233, plates vi. \$1.25 net.

These two books from the same publishing house may be reviewed together, since they possess a characteristic feature in common. Professor Kent states that he wrote his treatise on "the origin and permanent value of the Old Testament" "within the all too brief limits of a Christmas vacation". The haste of composition has been pointed to as

incompatible with thoroughness of treatment. The criticism is unfair. The previous studies of Professor Kent in this line, extending over years and popular lectures upon the theme had furnished him with the material. It only remained to give form and coherence to matter already at his disposal. And, doubtless, the discourse is more flowing because the pen sped so rapidly. At any rate, the literary charm of the book is great. And beyond this attractiveness, the manner in which the author states his doctrine is winsome, and his teaching is so phrased that it may often be interpreted up to the loftiest and purest conception of the subject which the Christian church has ever entertained. The book embodies much that agrees with the best modern thinking on these themes.

Of a different character, but adapted to its purpose, is the other work, from the pen of Dr. Sanders in collaboration with Professor Fowler. It is not intended for continuous reading, but is offered simply as a guide to students. It is mainly occupied with a chronological arrangement of the Scriptures and a series of questions on these writings. The authors generally refrain from stating their own views. Their aim is rather to present the literature of the Old and New Testaments, together with some uncannical writings, in the true chronological order, as they conceive of it, to suggest matters for investigation by the student of these documents, to furnish him with suitable guidance in the study of these problems by directing his attention to the relevant printed discussions, and then to leave him to himself to form and formulate his own conclusions. The number of reference books cited in the text is properly limited, while a much fuller bibliography is given in an appendix.

In our judgment neither of these works will long endure, despite the scholarly labor that has been expended upon them; for they rest on a foundation that appears to be crumbling. They are based on the theories of the Wellhausen school concerning the origin of the Israelites, the course of their religious development, and the growth of the Old Testament. But it has become quite evident that the fundamental positions of this school were assumed with inadequate appreciation of the fact that law and literature, religious doctrine and ritual, had already reached a high state of development when Moses began his work for the advancement of his people. He undertook his labors under great advantages, in an environment of attainment. This fact, which is steadily gaining the recognition of biblical scholars, is seen by increasing numbers to be fatal to the particular scheme of development in Israel which is assumed by the Wellhausen hypothesis.

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

ISRAEL'S GOLDEN AGE. The Story of the United Kingdom. By J. DICK FLEMING, B. D., Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics, Manitoba College, Winnipeg. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, 1907. 8vo.; pp. 160. Price 45 cents. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

This little book belongs to the series of "Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students" edited by Professor Marcus Dods, D.D.,

and Rev. Alexander Whyte, D. D." It goes somewhat beyond its title and covers not only "Israel's Golden Age," but also the conquest of Canaan and "Israel's Iron Age." The author seeks to penetrate beneath the events into their causes and relations, and into the motives of the actors in them. He writes well; and to those members of Bible classes who are already thoroughly familiar with the particulars of the biblical history, this survey from a philosophical standpoint will prove attractive and illuminating.

The work is marred by low views of Israel's religious teachers and teaching, and by a vacillating adherence to current subjective criticism.  
*Princeton.* JOHN D. DAVIS

**DANIEL AND HIS PROPHECIES.** By the Rev. CHARLES H. H. WRIGHT, D.D., Trin. Coll., Dub., M.A., Exeter Coll., Oxon; Ph.D. of the University of Leipzig, Dannelan Lecturer in the University of Dublin (1880-1); Bampton Lecturer (1878); Grinfield Lecturer on the Septuagint (1893-7); and Public Examiner in Semitic Languages in the Honours School, University of Oxford (1864, 1895). London: Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1906. 16mo., pp. xxii, 334. Imported by Little, Brown & Co., Boston. \$2.50 net.

The author of this book is widely known for his compact "Introduction to the Old Testament" and his elaborate exposition of the prophecies of Zechariah. His work displays competent knowledge of the literature on Daniel, and it is marked by fulness and frankness of discussion, calmness of tone, courtesy towards critics and exegetes of opposite views, an easy style, sober restraint in interpretation, and a close adherence to the substantial matters.

The salient points of this treatise, and the conclusions that determine the place and value one must assign to the Book of Daniel, are that the prophet Daniel was known to Ezekiel, that the book is authenticated as true prophecy by the endorsement of Christ; that the fourth kingdom is the Roman empire; and that the seventy weeks begin in the year 457 B. C., when the decree of Artaxerxes was issued to Ezra. The author's peculiar views that affect the general argument are: 1. His theory of an Aramaic original for the entire Book of Daniel. From it chapters ii-vii were taken bodily as copies. 2. His theory that chapters xi and xii do not contain the prophecy in the form in which it was penned by the prophet, but are a paraphrase by an interpreter of Daniel. The question of the text, which this theory implies, is extremely important. The additions to Daniel which are included in the Apocrypha, the form of the book partly in Aramaic and partly in Hebrew, the obscurities of the text and the variations in the versions, unite in warning the investigator, that many problems remain unsolved, that he is dealing with a book that has had its vicissitudes; and that the text before him must be received with peculiar caution. Nevertheless, because of the present limited critical apparatus, these chapters must be

accepted in their present form by the exegete and the critic as the basis of their work, and yet to many there is always the haunting fear that the prophecy in these two chapters particularly does not lie before us in its original form, but is a paraphrase, as Dr. Wright believes, or at least contains a marginal gloss or two imbedded in it. The entire fabric of the exegesis and criticism of the Book of Daniel rests primarily on these two chapters. The slightest possible modification of the text would necessitate a wholly different interpretation of this particular prophecy from the minute exposition that, notwithstanding all the obstacles which lie in its way, is yet the most favored one at present, and would require a reconstruction of the arguments for the date and character of the book.

Chapters iii and iv of Dr. Wright's book, constituting about one-eighth of the work and treating of the references in the Book of Daniel to the secular history of Babylonia, are not wholly satisfactory. In fact the archaeology seems to have been obtained at second hand, and not to have been thoroughly mastered at that. For example, Dr. Wright has failed to notice the simple and satisfactory explanation of the chronological divergence between Dan. 1: 1 and Jer. 25: 1. It is coming to be recognized that the two statements give the same date, and owe their diversity to the difference that existed between the scribes of Palestine and Babylonia in the method of reckoning regnal years. It is strange to read, remembering the views of the author, that the writer of Daniel "seems to have been well acquainted with the Books of the Kings and the Chronicles" "and Ezra" (pp. 113, 134). And it is stranger still to be told that in the year 540 B. C. "there was still a Jewish monarch living in retirement in Babel" (p. 132). Why does Dr. Wright say that "according to Winckler" Neriglissor married a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar? (p. 123). There is a greater authority for this fact, none less than Berosus.

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

**THE LORD OF GLORY.** A study of the Designations of our Lord in the New Testament, with especial reference to His Deity. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: American Tract Society, London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1907. 8vo., pp. 332.

What is attempted in this book is primarily a survey of the designations which the New Testament writers apply to our Lord, with a view to acquiring a sense of the attitude, intellectual and emotional, sustained by them to the Lord's person. But a secondary purpose is intertwined with this. This is to exhibit, by this example, the clearness and strength of the testimony of the New Testament to our Lord's essential divinity. The book is thus fundamentally an exposition, and actually an argument. It will attain its end only if it both conveys to the reader a plain general account of the whole body of designations applied to our Lord in the New Testament, and fixes in his mind a



clear conviction that to our Lord's first followers as a whole, and to Himself as well, He was nothing other than God manifest in the flesh. The starting point of both the exposition and the argument is taken from the Synoptic Gospels; and the material offered by them is dealt with more fully than that supplied by the rest of the New Testament, which is adduced rather as corroborative than as original evidence. The disposition of the matter will be readily understood from the headings of the successive sections: Introductory, the Designations of our Lord in Matthew; Matthew's Conception of our Lord; the Designations of our Lord in Luke and their Implications; the Jesus of the Synoptists; the Jesus of the Synoptists, the Primitive Jesus; the Designations of our Lord in John and their Significance; the Designations of our Lord in Acts and their Significance; the Corroboration of the Epistles of Paul; the Witness of the Epistle to the Hebrews; the Witness of the Apocalypse; the Issue of the Investigation.

Any value the book may have is very greatly increased by the full and accurate index of the passages of Scripture cited, which has been prepared by the Rev. Dr. John H. Kerr, Secretary of the American Tract Society, to whom also is wholly due any accuracy which may have been attained in printing the book. The great pains which Dr. Kerr has taken in verifying the numerous references with his own hands and otherwise watching over the actual printing of the book, have made the printed volume almost as much his as the author's; and the author takes this opportunity of acknowledging them and returning his thanks for them. There are two other indexes, one of which gives a list of the designations our Lord employed in the New Testament, while the other notes the authors cited.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

ST. PAUL The Man and His Work. By H. WEINEL, Professor Extraordinary of Theology in the University of Jena. Translated by the Rev. G. A. BIENEMANN, M. A., and edited by the Rev. W. D. MORRISON, L.L. D. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. 8vo. pp. xiv, 399.

Professor Weinel's vivid portrait of Paul, as seen through the spectacles of the modern critical school, has already been before the public for some time in its German form. It appeared first, in large part, in a series of papers which attracted wide attention, printed in successive numbers of the radical journal, the *Christliche Welt*. Then in its completeness, in book form. The English translation now before us reproduces the brilliant German work only in its contents; the charming form of the original has largely evaporated in the process of its transfusion into a new language. Nevertheless, the reader of the volume will obtain from it what it primarily contains—Professor Weinel's portrait of the Apostle Paul.

This portrait is injured somewhat by the narrowness of the founda-

tion on which it is built. For Professor Weinel accepts as from Paul only the four major Epistles—Romans, Corinthians, Galatians—together with Philippians and I Thessalonians, and knows no other primary source of information concerning the Apostle except the so-called "Travel-document" incorporated in Acts. It is far more injured, however, by certain peculiarities of interpretation, by which Professor Weinel, standing over his victim, forces upon him a series of opinions and points of view, which his language will hardly endure, but which Prof. Weinel thinks must be what he intends to say because he finds them in the Pharisaic literature of late Judaism—and was it not from the circle of the Pharisees that Paul sprung? It is most of all injured, however, by the double purpose which informs Prof. Weinel's sketch. It is not merely to paint as true and vivid a picture of Paul as possible that he writes; but to validate a new view of Paul and his place in the development of "Christianity", and above all to commend a new view of "Christianity" to our generation. "Our task", he says, "is to understand a character of the first century, in and for this our twentieth century, to represent the everlasting questions that assail the human heart in the Apostle's features of human weakness and human greatness, and guided by this, its 'second founder', to obtain some preliminary grasp of the fundamental problems of Christianity" (p. 12). Since his ultimate purpose is, thus, by means of Paul, to commend a new view of Christianity to the world, Prof. Weinel cannot complain if we find his work more useful as an exposition of this new Christianity than as a portrait of the Apostle—full as it may be of useful "broken lights" thrown back on the life of Paul.

The new view of Christianity which Professor Weinel wishes to further by this sketch of one of the early heroes of the Christian religion, is that it consists so utterly in an attitude of soul to God, conceived as Father, that it is entirely independent of all those questions of dogma with which it has been unfortunately identified through the ages. It was Paul above all others who entangled Christianity with conceptions of a Fall, of Original Sin, of an incarnated Heavenly Being, of an Atonement bought in blood, of a Sacramental system, of a limited Ethical outlook. But these things were but the husk of his religion, brought with him from his Pharisaic training; and represent neither the heart of the man nor the essence of the Christian religion. Penetrating beneath this hard shell of Pharisaic dogma, the nineteenth century has discovered the real Paul, and it is time now, as the twentieth century opens, that the whole world should know him, that they may admire and love him as he deserves, instead of being repelled by him as they now are—witness Lagarde and Nietzsche. And so doing it has not only discovered Paul but also saved the Christian religion. For nothing is more certain than that Christianity cannot survive in this our modern world if it is to be weighed down with all these outworn dogmas, which, to speak shortly, no longer correspond with our conception of the universe or of God. While it must be admitted, then, that Paul is fundamentally the author

of this dogmatic "Christianity", it must also be allowed that this dogmatic Christianity was accidental to his religion, and that in its essence it is the simple faith in God as Father, which Jesus taught, which along with Jesus Paul commends to us. "Wherever fire is, there are dross and ashes too," and we are to preserve not the dross and ashes but the pure flame. Paul was, no doubt, the first to develop these ideas by which "the religion of the divine Fatherhood was changed into the faith in the divine nature of the man Jesus" (p. 140). But we are not "to call every man a heretic who cannot accept Paul's mysticism or repeat the Shibboleth of 'the living Christ', because his modern outlook on the universe forbids him to do so" (p. 148): or who refuses to make of the dogma of the atonement, instead of a holy life, the narrow gate which leads to the kingdom of heaven (p. 169). It is not what Paul brought with him from Judaism but what he found in Christianity which concerns us. And in him as in Jesus "the living core and center of all religion is joy in the Divine Sonship": and this abides, though we can no longer find ourselves at home in his doctrinal system. Thus eloquently, Professor Weinel pleads, through his picture of Paul, for an undogmatic Christianity or rather for a Christianity whose dogmas—dogmas of unpropitiated forgiveness of unexpiated sin to all who will look to God for it—are quite different from the dogmas by which Christianity has thus far conquered the world to itself.

It is quite natural that Paul the dogmatist suffers a little at the hands of Prof. Weinel the non-dogmatist. The whole dogmatic system of the great theologian is looked somewhat pityingly upon as a soiled and ragged suit of old clothes not yet put off. The weaknesses of the man are thrown into high lights to explain his failure more purely to realize the high call of the Christian spirit. But the greatness of the man, the thinker, the organizer, the Christian, is seen too clearly to be quite obscured even by this envelope of weaknesses. And it is just here that Prof. Weinel's book becomes valuable. Its lesson is that we may reject the whole mass of Paul's teaching, and yet be forced to discover that Paul was too great a man to be neglected and too noble a man not to be admired and loved. The query is whether so great and so noble and so true a man can be so admired and loved as Prof. Weinel bids us admire and love him, and yet so disregarded or even despised in his teaching and in his testimony to the divine origin and authority and value of that teaching: whether we must not ultimately take our place by Nietzsche and curse him, or else with the whole Christian world and bless him? Is Prof. Weinel's attitude of a somewhat supercilious patronage quite tenable with respect to a man like Paul? And beyond that lies another question of some importance. Can "Christianity" after all be interpreted as consisting of the philosophical faith of the nineteenth century, baptized with the bare name of Christ, or must it not be held to be what has been taught us by Christ and His apostles? When we have "exchanged the thought of a special revelation of God to His people, for that of the great history of

religion throughout all humanity"—what warrant remains for calling this universal, natural religion by the specific name of "Christianity"—a name which, up to to-day, has been reserved not for universal natural religion, but for a very specific form of revealed religion indeed? We used to speak of this universal natural religion as the "higher heathenism". Is its character altered by the modern insistence that it should rather be called "Christianity"? "Christianity as Old as Creation" is the title of an old Deistic volume. "Christianity as broad as the universe"—the affinity is express. Perhaps Christianity is no longer tenable; but we shall gain nothing by calling what we think tenable "Christianity".

Princeton, Midsummer, 1906.

B. B. WARFIELD.

JESUS By W. BOUSSET, Professor of Theology at the University of Göttingen. Translated by Janet Penrose Trevelyan; edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906. Crown 8vo.; pp. vi., 211.

Professor Bousset's *Jesus* and his *Was wissen wir von Jesus* ought, of course, to be read together. The latter booklet stands related to the former something like prolegomena to performance: in it Professor Bousset vindicates his right to attempt a portrait of Jesus and indicates the basis upon which he attempts it. The occasion of this vindication was supplied by two of Kalthoff's astonishing books, the *Das Christusproblem* and the *Die Entstehung des Christentums*. In these Kalthoff contended that modern criticism of the origins of Christianity not only had bankrupted itself, and left itself no materials for forming a residual conception of Jesus—a position which is frankly taken to-day by many highly esteemed critics such, e. g., as Pfleiderer—but had actually obliterated the figure of Jesus from history and left us without ground for assuming even the existence of such a person,—a position in which he ranges himself with certain Dutch critics of a generation ago (Pierson, Naber, Loman) and is supported only by a free-lance here and there like, for example, our American, W. B. Smith, who, however, while sharing Kalthoff's negative conclusions, vigorously repudiates his "crudities" and especially his positive conception of Jesus as "merely a social-ethical Ideal". It is exceedingly pleasant to a "conservative" or an "apologist", accustomed as such to bear the scorn of the "critics", to see a critic like Professor Bousset sitting in the seat of the "conservative" and standing in the place of the "apologist". And this pleasure is greatly enhanced by the reappearance in Professor Bousset, as "conservative" and "apologist", of all those points of view and methods of argumentation we have been accustomed to see flouted when occupied and employed by other "conservatives" and "apologists". We are greatly inclined to whisper wonderingly to ourselves, Is Professor Bousset also among the prophets? and, sitting at his feet, to learn over again many things we knew perfectly well before, but had no reason to believe Professor Bousset and his fellow-critics had yet learned.

We learn here afresh, for example, that historical investigation cannot be dominated by theories of orderly development, and that the methods of physical science cannot safely be carried over into this sphere—in fact, that those who shall bury this “new method” have long been standing before the door (p. 10). We learn also here afresh that profane history itself assures us that Christians already existed in the Roman Empire in numbers sufficient to attract the attention of the governing body at a period only some ten or twenty years removed from the traditional date of the death of our Lord, and that this fact by itself renders the assumption that the Person of the Founder is only a figment of the imagination exceedingly difficult (p. 17). We learn here also afresh that the testimony which Paul bears to Jesus, a testimony not to be set aside by a theory of pseudopigraphy more facile than reasonable (p. 20), and not to be weakened by a systematic blindness to the facts (p. 25), puts wholly beyond dispute not only the existence of Jesus, but the main outlines of His life (p. 25; and Weinel, *Saint Paul, the Man and His Work*, could have taught Bousset to go much further here). We learn also here afresh that our Evangelical literature, which is quite independent of Paul and yet presents precisely the same portrait of Jesus which he draws, carries us back well into the first generation after the death of Jesus (pp. 34, 40), and presents to us the testimony of the earliest Palestinian community of Christians. And we also learn here afresh even that it is mere hyper-criticism to decline to derive historical facts even from John's Gospel (p. 76, note 20). In a word, in his capacity as “conservative” and “apologist” Professor Bousset fairly establishes a firm basis on which a trustworthy portrait of the historical Jesus can be erected. And in this we rejoice; yea, and shall rejoice.

The trouble is that Professor Bousset is unaccustomed to wear the garb of “conservative” and “apologist”, and, flinging it off as soon as his fear of Kalthoff permits him to do so, forthwith proceeds to minimize the gains he has registered when acting “in that capacity”, and to unbuild as far as possible what he had built up. Here we have, for example, the testimony of Paul and of the Evangelical tradition, each taking us back to within a very few years of the death of Jesus, representing between them the witness of the whole Christian community of the first generation after Christ. Their testimony is absolutely consentient. They agree not only in their testimony to the general course of Jesus' life in the world, that He was born of the seed of David, that He preached the gospel of the kingdom, that He went about doing good and attested His claims by works of power, that He established a sacrament in His broken body and shed blood, and died on the cross as a ransom for sinners, and that He rose again from the dead, was seen by many and ascended on high the Lord of all, from whence He is to be expected again to consummate His Kingdom—but also in their testimony to who and what Jesus was, what He came to do, what was the significance of His life and death, and what His relation is to those who trust in Him as their Saviour and Lord. Professor Bousset explicitly allows that Paul and the Evangelists



are at one in these things. "Already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous Son of God whose glory shone in this world; and it has been rightly emphasized that in this respect our three first gospels are distinguished from the Fourth only in degree." "For the faith of the community, which is shared already by our oldest evangelist, Jesus is the miraculous Son of God, on whom faith lays hold, and who is exalted quite to God's side." "For Mark already, as in the Gospel of Paul, the chief thing in Jesus' life is his suffering and death." And yet Professor Bousset refuses to accept this testimony! It was the universal earnest conviction of the entire Christian community at least within ten or twenty years of Jesus' death that this was not only what Jesus was and did, but what He represented Himself as being and doing. This community contained in itself personal attendants of Jesus who had companied with Him throughout His public career. Paul, for example, had associated with the 'first disciples' of Jesus and learned of them; he had even developed differences on matters of serious moment with them and had withstood them to the face; but these differences never touched on the matters of Jesus' essential claims and teachings, what He was, and what He came into the world to do, and how He compassed it in His life and death. The combined testimony of Paul and the Evangelists amounts thus to the most remarkable body of first hand witness to the career and teachings of the founder of a religion the world has ever seen. And yet Professor Bousset, after validating it in his capacity as "conservative" and "apologist" for the fact of Jesus' personal existence, sets it all lightly aside at the precise point where it pleases him no longer to play this rôle! And when we ask after the grounds of this remarkable proceeding we get really nothing but a platitude about "faith being the foe of history",—and the impossibility of one seeing clearly who believes and honors!

It is not faith only, however, which can blind the eyes of the historian. Professor Bousset has had occasion to observe that in the case of Kalthoff. It is equally visible in his own case. For his refusal to follow the witness of Paul and the Evangelists in their testimony to the manner of man Jesus was and the nature and bearing of His teaching is every whit as arbitrary as Kalthoff's refusal to follow them in their testimony to His objective existence and influence as a person in this world of ours. Of course, Professor Bousset has his "reasons" for his refusal to follow this witness and exhibits great skill in presenting these reasons. Has not Kalthoff also his reasons? and does not he also know how to set them forth persuasively? And are the one set of reasons any less well drawn than the other? Professor Bousset feels sure that he can penetrate beneath the tradition of Jesus embodied in the Gospels to the real Jesus—that to the keen eye of the careful prospector in this field, ever and anon through the soil of tradition the granite of historical truth peeps through. When one addressed Jesus with the title "Good Master", did He not respond that none but God was good? When miracles were demanded of Him

did He not refuse to work them? Did He not in the Parable of the Prodigal Son picture God as forgiving without propitiation? Did He not always point His hearers directly to God and keep Himself always in the background? But does Professor Bousset forget that he owes what knowledge he has of all these incidents to the very Evangelists who teach Him that Jesus was precisely the contrary to what He would fain imagine Him to be? And does it not occur to him that possibly these Evangelists—and the whole Christian community of the first age—may have better interpreted them than he is doing, when he makes them contradict in principle the whole conception of the person and work of the Master to illustrate which they record them? It certainly is a very odd way to write history to proceed from the beginning on the assumption that the whole body of first-hand witnesses are wrong in the essential features of the presentation they give and that only that is trustworthy in their report which can be twisted by skillful manipulation into a contradiction of their point of view.

Halting thus abruptly in his "conservative" career, Professor Bousset rescues from Kalthoff's skepticism a "historical Jesus", but refuses in his own skepticism to accept *the* "historical Jesus". His difference from Kalthoff is, then, at best, only one of degree. Both agree that the "Christianity" which now exists and which has existed since at least the second generation was not the creation of Jesus; and that the Jesus which has been believed in at least since Paul and the Evangelists depicted Him for us is the creation of "Christianity". They differ only as to whether behind the whole movement which we call "Christianity" we need to assume any person called Jesus at all. Kalthoff thinks not: he is sure that to everyone imbued with the principles of modern historical science it will seem absurd to think of Christianity, as a particular culture-phenomenon and a development-form of communal life, as the work of an individual founder of religion and therefore as finding its essence and origin in a historical Jesus. Bousset responds that "Christianity" as it came to be, certainly cannot be traced back to Jesus (p. 16), but that, though it transformed itself so grossly, so rapidly, nevertheless, "the decisive impulse to the whole movement" must be assigned "to a specific point" and must have had its "center in the personalities of Jesus and Paul" (p. 13). If this "historical Jesus" is, however, thus, not the "historical Jesus" of the Christian tradition, the question becomes pressing what kind of a historical Jesus He was. The book now before us is an answer to this question. And its real significance lies precisely in this—that it makes known in detail for us how Professor Bousset and his fellow scholars really conceive of that Jesus whose real existence they wring from the hands of the Kalthoffs and Smiths of our modern world.

It has already become superabundantly clear that the "historical Jesus" which Professor Bousset rescues from the destroying hand is not at all the Divine Jesus, the Redeemer of the World, of our New Testament records. Professor Bousset is modest enough in disclaiming full knowledge of this personality. But one of the things he is quite

sure of is that He was in no sense a heavenly being, as Paul and the Evangelists depict Him. He not only never claimed preëxistence; He expressly distinguished Himself from God and consistently presented Himself as but God's servant. True, He called Himself the "Son of Man" though, of course, not with the persistency with which He is represented in the Gospels as doing this, and only late in His life and only in moments of deepest emotion,—and only (shall we not say it?) in a somewhat *Pickwickian* sense! The reason of His employment of this Messianic title of Himself was that, though feeling Himself to be the Messiah, he shrank from the most current Messianic title of Son of David, because of its popular implications of a temporal rule at Jerusalem. Therefore He adopted this one instead,—although it bore, from its origin in Daniel's great vision, the implication of heavenly origin and preëxistence—which He by no means meant to adopt with it,—the truth being that "to Him the idea of the Son of Man meant only one thing—His return in glory" (p. 194). He permitted Himself, then, to use a title of Himself, the implications of which He repudiated, as we must believe—because "it is inconceivable that Jesus who stamped the fear of that almighty God who had power to damn body and soul together, upon the hearts of his disciples with such marvelous energy, and who could speak of that fear because he shared it to the bottom of his soul, should now have arrogated to himself the Judgeship of the world in the place of God" (p. 203). Which, being interpreted, seems to us to mean merely that Professor Bousset is in straits here. He cannot deny that Jesus used the title of "Son of Man" of Himself; he cannot deny that this carried with it an assertion of heavenly preëxistence and of Divine prerogatives: and yet he cannot bring himself to allow that Jesus made these assertions of Himself. Hence he is in straits and (like Biographers, who impute themselves to their victims) he extricates himself by putting Jesus in straits instead. The Evangelists' way is better: they represent Jesus as calling Himself the Son of Man because He wished to claim for Himself all that name imports.

This instance may stand as a sample. The Jesus whom Professor Bousset presents to us as the real "historical Jesus", is a sadly lowered Jesus from that which the entire body of the testimony gives us: a Jesus who was a mere man and merely a man of His times, imbued with the points of view of His day and race and situation,—filled no doubt with a pure vision of God and of His Fatherly goodness to man and with a burning compassion for man, but limited also by His training or lack of training by His opportunities or lack of opportunities, and by His one-sided enthusiasms. He did no miracles, but only wrought such wonders as might be psychologically mediated. He foresaw no future, but only walked steadfastly along the road that lay before him, learning much as He went—or else, when a rush of enthusiasm seized Him, predicting an establishment of a kingdom and a coming back in glory to do it, which never happened! He taught no new moral system—nor indeed any moral system at all: and the separate items of morality He taught



of this new commentary, edited by Prof. D. Johannes Weiss, of Marburg, announces the sale by subscription of the entire first edition a half year before its completion as well as a large subscription to the second edition. The extremely cheap prices at which the work is issued, its popular scientific character, written as it is to meet the needs of those who know something of the critical work that has been done on the New Testament and who, without critical scholarship of their own, wish to have the results of this work placed before them in a readable form; written also by men who are recognized and efficient leaders in one school or another of critical scholarship and who are yet sufficiently alike in point of view and method to present a homogeneous piece of constructive work.—all these elements enter in to make for this commentary the place it has already won in its home land.

The plan and point of view of the work are set forth by the editor in the *Begründung zur ersten Auflage*. 'The work attempts to open to the intelligent and thoughtful reader, interested in the problems of our religion, a vivid, historical understanding of the oldest documentary sources of Christianity. The different contributors are to be free from regard for theological schools or parties; and they are so to approach the New Testament that it may work upon them uninfluenced by presuppositions (*ganz ohne Voreingenommenheit*) to the end that they may show to the reader the thing itself as it is.' After due warning to those for whom the work is not intended—such as still retain their childhood's regard for the Bible—the editor admonishes those for whom the work is intended against judgments of detail. He would have the work as a whole produce its effect. To judge of details would constitute an injustice to the contributors since they all represent a common point of view (*Gesamtschauung*) in which one part depends on another and can only be understood in its connections with all the others. Hence it is asked that final judgment be reserved until the completed work has had an opportunity to produce its effect.

The first *Lieferung* begins with an able sketch by Dr. Jülicher on the History of the New Testament, in which the origin of the New Testament, or more particularly, the history of the New Testament canon, the history of New Testament interpretation, and the history of the transmitted text of the New Testament are discussed. Dr. Jülicher's results are well known from his *Einleitung*, of which there is an English translation. In his concluding paragraph Dr. Jülicher expresses his appreciation of the New Testament canon for what it contains, — i. e. the character of its contents—but more especially in its original form, but he also confesses a sad disillusionment in regard to the Church's shortcomings in its care of the New Testament text and in its exegetical labors. In his review of the history of New Testament interpretation, closing with a well deserved tribute to Calvin, a just appreciation of Luther's strength and weakness in this field, and a brief reference to the contributions of Pictism, the failure to give information about modern exegetical work constitutes a lack which is not adequately supplied by the short account of the course of modern



critical work on the New Testament from Grotius and Simon to Weizsacker and H. J. Holtzmann

The editor, Dr. Johannes Weiss, contributes the introductory and exegetical work on the Synoptic Gospels. The arrangement of the matter is admirable. After the introduction to the first three Gospels there follows the exegesis of the separate Gospels prefaced by a short introduction to each. The divisions into main- and sub-sections are given in heavy faced type as are also the more important notes. In the commentary on Mt. and Lk. the sources are conveniently indicated by marginal letters, M (Markus), Q (Logia-Quelle), and S (Sonder-Quelle).

Dr. J. Weiss adopts and builds upon the results of the two-document theory of the Synoptic problem. He admits that this theory has not solved all the elements of the problem; but, in spite of a group of scholars who still defend the priority of Matthew, he thinks that this theory, which is now accepted by the majority of competent scholars, is sufficiently secured to serve as a basis for his exegetical work. The problem of ascertaining the sources of the Synoptic Gospels is primarily a literary problem, but its solution may have very important historical bearings on their trustworthiness. At the outset Dr. Weiss raises the questions:—Does the witness of the Gospels to the life of Jesus rest on fact? Are the Gospels trustworthy historical sources? The modern spirit, imbued with a strong sense of reality and trained by scientific historical investigation, rebels against accepting the Gospel narratives as records of what actually happened. We must therefore inquire, How did these narratives come into being and how far may they be trusted?

A comparison of the Synoptic Gospels with the Fourth Gospel tends to commend the objectivity of the former. These contain some, though much less, of the halo of heavenly glory that surrounds the head of the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel. The same result follows from a comparison of the Johannine discourses with the Synoptic sayings of Jesus. Finally a comparison of the Synoptic Gospels in the matter of language, ordering of their material, etc., leads to the conclusion that Mark, the oldest Gospel, written shortly before the year 70, constitutes one of the two principal sources used by Matthew and Luke, the other being a discourse source (Q), of which Luke has preserved the original form better than Matthew whereas Matthew has kept the wording better than Luke. Besides these two sources other special sources were used. In Luke's case, however, this special source, including probably the Infancy narrative, may have been simply an enlarged and worked over form of "Q". Matthew's special source diverges widely from Luke's, especially in the Infancy-narrative. It contained also a number of miraculous incidents which come probably from a popular tradition in which Peter played an important role.

Having set forth in general his view of the sources of the Synoptic Gospels, Dr. J. Weiss seeks to determine their different strata. This course is justified, he thinks, by the fact that the authors of the Gospels

were not the first to write Gospel history but had had predecessors. The material embodied in the Gospels had already passed through various stages, both oral and written. The whole of the Markan material was for forty years unwritten until Mark, shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, gave it the fixed form of a Gospel. The discourse source (Q) was probably written earlier, certainly before 70. The only means of determining the historical value or trustworthiness of such material and of silencing the painful doubts that must arise in regard to the faithfulness of memories stretching over a period of forty years is not by ignoring the facts or by a pious belief that God would not permit damage to the report about Jesus, but simply by thorough historical investigation and criticism. The masters whom Dr. J. Weiss here follows are Strauss and Weizsäcker. In general he admits mythical elements in the Gospels but holds that the main features of the portrait-ure of Jesus and a large number of His words have been preserved faithfully. The process of separation required by the admission of mythical elements in the Gospels must take its starting point, according to Dr. J. Weiss, in the origin and development of the Gospel traditions up to the composition of our Gospels; for the history of the faith of early Christianity during the first fifty years of its existence is reflected in the Gospels.

The narrative element in the Gospels is determined, Dr. J. Weiss thinks, by the passion idea, the Gospels being primarily an exhibition of how the Son of God came to suffer and die. And, although this is presented mainly in the form of popular tradition of incidents or groups of incidents, its historical value is greatly increased by the fact that what is characteristic both of John the Baptist and of Jesus has been preserved. Moreover, a careful examination of this tradition reveals the Petrine origin of much that is contained in Mark and also to some extent in Matthew and Luke, where however much legendary matter has crept in—a characteristic which is true also of matter from other sources, much of which was motived unconsciously by Old Testament prophecy.

In connection with the discussion of demon possession Dr. J. Weiss states his attitude toward the miraculous elements in the Gospels. 'Even in Mark, but more so in the later Gospels, and most of all in John, we read the crassest and most inconceivable miracles of omnipotence: He (Jesus) walks on the water, multiplies loaves of bread, changes water into wine, and all without the slightest display of effort, as if (in His case) it could not have been otherwise . . . We must either accept these with the naive faith of the early Church as miracles of omnipotence, or we must admit that the faith of the early Christians has falsely attributed (*angedichtet*) such extravagant (*überschwangliche*) things to a Saviour of whom they believed everything. This was done, however, not with the intention to deceive but in the unconscious play of popular fancy. Moreover, the piety of the ancient world saw miracles where we of to-day behold only nature's conformity to law; it counted on miracle—a really divine person must act by means

of miracle—whereas we find one of the highest revelations of God in just the eternal, unchangeable course of the world order. This principle illumines the belief of the early Christians in the resurrection (and manifestly also of some modern scholars). The effect of this belief on the Gospels may be seen not only in the resurrection narratives, like Old Testament prophecy it furnished the motive for the creation of Gospel material, in this case, the resurrections attributed to Jesus. Another motive operative in a similar manner was the Messianic theology, the effects of which may be seen in the temptation, the Davidic sonship of Jesus, the birth in Bethlehem, etc. (No mention is made however in this connection of Jensen's *Gilgamesh* motive) · all of which leads to the conclusion, said to be painful, that our Gospels contain only in part clear and incontestible recollections of actual occurrences, in other respects they must be read not as historical sources but as witnesses to the faith and religious fancy of the early Church, of which they are so largely the production.

The following sections of the Introduction deal with the words of Jesus. The early Christians had little besides memory and hope. They were Jews and, even though not trained in the Rabbinical schools, they must have had retentive memories. Moreover, the teaching of Jesus was in such a form that it could readily be reproduced. The artistic completeness of the parables, the rhythm, the parallelism, the matter of His sayings must have lived in the memory of those who heard Him. There are indications, moreover, that the discourse source (Q) was committed to writing before the year 70. But what of Jesus' originality? Many of His sayings have parallels in Jewish literature. Jesus Himself shared the views of His time about the inspiration of the Old Testament, which He knew and used. Others drew from the same source and where there is similarity Jesus' originality does not suffer by the loss of priority. The report of Jesus' sayings, however, may have suffered not only by redactional alterations but also by additions from Jewish apocalyptic and prophetic writings such as Enoch, Ezra, etc., for these writings were held in high esteem by the early Christians along with the Old Testament and the words of Jesus. Additions of this kind to the words of Jesus are not easily detected because Jesus also attached Himself closely to the ancient prophecy. Consequently, a word attributed to Jesus need not necessarily be regarded as a later addition because of its connection with an Old Testament passage (p. 59) (although some such words are set aside by Dr J. Weiss chiefly on this ground (p. 47)). Thus the tradition of Jesus' words in the early Church was not only reproductive but also transforming and creative, reflecting in many instances the ideas of the Church and the conditions of her life (Mt xix. 17 cf. Mk x. 18), or the terms of Roman law (Mk. x. 12), or a spirit other than that of Jesus (Mt v. 21). Such a mixture may not be altogether pleasing to us; in fact, it may be very painful, but it has arisen, Dr J. Weiss informs us, as an unavoidable accompaniment of God's plan to give His revelation to man not in bald objectivity, graven on tables of stone,

but through the living activity of a historical personality to simple and modest men.

After speaking of the artistic, poetical form of Jesus' teaching, especially in the parables, Dr. J. Weiss asks the question: Who is it that speaks thus? In answering this question Dr. J. Weiss calls attention to the fact that there are words attributed to Jesus which reveal His consciousness of a secret mission and of a peculiar relation to God. As the end draws near Jesus confesses in ever clearer manner that He feels Himself to be the fulfiller of His people's hopes, the Messiah, the Son of God. The secret character of these revelations produces the impression that the speaker is certain of His calling but that the manner in which this calling shall be accomplished is a secret even to Him; He can only do preparatory work, believe, hope and leave the future to God. The man who spoke thus must have existed, for who could have created such an ideal figure? Certainly not the spirit of the Church. Some moving, quickening power must be posited and the simplest hypothesis is that which sees back of these words a personality whose inner life is reflected in them in simple grandeur.

It will not be possible in this notice to give an account in detail of the exegetical work of this commentary. The review of the Introduction will have made sufficiently plain its principles and its point of view. Upon the adequacy of these its permanent value will depend; for however much the several authors may have endeavored to reproduce "without presuppositions" the effect produced on them by the New Testament, the effect as presented manifestly represents and is controlled by a definite point of view, a *Gesamtanschauung*, embodying certain principles of historical criticism by which both the matter and the form of the New Testament have been judged.

Lie Rudolf Knopf writes on Acts and his work concludes the first volume. Of the second volume two *Lieferungen* have appeared. Dr. J. Weiss contributes the Introduction to the Pauline Epistles, Pastor Lie Wilhelm Lueken writes on the Thessalonian Epistles; Dr. Wilhelm Bousset on Galatians and the Corinthian Epistles; and Dr. Adolf Jülicher on Romans (I-V).

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

PAUL THE APOSTLE, AS VIEWED BY A LAYMAN. By EDWARD H. HALL.  
Boston. 1906. Pp. 203.

One who believes heartily in the historicity of the New Testament may possibly be pardoned for suggesting that, from his point of view, a more appropriate title for this book would be *Paul the Impossible as Viewed by a Sceptic*. The chief purpose of the author seems to be the discrediting of the Acts and the Epistles. These documents are the sources from which he proposes to derive his information in relation to the Apostle, but he continually characterizes them as "untrustworthy", "mythical", "unedifying", "full of inconsistencies" and "startling contradictions", "fragmentary" and abounding in "palpable discrepancies".

With such worthless historical material at hand the writer is properly at liberty to construct a Paul of his own imagining: and it is just here that we are disappointed, for it would have been more to the writer's credit had he created for us something other than the pitiful, weak, illogical, vacillating, shadowy, character who is introduced to us as "The Missionary", "The Mystic", "The Theologian". It is rather too severe a strain upon the imagination of the reader to suppose that such an impossible Paul could have accomplished the work assigned to him in history. For most men it will be more simple to suppose that the author is mistaken and that the Bible contains at least a fair measure of truth.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

DER ZEUGNISZWECK DES EVANGELISTEN JOHANNES nach seinen eigenen Angaben dargestellt von LIC. THEOL. KONRAD MEYER. Gütersloh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. pp. vi., 110.

In seeking to determine the purpose of the Fourth Gospel, Meyer has chosen a fruitful method of investigation, which, though obvious and simple enough, has too often been neglected. Instead of setting out from the contents of the Gospel as a whole, in order to determine from the character of the finished product the purpose that must have inspired its production, he carefully investigates first the direct information that the author gives as to his own plan, in order then to interpret the whole in the light of the information thus secured. This information is contained, Meyer believes, in a series of "specially Johannine" bits, inserted by the author of the whole Gospel at various points in the course of the narrative, which are somewhat different in language and thought from the rest of the Gospel, and with the First Epistle of John display a unity which permits of regarding their testimony as whole. The special insertions are i. 1-18; ii. 21ff; iii. 16ff; (vi. 39); xi. 51f.; xii. 37-43; xix. 35-37; xx. 30f. These passages, then, with the important addition of the First Epistle, are regarded by Meyer as forming the source of direct information as to the purpose of the evangelist. "In these passages the author claims to make report as an eye-witness of the life and death of Jesus Christ, for the furtherance of faith." That the author claims to be an eye-witness is proved (1) by the distinction made in Jn. xix. 35 and 1 Jn. i. 3 between the writer and his readers, (2) by the fact that the right of "witnessing" about Christ is in the thought of the evangelist conditioned upon a personal experience of his human life (See especially Jn. xv. 27), (3) by the occurrence of *θεωρεῖν* in Jn. i. 14, which verb in John is used only of literal, bodily sight, (4) by the absolutely unmistakable passage 1 Jn. i. 1-3. Since the writer of the Epistle is clearly identical with the writer of the Gospel, no interpretation of Jn. xix. 35 should be adopted which would separate the eye-witness there mentioned from the evangelist himself; for then one eye-witness would be found to appeal to another. Of course, it might be objected against Meyer that this



would not be quite an impossible proceeding; yet after all, if the evangelist is himself an eye-witness, there is no sufficient reason for finding a second eye witness in xix. 35. This remains true whether or no Meyer is right in referring the *ἑκείνους* of xix. 35 to the glorified Christ. The second main division deals with the subject and occasion of the witnessing. The subject is Jesus "the Christ, the Son of God"; the occasion is the prevalence of false teaching which emanated from Judaism and from docetism. In the Gospel, the former source of error is more prominent; in the Epistle, the latter; but both forms of error are combatted in either writing. The Jewish and docetic errors as combatted in the Gospel, though not united in the same party, as at the time of the Ignatian epistles, are not so entirely separate as at first sight appears. Between faith in the man Jesus who through the Elias-baptism received the power of the Christ and faith in the man Jesus with whom in the baptism the Christ was united, the difference is formal rather than material; the transition would be a transition from pure Jewish to gnostic ideas (see p. 48). In the case of either form of error, the importance of the baptism is evident; hence the effort of the evangelist to correct an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Baptist may be explained without reference to any distinct sect of disciples of John. The third section describes the carrying out of the witness in the Gospel, under the familiar heads of the witness of the "signs", of Jesus Himself, of the Baptist, of Moses and the Scriptures, and of the Spirit. In the fourth section, which deals with "strengthening of faith as the purpose of the witnessing", the author takes occasion to distinguish his own view sharply from those of Baldensperg, Wrede and Wernle by emphasizing the subordinate character of the apologetic interests in the Gospel as over against the general purpose of witnessing. (See p. 92). The Gospel was intended for Christians; "it may, it is true, be called a writing 'born of the conflict', but it is a proclamation to the general's own camp, not a challenge to the enemy"; though such a proclamation does contain a defiance of the enemy (p. 103). In a short appendix, Meyer expresses the view that Chap. xxi. is a later addition written mainly for the purpose of exhibiting Peter as reinstated in his position of authority. Either the chapter is not to be attributed to the evangelist at all or at least vv. 1-23 were written under widely different circumstances from those which prevailed at the time the Gospel was composed.

In some of the details of his work Meyer has ventured upon very doubtful ground, yet he is suggestive and instructive even where he is not convincing. The progress of the argument is sometimes obscure, but the wealth of fruitful suggestions which the booklet affords will repay careful study. The general conclusion as to the purpose of the evangelist is thoroughly sane and reasonable, but has evidently been attained not by mere appropriation of the results of others but by independent thinking. Meyer has in a modest way made a genuine contribution to the discussion of the Johannine problem.

Princeton,

J. GREESHAM MACHEN.

DES PAULUS BRIEF AN DIE RÖMER für höhere Schulen ausgelegt von  
RUDOLF NIEMANN, Gymnasialprofessor in Waren i. M. Gutersloh.  
Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann 1905. pp. iv, 127

DES PAULUS EPISTEL AN DIE RÖMER Abdruck der revidierten Über-  
setzung Luthers und Auslegung für Gymnasialprima von RUDOLF  
NIEMANN, Gymnasialprofessor in Waren (Schülerheft) Guters-  
loh. Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann, 1905 pp. 51.

These two little books are addressed to the special needs of the higher classes in the German schools, but they might well attain a wider sphere of influence. Unfortunately, the Epistle to the Romans finds no regular place in the curriculum of our colleges; but careful teachers of Bible classes, either in college or elsewhere, might well receive useful suggestions, both for their own exegesis and for their pedagogical method, from the former of Niemann's commentaries. The "Schülerheft" seems too condensed; it is not quite clear why the fuller commentary could not be placed in the hands of students as well as of teachers.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN

DER VORCHRISTLICHE JESUS, nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums. Mit einem Vorworte von  
P. W. Schmiedel WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH. Giessen: Alfred  
Topelmann (vormals J. Rickers Verlag). 1906. Pp. xix, 243.

This book is certainly unique in the circumstances of its origin. A professor of mathematics in Louisiana, who tells us that he was brought up as an orthodox Christian of the strictest sort, having entered the field of New Testament criticism, has published, in Germany and in the German language, with an introduction by a well-known German scholar, a book entitled *The Pre-Christian Jesus*.

The Introduction itself is somewhat remarkable. Professor Schmiedel intimates that he rejects the views of Smith *in toto*, and that, sooner or later, he shall seek to refute all his main positions (p. xi), and yet he regards it as the duty of every scientific theologian to read the book and to balance accounts with it (p. viii). For two reasons: first, because its theory is put forward again and again in varying forms (e. g., Loman, Kalthoff, Robertson), and second, because of its "scientific method" (p. ix). The latter point he emphasises. But it is just here that the Introduction strikes one as remarkable—the conclusions of the book are not to be trusted, and yet its method is scientific! If a method is truly scientific throughout, scientific in its treatment of the sources whence data are derived as well as in the treatment of the data themselves, ought not the result to be worthy of confidence? If it is scientific merely in its handling of data, but unscientific in its gathering of the same, then surely it is unscientific in that which is most important. Assuming that Professor Schmiedel's view is correct, and that the results of our author's study are not to be trusted, then it strikes one that as a model of scientific discipline it is not to be recom-

mended to theologians. It is better to study scientific method in models that are truly scientific than in those which are only seemingly so.

I have dwelt on this point in the Introduction because it appears to me to be the most significant thing in the book. Grant its truth, and there are few persons who will think it worth while to study the "bold combinations" of the author. "Bold combinations" which have not had a good foundation have indeed brought fame to many a theologian, but they have not edified the Church.

But we will now dismiss the Introduction, and give the author himself a chance.

He tells us in his Preface that in the year 1904 the traces of a pre-Christian cult of Jesus which he had discovered had so increased that he decided to collect and arrange them. Again, that the essence of primitive Christianity is to be found in the combination "Jesus Christ". Each of these titles, he says, originally denoted a deity, not an earthly being. "Christ" was pre-eminently Jewish; "Jesus", at least half foreign, originated in the Dispersion. "Out of the marriage of the Semitic and Hellenic spirit, this grafting of the wild olive into the good, the giant form of primitive Christianity sprang."

Coming now to the book itself. It consists of five essays with extensive notes. The first of these essays—*The Pre-Christian Jesus*—gives its name to the volume.

The author's starting point is the four-times repeated phrase "the things concerning Jesus" (Mk v. 27; Lk xxiv. 19; Acts xviii 25; xxviii. 31). This phrase as found in Luke is said to be "extraordinarily strange". It is accordingly conjectured that Luke's source did not have it. Lukewise in Mark it is thought to be an addition of the reviser. In Acts xxviii. 30-31 it is said to be plain that the phrase denotes a doctrine concerning Jesus, and in Acts xviii 24-28, the most important passage of all, this meaning is "clear as the sun".

Apollos of Alexandria, for it is he of whom this passage speaks, taught "the things concerning Jesus", and yet knew only the baptism of John. "Therefore", says Professor Smith, "he had heard nothing of Jesus as a historical character. He knew nothing of the teacher, of his message, his career, his personality, his life, his death, his resurrection and ascension. For if he had known anything of it, he would have known all. These things form a unity in the Gospel; and if he had known but the least item of them, it could never have been said of him that he had known only the baptism of John." The "unavoidable conclusion" from these things is that the phrase originally denoted a doctrine concerning Jesus, a doctrine sufficiently definite and inspiring to be made the ground of zealous and extensive activity, a doctrine which apparently preceded the gospel history of the life and death of Jesus.

Having arrived at this "astounding and significant" inference the author asks whether it is confirmed by other data, and finds that it is. It is confirmed by the story of the twelve men whom Paul baptized in Ephesus. They occupied the standpoint of the Baptist. What Paul

added to their faith was not that "the coming one" had already come, but that "the coming one" was Jesus. More striking confirmation is then found in the story of Simon Magus. "It is incredible and impossible", says the author, "that so powerful a magician accepted Christian teaching and baptism unless there was a deep and mysterious relation between the faith of Philip and that of Simon. The natural, yea unavoidable, supposition is that the sermon of Philip marked an advance on that of Simon, which advance the latter magnanimously and even enthusiastically recognized in that he joined himself to Philip as a devoted follower."

A third incident in Acts which is supposed to confirm the author's inference in regard to a definite and inspiring pre-Christian doctrine concerning Jesus is the story of Elymas. His name "Bar Jesus" was probably an appellation, and denoted the circle of men to which Elymas belonged. It probably marks him as "a promoter of the Jesus-cult." This probability becomes a certainty when it is considered that he is called a "false prophet"; for according to New Testament usage a false prophet is ever a proclaimer of Christianity, though he may be regarded as heterodox and perhaps as self-deceived.

A fourth confirmatory passage is the story of the seven sons of Sceva who exorcised demons. Suspicion is awakened by the number seven, and it is thought that these men were representatives of a pre-Christian form of faith, half friendly and half hostile to Paul.

Again, the "we"-passages of Acts, according to Professor Smith, concern missionaries who were quite independent of Paul, and only incidentally connected with him.

Then, further, it appears from Acts itself that its author knew nothing of the Christian propaganda; and since he was "a more or less careful comparative student" and had at hand a considerable amount of documentary sources, it appears that nothing of significance was then accessible.

Having thus established the ignorance of Luke and his times in regard to the origin of the Christian propaganda, the author says it is confirmatory of his hypothesis that the teaching of Jesus was pre-Christian, a cult of the Jews and especially the Hellenists, more or less secret.

In his concluding thoughts there are two points which are supposed to support his view. It appears from Hippolytus that the Naassenes, a Gnostic sect, celebrated Jesus as a divine being, and the hymn in which this celebration of Jesus is found goes back to "the remotest antiquity." And finally, the oldest preaching of the Gospel, as reported in Acts, shows that the name of Jesus was used as a charm, and that even before the crucifixion it had the magic powers of the divine name. "How was that possible unless the name and so the idea of Jesus had had a long history?"

Such, briefly, but I hope not indistinctly, is the course of Professor Smith's argument. To point out in detail the weakness of the supposed evidence would quite transcend our limits. While recognizing the remarkable cleverness of the argument, I am unable to discover a single

link in it which has any historical and demonstrative value whatever. Consider for a moment the passage which the author regards as most important of all, viz., the story of Apollos. He taught the things concerning Jesus, and yet knew only the baptism of John. It is inferred from this with the utmost confidence that he knew nothing of Jesus as a historical character. If he had been at all acquainted with his career, says our author, it could never have been said of him that he knew only the baptism of John. I doubt whether one careful reader out of a hundred will admit that this inference is justifiable. What does it mean that Apollos knew "only the baptism of John"? Professor Smith does not enlighten us on this point. But it is plain what the author of Acts meant by it, he meant the baptism of repentance in contrast to the baptism with the Spirit (see Acts xix. 1-7). Now it is perfectly evident that one might know about the life and teaching of Jesus and yet not know of this baptism, for such baptism is not mentioned in His teaching.

The statement that a powerful magician like Simon would not have accepted Christianity had there not been a deep mysterious kinship between it and his own faith is simply a begging of the question. The idea that the name "Bar-Jesus" probably marks Elymas as a "promoter of the Jesus-cult" reminds one of the sovereign manner in which Philo deduced from the etymology of proper names whatsoever he pleased. Granted that the number "seven" in the story of the Ephesian exorcists is suspicious, it surely gives no color to the view that they were representatives of a pre-Christian form of faith. To regard the Diary of Acts as belonging to missionaries quite independent of Paul—missionaries of the pre-Christian doctrine of Jesus—is to cut loose from that which has at least the appearance of historical credibility and to embark on a sea of conjectures whose sole merit is their novelty. The proof that Luke knew nothing of the origin of the Christian movement amounts at last to this, that because some things in his writings are not historical, therefore nothing in them is historical. For the statement that the Naassene hymn given in Hippolytus contains pre-Christian thought no shred of evidence has been adduced. The reference to Harnack in this connection is quite misleading, for there is nothing in his statement to suggest that he regards the hymn or its essential thought as pre-Christian. The declaration that the oldest preaching of the Gospel proves the pre-Christian existence of the Jesus-cult because in that preaching much prominence is given to the *name* of Jesus forms an appropriate culmination of the author's argument. Even if it were granted that the name was used as a charm—which is not made probable by the author—it would by no means follow that it must have been thus used in pre-Christian times.

In conclusion, I revert to Professor Schmiedel's Introduction. One is not surprised that he intimates a complete rejection of the hypothesis, but it will be a matter of surprise if he asks theologians to follow him in any very elaborate refutation of it. We may well emulate Professor Smith's zeal in seeking light on all problems connected with the origin of our Christian faith. We need not fear hypotheses, but conclusions



of transcendent importance must be preceded by premises of unquestionable validity

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A GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. By JAMES HOPE MOULTON. Vol. I, Prolegomena. Second Edition. Edinburgh: T & T. Clark. 1906. Pp. xx., 284. (First Edition, December 1905.)

It is not often a book marks a new departure in both form and contents at the same time, yet such seems to be the achievement of Dr. Moulton in his new grammar of New Testament Greek. The subject is a notoriously dry and musty one, yet these adjectives can no longer apply to a work which is written in a most attractive narrative style, and whose pages are now and then enlivened by a quiet but fascinating humor. "Maid of all work" is surely a very unconventional but expressive characterization for an over used preposition (p. 103), and "I suppose you haven't got . . . on you, have you?" (p. 170) to say the least a suggestive illustration, while the quiet thrust at Professor Schmiedel is not less telling because couched in humorous form. He is referred to as having been "unfortunately called away from grammar by the *b'ne Jerahmeel* to perform a postmortem examination upon the Gospel history" (p. xii, cf. also p. 48).<sup>1</sup>

But we do not go to a book such as Dr. Moulton's for humor and rhetoric, welcome though they may be. Our quest is the hard facts of the science of grammar, and we are not disappointed. The material is as noteworthy as its treatment and form, and we need not hesitate a moment to call the work epoch-making.

Few men have been fitted for their task as has Doctor Moulton. Chosen from boyhood by his father, Rev. W. F. Moulton, D.D., the English translator and editor of Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament*, to be his successor and reviser, he first made a specialty of the study and teaching of the classics and comparative philology, as Fellow of King's College and as Senior Classical Master in the Leys School at Cambridge. He was also author of an *Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek* (London, 1895), and *Two Lectures on the Science of Language* (Cambridge, 1903). More recently he has been Tutor in New Testament Language and Literature in Didsbury Theological College, Manchester, and with the New Testament idiom constantly in mind has made a minute and extended study of the Papyri and other remains of later Greek.

Some of the results of his investigations have been published in the *Classical Review* (xv, pp. 31ff., 434ff.; xviii 106ff., 151ff.) and in the *Expositor* (Series VI, Vols vii to x). In the present volume, however, we have a fuller and more organized presentation of the data he has gathered, as well as a summary of the results reached by other investigators in this till recently sorely neglected field of contemporary and later Greek—notably of Professor Albert Thumb of Marburg. Accurately speaking, this book is but the prolegomena to a still more organ-

ized and exhaustive second volume, which is to provide "a succinct and systematic grammar of Hellenistic Greek" (p. x of preface to the first Edn.).

A few representative examples of his results, and their significance for the study of the New Testament cannot fail to be of interest to every student of that volume.

i. In the whole conception of the character of *the language of the New Testament* itself we have a most striking departure from the views of the older grammarians. Even the most recent author of a New Testament grammar, the late Professor Friedrich Blass of Halle, who to a degree shared the older views, comes in for some sharp criticism in this regard (pp. 73, 75, 81, 94, 209). Doctor Moulton believes Hellenistic Greek can no longer be regarded as "Jewish-Greek". "The Papyri have finally destroyed the figment of a New Testament Greek which in any material respect differed from that spoken by ordinary people in daily life throughout the Roman world" (p. 18). Thus the view of the pioneer in this field of investigation, Professor Adolf Deissmann of Heidelberg (*Bibelstudien*, Marburg, 1895 and 1897, etc., and especially *New Light on the New Testament*, Edinburgh, 1907, and "The Philology of the Greek Bible: Its Present and Future", in the *Expositor* for Oct. and Nov. 1907) is vigorously defended and in our opinion amply established. Protests against this position, however, are not lacking from reliable authorities, as for example: F. C. Conybeare and St. G. Stock (*Selections from the LXX*, p. 22, Boston, 1905), Eberhard Nestle (*Zeitschrift für Nt. Wissenschaft*, pp. 297f., 1906), and quite emphatically Professor H. B. Swete (*The Apocalypse of St. John*, p. cxx, London, 1906).

ii. Much new light is thrown upon the field of *Textual Criticism*. Dr. Moulton shows, by a study of the grammar of later Greek as represented by the Papyri, etc.

(1) It is most significant, for example, that for the scribes of even our earliest manuscript, the pronunciation of *ai* and *ε. ei* (η) and *i, ai* and *ι, o* and *ω* was identical (p. 34). "Therefore we cannot regard our best Mss. as decisive on such questions" (p. 35).

(2) The orthographic peculiarities in the New Testament uncials, it is shown, may be of the greatest value in fixing the provenance of the Mss., and thus supply criteria for localizing the various textual types (pp. 31 and 244).

(3) Striking confirmation of the text of the great uncials is presented through testing them as to whether or not their scribes conformed the text to the popular grammatical style of their day (Chapter iii). We might also inquire further in this connection whether such a study of the grammatical peculiarities of the *κ B* Text might not throw light on the problem as to whether it is itself a revision of the Western Text.

iii. In recent years the argument from language when based on vocabulary, hapax-legomena, etc., has come to be everywhere looked upon with considerable suspicion in Literary Criticism. More signifi-

cance has been accorded perhaps to the "form-words" (the particles, etc.), which, it is claimed, betray the real author. But now Prof. Thumb, and here Dr. Moulton shows that the grammar of a writing is a still more trustworthy test of authorship and of locality of origin.

(1) For example, the use  $\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  instead of  $\mu\omicron\upsilon$  in the Fourth Gospel points toward Asia Minor (*Th. Literaturzeitung*, 1903, p. 421), though other linguistic evidence is contradictory (Moulton, p. 401).

(2) The grammatical peculiarities of Revelation point to an author of limited culture and education. If its date was 95 A. D. the same author cannot have written the Fourth Gospel only a short time thereafter. Either we must take the earlier date for Revelation, and suppose some one mended the author's grammar throughout the Gospel, or we must deny the unity of their authorship (pp. 9f., 90).

(3) The marked uniformity in the use of  $\tau\omicron\upsilon$  with the infinitive in the "we" document, the Gospel of Luke and the remainder of Acts points strongly toward their all being by the same author (p. 217, cf. p. 48 and Harnack's argument in *Lukas der Arzt*, chapter ii, Leipzig, 1906).

(4) Contributions are also made toward the solution of the Synoptic problem—e. g. the treatment of Mark by Matthew and Luke (pp. 104, 124, 159, 191).

iv. Any detailed exhibition of the results of Dr. Moulton's investigations for *exegesis proper* would require the reprinting of his entire book. Probably the most far-reaching result which has come from a study of the Papyri, etc., however, is an evident blurring of many of the finer distinctions characteristic of classical Greek. This principle (which of course must be carefully guarded in application) effectually disposes of many refinements in exegesis which have served to bolster up more than one favorite doctrine or literary hypothesis. Among the many examples which might be cited we may notice:

(1) A weakening of the distinction between  $\epsilon\iota$  and  $\epsilon\upsilon$ . How much controversy over the mode of baptism has turned on this distinction? And Professor Moulton says "It is impossible to see in John 1: 18 ( $\omega\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omega\upsilon$ ) the combination . . . of rest and motion, of a continuous relation with a realization of it", as Westcott held (p. 234, cf. pp. 63 and 66). Similarly, between  $\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda$  and  $\epsilon\upsilon\pi\epsilon\pi$  (p. 105).

(2) A laying to rest—we trust forever—notwithstanding Dr. E. A. Abbott's *Johannine Grammar*, of Meyer's objections to  $\iota\omega\ \epsilon\kappa\beta\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ . The modern Greek  $\kappa\alpha'$  with the subjunctive = the old infinitive, has settled the question (pp. 205ff., 249). Similarly as to  $\tau\omicron\iota$ ,  $\pi\acute{\rho}\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron$  and  $\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omicron$  with the infinitive (pp. 217ff.).

(3) Dr. Moulton claims it is impossible to assert in places outside of the free Greek of Paul that  $\acute{\omicron}\acute{\upsilon}\mu\eta$  bears any special emphasis (p. 189, cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.* xviii, pp. 453ff.).

(4) He somewhat sarcastically points out the impossibility of differentiating documents on the basis of such heteroclisia as  $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\iota\varsigma$  in Acts 14: 6 and 8, as Clemen and Jüngst maintain (p. 48).

Any detailed criticism of Dr. Moulton's book would be inappropriate. The volume before us is not intended to be a detailed and exhaustive grammar, but a *prolegomena*, though its admirable indices make it already a most useful, indeed indispensable, work in this very capacity. Nevertheless, we think that perhaps Dr. Moulton would have more completely surveyed the field in these preliminary remarks—and it may be also in the detailed presentation of his results—if he had included also (c. g. p. 23) among the materials for present day study of the Greek of the New Testament those additional ones indicated and summarized by Professor Thumb in his reviews "Die Forschungen über die hellenistische Sprache in den Jahren 1896-1901; 1902 4," in the *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 11, 396ff., and 111 443ff., viz.:

(1) Greek elements preserved in the Latin, Gothic and Oriental languages. Numerous contributions to this field are at hand. For example Krauss, *Griechische und lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud*, etc., Berlin, 1898-99; Schlatter, *Verkanntes Griechisch*, Gütersloh, 1900; von Lemm, *Kleine koptische Studien*, St. Petersburg, 1900; Thumb, "Die griechischen Elemente des Armenischen", *Bss. Zschr.* ix. (1900), 388f., etc.

(2) The Atticising Grammarians. It is true Schmid's *Atticismus*, u. s. x. is utilized, but considerable has been done on the individual atticising writers, c. g. in the monographs of Chabert, Fritz, Fritsch, Galante, etc.

(3) Graeco Latin grammatical manuals or Hermeneumata (cf Thumb, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, vi. pp. 231f., *Archiv. für Papyrus Forschung*, ii. pp. 404f.).

We cannot help also hazarding just one query regarding a matter of detail. Is it true that no perfective compound of *θέλω* is found in the New Testament, as stated on p. 117? Surely *ἀπεκδυόμενοι* (Col. iii. 9) is perfective, and means "having put off utterly". Col. ii. 15 may be similar but is not so clear.

In conclusion we can, perhaps, commend the work no more highly than by quoting the words of Professor Thumb himself, who said to a pupil on the appearance of the first edition, "We have nothing to equal it in German". That from the greatest German authority is significant.

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SAMUEL DICKEY.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DE LEER VAN DEN PERSOON EN HET WERK VAN CHRISTUS BIJ TERTULLIANUS. Academisch proefschrift ter verkrijging van den graad van Doctor in de H. Godgeleerdheid aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, op gezag van den Rector-Magnificus Dr. F. L. Rutgers, Hoogleraar in de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, in het openbaar te verdedigen op Vrijdag 15 Juni, 1906, des namiddags te 2 uur,

in het Gebouw van de Maatschappij voor den Werkenden Stand, door JOHANNES J. JANSEN, geboren te Longerhou, dienaar des Woordes bij de Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk te Whitinsville, Mass., U. S. of A. Kampen: J. H. Kok 1906. 8vo., pp. 173.

The subject which Dr. Jansen deals with in this dissertation is one of very great interest, and he treats it with prudence and care. After a brief but excellently worked out Introduction (pp. 1-19), in which he gives some account of Tertullian himself, he surveys in four chapters the arguments of the chief writings of Tertullian in which he has given expression to his views of the person and work of Christ (pp. 20-106); and then in two concluding chapters sums up the results of the survey (pp. 107-165).

On the most mooted point in Tertullian's Christology—the eternity of the personal distinctness of the Logos—Dr. Jansen takes his stand with those who think Tertullian remained bound in the prolation-theology of the Logos-speculation. He writes (p. 132): "It is plain that Tertullian places the Son beneath God. He makes the Son subject to the Father. His birth and His creation make the Son less than God, who begot and created Him. The purpose for which Wisdom, that is, the Son, was created, was the creation of the world . . . He did not know how clearly enough to distinguish and to hold apart the ontological and the cosmological in the Trinity. The Son was with him a sort of intermediate being. God, of course, but yet standing below God. As much below as one who is born and created stands below Him who is not born and not created. It is in Athanasius that the mixture of the ontological and cosmological is first of all excluded. The trinity with him is an eternal one. And Augustine goes further than Athanasius." Again (p. 138): "Still connected with this there remained in Tertullian subordinationism or inferiorism. The description of the origin of the Word, the second Person in the Holy Trinity, throws into clearness what Tertullian elsewhere says in so many words: *fuit tempus cum filius non fuit* (Herm. 3). And Tertullian does not merely speak of the Son as created and brought into being by the Father, and thus as not from eternity; in still another aspect he works out and emphasises that the Father is greater than the Son. Jesus Himself said once, 'The Father is greater than I' (Jno. 14. 28). Father and Son are distinguished in this respect,—that the Father is invisible and the Son visible. The Son has appeared, has revealed Himself—the Father, not. . . ."

The work of the Mediator as conceived by Tertullian Dr. Jansen presents under the scheme of the three-fold office. "The work of Christ, in Tertullian", he remarks, "appears as a three-fold task: law-giving, offering, and ruling: this threefold activity corresponds to the three-fold office of prophet, priest and king: Tertullian calls Christ *novae legis iator, sacrificarum aeternum antistes, regni aeterni aeternus dominator* (adv. Jud. 6)" (p. 148). It can scarcely be contended, however, that Tertullian's thought of the work of Christ organized itself con-



sciously to him in this *schema*. And this leads us to indicate the chief fault we have to find with Dr. Jansen's dissertation. It is somewhat lacking in perspective. Tertullian's views are very carefully drawn out, but they are set out by themselves and not in their historical relations. We look at them as we look at a mosaic, in the flat: and in a mosaic of Dr. Jansen's making. We do not see them as a stage in a historical development, but only as they are in themselves. And we do not see them in the connection in which they stood in Tertullian's own mind, but as isolated entities contemplated by the expounder. We learn from them therefore only certain items of Tertullian's opinions; we do not learn Tertullian's mind.

*Princeton, August, 1906.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

BOUWSTOFFEN VOOR DE GESCHIEDENIS DER NEDERDUITSCH-GEREFORMEERDE KERKEN IN ZUID AFRIKA, door C. SPOELSTRA V.D.M. Deel I, Afdeeling I. Brieven van de Kaapsche Kerken, hoofdzakelyk aan de Classis Amsterdam. (1655-1804) Amsterdam en Kaapstad. Hollandsch-Afrikaansche-Uitgevers Maatschappij v/h Jacques Dusseau & Co 1906. Large 8vo., pp. 631.

This large volume is a unique departure from ordinary attempts at writing Church-history, in a special sense. No history can be satisfactorily written without a thorough and extensive study of the sources. But ordinarily the historian keeps these sources from the view of his readers or merely indicates them in his bibliography or in his notes. The author of this volume, however, was compelled by his specific aim, as indicated in the introduction, to carry his workshop in the open and to allow his readers to verify and control his statements of fact, by the sources themselves.

Years of patient and unremitting toil, both in Holland and in S. Africa, were devoted to patient research and collection. Many of the priceless documents, he found, were poorly guarded or so completely buried under other materials that humanly speaking no other man would be able to find his way in the labyrinth, which he had traversed, with such endless trouble. The task grew as it proceeded and he finally decided to publish all his sources, before he came to his real task, the writing of the history of the S. African Church. And for this every lover of Church-history will heartily thank him. For his patient research has unearthed a mass of material, of the existence of which no one dreamed and which henceforth will be accessible to every investigator. Had the author limited himself to the publication of these documents, his work would have been a great one. If he succeeds in writing a truly readable history of the Church of S. Africa, he will greatly add to our debt of obligation. And the flashes of originality and lucid statement, which appear here and there, in the present volume give us assurance in our expectation.

The volume before us, of more than 600 great octavo pages, confines itself to the publication of the "Letters of the Cape-Churches, princi-

pally to the Classis of Amsterdam". For the churches, founded by the E. and W. Indian Companies, were under the care of this Classis (Presbytery) and continually reported on the state and progress of things. Originally the Cape-churches did not keep copy of their letters; this practice was only inaugurated in 1708, but from that time till June 2, 1795, it was persistently followed. As the original documents were in some instances lost, these copies were of material assistance to our author. Moreover, the "Deputati ad res Indicas" carefully excerpted the letters they received, so that even in case of the loss of both original and copy, traces of the correspondence still remain. These extracts are separately published by the author. In the lengthy introduction, the author's aims are defined and the publication of all these documents is justified by a description of the *importance of his researches, their progress and results*. Here also we are informed, in a very full bibliography, what efforts have been made in the direction of writing on the history of the Indian Churches, E. and W.

The researches of Rev. Spoelstra extended from May 1896 practically till the date of publication of this volume and have been costly, tire-some and painstaking. The result is the present work, which will be followed by a similar volume, containing the letters of the Classis of Amsterdam to the Cape-churches and various other documents. Then as a third volume the history proper will appear.

The letters of this first volume are singularly interesting, full of surprises, of glimpses of real human life, with its light and shadow, in the Dutch colonies; and these letters cast a singular light on many things, which seemed incomprehensible to us before, in the genetic history of the Cape-churches. Our author, of course, writes in Dutch and the documents published are almost altogether in that language, thus barring out many who, in England and America, would like to study the history of the South-African Church.

Louisville, Ky.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

THE LIFE OF SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS. By J. E. HODDER WILLIAMS. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York City. Crown Octavo. Illustrated. 356 pages. \$1.25 net.

This fascinating volume tells how a farmer boy from the Lorna Doone country, gifted with "Exmoor toughness", with untiring energy and Christian faith, became the organizer of one of the mightiest movements of the modern world: "How he became a great Merchant Knight" and how through his eighty-four years he remained "Young in spirit and mighty in power". This biography of the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, written by his grand-son, is the "life of a man who was always young, written by a young man for young men", yet it will be read with profit and interest not only by young men or by those interested in young men, but by all who enjoy a romance in real life, and especially by those who would have an intelligent acquaintance with the religious history of the past century or who are concerned with the developing agencies of the Christian church.

To those engaged in Christian work, the book will naturally be of chiefest interest, and it will reveal the fact that Sir George Williams was not merely the founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, but through all his life the inspiring genius. "He was no mere figure-head, but a force whose influence was felt throughout all the ramifications of the work." Nor was this due to the accident of circumstances, but to an intelligent act of definite dedication on the part of one who at the age of twenty-six solemnly "determined to give his life for the prosperity of the Association", which had originated three years before in a prayer meeting, held in his own room; and when the fifty years of its growth were celebrated by a jubilee gathering, it was the largest delegated religious convention ever held in the British Isles, and the occasion partook of the nature of an ovation to the man to whom the development of the work was in largest measure due. The movement then represented five thousand associations and one half million of members, and its influence was felt among all classes and in all countries of the world.

Yet this book is not intended to be a full or formal history of the Young Men's Christian Association. It is the life story of a man rather than of an institution, and the work is mentioned only as it was influenced by the central figure. Here is the picture of the "Ideal Christian Layman of his generation"; a merchant who had amassed a fortune by industry and integrity: a philanthropist whose benefactions amounted to much more than half his income: a Christian who devoted his life to the spiritual welfare of young men. It is not strange, that knighthood was conferred upon him by the queen; that the freedom of the city was presented to him by the London council; and that at last his body was given a resting place in the Cathedral of St. Paul. Nor will it be more than natural that his influence and memory, already assured by the work he established, will be broadened and brightened by this biography, the literary excellence and permanent value of which entitle it to a high place among the memoirs of Christian heroes.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

**THE ANCESTRY OF OUR ENGLISH BIBLE.** By IRA MAURICE PRICE, Ph.D., Professor of the Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago. Pp. xxiv., 330. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1907. \$1.50 net.

A telling title is half the battle, so some bookmen maintain. If they be right then for this book the battle for popular recognition is half won, and without the reading of a line of its contents. "*The Ancestry of Our English Bible*." How much better this than "*The History*" or "*The Story of the English Bible*" or than any one of the other familiar titles by which similar volumes are known. This title goes straight to the heart of the subject in hand. It emphasizes the all important fact that the Bible, even in our translation, is a *living* book, and being a *living* book must have sprung from both Divine and human parentage. It asserts that our Bible is the very Word of God committed to writing

by holy men who wrote as they were inspired of God. Unless this title means this it means nothing when used in these associations. Unless this title means this it is a misnomer. Such being the case the author might well have begun his preface with a sentence or two referring to the ancestry of our Bible on the Divine side before speaking as he does of its ancestry on the human side. He could thus have justified the use of the title without entering upon any discussion of Inspiration and would have introduced his readers to the subject to be considered with fuller knowledge on their part and better grace on his part.

The favorable impression made by the title of this book is fully supported by its contents. A page of the American Standard Revised Version is placed before the reader and attention is called to the marginal readings. These are classified and each class illustrated by numerous examples. The immediate and natural question of the reader is, "why and whence these variant readings?" The answer is given in the succeeding chapters, which discuss first for the Old Testament, and then for the New, the sources of the text upon which our latest translation is based, and how the manuscripts and versions are used to eliminate scribal errors and obtain "almost the polished shaft of the original." These sources are presented in connection with the various versions. Some portion of each chapter descriptive of a version is devoted to a description of its principal manuscripts, while a statement of the historical background is given where it will add vividness and stimulate interest. The volume closes with accounts of the principal English versions of the Bible in which particular attention is given to the historical significance and connections of these monumental works. Over forty well selected illustrations inserted at suitable places add to the value of the book, and the introduction of photographs of some of the great translators and textual critics is worthy of note. A comprehensive bibliography and valuable chronological table and two excellent indexes, one topical and one scriptural, complete the volume.

This book is a clear, concise and comprehensive compendium. Except for advanced students, it will be of more service as a reference book than as a text book. Every teacher, however, who expects to present in a popular form the subjects contained in it will find it invaluable as a companion volume to some smaller work for class room use. And every student who has studied a smaller treatise will find his field of vision and his fund of fact greatly enlarged by consulting this well written and well printed book.

*Princeton*

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

**THE DIVINER IMMANENCE.** By FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1906. 12mo., pp. 159.

This is a book, if not exactly for, yet certainly out of the times. The author appears to be passing his intellectual life in a circle the shibboleth of which is "the divine immanence". He has been plagued with the application of this formula to every sphere of thought, and that in its pantheising sense. The sense, that is, in which God is conceived as so completely in all things that all things are just God,—a system of God's present working. So that nature in each of its spheres—physical, mental, moral—and in all its phases is but an actual and immediate deed of God, and we may see God in all that occurs manifested in one or another aspect of His (to us) multi-form Being. Against this pantheistic obliteration of distinctions, the author healthily revolts, and writes this book from the standpoint of a convinced disciple of the philosophy of the "divine immanence", indeed, but with a view to rescuing the obvious distinctions observable in the phases of nature and life. His purpose thus becomes to vindicate the compatibility of the doctrine of the divine immanence with a belief in a diviner immanence still,—with a belief in higher kinds of nearness than the physical immanence postulated by this philosophy, and even in varying degrees of this nearness. At bottom the book is thus a defence of the theistic conception of the universe and of the personality of God and his personal, that is purposive, modes of action; while in form it is an attempt to defend the validity of certain Christian conceptions, rooted in this theistic view of the world, and thus to justify believers in "the divine immanence" in remaining distinctively Christian in their thought.

To one imbued with the formative ideas of the Reformed theology, the whole recent movement to validate the conception of the "divine immanence", with the accompanying attempts (like Mr. McConnell's) to curb it within reasonable bounds, has its deep and not unpathetic interest. It can but seem to him an effort, more or less imperfectly informed, to recover the Reformed doctrine of *concursum*; and all that is good in it appears to him to be better expressed and better guarded in the Reformed doctrine of *concursum*. Nothing could be more startling to him than to hear its protagonists proclaiming, as they ceaselessly do, that the conceptions of God in His relations to His universe, current before, and outside, their movement, were stained with, or sunk in, Deistic modes of thought. It has not been so in the circles with which he is familiar; and he cannot help wondering if even so simple a task as the reading of some good old seventeenth century Reformed divine,—say Voetius or even Turretine,—or even of any of their spiritual successors of the nineteenth century, would not have saved these thinkers not only from such assertions but from much of the crudities of their suggestions. What Mr. McConnell will appear to a Reformed thinker to be striving after will inevitably be the recovery of the Reformed doctrine of *concursum* as over against the pantheising tendencies which have accompanied the preaching of "the immanence" of God. Mr. McConnell seems, indeed, half to suspect this himself when (p. 143) he thinks of "the old doctrine of predestination" while he is discussing the doctrine of providence, and, admitting that there was "much good in



that old doctrine" (though it was "intolerable in its total effect"), claims all that was good in it for himself. "Predestination," however, is not at this point in question: he that believes in "providence" will necessarily believe in "predestination", as indeed Mr. McConnell in the immediate context acknowledges, when he asserts that "anything which happens to us is intended". The point in question is whether God is concerned in these "happenings", and how He is concerned in them: and Mr. McConnell will find the great fact for which he here enters the lists that "all God's dealings with men" are "special providences", that "God sends everything that happens to us",—yes, that God as the *causa causarum* is active in all that occurs,—fully and warily worked out in the Reformed doctrine of *concursum*, with careful guarding of the rights of both God and man.

There are some things in his own construction, no doubt,—even some things which he makes of primary importance—which Mr. McConnell will not find in the Reformed doctrine of *concursum*; though he may find something like them in the form given to the general doctrine of *concursum* by thinkers of another type, say, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas. We refer particularly to the portentous emphasis which Mr. McConnell (doubtless out of his Arminian inheritances) throws on the limitations of God, especially His limitation by the freedom of man. He will find nothing of limitations in or of God in the Reformed doctrine. That doctrine knows how to conceive God as without responsibility for human guilt and yet as not subject to human domination—and it would be well for Mr. McConnell to learn of it that he may avoid speaking of God as standing helpless before man and acting only when and as He may be permitted by man to act. Having so learned, such phrases as that God "cannot move until we move" will appear as offensive to him as they do to us: and the whole construction will fall away by which he holds God responsible for human sin to the extent at least that because of His implication with it He owes man redemption. "God has bestowed upon man the unsolicited boon of freedom—an awful gift—and He is thereby under moral necessity to go to extremes to warn men from the evil which thus becomes almost inevitable" (p. 96). "God has sent forth men into a terrible universe without consulting them and has thrust into their hands the awful boon of freedom. He is thus under enormous moral obligation. He need not have created men, but having created them He cannot discharge His moral bonds to them and to Himself short of Calvary. . . . It is hard to see how a moral Creator could have peace of conscience without sharing the death made necessary by the moral imperfection flowing from the unsolicited gift of freedom" (p. 110). "The cross shows us a Father under moral obligation to exert every moral influence for the moral salvation of His children" (p. 111). If such deliverances are to be taken seriously, they mean that sin is rooted in freedom by an "almost inevitable" necessity: and that God in making man free obligated Himself thereby by the most tremendous obligation to save man from the results of his freedom. Nevertheless, we are taught that God did not save man from this misuse of His freedom, nor could He;

and that God has not rescued man as man from the results of this misuse of his freedom, nor indeed can He; but that He must rather wait at every step on the initiative of that very human freedom before He can act at all! "It may be that God has conditioned Himself by our freedom. It may be that He can do what He desires for us only as we remove the limitation upon Him by our own attitude" (p. 151 and often to the same effect). If Mr. McConnell can find a theodicy in that pathway, he is welcome to it. For ourselves we prefer to believe in a God who can, rather than in one who can not: and we comfort ourselves with Mr. McConnell's own words: "We must not forget that plan covers the entire expanse, and that too short a view is sure to keep us from seeing the truth as God sees it" (p. 73). If plan covers "the entire expanse", it embraces the freedom of man and all its issues, and will reach its end by means of that freedom and its issues: and if we must avoid "too short a view", we can not consent to embrace less than eternity in this plan.

We have no intention, however, of entering into the details of Mr. McConnell's theology. It is Arminian, but it is a new Arminianism, deeply colored by the conceptions derived from the doctrine of the divine immanence. Perhaps the Christology is the most interesting portion of it here outlined. He has no sympathy whatever with the old orthodoxy "which made Christ a sort of masked God"—"acting a farce". Some sympathy moves him for "the splendid conception" of the new pantheism, which conceives that in Jesus God has "taken a human organism and filled it with His own thought": but he rejects this view too. For himself he believes that God from all eternity must have contemplated over against Himself a personal Other, and that in time He gave this Other, by an impoverishment wrought "by withholding from Him His accustomed powers, through Incarnation" for the redemption of men. This strong Kenotism works back with him, however, to God Himself, and it is in this impoverishment of the Father that we are especially interested. In it God the Father Himself comes to us in His Son, suffering for the sake of men. Thus God, on the Cross, satisfies His own conscience, "His own self-respect"—His obligations to men; reveals His righteousness in exerting "every moral influence for the moral salvation of His children"; expresses His love. The exposition is too brief to be complete: and we do not press, therefore, the omissions—of any clear relating of the cross to human guilt, of the sacrifice to the expiation of sin and the propitiation of God. But there seems to be no clear consciousness of these things—the primary things in the Scriptural representation—underlying what exposition we have. And Mr. McConnell does not write as if he were unable to suggest his full meaning.

*Princeton, June, 1906.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

ON LIFE AFTER DEATH. From the German of GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER. By Dr. Hugo Wernicke, Head Master of Weimar Realgymnasium. A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 16mo.; pp. 134.

THE REDEEMED LIFE AFTER DEATH. By CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL.  
New York, Chicago and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. [1905.]  
16mo. pp. 58.

Here are two devout speculations as to life after death, one by a philosophical thinker of real though erratic power, the other by a highly placed Christian teacher. Both base upon the Christian tradition, but neither finds its real authority in the Christian Scriptures. Each leaves us with no further assurance of the life after death than may be derived from the common thought of men reinforced by the expressed conviction of the writer.

Fechner's little book has won to itself a certain fame, not undeserved by the richness of its fancy and the concinnity of its development of a thesis in itself bizarre enough. It witnesses at least to the strength of the author's conviction of human immortality and to the nobility of his anticipations for the future for the human spirit. It is filled also with finely conceived remarks, the fruit of Fechner's profound studies in psychophysics and allied topics. One would, for example, read a much longer treatise than this, to light upon such a remark as the following: "What does the anatomist see in a man's brain? It is to him a labyrinth of whitish filaments, the meaning of which he cannot read. And what does the brain see in itself? A world of light, and sound, and thoughts, associations, fancies, emotions of love and hatred" (p. 93). The whole refutation of materialism is latent in those few words.

Dr. Hall's meditation is much less ambitious than Fechner's and much less suggestive. A single passage of it recalls Fechner's manner: "The present life is the eternal life, seen for the time being through the mode of the physical. Death is the suspension of relations with the physical universe. Life, which was eternal here, goes on, undeterred and undissolved by the suspension of these physical relations. This is the power of an endless, an indissoluble life—a life that cannot be dissolved. The mode of existence may change; relations may be suspended; mourners may go about the streets, the dust may return to the earth as it was; but the spirit which came out from God, which is akin to God, returns to God, Who gave it: lives with God." That might almost have been found in Fechner. Ordinarily, however, Dr. Hall does not let his plummet down so deep. We are a little puzzled to know what he means when he remarks that if belief in the continuation of life after death were peculiar to Christianity, "its authority . . . might be much less than it is" (p. 11). What is the seat of authority in Christianity? Again we are puzzled when we read the list of debated topics concerning the future life "upon which it is beyond the power of man to pronounce a final decision". This list includes not merely "the fate of the ignorant, the destiny of religious souls outside of Christendom", but also "the salvation of infants" and even "the doom of those who never repent", and the "judgment of mankind" (p. 22). Surely Dr. Hall does not hold *all* these to be insoluble problems. One is reassured to learn that there are "glorious articles

of belief coming down to us unbroken from Christ" which Dr. Hall commends to us, apparently on that ground, as assured, viz., these three: "the continuance of personal identity; the progress of the soul; the resurrection of the body" (p. 45). The line of division drawn between the two classes of topics seems arbitrary: but we are thankful the class of verities still has a content.

Princeton, May, 1906.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE NEW THEOLOGY. By R. J. CAMPBELL, M.A., Minister of the City Temple, London. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1907. Pp. 258.

Mr. Campbell's recent book, under the above title, is a crude and unphilosophical attempt to state the metaphysical tenets of idealistic monism, and to draw from these the resulting religious ideas, labelling them with the terminology of Christian theology. It is not pretended that the Bible is authoritative even in the Ritschlian sense. The doctrinal statement of Christian truth made by the Church of God under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, is also repudiated in language that might almost be termed violent. It is not, of course, denied that these doctrines stand for philosophical principles; the form, however, to which we are accustomed to attach the adjective Christian, is said to be "incredible," while the truth for which these doctrines stand, being simply a tenet of idealistic monism, is said to be so necessary an idea that no thinker can escape from it. It is not at all surprising, therefore, indeed it is the necessary consequence of this method of procedure, to be told by Mr. Campbell that, although Prof. Haeckel would probably not admit it, nevertheless he believes in the Trinity because he begins by assuming an infinite space filled with matter, and then proceeds to divide the latter as if it were finite. This, Mr. Campbell says, gives us two terms of the Trinity, and we get the third as soon as Haeckel explains the cosmic process by taking for granted that "the infinite is pressing in and up through the finite", etc., i. e., the infinite, the finite, and the activity of the former in the latter—this is Mr. Campbell's idea of the Trinity. We would sympathize with Prof. Haeckel, if he should object to being told that he believes in *the* Trinity, by which he would no doubt understand the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It is needless to add that while Mr. Campbell's terms are, as he says, a trinity in unity, they are, of course, not *the* Trinity; nor is his doctrine of the Trinity the Christian doctrine. Mr. Campbell would no doubt acknowledge this in this instance; but, as this is a fair illustration of his method, he should go on to acknowledge that his "New Theology" cannot be called Christian in any legitimate sense of the term. It is, as we said, idealistic monism. Being equals consciousness. The infinite is the All. Every kind of distinction must be not only comprehended but also transcended within the infinite. These are Mr. Campbell's assumptions. God is the "Mysterious Power which is finding expression in the universe." He is the All-consciousness. In order to manifest "even to Himself," the possibilities of His being,

God must limit His being. In this way we get two "modes" of God—the infinite, perfect, and unconditioned; and the finite, imperfect, and conditioned. "And yet these two are one." (pp. 22, 23). Mr. Campbell says that he starts with "the *assumption* (italics mine) that the universe is God's thought about Himself, and that in so far as I am able to think it along with Him, I and my Father (even metaphysically speaking) are one." (p. 26). The words in brackets are Mr. Campbell's. Man is a mode of the Infinite. His true self is a "subliminal consciousness", or rather unconsciousness, while man's ordinary "surface consciousness" is "somewhat illusory," and to the "higher self," i. e., to the subliminal consciousness, no dividing line exists between it and the surface consciousness, or between it and God. Mr. Campbell seems fully confident of this. For although this subliminal consciousness is below the threshold of consciousness, i. e., in a state of unconsciousness, and although we have never been able to look at things from this point of view, and presume that Mr. Campbell never has—for if he had, this subliminal consciousness would thereby cease to be subliminal and so become just ordinary, deceptive, illusory, surface consciousness—yet, we repeat, he is sure that from this higher standpoint—to which *ex hypothesi* no one has ever attained while conscious—all demarcations vanish and the Infinite all-consciousness becomes, as it really is, all in all. This metaphysic he distinguishes from pantheism which he identifies with materialistic monism (p. 35).

But what of Christ and Christianity? In order to understand Christ, Mr. Campbell says, we must distinguish three terms—Deity which is "the all-controlling consciousness" of the universe; divinity which is the moral nature of God as finite or limited i. e. love; humanity which is the human aspect or mode of God's being in our human consciousness. To use Mr. Campbell's words, there must be one side or aspect of God which is human, and "Jesus is the fullest expression of that eternal divine Man on the field of human history." The essence of this human side of God is love. "Jesus was divine simply and solely because His life was never governed by any other principle." (pp. 73-76). But let Mr. Campbell speak for himself. He sums up his conception of Jesus as follows (p. 92): "Jesus was God, but so are we. He was God because His life was the expression of divine love; we too are one with God in so far as our lives express the same thing. Jesus was not God in the sense that He possessed an infinite consciousness; no more are we. Jesus expressed fully and completely, in so far as a finite consciousness ever could, that aspect of the nature of God which we have called the eternal Son or Christ, or ideal Man who is the soul of the universe," etc. In this human side of God, Mr. Campbell says, we are all one. He tells us that the "average Westerner cannot grasp this", but assures us, nevertheless, that it is the absolute truth. Sin which is described as a "quest after God," is defined as selfishness, and of course any idea of guilt is eliminated altogether. As selfishness it is conceived as something positive, although evil, which is the genus of which sin is the species, is held to be non being and mere negation.



The Atonement is the realization of the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God. It has essentially and originally no relation to sin, but of course can only be realized by the giving up of selfishness.

Salvation, judgment, heaven and hell, are all terms descriptive of inner states of consciousness. This in barest outline is the New Theology of Mr. Campbell.

We have not space to criticise it in detail. Several general considerations should be noticed. To begin with, it is not Christian theology. From first to last it is simply an exposition of the ideas of monistic idealism or idealistic monism. But when one has explicitly abandoned the great facts of Christianity and their authoritative interpretation in the New Testament, finding in the New Testament teaching, just as in that of Prof. Haeckel, only the faulty expression of the doctrines of a certain philosophy, it is without any kind of warrant whatsoever that the claim can be made that it is Christianity or Christian theology which is being set forth. Christianity is a historical religion and not the product of human speculation; and what Mr. Campbell has given us is simply his private metaphysics. To be sure he claims to find a great deal of idealistic monism in the New Testament. Thus in the statements in the Gospel of John where Jesus claims identity with God, Mr. Campbell holds that what is meant is simply the identity of God and man; and if it is urged that the language used is evidently meant to apply only to Jesus, Mr. Campbell reveals his amazing lack of exegetical insight by replying: "I think that the exceedingly able writer of the fourth Gospel knew better,"—his argument apparently being that the author of the fourth Gospel being so exceedingly able a thinker, must have meant to teach idealistic monism. More often, however, Mr. Campbell thinks that the New Testament writers do not attain to this great truth. Thus, for example, he thinks that although at times the Apostle Paul attained the heights of idealistic monism, a great deal of what the Apostle taught is "just nonsense." Thus it is abundantly evident that what Mr. Campbell has set forth in this book is just the tenets of idealistic monism, and he frankly says that his teaching leads back through Hegelianism to Greek thought, and back of that to the wise men of the East who lived long before Jesus was born. When we are told, that the idea that Jesus is God in any other sense than we men are; that "the New Testament language about the Atonement, especially the language of Paul, has been, and still is, the prolific source of most of the mischievous interpretations of it which exist in the religious mind"; that sin is the necessary result of our failure to realize our identity with God; that every man is not only divine in the same sense which Jesus was, but also becomes a Saviour when he lives for the "higher self"—when we are told all this, I repeat, it surely is not too much to say that whatever this theology may be, it is not Christian.

Nor is this monistic idealism and its solvent of Christianity set forth with philosophical insight or argumentative force. It has been so set

forth frequently, notably in the writings of the late Prof. T. H. Green of Oxford (cf. Green's *Miscell. Works*, iii pp. 160-185, 230-276, for his treatment of Christianity). In Mr. Campbell's treatment of the subject there is no argument at all. The oneness of God and man is simply assumed, and the consequences deduced. But can this philosophy be so lightly assumed when the pluralists, personal idealists, pragmatists, and agnostics are almost swamping us with arguments for their metaphysical opinions? In some isolated instances where argument is attempted, it is either absurd or else contains so many "ambiguous middles" and *petitiones principii* as to be logically worthless. As an example of the former kind, the proof for the metaphysical identity of all humanity may be cited (p. 33). "Common sense", we are told, "assumes that I and thou are eternally distinct", but we are learning otherwise. The argument for this is as follows: "You are about to make an observation at table, and some member of your family makes it before you; you are thinking of a certain tune and someone begins to hum it; you have a certain purpose in mind and, lo, the same thought finds expression in someone else despite all probabilities." And if anyone objects that this is only "thought transference," the answer is—"precisely, but what are you except your thought"? The inference from this is, somehow, the metaphysical identity of all the members of the human race. This has the advantage of being an absolutely unanswerable argument, but labors under the disadvantage of not meriting an answer. As an example of Mr. Campbell's logic, the argument on p. 40 may be cited. He is using an *argumentum ad hominem*—is it objected that in affirming the identity of man and God, contradictory and opposite things must be affirmed of human persons, I would reply, says Mr. Campbell, that my critics, the orthodox, are affirming precisely the same divine and human qualities of the man Jesus. Quite so, but does Mr. Campbell forget or does he not know that these theologians held also the doctrine of the *gemina mens* in Jesus, and that hence, apart from the question of whether that doctrine be true, his *argumentum ad hominem* is absolutely without force. But enough of Mr. Campbell's arguments; in the main, the book is a series of assumptions and assertions, and is quite devoid of argument.

Another noticeable thing about the book is its inconsistency in regard to some of its fundamental and underlying ideas. First of all, notice how Mr. Campbell (p. 126) in criticising evangelical doctrines, distinguishes between the intellectual form which is regarded only as a symbol, the husk of the "emotional content", and "spiritual experience" which is the truth and essence of religion. This distinction, he says, enables us to understand how we can appreciate the value of even "archaic" doctrinal formularies. Just as a landscape or piece of music will awaken in one mind what they are incapable of arousing in another, so the forms of religious truth are nothing in themselves; the reality is the emotion which they excite. Of course, the logic of this is to make all the various forms of religious truth simply exciting causes or vehicles of religious sentiment, and religion is reduced to mere relig-

ious feeling. Mr. Campbell himself draws the only possible conclusion when he says that this should help us to realize "that truth is one under apparently contradictory forms of statement", i. e. there is no intellectual content essential to religion, it is bare undifferentiated religious emotion. But what, then, becomes of idealistic monism? This is no more the product of natural feeling than is Christianity. If it begets returning love in the plain sinner to be told that his heavenly Father loves him and has sent His Son to be the propitiation for his sin, it also excites religious sentiment in Mr. Campbell to be told that we are all potential Saviours and identical with God. From this point of view Christianity and idealistic monism would be fundamentally on the same footing, except that evangelical Christianity would appeal more to the plain non-metaphysical sinner. In other words, Mr. Campbell never seems to realize that in making the essential truth of religion to consist in mere religious sentiment, he has undermined the basis of that intellectualistic construction known as idealistic monism.

Another fundamental contradiction is involved in his doctrine of authority. He repudiates the idea of any external authority in religious knowledge, and holds that the seat of authority is an inner one, viz., the religious consciousness. But if the standpoint of the subliminal consciousness is *ex hypothesi* forever closed, and if, as Mr. Campbell holds, the "surface consciousness" is "illusory", it would seem as if we were in a bad way. If the light that is in us be "illusory," how great must be the illusion!

One more fundamental contradiction should be noticed. If the infinite consciousness or the All, or the Absolute of this monism not only "comprehends" but "transcends", i. e., really, according to Mr. Campbell, swallows up and makes unreal, all distinctions such as that between me and thee, between God and man, and between love, justice, and holiness in God; if, in a word, every distinction is a negation or limitation, how can the Personality of the Absolute be retained? Why must we not give up the Personality of God? Why must we not even cease to speak of the Absolute as conscious, since consciousness involves distinctions. Logic will drive us to the undifferentiated Experience of Mr. Bradley or the Unknowable of Mr. Spencer. And then what is to become of freedom, or the duty of self-sacrifice, and of all the ethical clothing with which Mr. Campbell has draped the bare bones of his metaphysics? The ethical warmth of the book is in direct conflict with its metaphysical basis.

Another point which calls for special mention is Mr. Campbell's apparently utter ignorance of the theology which he is attacking. For example, on p. 39 we read—"According to the received theology, Jesus was God, and yet did not possess the all-controlling consciousness of the universe"? We are under the impression that the kenotic theory is pretty well exploded, and are amazed that Mr. Campbell should designate it as the "received theology." We suspect, however, that what he really intended by the "received theology" was the Chaldeonian Christology, in which case his confusion of it with the

kenotic theory betrays an appalling theological ignorance. Then again, to cite but one more instance, Mr. Campbell says (p. 19)—"The God of the ordinary church-goer, and of the man who is supposed to teach him from study and pulpit, is an antiquated Theologian who has made His universe so badly that it went wrong in spite of Him, and has remained wrong ever since." He is a God who is "spiteful" and "silly." Entirely aside from the coarse and vulgar satire directed against a straw man of his own creation; entirely apart from the question why even such a God should be characterized as an antiquated theologian, since this God could not help himself, whereas the theologians, according to Mr. Campbell, are wilfully doing harm; apart from such minor questions,—is Mr. Campbell so ignorant of the history of theology as to suppose that this is anything but a wanton caricature? That there has been much theological thought which would place the occurrence of sin in the universe outside the divine decree and control, we are not at all concerned to deny; but should Calvin and all the other Reformed theologians be all jumbled together with their opponents, and all alike come in for scathing sarcasm and ignorant misrepresentation?

And what, finally, shall we say of the tone and spirit of Mr. Campbell's polemic when he is attacked? Here is an instance. Robertson Nicoll in *The British Weekly* had made certain criticisms of previous statements of Mr. Campbell concerning sin. Mr. Campbell accused Dr. Nicoll of having wilfully misrepresented him, and referred to Dr. Nicoll's quotation of his words as "a good illustration of the sinfulness of sin." Dr. Nicoll in *The British Weekly* of March 21, 1907, says with considerable justification that some persons when criticised write in a temper which savors strongly of the declaration of Ali, the zealous Vizier of Mohammed—"Whoever rises against thee, I will dash out his teeth, tear out his eyes, break his legs, rip up his belly."

Dr. Fairbairn has characterized Mr. Campbell's "New Theology" as a "farrago of nonsense," thus applying to it the same term which Mr. Campbell applied to some of the teaching of the Apostle Paul, when he called it "just nonsense". We are not sure that this term will describe accurately the entire contents of the book; certainly we can think of no other category under which very much of its contents could more accurately be subsumed. Perhaps it might be fairer to describe the book as a somewhat feeble attempt to expound idealistic monism, and a coarse and bitter attack upon evangelical Christianity.

Princeton,

C. W. HODGE.

DER CHRISTLICHE GLAUBE (DOGMATIK), dargestellt von D. Th. Haering, Professor in Tübingen; Calw und Stuttgart; Verlag der Vereinsbuchhandlung. 1906. Pp. 616.

We have in this volume a complete system of doctrine from the general stand point of the "right wing" of the Ritschlian School. There have not as yet appeared very many complete systematic treatises from

the general standpoint which may be somewhat loosely termed Ritschlian. Kaftan's *Dogmatik* was published in 1897 and the third and fourth edition in 1901; also his supplementary Articles in the *Zeitschr. f. Th. u. K.* in 1903 entitled "Zur Dogmatik" have been published separately. Then there is the *Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen*, by the late Prof. Reischle; and in 1905 Prof. Kirn published his *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik*, which was reviewed by the writer of this notice in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October 1905. The year 1906 saw the publication of two complete systematic treatises on Dogmatics—this volume of Prof. Haering, and Teil I of Prof. H. H. Wendt's *System der Christlichen Lehre*, the second part of which has just been published in 1907. In 1888 Prof. Haering had written a brochure in criticism of Ritschl's doctrine of the Atonement—*Zur Ritschl's Versöhnungslehre*, and in reply to criticisms by Ritschl made just before his death, and by others, in 1893 Prof. Haering published his monograph of about one hundred pages, entitled *Zur Versöhnungslehre*, in which he discussed the doctrine of the Atonement, and pointed out wherein his doctrine differed from that of Grotius. Prof. Haering has also written a monograph on subjects connected with Ritschl's theory of knowledge.

In the present volume, after a very full and quite suggestive treatment of the subjects of theological prolegomena covering 198 pages, the author sets forth his system of doctrine. He occupies, as was said, the standpoint of the Ritschlian right wing. Although, in general, Ritschlian in his conception of the nature of religious knowledge and its distinction from theoretic knowledge, he seeks to avoid the extremes of Ritschl's position, and also endeavors to take a more positive attitude toward questions such as that of Christ's pre-existence and relation to God (though his remarks on this subject are neither clear nor satisfactory, (p. 443-453), the nature of sin and the value of the Atonement in relation to God, etc.

The book on the whole is an able presentation of theology from the author's point of view already described. It is not so clear as the above mentioned work of Prof. H. H. Wendt, which has also just been published. All references to theological literature are wanting, and the reader is referred to Luthardt's *Compendium* and Kaftan's *Dogmatik*. In this respect also, the somewhat full bibliographical references in Prof. Wendt's book render it more serviceable to the student.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

THE SPIRIT WORLD. By JOSEPH HAMILTON, author of "Our Own and Other Worlds", "The Starry Hosts". Introduction by Rev. W. H. Withrow, D.D., F.R.S.C. Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. xii., 274.

For a book that treats of this mysterious and occult subject, this volume is entitled to be regarded as reverent, sane and evangelical. The author names and rebukes some of the present tendencies toward



materialism. There are, in addition to the natural "disposition of the unrenewed heart to rest in material things", the discoveries of physical science, the varied applications of those discoveries, the accumulations of large fortunes and the grinding struggle incident to poverty. The author holds, without hesitation or qualification, to the supernatural and to miracles. His conceptions of the nature of mind and of matter make it easier, he believes, to hold to the scripture narratives of the miraculous than to reject them. He believes in Trichotomy and that the soul is the Spiritual body. He treads upon the dubious domain of speculation but he does not dogmatize therein. Angels are spirits equipped with spiritual bodies; indeed, he doubts whether there is such a creature as an absolutely bodiless spirit. This view is supported by Scripture upon which the author continually draws for proof. Many Scripture miracles are held to be only instances of special transformation from the material body to the spiritual, as, *e. g.*, Moses on the Mount, or *vice versa* as *e. g.* angelic appearances, Moses and Elias at the transfiguration, and our Lord often during the time between his resurrection and his ascension. Caesar said he would gladly give all his victories for a glimpse of the sources of the Nile and the curious mind of man would fain peer into the secrets of the Lord our God. We believe this book has much that is sound inference from Scripture and much more that is well worth intelligent consideration. It is good devotional reading to the discriminating believer and we lay it down with the feeling that the author has done no small service, in spite of some obvious shortcomings, in answering the questions and comforting the hearts and confirming the hopes of weak and wavering pilgrims on the way.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF THE CROSS. By HENRY C. MABIE,  
Corresponding Secretary American Baptist Missionary Union. F.  
H. Revell Co., New York. 1906. Pp. 259. \$1.25 net

The author has been so well known as a preacher of a pure Gospel, and so prominent as a leader of world-wide missionary activity, that a cordial reception and a helpful influence were assured for this volume, which aims to show that only the Cross of Christ can furnish a true motive and an effective instrument for missionary effort. In the first five chapters, it is demonstrated that "the cross" denotes much more than the mere tragedy of the crucifixion viewed as an act of violence or the death of a martyr; it indicates an actual objective achievement wrought in the moral universe, a death endured in behalf of others. Having thus shown the "meaning of 'the cross'", the writer devotes the remainder of his book to an explanation of its "Message," concerning personal salvation, the development of spiritual life, the redemption of  
v and the evangelization of the world.

some might not accept the view of atonement so clearly set

forth by the writer, or might differ from him in certain of the implications of his argument, it seems difficult to suppose that any one who truly appreciates the significance of the death of Christ, could fail to appreciate the main contention of the writer when he declares that "the charter of missions is not to be found so much in the mere command of Christ as "in the character and work of Him who hung upon the tree."

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

**THE CHURCH AND THE CHANGING ORDER.** By Shailer Mathews, Professor of Historical and Comparative Theology in the University of Chicago; Author of "The Social Teaching of Jesus," "The Messianic Hope in the New Testament"; editor of "The World To-day". 8vo.: pp. viii, 255. New York: The MacMillan Company. London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd. 1907.

The aim of this interesting and sprightly volume is to point out the changes which must be made in the policy, the teachings, and the methods, of the Church, if she is to continue to be the great power for good in her radically new environment that she has been in the past. Our author, consequently, considers the relation of the church to modern scholarship, to the prevalent objection to the Gospel of the resurrection, to "the Gospel of brotherhood," to the widely spread "social discontent", to the social movement so characteristic of our day, to the well nigh universal materialism of our times; and he concludes with a chapter entitled "The Sword of the Christ," in which he sounds the resulting call to heroic and self-sacrificing struggle.

The discussion is usually well balanced and illuminating, and often most appropriate to present conditions. Specially so are the chapters on "The Church and the Gospel of the Risen Christ" and "The Church and Materialism." We can never emphasize too strongly, and least of all now, that the Gospel or Christianity is far from being identical with religion; that while "religion as a form of human experience may be independent of specific facts in history," Christianity or the Gospel" as a means of inducing and regulating that experience certainly contains historical elements"; that, consequently, the facts as to Christ, particularly as to His resurrection and ascension, are vital; that in the destruction of the historic fact of the resurrection of Jesus as Paul conceived it the Gospel as a basis for a new type of religion would disappear and with it the new and particular form of religion as well; and that, hence, the Gospel ought always to be preached with primitive insistence upon its historic element. That is fundamental and indispensable.

So, too, no lesson is so much needed to-day as that "materialism is the greatest enemy of the church; nor could our author be more effective

than he is when he shows how many and how subtle are the forms of its manifestation, such as, the passion for wealth, the devotion of the home to income earning, excessive athleticism, sensual theatrical exhibitions, the craze for gambling, etc. Of course, as Prof. Matthews strenuously maintains, the cure for all this is insistence on the reality of religion. We are not so sure, however, that, as he implies, the reality of religion is emphasized in proportion as the doctrines of religion are minimized, the fact of Christianity is made real in so far as its truths are kept in the background. On the contrary, we are sure that if the worth of Christianity is inseparable from its historic basis, so it is its doctrines which give worth to that basis. It is precisely the doctrine that Christ "died for our sins and was raised again for our justification" that makes his death and resurrection the most precious of all facts for us. Were this doctrine not true, our preaching would be as vain as Paul says that it would be if Christ had not risen. While our Lord's supernaturalness would be evinced, he would not be revealed as *our Saviour*. In a word, the doctrinal element which our author thinks now stands in the way of the progress of Christianity needs to be made as prominent as the historical element. It is partly because the former is being so generally ignored that the latter is coming to be denied. It is in the meaning of a fact that we feel its reasonableness.

Hence, we must take issue again with Prof. Matthews in his estimate of the importance of the distinction between the supernatural and the natural. We cannot agree with him that if the distinction is real, then God is not so active in the operations of nature as in his supernatural works; or that if this be not so, then "the distinction between natural and supernatural is one for a debating society." Of course, 'when something exceptional happens, we may be sure that in bringing it to pass God does not throw the universe into anarchy. He violates law when he acts supernaturally no more than when he acts naturally. But it is just as true that he has not imposed any such laws on the universe as prevent him from interposing in its affairs when and where and as he pleases, and it is precisely the fact that in Christianity we have such a supernatural interposition which gives to it its supreme worth. If God cannot supernaturally put out His own hand in nature and work through processes *above* those of nature, how can even He save a world "dead through trespasses and sins"? According to His own processes in nature, the inevitable issue in the case of such a world can be only increasing corruption. Consequently, so far from this distinction between the supernatural and the natural being one for a debating society merely, it is on the reality of this distinction that the hope of the world rests, and it is also in the reality of this distinction that we see most clearly the reasonableness of the fundamental facts of Christianity. If for example, the resurrection of our Lord were not supernatural, how could we receive it as a fact? It is clearly outside of and above all that reason has taught us as to nature. In a word, it is precisely its supernaturalness which makes it reasonable as a fact.

We may not close this notice without calling attention to the change

that such positions as those of this volume call for in the education of the ministry. So long as the Bible be regarded as a distinctly supernatural book, a message from God Himself, inspired and, consequently, infallible even as to its words, it will be indispensable that the Christian minister should understand the language in which it is written. How else can he be a "preacher of the Word"; and unless he be a "preacher of the Word," how can he be an "ambassador of Christ"? Is not the first requirement of an ambassador that he shall present and so that he shall be able to read and interpret for himself the proclamation of his king? Hence, whatever else the theological student may omit or elect, he must qualify himself in the languages of holy Scripture; and that there are many who fail to do this even when the curriculum aims to secure it,—this only proves that many go into the ministry unprepared and that few, if any, of our seminaries are what they ought to be. On the other hand, however, if the distinction between natural and supernatural be one for a debating society only; if the Bible, instead of being the very Word of God Himself, be merely the expression of the developing religious nature of man, it follows, of course, that the candidate for the ministry would better be left to pick and choose his own studies. His religious nature must be at liberty to expand freely. Indeed, it may well be that even in his whims and fancies we shall have a higher revelation of God than we could possibly have in the visions and reasonings of prophets and apostles of a primitive and far less privileged age. Hence, the folly of insisting that the student for the ministry shall study the language that Isaiah spoke and the tongue in which Paul wrote. Were there no other objection, it is to divert him from those sociological speculations and experiments to which the church may most hopefully look for the development of the Gospel demanded by "the changing order."

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS. By REV. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, M.A., cloth, 12mo. 124 pp. Fleming H. Revell Co., price 75 cents net.

These brief chapters are the evident product of a well disciplined mind, a catholic spirit and a reverent faith. The philosophic and speculative inclination of the writer seems to be suggested by his characterization of Jesus as "The Conscious Over-Soul and Spiritual Guide of Universal Mankind," the "Abiding Center of the Life of the Universal Man," the "Over Soul of the Universal Human Spirit." The purpose of the book, however, is "Not to pursue an intellectual interest but to serve a religious need." The discussion concerns the relation in which Jesus stands to the human race, which is "Only a part of the question of the place of Christ in the cosmic process." Jesus is set forth as "The representative Man in whom the Idea of the species is incarnated." His character is declared to be free from the usual limitations suggested by sex or race or time or social rank. He is the "Universal Human Norm." He is the "Sole instance of the Catholic Man." The

writer establishes this view of "the Universality of Jesus" by a series of studies in the memoirs of His life. He summons the Witness of Christ's Environment, of his Origin, Baptism, Temptation, Transfiguration, Teaching, Prayers, Death, Resurrection, and of the event of Pentecost. Even when it is not possible to agree with certain interpretations of the "Representative fragments of the Records" which the writer passes in review, the main point is in every case clearly illustrated and evidence is given of careful and original thought. For instance in connection with the Baptism of Jesus, while it may seem that more is included in the terms "Lamb of God" and "Baptism with the Spirit" than the writer sets forth, he does establish the fact that "The note of Universality is struck at the threshold of Christ's career. Or again, while it may seem fanciful in the writer to insist that the temptation of Christ to cast himself from the pinnacle of the temple is to be interpreted as meaning that Christ thought of becoming a high priest and "setting himself upon a hierarchical eminence", nevertheless, in his whole treatment of the Temptation the writer shows that the "Moral core of the Experience is Generic". So, too, while it may be questioned whether the meaning of the Transfiguration scene was a great "renunciation," and whether the essence of Pentecost is suggested by "Universality", it is strikingly demonstrated that in all these experiences of Christ there is set forth the catholicity of his person and work. So, too, in referring to the book as a whole, while one may doubt the possible universalistic implications of some of the terms employed, we are enabled to see in clear light the Representative Ideal Man, and we are certain to agree with the practical conclusions of the writer which are as follows:

*First*, that such a picture is a suggestion of the inspiration of the Gospels; and *secondly*, that the revelation of such a character inspires us to seek to attain His likeness; and *thirdly*, that the ideal of Christian character is to be found in the world-embracing love; and *finally* that the catholicity of Jesus assures us of His future universal sway.

These chapters are full of stimulating thought and reveal to us a writer filled with loving trust in the "Catholic Christ" Who by His living spirit is still moving in the hearts of men for the fulfillment of the designs of God.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN

THE PRAYERS OF THE BIBLE. By PROFESSOR JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, M.A. New York. A. C. Armstrong and Son. Pp. 388.

The writer declares the purpose of the book to be both scientific and practical. "It is an attempt to understand Biblical prayer by an examination of the prayers and allusions to prayer, and it seeks to gather up the results of this examination and to apply them to the public and private devotions of to-day."

Of the four parts of the book the first and third are more directly concerned with the scientific, the second and fourth with the practical



aim. Part I is an interesting discussion of Biblical prayer, including such topics as "The themes of prayer," "The inward and outward conditions", "The teachings and practice of Jesus", "The prayers of Paul."

In Part II the author applies to "Modern Prayer", the principles which have been discovered in his review of the prayers of the Bible, and in three brief, thoughtful, and helpful chapters treats of "The Nature and Content of Prayer," "The Form of Prayer," "Free and Liturgical Prayer."

We are reminded by Part III of the large amount of Scripture which is included under the title of prayer, and we are also enabled to test the conclusions of the writer, and are aided in further study of his suggestive theme; for we are here given a comprehensive collection of the prayers of the Old and New Testaments under the classification of "petition", "intercession", "thanksgiving", "confession", "praise", "vows", "complaints", "benedictions and doxologies".

In Part IV selections are made, from these various classes, of "Biblical prayers for modern use." The volume, as a whole, cannot fail to stimulate one to a more careful consideration of the subject suggested, nor, if thoughtfully read, to aid in the exercise of private and public devotion.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE SOCIAL MESSAGE OF THE MODERN PULPIT By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, First Congregational Church, Oakland, California. The Lyman Beecher Lectures 1905-6. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 293, \$1.25 net.

The author makes a convincing and stimulating appeal for expository preaching; yet there is reason for suggesting that in his treatment of the Book of Exodus, he has not given us an encouraging example of Biblical exposition. In reviewing the history as "The Story of an Ancient Labor Movement," the deep significance of the narrative is not set forth, nor is new light thrown upon modern social problems. The familiar metaphor is merely expanded into the compass of chapters which speak of "industrial and social bondage," of the need of "an industrial deliverer," of "the promised land" of "a new social order." We are, however, indebted to the writer for discussing seriously a problem which confronts the modern pulpit, for reminding us anew of distressing social conditions to which we dare not be indifferent, and for certain practical suggestions for the guidance of the Christian minister. Among the latter may be mentioned the advice to avoid all that flavors of partisanship, to exalt material above spiritual values, to emphasize the peril of self-interest, to insist upon the recognition of the will of God in the organized life of men. While insisting upon moral obligation, there seems to be lacking, in the discussion, a clear statement of its sanctions; and while recognizing the need of character and self sacrifices in order to the establishment of an ideal social order, one misses the Christian motives of constraining love to Him "who

died for all, that they who live, should no longer live unto themselves, but unto Him, who, for their sakes, died and rose again." The social message of which Christ is not the substance will not be adequate for the modern pulpit.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

PREACHER PROBLEMS OR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY PREACHER AT HIS WORK. By WILLIAM THOMAS MOORE, LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 387. \$1.50 net.

In thirty-six brief chapters, originally prepared as lectures for ministerial students, the writer endeavors to aid in the solution of "The problems growing out of the preacher's personal relation to his work", "The problems growing out of the modern view of the world," "The problems growing out of ways and means." The first of these three classes of problems includes the problem of "the call," of "character," of the "library," of the sermon, of visiting, of literary work, of vacation, of worries. The second class suggests the ethical, scientific, theological, and Biblical problems. The third presents such problems as social life, the prayer-meeting, the Sunday-School, church music, evangelism, and endeavors to show "how the practical duties of the preacher's position can be met".

The treatment throughout is informal, unconventional, conservative, sane and sensible. The large number of subjects treated necessitate a discussion of each so brief as to border at times on the superficial; but each chapter is helpful and is evidently the product, not of mere theorizing, but of practical experience. The book is to be heartily commended to pastors and especially to theological students.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF JESUS. By JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph.D., LL.D. New York: The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations. 1906. Pp. 168.

In spite of the writer's reverent spirit and careful treatment, this series of brief studies, intended for the instruction and inspiration of young men, is a striking example of how certainly the teachings of Jesus lose their significance when separated from His Divine Person and atoning work. In endeavoring to avoid all Christian "doctrines," the author leaves no true support or sanction for the teachings which remain. He is able, of course, to suggest that the life and words of Jesus embody principles which, if applied, would result in the regeneration of society, and he wisely insists that a "regenerated social order" can only result from "the perfecting of individuals". But how can individuals be regenerated and perfected? This is the crux of the social question, and the writer nowhere intimates the true and simple

answer which the Gospels so plainly proclaim. It is interesting to note how powerless a system is the Christianity which has been robbed of the redeeming and divine Christ.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**JESUS AND NICODEMUS.** A study in spiritual life. By the REVEREND JOHN REID, M.A. Inverness. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 288. Price \$1.75 net.

This treatment of a most fascinating and important passage in the Gospel according to John, is from every point of view admirable and satisfying. The writer proposes to interpret afresh this familiar narrative and to "see its meaning in the light of the time, and read out its lesson for the individual, the Church, and the world." It is sufficient praise to suggest that the author has already achieved his aim, and has given us a discussion as lucid as it is illuminating. The concise chapters of this volume contain not merely an exposition, but also an impressive application of truth, and will be found of value and spiritual help to all by whom they may be read.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**FOR THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY.** By J. HARWOOD PATTISON. Elaborated by his son, Harold Pattison. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1907. Pp. 558. Price \$1.50 net.

We here find a son admirably completing the literary work and continuing the helpful influence of his honored father. The substance of this book consists in the lectures delivered in the Rochester Theological Seminary by the late Dr. T. Harwood Pattison, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. These lectures were left in the form of notes which have been so revised, arranged and enlarged, by the Rev. Harold Pattison, that they form a series of chapters which will prove of value to all who are interested in the work of the Christian Ministry. While the author disclaims the purpose of teaching pastoral theology the practical suggestions which are made, and the principles which are enunciated, cannot fail to aid in the solution of the problems which confront those who are engaged in the pastoral office. The book is primarily designed for the use of those who are to be in the ministry of the Baptist Church, but is well adapted to serve those of other communions.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

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## GENERAL LITERATURE.

**ATTI DELLA R. ACCADEMIA DEI LINCEI ANNO CCCI.** 1904. Serie Quinta. Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità. Vol. I. Roma. Tipografia della R. Accademia dei Lincei. 1904. 4to, pp. 468.

**THE SAME.** Vols II and III. 1905, 1906. Pp. 467 and 488.

We have here the "Acts" of the most venerable Academy of the Lincei, now in its 304th year, for the years 1904, 1905 and 1906, being the first three volumes of the 5th series. They are printed very handsomely with numerous illustrations, and cover recent archaeological researches in Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, and contain much valuable material for the student of Italian antiquity. Vol. I is concerned with discoveries in Sardinia and Sicily, for the most part, but also includes others in Rome, Norba and Pistoia. Vol. II describes the discoveries in Rome, Pompeii and Venice, chiefly, and has notes of archaeological interest from many other Italian towns. Vol. III devotes most of its pages to Etruria, Latium and the Campania, Pompeii, Rome and its suburbs, Samnium and Sabina, and Venice.

The Review has also received the *Rendiconti* of the above Academy for the section of the moral, historical and philological sciences, vol. XIV of the fifth series, fasc. 9-12, 1905, and vol. XV, fasc. 1-4, 7-12, 1906. These contain papers presented at the sessions of the Academy and the proceedings of the same.

*Princeton.*

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

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NUMBER 2

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# The Princeton Theological Review

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## THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY AND ITS WORK.

The "Westminster Assembly of Divines" derives its name from the ancient conventual church of Westminster Abbey, situated in the western district of the county of London. It was convened in the most ornate portion of this noble fabric, the Chapel of Henry VII, on the first day of July, 1643; but, as the cold weather of autumn came on, it was transferred (October 2nd, 1643) to a more comfortable room (the so-called "Jerusalem Chamber") in the adjoining Deanery. In that room it thereafter sat, not merely to the end of the 1163 numbered sessions, during which its important labors were transacted (up to Feb. 22, 1649), but through some three years more of irregular life, acting as a committee for the examination of appointees to charges and applicants for licensure to preach. It ultimately vanished with the famous "Long Parliament" to which it owed its being. The last entry in its Minutes is dated March 25th, 1652.<sup>1</sup>

The summoning of the Westminster Assembly was an important incident in the conflict between the Parliament and the king, which was the form taken on English soil by the ecclesiastico-political struggle by which all Europe was

<sup>1</sup> In the ordinance convening the Assembly, it is commissioned to sit "during this present Parliament, or until further order be taken by both the said houses".

convulsed during the seventeenth century. It was the difficult task of that century to work out to its legitimate issue what had been auspiciously begun in the great revolution of the preceding period; to secure from disintegration what had been won in that revolution; to protect it from reaction; and to repel the destructive forces set in motion against it by the counter-reformation. The new Protestantism was, during this its second age, cast into a crucible in the heats of which it everywhere suffered serious losses, even though it emerged from them, wherever it survived, in greater compactness and purity. The form which the struggle took in England was determined by the peculiar course the Reformation movement had followed in that country. There, on its official side, the Reformation was fundamentally a contest between the king and the pope. The purpose which Henry VIII set before himself was to free the state from foreign influences exerted by the pope through the church; and his efforts were directed, with great singleness of aim, to the establishment of his own authority in ecclesiastical matters to the exclusion of that of the pope. In these efforts he had the support of Parliament, always jealous of foreign interference; and was not merely sustained but urged on by the whole force of the religious and doctrinal reform gradually spreading among the people, which, however, he made it his business rather to curb than to encourage. The removal of this curb during the reign of Edward VI concealed for a time the evils inherent in the new powers assumed by the throne. But with the accession of Elizabeth, who had no sympathy whatever with religious enthusiasm, they began to appear; and they grew ever more flagrant under her successors. The authority in ecclesiastical matters which had been vindicated to the throne over against the pope, was increasingly employed to establish the general authority of the throne over against the Parliament. The church thus became the instrument of the crown in compacting its absolutism; and the interests of civil liberty soon rendered it as imperative to break the absolutism of the

king in ecclesiastical affairs as it had ever been to eliminate the papacy from the control of the English Church.

The controversy was thus shifted from a contest between pope and king to a contest between king and Parliament. And as the cause of the king had ever more intimately allied itself with that of the prelatical party in the church, which had grown more and more reactionary until under the leading of Laud (1573-1645) it has become aggressively and revolutionarily so,<sup>2</sup> the cause of Puritanism, that is of pure Protestantism, became ever more identical with that of the Parliament. When the parties were ultimately lined up for the final struggle, therefore, it was king and prelate on the one side, against Parliament and Puritan on the other.<sup>3</sup> The main issue which was raised was a secular one, the issue of representative government over against royal absolutism. This issue was fought to a finish, with the ultimate result that there were established in England a constitutional monarchy and a responsible government. There was complicated with this issue, however, also the issue, no doubt, at bottom, of religious freedom over against ecclesiastical tyranny, for it was impatience with ecclesiastical tyranny which gave its vigor to the movement. But the form which was openly taken by the ecclesiastical issue was rather that of a contest between a pure Protestantism and catholicizing reaction. It was in the mind of neither of the immediate contestants in the main conflict to free the church

"Laud's real influence was derived from the unity of his purpose. He directed all the powers of a clear, narrow mind and a dogged will to the realization of a single aim. His resolve was to revise the Church of England to what he conceived to be its real position as a branch, though a reformed branch, of the great Catholic Church throughout the world. . . . The first step in the realization of such a theory was the severance of whatever ties had hitherto united the English Church to the Reformed Churches of the Continent. . . . His policy was no longer the purely conservative policy of Parker and Whitgift; it was aggressive and revolutionary." (Green, *Short History*, etc., p. 499, etc.)

"As Mr. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland*, 1907, p. 248, puts it: "On the side of King Charles all the Romans and Anglicans; on that of 'King Pym' all the many varieties of Puritanism."

from the domination of the state: they differed only as to the seat of the civil authority to which the church should be subject—whether king or Parliament. This fundamental controversy lay behind the conflict over the organization of the subject church and the ordering of its forms of worship—matters which quickly lost their importance, therefore, when the main question was settled. It can occasion little surprise, accordingly, that, when the heats of conflict were over and exhaustion succeeded effort, the English people were able to content themselves, as the ultimate result on the ecclesiastical side, with so slight a gain as a mere act of toleration (May 24, 1689).

This struggle had reached its acutest stage when "the Long Parliament" met, on the third of November, 1640. Profoundly distrustful of the King's sincerity, and determined on its own behalf to be trifled with no longer, Parliament was in no mood for compromises with respect whether to civil or to ecclesiastical affairs. On the ecclesiastical side it was without concern, indeed, for doctrine. It was under no illusions, to be sure, as to the doctrinal significance of the Catholic reaction, and it was fully sensible of the spread of Arminianism in high places.<sup>4</sup> But although there were not lacking hints of such a thing, Tract No. 90 had not yet been written,<sup>5</sup> and the soundly Reformed character of the Church of England as well in its official Articles of Religion as in its general conviction was not in dispute. John Milton accurately reflects the common senti-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the Resolutions on Religion of Feb. 24, 1629; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*, 1896, pp. 521 sq.

<sup>5</sup> A precursor of Tract No. 90, however, had been published in 1634 by "Franciscus a Sancta Clara", a pervert to Romanism of the name of Davenport, entitled "God, Nature, Grace, or a Treatise on Predestination, the Deserts and Remission of Sin, etc.,—*ubi ad trutinam fidei Catholicae examinatur confessio Anglicana et ad singula puncta quid teneat, qualiter differat, excutitur*, etc. . . . A new edition of this Tract was called for in 1635. The reactionary divines meanwhile were already acting on such a theory. For the state of the case in the later years of James' reign see Bishop Carleton's *Examination of Bishop Montague's Appeal*, pp. 5, 49, 94.



ment of the day when he declares that "in purity of doctrine" English Churchmen "agreed with their brethern", that is, of the other Reformed Churches, while yet "in discipline, which is the execution and applying of the doctrine home" they were "no better than a schism from all the Reformation and a sore scandal to them".<sup>6</sup> What the nation in Commons assembled was determined to be rid of in its church establishment was, therefore, briefly, "bishopsrics" and "ceremonies",—what Milton calls "the irreligious pride and hateful tyranny of prelates" and the "senseless ceremonies" which were only "a dangerous earnest of sliding back to Rome". The Convocation of 1640, continuing illegally to sit after the dissolution of the "Short Parliament", had indeed endeavored to protect the established organization of the church. It had framed a canon, requiring from the whole body of the clergy the famous "et cetera oath," a sort of echo and counterblast to the "National Covenant" which had been subscribed in Scotland two years before (Feb. 28, 1638). By this oath every clergyman was to bind himself never to give his consent "to alter the government of this Church by archbishops, bishops, deans, and archdeacons, etc., as it stands now established, and by right it ought to stand".<sup>7</sup> It was even thought worth while to prepare a number of petitions for Parliament with the design of counteracting the effect of this act of convocation. The most important of these, the so-called "London" or "Root-and-Branch" petition bore no fewer than 15,000 signatures, and the personal attendance of some 1500 gentlemen of quality when it was presented to Parliament lent weight to its prayer. This was to the effect that "the government of archbishops and lord bishops, deans, and archdeacons, etc." (the same enumeration, observe, as in the "et cetera oath") "with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be abolished, and all laws in their behalf made void, and the government according

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Reformation in England*, etc. 1641.

<sup>7</sup> Wilkins, iv., p. 549; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, *Documents Illustrative of English Church History*, 1896, p. 536.

to God's word may be rightly placed amongst us".<sup>8</sup> Parliament, however, was in no need of prodding for this work, though it was for various reasons disposed to proceed leisurely in it. The obnoxious act of Convocation was at once taken up and rebuked. But even the Root and Branch Petition, which was apparently ready from the beginning of the session,<sup>9</sup> was not presented until Dec. 11, and after its presentation was not taken into formal consideration by the House until the following February. As was natural, differences of opinion also began to manifest themselves, as to precisely what should be done with the Bishops, and as to the precise form of government which should be set up in the church after they had been dealt with. There is no reason to doubt the exactness of Baillie's information<sup>10</sup> that the Commons were by a large majority of their membership for erecting some "kind of Presbyteries", and "for bringing down the Bishop in all things, spiritual and temporal, so low as can be with any substance". In Parliament as out of it the great majority of leading men had become Presbyterian in their tendencies, and the Independents were for the present prepared to act with them. But there was very little knowledge abroad among the members of Parliament of what Presbytery really was,<sup>11</sup> and even the most convinced Presbyterians doubted the feasibility of setting up the whole Presbyterian system at once, while an influential party still advocated what Baillie calls<sup>12</sup> "a calked Episcopacy".<sup>13</sup> It still hung in the balance, there-

<sup>8</sup> Rushworth, *Hist. Coll.*, Ed. 1721, iv., p. 93; reprinted in Gee and Hardy, p. 537.

<sup>9</sup> Baillie, *Letters* (Ed. Laing), i., p. 273.

<sup>10</sup> Baillie, i., p. 303.

<sup>11</sup> Baillie, ii., p. 167.

<sup>12</sup> Baillie, i., p. 287.

<sup>13</sup> The views of this party find full expression in what Mr. Marriott (*The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Lord Falkland*, 1907, p. 197) calls Falkland's "powerful speech" in opposition to the "Root and Branch Bill". It is printed by Mr. Marriott, pp. 198-204. Falkland was a typical example of the party, says Mr. Marriott (p. 248), which "anti-Laudian but not anti-Episcopal" felt strongly the evils of the Laudian reaction but were devoted to the traditional settlement of the

fore, whether Bishops should be utterly abolished; and any hesitation which may have existed in the Commons was more than matched in the House of Lords. Above all it never entered the thought of Parliament to set up in the church any manner of government whatever over which it did not itself retain control.<sup>14</sup> The result was that actual legislation dragged. Abortive bill after abortive bill was

church. "He is a great stranger in Israel", said he in a speech of Feb. 8, 1641 (Marriott, pp. 181-2), who knows not this kingdom hath long labored under many and great oppressions, both in religion and liberty; and his acquaintance here is not great, and his ingenuity less, who doth not both know and acknowledge that a great, if not a principal, cause of both these have been some Bishops and their adherents. Mr. Speaker, a little search will serve to find them to have been the destruction of unity under pretense of uniformity, to have brought in superstition and scandal under the titles of reverence and decency; to have defiled our Church by adorning our churches; to have slackened the strictness of that union which was formerly between us and those of our religion beyond the sea", . . . and the like. The remedy, however, for these evils, he insisted, was not to take away Bishops but to reduce them to their proper place and functions as spiritual officers of a spiritual body. He expresses the opinion (Marriott, p. 200) that the utter destruction of Bishops was not desired by "most men", and that the petitions before Parliament were misleading, "because men petition for what they have not and not for what they have", and the like. Yet he betrays his conviction (p. 203) that "the Scotch government" is in store for England. Similarly Baxter (*Autobiog.*, i., p. 146) tells us that Presbytery was "but a stranger" in England, and "though most of the ministers then in England saw nothing in the Presbyterian way of practice which they could not cheerfully concur in, yet it was but few that had resolved on their principles". He adds that "the most that ever he could meet" were averse to the *ius divinum* of lay elders and "for the moderate primitive Episcopacy".

"It was this "trenchant secularity" of Parliament—its ingrained Erastianism—which afterwards made it so earnest and persistent for the government of the church by a Parliamentary Commission. It was in this direction that its thoughts turned at the beginning of its discussion of the settlement of the church (see the lucid account of the debates on the Root and Branch Bill given by Shaw, i., p. 90 sq., and cf. Fiennes' speech, pp. 35-36); and from this determination it never receded. Mr. Marriott (*Falkland*, as cited, p. 208) remarks so far justly: "The fact is that the dominant sentiment of the Long Parliament as regards the Church was neither Episcopalian, Presbyterian nor Independent; it was Erastian. Amid infinite variety of opinions, two conclusions more and more clearly emerged; first, that there must be some form of ecclesiastical organization; and secondly, that whatever

brought in; now simply to deprive the prelates of secular functions, and again to abolish the whole Episcopal system. It was not until the autumn of 1641 (Oct. 21), that at length a bill excluding the Bishops from secular activities was passed by the Commons to which the assent of the Lords was obtained (Feb. 5, 1642);<sup>15</sup> and not until another year had slipped away that, under Scotch influence (Aug., 1642), a bill was finally passed (Jan. 26, 1643,) abolishing prelacy altogether.

Alongside of these slowly maturing efforts at negative legislation there naturally ran a parallel series of attempts to provide a positive constitution for the church after the Bishops had been minished or done away. It was recognized from the beginning that for this positive legislation the advice of approved divines would be requisite.<sup>16</sup> Preparation for it took, therefore, much the form of proposals for securing such advice. From all sides, within Parliament and without it alike, the suggestion was pressed that a formal Synod of Divines should be convened to which Parliament should statedly appeal for counsel in all questions which should occasionally arise in the process of the settlement of the church. And from the beginning it was at the form might be, its government must be strictly controlled by Parliament." In their Erastianism Falkland and Fiennes were wholly at one.

<sup>15</sup> This bill was also passed by the King by a commission (*Lords' Journal*, iv., 580) and therefore on any ground became a law of the Realm (*Statutes*, v., 138, 16 Car. I., c. 27) taking effect Feb. 13, 1642. It may be read in Gee and Hardy, p. 564.

<sup>16</sup> The most notable early attempt to secure such advice was probably that taken by the Lords March 1, 1641, in the appointment of what has come to be known as Bishop Williams' Committee. See the full account of this Committee in Shaw's *History of the English Church*, etc., I., p. 65 sq.; II., pp. 287-294; cf. Mitchell, Baird Lectures, pp. 100 sq. Similarly, in its discussion of the "Ministers' petition and remonstrance" in February, 1641, the Commons sought the advice of divines in its committee. The desirability of a standing Assembly of Divines for giving stated advice to Parliament was adverted to by more than one speaker in the course of the discussion of the Root and Branch Bill which was introduced on May 27, 1641: on the government to be set up after the abolishing of the prelates the debaters felt the need of advice from such a body.

least hinted that, in framing its advice, such a Synod might well bear in mind wider interests than merely the internal peace of the Church of England; that it might for example, consider the advantage of securing along with that a greater harmony with the other Reformed Churches, particularly the neighboring Church of Scotland. It was accordingly with this wider outlook in mind that the proposition was given explicit shape in "the Grand Remonstrance" which was drawn up in the Commons on Nov. 8, 1641, and, having been passed on Nov. 22, was presented to the King on Dec. 11. This document began by avowing the intention of Parliament to "reduce within bounds that exorbitant power which the prelates had assumed unto themselves", and to set up "a juster discipline and government in the Church". It proceeded thus (§ 186): "And the better to effect the intended reformation, we desire there may be a general synod of the most grave, pious, learned, and judicious divines of this island; assisted with some from foreign parts, professing the same religion with us, who may consider of all things necessary for the peace and good government of the Church, and represent the results of their consultations unto Parliament, to be there allowed of and confirmed, and receive the stamp of authority, thereby to find passage and obedience throughout the kingdom".<sup>17</sup> In pursuance of this design, the Commons engaged themselves desultorily from the ensuing February (1642) in preparations for convening such a synod. The names of suitable ministers to sit in it were canvassed; selection was made of two divines from each English and one from each Welsh county, two from the Channel Islands and from each University, and five from London;<sup>18</sup> and a bill was passed through both Houses (May 9 to June 30, 1642) commanding the Assembly so constituted to convene on July 1st, 1642.<sup>19</sup> The King's assent failing, however, this bill lapsed, and was superseded by another to the same general effect, and that

<sup>17</sup> Rushworth, ed. 1721, iv., p. 438; cf. Gee and Hardy, p. 561.

<sup>18</sup> *Commons' Journal*, ii., pp. 524, 535-564.

<sup>19</sup> *Lords' Journal*, v., p. 84; *Commons' Journal*, ii., p. 287.



by yet another, and yet another, which went the same way, until finally a sixth bill was prepared, read in the Commons as an ordinance on May 13, 1643, and having been agreed to by the Lords on June 12, 1643, was put into effect without the King's assent. By this ordinance,<sup>20</sup> the Divines, in number 121, supplemented by ten peers and twenty members of the House of Commons (40 being a quorum) were required "to meet and assemble themselves at Westminster, in the Chapel called King Henry the VII's Chapel, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand six hundred and forty three," and thereafter "from time to time to sit, and be removed from place to place" and to "confer and to treat among themselves of such matters and things touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconstructions, as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other; and to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament shall be required; and the same not to divulge by printing, writing, or otherwise, without the consent of both or either House of Parliament".

The prominence given in this ordinance to the reorganization of the government of the Church of England as the primary matter upon which the Assembly thus instituted should be consulted was inherent in the nature of the case, but should not pass without specific notice. And, we should further note, next to the reorganization of the government of the church the reform of its liturgy was, as was natural

<sup>20</sup> Rushworth, ed. 1692, II., iii. (Vol. V.), p. 337: it is printed in the preliminary materials gathered at the opening of the Scottish editions of the Confession of Faith; also in the opening pages of A. F. Mitchell, *The Westminster Assembly*, etc. (The Baird Lecture for 1882), ed. 2, 1897, pp. xiii-xvi.

in the circumstances, to be the Assembly's care. Doctrinal matters lay wholly in the background. In the heading of the ordinance it is described with exactness as an ordinance "for the calling of an Assembly of learned and godly Divines, and others, to be consulted with by the Parliament, for the settling of the Government and Liturgy of the Church of England"; while it is only added as something clearly secondary in importance that its labors may be directed also to "the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the said Church from false aspersions and interpretations". In the body of the ordinance the occasion of calling such an Assembly is detailed. It was because "many things remained in the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church which did necessarily require a farther and more perfect reformation than as yet hath been attained"; and more specifically because Parliament had arrived at the determination that the existing prelatical government should be taken away as evil, "a great impediment to reformation and growth of religion and very prejudicial to the state and government of this kingdom". The prime purpose for calling the Assembly is therefore declared to be "to consult and advise" with Parliament, as it may be required to do, in the Parliament's efforts to substitute for the existing prelatical government of the Church, such a government "as may be most agreeable to God's holy word, and most apt to procure and preserve the peace of the Church at home, and nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland, and other Reformed Churches abroad". It is a clearly secondary duty laid on it also "to vindicate and clear the doctrine of the Church of England from all false calumnies and aspersions". It has already been pointed out, that this emphasis on the reformation first of the government and next of the liturgy of the church, merely reflects the actual situation of affairs. The doctrine of the Church of England was everywhere recognized as in itself soundly Reformed, and needing only to be protected from corrupting misinterpretations; its government and worship, on the other hand, were conceived to be themselves sadly in need of

reformation, in the interests of adjustment to the will of God as declared in Scripture, and of harmonizing with the practice of the sister Reformed Churches. Of these sister Reformed Churches, that of Scotland is particularly singled out for mention as the one into "a nearer agreement" with the government of which it were especially desirable that the new government of the Church of England should be brought. But this appears on the face of the ordinance merely as a measure of general prudence and propriety—there is nothing to indicate that any formal uniformity in religion with Scotland was to be sought. It was with the reorganization of the Church of England alone that Parliament was at this time concerned; and the Assembly called "to consult and advise" with it in this work, had no function beyond the bounds of that Church.

What is of most importance to observe in this ordinance, however, is the care that is taken to withhold all independent powers from the Assembly it convened and to confine it to a purely advisory function. Parliament had no intention whatever of erecting by its own side an ecclesiastical legislature to which might be committed the work of reorganizing the church, leaving Parliament free to give itself to the civil affairs of the nation. What it proposed to do, was simply to create a permanent Committee of Divines which should be continuously accessible to it, and to which it could resort from time to time for counsel in its prosecution of the task of reconstituting the government, discipline and worship of the Church of England.<sup>21</sup> Parliament was determined to hold the entire power, civil and ecclesiastical alike, in its own hands; and it took the most extreme pains to deny all initiation and all jurisdiction to the Assembly of Divines it was erecting,<sup>22</sup> and to limit it strictly to

<sup>21</sup> "This is no proper Assembly", remarks Baillie (ii, p. 180), meaning that it has no such powers as belonged to the Scottish General Assembly: "but a meeting called by the Parliament to advyse them in all things they are asked." As Dr. Leishman puts it, the Westminster Assembly "in the language of our time was rather a Parliamentary Commission" (*The Westminster Directory*, etc., 1901, p. x).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e. g. the explicit action of the Lords to this effect, *Lords' Jour-*

supplying Parliament with advice upon specific propositions occasionally submitted to it. The ordinance is described in its heading as an ordinance for the calling of an Assembly "to be consulted with by the Parliament". And in the body of the ordinance the function of the Divines is described as "to consult and advise of such matters and things, touching the premises"—that is to say, the Liturgy, Discipline and Government of the Church, together with the clearing and vindicating of its doctrine,—"as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the Houses of Parliament, and to give their advice and counsel therein to both or either of said Houses, when, and as often as, they shall be thereunto required". And again, with perhaps superfluous but certainly significant emphasis, in the empowering clauses, the assembled Divines are given "power and authority, and are hereby likewise enjoined, from time to time during the present Parliament, or until further order be taken by both the said Houses, to confer and treat among themselves of such matters and things, touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconceptions, as shall be proposed unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other"; and are further enjoined "to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses shall be required; and the same not to divulge, by printing, writing, or otherwise without the consent of both or either House of Parliament". To make assurance trebly certain the ordinance closes with this blanket clause: "Provided always, That this Ordinance, or anything therein contained, shall not give unto the persons aforesaid, or any of them, nor shall they in this Assembly assume to exercise any jurisdiction, power, or authority ecclesiastical whatsoever,

*nal.* vi., p. 84, to which the closing words of the Ordinance are conformed.

or any other power than is herein particularly expressed." The effect of these regulations was of course to make the Westminster Assembly merely the creature of Parliament. They reflect the Erastian temper of Parliament, which, intent though it was upon vindicating the civil liberty of the subject, never caught sight of the vision of a free Church in a free State, but not unnaturally identified the cause of freedom with itself and would have felt it a betrayal of liberty not to have retained all authority, civil and ecclesiastical alike, in its own hands as the representatives of the nation. With it, the great conflict in progress was that between King and Parliament; and what it was chiefly concerned with was the establishment of Parliamentary government. In its regulations with respect to the Westminster Assembly, however, it did not go one step beyond what it had been accustomed to see practiced in England with regard to the civil control of ecclesiastical assemblies. The effect of these regulations was, in fact, merely to place this Assembly with respect to its independence of action, in the same position relatively to Parliament, which had been previously occupied by the Convocations of the Church of England relatively to the crown, as regulated by 25 Henry VIII (1533/4), c. 19, revived by 1 Eliz. (1538/9), c. 1. s. z., and expounded by Coke, *Reports*, xiii, p. 72.<sup>28</sup> And it must be borne in mind that stringent as these regulations were, they denied to the Assembly only initiation and au-

<sup>28</sup> Even the Thirty-Nine Articles (Art. xxi.) declare that "General Councils may not be gathered together but by the commandment and will of princes". This was the "law of creeds" in England. Baillie (I., pp. 95-96) even tells us that when the question was mooted in Scotland whether a lawful Assembly might be held without or in opposition to the will of the Crown, he was himself in grave doubt, and could find no example of a National Assembly meeting against the will of the supreme magistrate, rightly professing, either in antiquity or among the Reformed Churches. Scotland soon supplied him with an example. The doubts of Baillie in Scotland, the attitude of Parliament in England, are incident to the principle of establishment, and it would seem can finally be rid of only in free churches. We must bear in mind, however, that from the beginning the Scotch Church claimed and exercised autonomy in *spiritualia*.



thority: they left it perfectly free in its deliberations and conclusions.<sup>24</sup> The limitation of its discussions to topics committed to it by Parliament, moreover, proved no grievance, in the face of the very broad commitments which were ultimately made to it; and its incapacity to give legal effect to its determinations—which it could present only as “humble advices” to Parliament—deprived them of none of their intrinsic value, and has in no way lessened their ultimate influence.

In pursuance of this ordinance, and in defiance of an inhibitory proclamation from the King, the Assembly duly met on July 1st, 1643. It was constituted in the chapel of Henry VII after there had been preached to its members in the Abbey by Dr. William Twisse, who had been named by Parliament prolocutor to the Assembly, a sermon which was listened to by a great concourse, including both Houses of Parliament. Sixty-nine members were in attendance on the first day; and that seems to have thereafter been the average daily attendance.<sup>25</sup> No business was transacted on this day, however, but adjournment was taken until July 6: and it was not until July 8 that work was begun, after each member had made a solemn protestation “to maintain nothing in point of doctrine but what he believed to be most agreeable to the Word of God, nor in point of discipline but what may make most for God’s glory and the peace and good of His Church”. The first task committed to the Assembly was the revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles, and it was engaged upon this labor intermittently until Oct. 12, at which date it had reached the 16th Article.<sup>26</sup> That the

<sup>24</sup> The independence of the spirit of the Assembly is illustrated by the conflict which arose between the Assembly and Parliament in the matter of the exclusion of the scandalous from the Lord’s Supper and in the much broader matter of the autonomy of the Church. In these matters, the Assembly exceeded its commission and offered unsought advice to Parliament, much to the distaste of that body; and even declined to act on the determinations of Parliament.

<sup>25</sup> Baillie, ii., p. 108: “Ordinarilie there will be present above three-score of their divines.”

<sup>26</sup> The House of Commons three years afterwards (Dec. 10, 1646) sent an order to the Assembly asking to have sent up to it “what is

Assembly was thus put for its first work upon the least pressing of the tasks which were expected of it,—“the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the Church of England from false aspersions and misconstructions”—may have been due to the concurrence of many causes. It may have been that in its engrossment with far more immediately pressing duties than even the settlement of the future government of the Church of England, Parliament had had no opportunity to prepare work for the Assembly. Beyond question, however, the main cause was the premonition of that change in the posture of affairs by which the work of the Assembly was given a new significance and a much wider range than were contemplated when it was called, and an international rather than a merely national bearing. It was natural that Parliament should hold it back from its more important labors until the arrangements already in progress for this change in the scope of its work were perfected. It is not necessary to suppose that the determinations of the Assembly were essentially altered—or that Parliament supposed they would be—by the change in the bearing of its work to which we allude. It is quite true that in the course of the debates which were subsequently held, sufficient confusion of mind was occasionally exhibited on the part of many in the Assembly to make us thankful that these debates were actually regulated by the firm guidance of men of experience in the matters under discus-

finished upon the Articles of the Church of England”, its purpose being to employ them in its negotiations with the King. After some demurring, and after attaching to them an explanatory preface, the Divines sent them up on April 29, 1647. For its own use Parliament omitted the Preface and Article viii on the Creeds; and they were printed in this form in a tract entitled *The Four Bills, sent to the King to the Isle of Wight to be passed*, which was published March 20, 1648. It is in this Parliamentary form that they have usually been reprinted, e. g. in Hall's *Harmony of the Protestant Confessions*; Neal's *History of the Puritans*, App. vii.; Stoughton's *History of the Church of the Commonwealth*, App. p. 228 sq. The lacking Preface and Art. viii. are printed by Drs. Mitchell and Struthers, *Minutes*, pp. 541-2. The complete text, with all the changes made by the Divines marked, may be found in App. iv., pp. 342, sq., of E. Tyrrell Green's *The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Age of the Reformation*, London, 1896.

sion.<sup>27</sup> But the known convictions of the members of the Assembly, evidenced in their printed works no less than in the debates of the Assembly, render it altogether unlikely that had they been called upon, as it was at first contemplated they should be, to advise Parliament unassisted and merely with respect to the settlement of the Church of England, they would have failed to fight their way to conclusions quite similar to those they actually reached.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless the alteration of the bearing of their work from a merely national to international significance, obviously not only gave it a far wider compass than was at first contemplated, but quite revolutionized its spirit and threw it into such changed relations as to give it a totally different character.

This great change in the function which the Assembly was to serve, was brought about by the stage reached by the civil conflict in the summer of 1643. The Parliamentary cause had sunk to its lowest ebb; and it had become imperative to obtain the assistance of the Scots. But the assistance

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Baillie, ii., p. 177 (May 9, 1644), who, after remarking on the wide differences of opinion which emerged in the course of debate, cries out: "Had not God sent Mr. Henderson, Mr. Rutherford and Mr. Gillespie among them, I see not that ever they could have agreed to any settled government." The task of establishing a Presbyterian government in a church without any experience of it, in the face of violent Independent and Erastian opposition, was no light one: and it was altogether natural that the English divines whose Presbyterianism was purely theoretical, illuminated by no practice, should have been much disabled by varying views among themselves as to the best methods of procedure.

<sup>28</sup> Even Dr. Shaw allows (*A History of the English Church during . . . 1640-1660*, p. 3) that "it is probable that, without the necessity of calling in Scotland, and of adopting the Solemn League and Covenant, the Long Parliament would have resolved upon a system of church government that might be called Presbyterian". And when he adds "though in a sense very different from that usually conveyed by the term", this caution need not be objected to: it is clear enough that the English, even in the Assembly and much more in Parliament, had much to learn as to what the Presbyterianism which they were intent on setting up was and what it carried with it. Scotch influence was necessary, however, not to make them Presbyterians, but to make them intelligent Presbyterians.

of the Scots could be had only at the price of a distinctively ecclesiastical alliance. The Scotch had been far greater sufferers than even the English from the absolutism which had been practiced by the Stuart Kings in ecclesiastical matters. Not content with asserting and exercising original authority in the ecclesiastical affairs of England, these monarchs had asserted and were ever increasingly exercising the same absolutism in the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland also; and had freely employed the ecclesiastical instruments at their service in England in order to secure their ends in Scotland. But the relations of church and state in Scotland were not quite the same as those which obtained in England.<sup>29</sup> In the northern kingdom from the beginning of the Reformation, the ideal of a free church in a free state had been sedulously cherished and repeatedly given effect; and the government of the church was in representative courts which asserted and exercised their own independent spiritual jurisdiction. The interference of the king with the working of this ecclesiastical machinery was, therefore, widely resented as mere tyranny. And as it was employed precisely for the purpose of destroying the ecclesiastical organization which had been established in the Church of Scotland, and of assimilating the Scottish Church in government and mode of worship (doctrine was not in question<sup>30</sup>) to the model

<sup>29</sup> Cf. the *Information from the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland to the Kingdom of England*, 1640: "The second error ariseth from not knowing our laws and so measuring us with your line. . . . We neither know nor will examine if according to your laws these may be accounted derogatory to royal authority. But it is most sure and evident by all the registers and records of our laws . . . that we have proceeded at this time upon no other ground than on laws and practice of this kingdom never before questioned, but inviolably observed as the only rule of our government." The whole matter is judiciously stated by Dr. A. F. Mitchell in his Baird Lectures on *The Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 2, pp. 289-91; cf. W. Beveridge, *A Short History of the Westminster Assembly*, pp. 116-122, Note on "Spiritual Independence"; also Thomas Brown, *Church and State in Scotland*, 1891; J. Macpherson, *The Doctrine of the Church in Scottish Theology*, 1903, Lectures 5 and 6.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the Aberdeen Articles of 1616, which the Westminster Divines not disdain to use in perfecting their own symbol. On these articles,

of the Church of England, which was considered by the Scots far less pure and scriptural than their own, it took the form also of religious persecution. No claim could be put in here, as was put in in England, that the royal prerogative was exercised only for conserving the ancient settlement of the church. It was employed precisely for pulling down what had been built up, and was, therefore, not only tyrannical in form but revolutionary in its entire effect. Add that it was understood that the instrument, if not the instigator, of this persecuting tyranny had come in late years to be a foreign prelate aggressively bent even in England on a violently reactionary policy, to which that nation was unalterably averse, and in Scotland balking apparently at nothing which promised to reduce the church there to the same Catholicizing model which he had set himself to establish and perpetuate in England, and it will be apparent how galling the situation had become. Chafing under such wrongs, Scotland needed only a spark to be set on fire. The spark was provided in the spring of 1637, by the imposition upon the Church of Scotland by the mere proclamation of the King—"without warrant from our Kirk", as say the Scottish Commissioners—of a complete new service-book designed to assimilate the worship of the Scottish Church as closely as possible to that of England, or, as Milton expresses it from the English Puritan point of sight, "to force on their fellow-subjects, that which themselves were weary of, the skeleton of a mass-book".<sup>21</sup> When the book was read in the Cathedral Church of St. Giles, Edinburgh, July 23d, 1637, however, "incontinent", says Baillie,<sup>22</sup> "the

cf. C. G. McCrie, *The Confessions of the Church of Scotland*, 1907, pp. 27-35. The Articles may be read in the *Booke of the Universall Kirk of Scotland*, pp. 1132-39.

"Ar we so modest spirits, and so towardly handlit in this matter", exclaims Baillie, when the imposition of the service book was in progress, "that there in apeirance we will imbrace in a day such a masse of novelties?" (*Letters*, i., i.).

<sup>21</sup> i., p. 18. James Gordon's account is as follows: "A number of the meaner sorte of the people, most of them waiting maides and women, who use in that towne for to keepe places for the better sorte, with clapping of their handes, cursings, and outcryes, raised such an uncoth



serving-maids began such a tumult, as was never heard of since the Reformation of our nation"; and thus "the serving-maids of Edinburgh"—symbolized in the picturesque legend of Jennie Geddes and her stool, which has almost attained the dignity of history—"began to draw down the Bishop's pride when it was at the highest".<sup>83</sup> The movement thus inaugurated ran rapidly forward: as Archbishop Spottiswoode is said to have exclaimed, "all that they had been doing these thirty years past was thrown down at once". The Scots immediately reclaimed their ecclesiastical, and, in doing that, also their civil liberties; eradicated at once every trace of the prelacy which had been imposed on them, and restored their Presbyterian government; secured the simplicity of their worship and reinstated the strictness of their discipline; and withal bound themselves by a great oath—"the National Covenant"<sup>84</sup>—to the perpetual preservation of their religious settlement in its purity.

The Scots to whom the English Parliament made its appeal for aid in the summer of 1643, were, then, "a covenanted nation". They were profoundly convinced that the root of all the ills they had been made to suffer through two reigns, culminating in the insufferable tyranny of the Laudian domination, was to be found in the restless ambition of the English prelates; and they had once for all determined to make it their primary end to secure themselves in the permanent peaceful possession of their own religious establishment and hubbub in the church, that not any one could either heare or be hearde" (*History of Scots Affairs from 1637 to 1641*, 3 vols. Spalding Club. Aberdeen. 1841. Vol. i., p. 7). Cf. [Balcanquhal], *A Large Declaration concerning the late Tumults in Scotland from their first Original, etc.* London, 1639, p. 23. To understand this scene we must bear in mind the division which obtained in Scotland of the Sabbath service into the Reader's and the Minister's Service. The Minister often entered the church only when his own part of the service began; and it had become the custom of "the better sorte" also to enter at that time. Meanwhile their places were kept for them by their maids. The congregation for the first half of the service was, therefore, chiefly made up of "waiting maides".

<sup>83</sup> Baillie, I., p. 95.

<sup>84</sup> The National Covenant is printed in the current editions of the Scottish "Confession of Faith", etc.

lishment. The Parliamentary Commissioners came to them, indeed, seeking aid in their political struggle and with their minds set on a civil compact: they found the Scots, however, equally determined that any bond into which they entered should deal primarily with the ecclesiastical situation and should be fundamentally a religious engagement. "The English", says Baillie,<sup>85</sup> "were for a Civill League, we for a religious Covenant." The Scots, indeed, had nothing to gain from the alliance which was offered them, unless they gained security for their church from future English interference; while on the other hand by entering into it they risked everything which they had at such great cost recovered for themselves. Their own liberties were already regained; the cause of Parliament in England, on the contrary, hung in the gravest doubt. It really was an act of high chivalry, to call it by no more sacred name, for them to cast in their lot at this crisis with the Parliament; and more than one Scot must have cried to himself during the ensuing years, "Surely it was a great act of faith in God, and hudge courage and unheard of compassion, that moved our nation to hazard their own peace and venture their lives and all, for to save a people so irrecoverable ruined both in their own and all the world's eyes".<sup>86</sup> On the other hand, the Scots demanded nothing more than that the Parliament should explicitly bind itself to the course it was on its own account loudly professing to be following, and had already declared, in the ordinance (for example) by which it had called to its aid an advisory council of Divines,<sup>87</sup> to be the object it was setting before itself in the reconstruction of

<sup>85</sup> ii., p. 90.

<sup>86</sup> So Baillie soliloquizes, *Letters*, ii., pp. 99-100: and so all men at the time judged, as even Mr. J. A. R. Marriot allows. "Baillie is justified", says he (*The Life and Times of Lucius Cary, Viscount Falkland*, 1907, p. 303) "in taking credit for the Scots in coming to the assistance of a ruined cause."

<sup>87</sup> "Such a government shall be settled in the Church as may be . . . most apt to procure and preserve . . . nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland, and other Reformed Churches abroad." This already promised in effect the establishment of a Presbyterian system in England.

the English Church. All that was asked of the Parliament, in point of fact, was, thus, that it should give greater precision, and binding force under the sanction of a solemn covenant, to its repeatedly declared purpose. That the Parliamentary Commissioners boggled over this demand, especially if it were in the effort "to keep a doore open in England to Independencie",<sup>88</sup> was scarcely worthy of them, and boded ill for the future. That they yielded in the end and the Scots had their way may have been, no doubt, the index of their necessities; but it would seem to have been already given in the logic of the situation. To hold out on this issue were to stultify the whole course of the Long Parliament heretofore. The result was, accordingly, "the Solemn League and Covenant."

By this pact, the two nations bound themselves to each other in a solemn league and covenant, the two terms being employed apparently as designating the pact respectively from the civil and the religious sides. This "league and covenant" was sworn to in England by both Houses of Parliament, as also by their servant-body, the Assembly of Divines, and in Scotland by both the civil and religious authorities; and then was sent out into the two countries to be subscribed by the whole population. By the terms of the engagement made in it, the difference in the actual ecclesiastical situations of the contracting parties was clearly recognized, and that in such terms as to make the actual situation in Scotland the model of the establishment agreed upon for both countries. The contracting parties bound themselves to "the *preservation* of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, against our common enemies", on the one hand; and on the other to "the *reformation* of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland,"<sup>89</sup> in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the Word of

<sup>88</sup> So Baillie, ii, p. 90; cf. also Burnet, *Dukes of Hamilton*, p. 307.

<sup>89</sup> The inclusion of Ireland in the new church-system is to be observed; so that from the Treaty of Edinburgh, Nov. 19, 1643, we hear always of "the three kingdoms" in this connection.

God, and the example of the best reformed churches"; to the end that thereby "the Churches of God in the three kingdoms" might be brought "to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of church government, directory for worship and catechizing."<sup>40</sup> According to the terms of this engagement, therefore, the Parliament undertook, in the settlement of the Church of England on which it was engaged, to study to bring that Church to the nearest possible "conjunction and uniformity" with the existing settlement of the Church of Scotland, and that in the four items of Confession of Faith, Form of Church Government, Directory for Worship, and Catechizing, and these four items were accordingly currently spoken of thereafter as "the four points or parts of uniformity".<sup>41</sup> By this engagement there was given obvi-

\* Rushworth, Ed 1721, v., p. 478. The "Solemn League and Covenant" is also printed in the ordinary Scotch editions of the *Confession of Faith*; and in Gee and Hardy, p. 569.

\* No doubt the engagement does not in so many words bind the English to the adoption of "the Presbyterian system", and no doubt it was with a view to preserving to them a certain liberty of action that they insisted on inserting the clause "according to the Word of God", and on defining the variety of prelacy which was condemned; but much too much has been made of these things (cf. Gardiner, *Civil War*, ii., p. 268). After all the engagement bound the contracting nations to the preservation of the ecclesiastical establishment in Scotland, and to the reformation of the ecclesiastical establishment in England according to the Scotch model, so far as the Word of God permitted, and it was fully understood that whatever this saving clause denoted it had reference to details rather than to principles. It must be admitted, however, that there soon developed a disposition to treat this saving-clause as permitting liberty in the settlement of the English Church, so far as the Scriptures allowed it: and to those who were able to persuade themselves that no schedule of church-government was derivable from Scripture, this liberty stretched very far. We may observe how the matter was viewed by the Parliamentary contractors, as clearly as elsewhere, no doubt, from certain words of Browne, when rebuking the Assembly (Ap. 30, 1646) for its attitude with respect to the *jus divinum*. "It is much pressed", said he, "for the point of the Covenant. We all agree that the Word of God is the rule and must be the rule, but say there is no positive rule in the Word. Are we by the Covenant bound to follow the practice of the Reformed Churches in case it be against the fundamental law of the kingdom? You must interpret the Covenant so that all parts may stand. We are bound to maintain the

ously not only a wholly new bearing to the work of the Assembly of Divines which had been convened as a standing body of counsellors to the Parliament in ecclesiastical affairs, and that one of largely increased significance and heightened dignity; but also a wholly new definiteness to the work which should be required of it, with respect both to its compass and its aim. Whatever else Parliament might call on the Assembly to advise it in, it would now necessarily call on it to propose to it a new Form of Church Government, a new Directory for Worship, a new Confession of Faith, and a new Catechetical Manual. And in framing these formularies the aim of the Assembly would now necessarily be to prepare forms which might be acceptable not merely to the Church of England, as promising to secure her internal peace, and efficiency, but also to the Church of Scotland as preserving the doctrines, worship, discipline, government already established in that Church. The significance of the Solemn League and Covenant was, therefore, that it pledged the two nations to uniformity in their religious establishments and pledged them to a uniformity on the model of the establishment already existing in the Church of Scotland.

The taking of the Solemn League and Covenant by the two nations, on the one side marked the completeness of the failure of the ecclesiastical policy of the King, and on the other seemed to promise to the Scots the accomplishment

liberties of Parliament and kingdom. If I do any act against this, I am a breaker of the Covenant." (*Minutes*, p. 448 sq.). That is to say, Browne is so convinced that there is no divine prescription as to the government of the church and that the sole judge in ecclesiastical things is the state, and that, as Rudyard put it on the same occasion, "the civil magistrate is a church officer in every Christian commonwealth" to whom in England all jurisdiction is reserved, that he cannot admit that the Covenant with its "according to the Word of God" imposes any form of government whatever. He has more difficulty with the adjoined phrase, "and the example of the best Reformed Churches", and in point of fact merely repudiates its binding force when inconsistent with English law—as if the very purpose of the Covenant were not to establish a new law in England. That the Covenant bound all parties to preserve the Presbyterian establishment in Scotland, no man doubted. (Cf. Carlyle's *Cromwell's Letters*, ii, p. 172.)



of a dream which had long been cherished by them. The broader ecclesiastical policy consistently pursued by the throne throughout the whole Stuart period had been directed to the reduction of the religion of the three kingdoms to uniformity.<sup>42</sup> The model of this uniformity, however, was naturally derived from the Prelatical constitution of the Church of England, to which the Stuart monarchs had taken so violent a predilection; and that, in the later years of their administration when the policy of "thorough" was being pushed forward, as interpreted in an extremely reactionary spirit. No one could doubt that important advantages would accrue from uniformity in the religious establishment of the three kingdoms; and the Scots, taking a leaf out of their adversaries book, began early to press for its institution in the reconstructed church, on the basis, however, of their own Presbyterianism. Their motive for this was not merely zeal for the extension of their particular church-order, which they sincerely believed to be *jure divino*; but a conviction that only so could they secure themselves from future interference in their own religious establishment from the side of the stronger sister-nation. They had no sooner recovered their Presbyterian organization, and simplicity of worship, therefore, than they began to urge the reformation of the sister-church on their model. The Scottish peace-commissioners, for example, took up to London with them, in the closing months of 1640,<sup>43</sup> a paper drawn up by Alexander Henderson, in which they set forth their "desires concerning unity in Religion", and "uniformity of Church Government as a special mean to preserve peace in his Majesty's dominion".<sup>44</sup> In this paper they declared that "it is to be wished that there were one

<sup>42</sup> Cf. the expression given to this policy in the Preface to *The Booke of Common Prayer*, which was thrust upon the Scottish Church in 1637 (Prof. Cooper's Edition, Edinburgh, 1904, pp. 7-8).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the letter of Alexander Balfour, from Newcastle, 29 Dec., 1640, printed in Laing's Ed. of Baillie's *Letters*, ii., p. 473.

<sup>44</sup> The document is printed in the Appendix to Hetherington's *History of the Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 4, pp. 382 sq. Cf. Mitchell, Baird *Lectures on The Westminster Assembly*, Ed. 2, p. 105 and note.

Confession of Faith, one form of Catechism, one Directory for all parts of the public worship of God, and for prayer, preaching, administration of sacraments, etc., and one form of Church Government in all the churches of his Majesty's dominions". Here we see enumerated the precise schedule of uniformity which was afterwards undertaken under the sanction of the Solemn League and Covenant, the items being arranged climactically in the order of ascending immediate importance. For the Commissioners recognized that it was uniformity of Church Government which was most imperatively required; and equally frankly urged that this uniformity of Church Government should be sought by the common adoption by both nations of the Presbyterian system. The propriety of such a demand they argued on the grounds that the Presbyterian system was the system in use in all other Reformed churches; that the English Prelatical system had been the source of much evil; that the Reformed churches were clear that their system is *jure divino*, while the *jus divinum* was not commonly claimed for Episcopacy;<sup>15</sup> and above all, that the Scotch were bound by oath, not lately taken in wilfulness but of ancient obligation, to the Presbyterian system, while the English were free to recast their system, and indeed were already bent on recasting it. This paper was handed in to the Lords of the Treaty on March 10, 1641, with little apparent immediate effect. Indeed, there seems to have been even a disposition to resent its suggestions. The whole matter was put to one side by the Parliament with a somewhat grudging word of thanks to Scotland for wishing uniformity of church government with England, and a somewhat dry intimation that Parliament had already taken into consideration the reformation of church government

<sup>15</sup> The *jus divinum* seems to have been first claimed for episcopacy by Bancroft in the reign of Elizabeth, but was finding many supporters at the time when Henderson's paper was drawn up, though these supporters still constituted only a party. The difference between the two parties in this matter was urged by Falkland (Marriott, p. 203): only "some bishops pretended to *jure divino*", but this is the essence of "the Scotch Government".

and would proceed in it in due time "as should best conduce to the glory of God and peace of the Church".<sup>46</sup> This response was accordingly embodied in the treaty of August 7, 1641,<sup>47</sup> to the effect that the desire expressed for "a uniformity of Church Government between the two nations" was commendable; "and as the Parliament had already taken into consideration the reformation of Church Government, so they would proceed in due time as should seem most conducive to the glory of God and peace of the Church and of both kingdoms".

Nevertheless the suggestion ultimately bore fruit. It was repeated by Henderson to the Scottish Assembly, meeting at the end of July next ensuing, in a proposition that the Scotch Church, by way of holding out the olive branch, should itself draw up a new "Confession of Faith, a Catechism, a Directory for all parts of publick worship, and a Platform of Government, wherein England and we might agree".<sup>48</sup> This proposal met so far with favor that Henderson was himself appointed to take the labor in hand, with such help as he should choose to call to his side. On further consideration, however, he himself judged it best to await the issue of affairs in England;<sup>49</sup> fully recognizing that the adoption of purely Scottish forms by both nations was not to be hoped for, but if uniformity was ever to be attained, it must come by "the setting down of a new form for all, prepared by some men set apart for that work".<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, when, as the outbreak of open war between the Parliament and the King became imminent in the midsummer of 1642, Parliament addressed a letter to the Scottish Assembly declaring "their earnest desire to have their church reformed according to the word of God,"<sup>51</sup> and their well-grounded hope of accomplishing this

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 128 sq.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Makower, *Constitutional History of the Church of England*, E. T., p. 78, note 37.

<sup>48</sup> Baillie, *Letters*, i., p. 365; cf. p. 376.

<sup>49</sup> Baillie, *ii.*, pp. 1, 2, 24.

<sup>50</sup> Henderson's letter in Baillie, *ii.*, p. 2.

<sup>51</sup> Baillie, *ii.*, p. 45.

task if war could be averted,—all of which was interpreted, and was intended to be interpreted, by an accompanying letter “from a number of English ministers at London” in which it was asserted that “the desire of the most godly and considerable part” among them was for the establishment in England of the Presbyterian Government, “which hath just and evident foundation both in the word of God and religious reason”; and, referring directly to the Scottish proposal, “that (according to your intimation) we may agree in one Confession of Faith, one Directory of Worship, one public Catechism, and form of Government”<sup>52</sup>—the Assembly naturally responded<sup>53</sup> by reiterating its desire for this unifying settlement and renewing “the proposition made by” its commissioners in 1641 “for beginning the work of reformation at the uniformity of Church Government”. “For what hope” the Assembly argues, can there be of unity in religion, of one Confession of Faith, one form of Worship, and one Catechism, till there be one form of ecclesiastical government?” The response of Parliament,<sup>54</sup> satisfactory if a little reserved, intimated the expected meeting of the reforming synod on Nov. 5, and asked the appointment of some Scottish delegates “to assist at it”,<sup>55</sup> a request which was immediately complied with, and the Commissioners named, who, a year later, after the adoption of the Solemn League and Covenant, went up in somewhat different circumstances, and with a somewhat different commission.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile the Scots assiduously kept their

<sup>52</sup> Acts of Assembly, 1642.

<sup>53</sup> This letter is printed in Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 388.

<sup>54</sup> Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 390 sq.

<sup>55</sup> Baillie, *Letters*, ii., 55.

<sup>56</sup> These commissioners were eight in number, and were fairly representative of the Church of Scotland, in the two parties into which it was then divided with respect to its sympathies with the old order in Scotland or with “the movement party in the South”, that is, the Puritans. Robert Douglas, Alexander Henderson, Robert Baillie, with the Earl of Cassilis and Lord Maitland, belonged to the one side; Samuel Rutherford, George Gillespie and Archibald Johnston of Warriston to the other (cf. Leishman, *The Westminster Directory*, 190

Douglas and Cassilis never went up to London on their

proposals for the institution of uniformity of religious constitution in the two nations forward,<sup>57</sup> and the course of events finally threw the game into their hands, when the commissioners of Parliament appeared in Edinburgh in August, 1643 seeking Scottish aid in their extremity, and swore the Solemn League and Covenant as its price. By this compact the two nations bound themselves precisely to the punctual carrying out of the program proposed by the Scottish Commissioners in 1640 -1.

The Solemn League and Covenant, it must be borne in mind, was no loose agreement between two churches, but a solemnly ratified treaty between two nations. The commissioners who went up to London from Scotland under its provisions, went up not as delegates from the Scottish Church to lend their hand to the work of the Assembly of Divines, but as the accredited representatives of the Scottish people, to treat with the English Parliament in the settlement of the details of that religious uniformity which the two nations had agreed with one another to institute. They might on the invitation of the English Parliament be present at the sessions of the advisory Assembly it had convened, and give it their advice throughout all the processes of its commission, which Dr. Leishman supposes to have been due to the King's veto on the Assembly, as both were strong royalists (as cited p. x.). In the case of Douglas, at least, this seems hardly likely, in view of his position in the Commission of the General Assembly, and his letters recorded in its minutes. Dr. Mitchell rather has the truth, when he writes (Baird Lectures, pp. 129-130): "Robert Douglas, the silent, sagacious, masterful man, could not be spared from the duties of leadership at home, but he assisted and cheered them by his letters, maintained good understanding between them and the Church in Scotland, and in their absence came to occupy a place among his brethren almost as unique as that of Calvin among the presbyters of Geneva." The notices of his colleagues in Baillie's *Letters*, which are always appreciative and affectionate, exhibit a complete harmony among the Commissioners at London; and the *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland*, published by Drs. Mitchell and Christie, reveal an equal harmony between the Commissioners in London and the Commission in Edinburgh under the guidance of Douglas.

<sup>57</sup> Baillie, ii., p. 87; and cf. the correspondence with the King in Rushworth, Ed. 1692, III., ii. (vol. 5), pp. 393 sq.



deliberations. And it is obvious that their presence there would much advance the business in hand, by tending to prevent proposals of a hopelessly one-sided character from being formulated. It would seem obvious also that it was eminently fitting that Scotch counsels should be heard in the deliberations of a body to which, under whatever safeguards, was in point of fact committed the task of preparing the drafts of formularies which it was hoped might prove acceptable to both churches,—especially when thirty members of the English Parliament, the party of the other part to this treaty, were members of the body. But the proper task of the Scotch commissioners lay not in the Assembly of Divines, but outside of it. It was their function, speaking broadly, to see that such formularies were proposed to the two contracting nations for the reducing of their church establishments to uniformity, as would be acceptable to the Church of Scotland which they represented, and would fulfil the provisions of the Solemn League and Covenant under the sanction of which they were acting.<sup>58</sup> And if the Assembly of Divines were utilized, as it in point of fact was utilized, to draw up these draft formularies, it was the business of the Scottish Commissioners to see that the Divines did their work in full view of the Scottish desires and point of view, and that the documents issued from their hands in a form in which the Church of Scotland could adopt them. In the prosecution of these their functions as treaty commissioners, their immediate relations were not with the Assembly of Divines but with the Parliament or

<sup>58</sup> The General Assembly (*Acts* for 1643, pp. 89, 90 sq.) addressing the *Parliament of England*, informs it that the Scottish Commissioners have been "nominated and elected" "to repair unto the Assembly of Divines and others of the Church of England, now sitting at Westminster, to propound, consult, treat and conclude with them . . . in all such things. . . ." Here the Assembly of Divines and the Scotch Commissioners are looked upon as the two parties by whose consultations together the contemplated agreements are to be reached. Addressing the *Assembly of Divines*, however, the General Assembly only informs them that commissioners had been appointed "to report to your Assembly" without defining to what ends. It is to *Parliament* that the Assembly speaks as to the other contracting party.

with whatever commissioners the Parliament might appoint to represent it in conference with them. They could treat with or act directly upon the Assembly of Divines only at the request of Parliament, to treat with which they were really commissioned; and only to the extent which Parliament might judge useful for the common end in view. A disposition manifested itself, it is true, on their appearing in London, to look upon them merely as Scotch members of the Assembly of Divines, appointed to sit with the Divines in response to a request from the English Parliament. This view of their functions they vigorously repudiated. They were perfectly willing, they said,<sup>59</sup> to sit in the Assembly as individuals and to lend the Divines in their deliberations all the aid in their power, if the Parliament invited them to do so. But as commissioners for their National Church, they were Treaty Commissioners, empowered to treat with the Parliament itself. Accordingly a committee of Parliament was appointed (Oct 15, 1643) to meet statedly with them and consult with them, to which was added a committee from the Divines; and it was through this "Grand Committee" that the work of the Assembly on the points of uniformity was directed.<sup>60</sup> As they were requested by Parliament also

<sup>59</sup> This "willingness" was not, however, spontaneous. Henderson tells us (Baillie's *Letters*, ii., p. 483) that the Commissioners, "against their former resolution, were, by their friends and for the good of the cause, persuaded to joyne" with the Assembly. Baillie's own very lucid account runs as follows (ii., p. 110): "When our Commissioners came up they were desired to sit as members of the Assembly, but they wisely declined to do so; but since they came up as Commissioners from our national Church to treat for uniformity, they required to be dealt with in that capacity. They were willing as private men to sit in the Assembly, and upon occasion to give their advice on points debated; but for the uniformity they required a committee might be appointed from the Parliament and the Assembly to treat with them thereanent. All of these after some harsh enough debates were granted; so once a week and sometimes oftener there is a committee of some Lords, Commons and Divines which meets with us anent our commission." For this committee see p. 102.

<sup>60</sup> *Commons' Journal*, iii., p. 278; *Lords' Journal*, v., p. 265; Lightfoot, xiii., p. 27. Cf. Baillie, ii., pp. 102, 110; and for the completeness with which they were from the first recognized and dealt with as treaty com-

"as private men" to sit in the Assembly of Divines they occupied a sort of dual position relatively to the Assembly,<sup>61</sup> and this has been the occasion of some misunderstanding and even criticism of their varied lines of activity. The matter is, however, perfectly simple. In all its work looking to the preparation of a basis for the proposed uniformity, the Assembly really did its work under the direction proximately not of the Parliament but of "the Grand Committee", and the results of its labors were presented, therefore, not merely to Parliament, but, also, through its commissioners, to the Scottish Assembly. The Scotch Commissioners as members of "the Grand Committee" had therefore an important part in preparing the work of the Divines for them in all that concerned the uniformity; and as present at the deliberations of the Divines were naturally concerned to secure for their own proposals favorable consideration, and did their best endeavors to obtain such results as they might as commissioners of the Scotch Church recommend to its approval. Throughout everything they acted consistently as the Commissioners of the Scotch Church, seeking the ends which they were as such charged with securing. They were not members of the Assembly of Divines, were present at its meetings and took part in its deliberations only by express invitation and frankly as the agents of the Scotch missionaries apart from the Assembly cf. instances in Rushworth, III., ii. (vol. 5), p. 371, ed. 1692.

"Cf. the speech of George Gillespie in the General Assembly, Aug. 6, 1647 (Baillie's *Letters*, III., p. 450): "Ye know we have acted in a double capacity according to our commission: We have gone on in a way of treating with the Committee of Parliament and Divines jointly, and have given in many papers as concerning the officers of the Kirk, excluding scandalous persons from the Kirk Sacrament, the growth of Heresies, and such things as in your judgment and ours was defective among them. We have acted in another capacity, debating with and assisting the Assembly of Divines their debates. . . ." Lord Wariston thus expresses his relation to the Assembly of Divines: "I am a stranger . . . having a commission both from that Church and State, and at the desire of this kingdome assisting in your debates." (Speech to the Assembly of Divines, May 1st, 1646, in *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland*, edited by Mitchell and Christie, i., p. 82.)

Church, and possessed and exercised no voice in the determinations of the body.<sup>62</sup>

By the Solemn League and Covenant, therefore, the work of the Assembly of Divines was revolutionized, and not only directed to a new end but put upon a wholly new basis. Its proceedings up to the arrival of the first of the Scottish Commissioners in London, on Sept. 15, 1643, and the taking of the Covenant on Sept. 22nd, must be regarded simply as "marking time". The Parliament perfectly understood before the first of July, what was before it; and it could never have imagined that the revision of the Thirty-nine Articles upon which it had set the Assembly could prove an acceptable Confession of Faith for the two churches. The employment of the Assembly in that labor was but an expedient to occupy it innocuously until its real work under the new conditions could be begun. With the coming of the Scotch Commissioners, however, the real work of the Assembly became possible, and was at once committed to it. Already on Sept. 18, there was referred to it from the Commons the consideration of a discipline and government apt to procure nearer agreement with the Church of Scotland and of a new liturgical form, and from the 12th of the October following,<sup>63</sup> when the Lords had concurred, the Assembly was engaged, with many interruptions, no doubt, but in a true sense continuously, and even strenuously, upon the "four things mentioned in the Covenant, viz.: the Directory for Worship, the Confession of Faith, Form of Church Government, and Catechism".<sup>64</sup> And when "the debating and perfecting" of these four things were over, the

<sup>62</sup>The fact that the Scotch Commissioners did not vote in the divisions of the Divines is made evident in various ways, and is confirmed by the absence of their names from all the recorded votes of the Assembly (see, e. g., *Minutes*, p. 252). Cf. in general the note of Dr. Mitchell in his *Baird Lectures* (2d ed.), pp. 180-1.

<sup>63</sup>The order of the Commons was passed Sept. 18 and at once communicated to the Assembly; but the Lords concurred only on Oct. 12. See the facts drawn out by Shaw, *A Hist. of the English Church*, I., pp. 153-4.

<sup>64</sup>*Minutes*, Session 936, Oct. 15, 1647, p. 484.

real work of the Divines was done, and the last of the Scotch Commissioners accordingly, having caused a formal minute to that effect to be entered on the records of the Assembly, felt able to take leave of the Assembly and return home.<sup>68</sup> As an advisory committee to the Parliament of England, many other tasks were laid on the Assembly, some of which had their close connection with its work on the points of uniformity, and some of which had no connection with it at all. And the life of the Assembly was prolonged as such a committee for many months after its whole work on "the uniformity" had been completed. But its significant work lies decidedly in its preparation of a complete set of formularies—Confession, Catechisms, Platform of Government, Directory for Worship—which it proposed to the contracting nations as a suitable basis for a uniform church establishment in the three kingdoms.

In the next number of this REVIEW some account will be given of the work of the Divines in the preparation of these formularies.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

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<sup>68</sup> *Minutes*, p. 484.



## MARRIAGE AMONG THE EARLY BABYLONIANS AND HEBREWS.\*

The discoveries in the realm of Assyriology have been of too wonderful a character for their full significance to be easily and quickly grasped. To have our historical horizon suddenly pushed back several millenniums is in itself startling; but to know that in the third millennium before Christ, and perhaps earlier, there was a highly developed complex civilization, comparable in many respects to our own, in the valley of the Euphrates, and also of the Nile, is to realize that it will be many years before we have adjusted our historical sense to this new knowledge. The first feeling on examining the remains of these ancient peoples—the few fragments of their art that have come down to us, and especially their literature, with what it reveals of an active, virile and cultured people—is that of simple amazement that such things could have been and then have vanished completely. And when in turn we consider, as we are forced to consider, our own much vaunted position as the “heirs of all the ages in the foremost files of time”, we are compelled to ask ourselves whether our civilization, too, may not, after all, go the way of these former ones, and the time come “when London shall be a habitation of bitterns, when St. Paul and Westminster Abbey shall stand shapeless and nameless ruins in the midst of an unpeopled marsh, when the piers of Waterloo Bridge shall become the nuclei of islets of reeds and osiers, and cast the jagged shadows of their broken arches on the solitary stream”.

The latter years of the Assyrian Empire were long considered the Golden Age of Assyrian and Babylonian culture.

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\* The substance of this article was delivered as a lecture at the Grove City Summer School, August, 1907.

This view, however, has to be given up. The famous library of Ashurbanipal consists largely of duplicates of older Babylonian texts, and the glory of his time is to be regarded, at least as far as culture is concerned, as only a renaissance. Whence this wonderful literature came we do not know, not even whether it was original with the Semites or obtained by them from their predecessors in the valley of the Euphrates, the so-called "Sumerians". But in our search for a period in which were wedded the originality and energy required to produce such works, we are arrested at that of the so-called "First Dynasty" of Babylon. It is with this period that we have to deal more particularly in this article. This dynasty reigned in Babylon for about three centuries at the end of the third millennium before Christ. The best known and most powerful of its number was Hammurabi, the sixth of the eleven kings who are included in it. From it we have a large and rapidly increasing number of documents, both official and private. They picture to us a land intersected with frequent canals, bearing vessels laden with corn, oil, dates, wine, and numerous other products; a fertile and well cultivated country, a well established and efficient administration (at least under Hammurabi), and a complex civilization with different grades in society, trade highly developed, a monetary system (possibly stamped coins), companies of traders, guilds of workmen, agencies, and perhaps even a postal system.

By far the most important single document of this period is the code of laws promulgated by Hammurabi. Rarely, if ever, has such an important "find" been made in the realm of archæology. Published over two thousand years before the Code of Justinian, we find in it the human mind working exactly as to-day, the same sense of justice, responsibility, and back of it the same humanitarian principles. Hammurabi's statement that he was appointed by the gods "to spread abroad justice in the land, to destroy the evil and the wicked, and to prevent the strong from oppressing

the weak" is quite consonant with the terms of his code. The resemblance to modern law is seen chiefly in the sections referring to property. For instance, concerning mortgage it is enacted that if a man borrow money, and promise the lender in return the whole produce of a field, the lender at harvest time shall not be allowed to take more than will cover the original debt with interest and the cost of cultivation (§ 49). Or again, if a widow with children under age wish to marry again, she must first obtain the consent of the authorities, who may then make her and her second husband co-trustees of the first husband's estate in the interest of his children (§ 177). Both laws, it will be seen, sought the protection of the weak and helpless, and both are to be found in modern statute books.

That this code of laws was the first to be given to those peoples is very doubtful. Their form and their grouping would alone suggest that we have here not the first attempt at formulating laws or codifying them. Moreover, there have come down to us fragments of another code, differing in many points from that of Hammurabi and mirroring apparently an earlier stage of development. A characteristic of these fragments is that they are bilingual, one column being written in the language of the pre-Semitic Sumerians, the other in Babylonian. This in itself is strong evidence for their priority. One thing of which Hammurabi boasts is that he has made known his laws "in the language of the country",<sup>1</sup> and for this, perhaps, he deserves more credit than for originality. Whether or not, however, it had codified statutory law before the time of Hammurabi we can by no means regard the country as lawless. Private legal contracts dated centuries before his time show us a system of judges and judicial administration in the individual towns far from primitive, and still earlier literature and remains warrant us in saying that the cities

<sup>1</sup> Accepting Lyon's explanation of *ina pi* (KA) *matim*, J A O S. XXV, p. 269.



patriarchate and that of the much later city civilization is not yet possible. This much, however, we may affirm: that when several families were grouped together for geographical reasons, mutual defense, or religious purposes, a new social unit was formed, the common interests of which necessarily encroached upon the absolute power of the father, and in which the customs of the several families would tend to become (if they were not already) very similar, if not identical. And indeed we find that much of the Babylonian legislation, as well as that of other peoples, is concerned with more accurately defining the rights of the father and the members of the family on one hand and that of the town or state on the other. Hand in hand with the progress of such communal or city life went such things as division of labor, freeing of slaves, centralization of cultus, rise of the priesthood as a special class with special rights, change in the position of women, judges, courts of law, etc., all of which would of necessity react upon the authority of the father in his own family. The state of affairs was still further complicated in earlier times by the presence of people who had preceded the Semites in the valley, and who had been either conquered or assimilated, or both, and in later times by the foreigners of different nationalities who sojourned in, or travelled through the land, as well as by the active intercourse between Babylonia and other countries. From very early times there must have been a considerable number of residents unattached to families.

In the third millennium before Christ southern Babylonia was filled with small towns, the inhabitants of which, although of more than one race, had more or less the same customs and language, or rather languages,<sup>4</sup> and were otherwise united by trade, commerce, travel, and those things which are common to people inhabiting one district and having in the main the same interests. Still, each of these towns had its own organization, its king, judges, and temple,

<sup>4</sup> The Sumerian was being gradually supplanted by the Semitic Babylonian.



and, we must conclude, differed from the others in customs, at least to some extent. They made war upon each other and occasionally one would subdue several others. This was the state of affairs when Hammurabi succeeded in uniting a large number of them under his own sway. In his historical inscriptions and letters<sup>5</sup> we can see with what zeal he set about the task of making one united empire out of these, to some extent, heterogeneous elements. He built new canals and cleared out old ones, he was in constant communication with his governors in the various towns, soldiers and officials passed constantly to and fro on the imperial business, he revised the decisions of the judges, and at times called a case to Babylon for trial. It is in the light of this that we must view the code of laws promulgated in his reign. His task was not easy; there were the customs and rights of the individual, the family, the town, and the empire to be considered. If different customs or laws prevailed in different sections of the country they had to be brought into conformity, and, above all else, it is clear that the interests of humanitarianism and mercy were not neglected. The position of the slave, the borrower, the debtor, and all unfortunates was, as far as we can see, essentially bettered by his legislation.

His purpose, of course, could not be accomplished at once; old customs and old recognized rights were too deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people to be lightly set aside, and to this we must doubtless ascribe the peculiarity mentioned before, that many of the contracts of this period do not conform to the requirements of the code. How far the primitive right of the father had been already modified and curtailed by custom or legislation we cannot say, but Hammurabi, even if such a thing had occurred to him, would have been unable to take away his powers entirely. This is well illustrated by one section (129) of the code. It is enacted that if a wife be taken in adultery with a man, the two shall be thrown into the water, "provided that the

<sup>5</sup> Published by L. W. King, *Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*.

husband may save his wife and the king his servant". In this case the husband stood in the same relation to his wife as the king to his subject. Similarly, the right of a father to sell his wife and children in case of debt is not disputed, but it is enacted that they shall serve only three years (§ 117). A father has the right to disinherit a son, but he must first get the approval of the authorities (§ 168f.), and even then he shall not cut him off until he have twice committed an offense worthy of such punishment. However, the code does not hesitate to fix the penalty for unfilial conduct on the part of a son, or to interfere in other respects in the relations of father and mother to their children, adopted children, and slaves. The family as a self-contained independent unit had already long ceased to exist.

It will not be possible for some time yet to give a satisfactory picture of the social and economic conditions in old Babylon. As yet we have only its main outlines and are attempting here and there to sketch in a few details. In this article we wish to speak more particularly of some of the marriage relations as they are portrayed to us in the literature of the time, and to compare these with the stories of the early Hebrew patriarchs. In the first place, it is to be remembered that we are not dealing with a time when women were mere chattels or confined to a harem. The high position occupied by woman in the days of Hammurabi has astonished everyone. It is true that they do not appear in the contract literature as often as men, but still they seem to have been endowed with as many, or almost as many, rights as their brothers. They could be parties to a suit; could hold, buy and sell land, houses, slaves, etc., adopt children, act as scribes, and in one instance we know of a woman acting as judge.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, judging by this kind of

<sup>8</sup> Bu. 91-5-9, 327 C. T. VIII. Translated by Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 5. As, however, the woman was also the scribe, she may be only formally entered among the judges.

...the law of the land ... the law of the land ...

...the law of the land ... the law of the land ...

...the law of the land ... the law of the land ...

...the law of the land ... the law of the land ...

...the law of the land ... the law of the land ...

Although these customs were perfectly clear, too much must not be read into them. The last two deal only with

<sup>1</sup> The Babylonian, unlike the Hebrew, did not have separate words for concubines and slaves.

<sup>2</sup> This translation is permissible. In the former case the maid is protected from the father, who may not resell her (cf. § 118); in the latter she is protected from her first owner, the father of her children, who must keep her in the family.

<sup>3</sup> For cases in which the father adopted such children see A. S. III, p. 261.

<sup>4</sup> (Hebrew) *shachabim*.

the case of a man who has children by *both* his wife and his concubine. What claims the children of the latter would have in case there were no children by the wife is not evident. In other words, these sections do not aim to set forth the legal status and rights of maid and children, but these are only incidentally mentioned in the laws governing inheritance.<sup>11</sup> They do show, however, that in case a man had concubines, and children by them and also by the free wife, the former are not legal children of the free father unless he formally adopt them, for that is the meaning of the expression "if he say, my children". But more than this, we see in these three sections evidently an attempt on the part of the lawgiver to ameliorate the condition of such a maid and her children by enacting (1) that the maid who has so borne children may no longer be treated as the other slaves (§ 118)—as a mere chattel—but must be maintained in the house, and (2) that she and her children must be given their freedom on the death of the father-proprietor, even though the children have not been adopted. The phrase "the children of the wife shall have no right to claim them for slavery" can be no empty repetition, but must owe its prominent place to the frequency of attempts on the part of the legal heirs to keep the maid and her children in the position they had occupied before the father's death; or perhaps we should regard the enactment as new. While we have no right to assert positively that in all cases the children took the same rank as the mother, this would seem to have been the case. In favor of this are the sections just quoted and the other enactment that the children of a slave father and free woman are themselves free (§ 179).

But if it is clear in the case of the slave girl that the tendency was to make her position more easy, much more may we affirm it of the married woman. We shall see that both custom and legislation unite in an endeavor to lift her from the position of dependence on her husband, her family

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Lyons, J A O S. XXV, p. 251f.

providing for her by dowry, and law and contract limiting the husband's right of divorce. Concerning the relations of a man to his legal wife<sup>12</sup> we have some definite information. When a man wished to take a wife he must bring

<sup>12</sup> According to some scholars the code distinguishes four kinds of wives—the free wife (*chirtum*), the concubine (*shugetum*), the votary wife (SAL + DIS, the Babylonian equivalent is not sure), and the slave wife (*amtum*), see e. g. Lyons, J A O S. XXV, p. 259. Besides these the word *kallatum* denotes the wife between the time of betrothal and marriage (*Bräut, fiancée*), and *ashshatum* properly "woman" is used as a general term for wife whether before or after marriage, free or slave (it is used of a slave wife in Bu. 91-5-9, 374, C T. VIII). This fourfold distinction, however, cannot be certainly affirmed as yet. *Chirtum* denotes the legal wife undoubtedly; but "concubine" is not a good rendering of *shugetum*. Her position, as we shall see later, was closer to that of the *chirtum* than that of slave-wife. The etymological meaning of the word is unknown; there seems no satisfactory Babylonian explanation for it. Moreover, it is doubtful if the word describes the woman as a wife only. In § 184 it is used of one who is neither married nor betrothed, but who is looking forward to becoming a married woman. As a married woman the *shugetum* is expected to bear children herself. In § 144f. a man is allowed to take in addition to his wife a *shugetum*, only in case he has no children; and in § 137 she is distinguished from the SAL + DIS in that she is supposed to have borne children herself (*uldushum*), whereas the latter may provide her husband with children some other way (*usharshushu*), of which we shall speak later. Taking all these things into consideration, it seems best to regard *shugetum* as meaning a mature, marriageable woman, and as such to derive it from the Sumerian SHU-GE, a term frequently applied to animals of both sexes and rendered provisionally by "old" (Reisner, *Tempelurkunden aus Tell eloh*, p. 35; Radau, *Early Bab. History*, p. 370, et al), of which SHU-GI = *shēbu* is only a variation. The term then has no reference to the legal position of a married woman as secondary wife or concubine, but to her age and the end for which she is brought into the man's house, namely, childbearing.

The ideogram SAL + DIS, which Lyons and Johns would render "votary wife", is by others regarded as equivalent to the general term *ashshatum* (Scheil, Harper, Müller, Kohler und Feiser, Winckler, Davies). In spite, however, of the majority to the contrary, the former view is not to be lightly disregarded. There is another well-known ideogram (NAM) for *ashshatum* (found in the code B III, 57), and that there should be two for the same word is not probable in a document as carefully written and as exact as the code. The ideogram SAL + DIS is used: (1) before the names of gods, and denotes in such passages evidently priestess (e. g. B XV, 93, SAL + DIS (*il*) *Marduk* = priestess of Marduk), and so also in the other literature of the time;



or send to the father of the girl a present (*tirchatum*),<sup>13</sup> which, for want of a better name, we may call the "bride-money". This present varied in amount, of course, according to the means of the groom's family. In one contract it was ten shekels (MAP. No. 88), in another one shekel (MAP. No. 92); indeed, it might be lacking altogether, and such a case is contemplated by the code of Hammurabi (§ 139); but the custom was a strong one, and it is even provided in the code that, should a father die before his youngest son is married, the brothers shall give their young brother a portion from the goods of the father's house, over and above his regular share, to be used as bride-money in procuring himself a wife (§ 166). Still, that this custom had long lost its primitive significance of buying the bride, and was regarded, sometimes at least, as a mere formality, is evidenced by the fact that the bride-money might be returned with the bride as part of her dowry (Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII), and also by the smallness of the sum given. The bride-money paid for a daughter of the king Ammiditana<sup>14</sup> was only four shekels.

(2) without the name of a god, in which case it refers either to a married wife, or to a class of women whose status we cannot with our present knowledge definitely determine, but who were the subject of special legislation, and frequently associated in the laws with women attached to the temples. The word *walâdu*, "to bear children", is never used of the SAL + DIS wife. There is therefore some ground for Lyons' statement that this ideogram, when used of a wife, denotes a "votary wife" "who seems never to bear children". He suggests by way of explanation that "she was perhaps in the service of the temple until she passed the age of child-bearing and was then free to marry. One might compare the vestal virgins at Rome, who were also free to marry after thirty years of service" (J A O S. XXV, p. 259).

With this would agree the account of the marriage of Lamazatim, priestess (SAL + DIS) of Marduk, to Ilushu-bani, on the occasion of which she took with her as part of her dowry her sister Suratum(?) to be *shugetum* (Bu. 88-5-12, 10; C T. VIII; translated in part by Meissner A. S. III, 66).

<sup>13</sup> Besides the bride-money there were apparently other presents, for it is commanded that in case the groom break the engagement he shall forfeit "whatever has been brought" to the father-in-law (§ 159).

<sup>14</sup> Bu. 88-5-12, 193; CT. VIII. The published text reads *Ammiditana*

How far the wishes of the bride were consulted in the engagement cannot be definitely determined. On the one hand it is stated that the father gave the bride to her husband (*c. g.* § 183f. and frequently); on the other it is said of a widow, a divorced woman and a betrothed bride who has been violated by her prospective father-in-law "the man of her choice (heart) may marry her" (§§ 137, 156, 172). As the legal expression "to give a bride" might persist, along with the accompanying formality, long after its original significance (the absolute power of the father in the family and the sale of daughters), had died out, and as it is expressly stated of all except maiden brides that they might marry the man of their choice, and as women in other respects occupied such a free position, we cannot be far wrong in thinking that a considerable degree of freedom was allowed to a girl, in this matter of so much importance to herself. To ascribe to the early Babylonians the marriage customs of modern and mediæval town Arabs and Turks is certainly unwarranted.

The engagement thus formed might be broken by either the groom or the bride's father. In the former case the groom forfeited whatever he had sent to the prospective father-in-law's house (§ 159); in the latter the father of the girl must return double the amount received (§ 160). A still more interesting and very human law is that which provides that if a friend slander the prospective bridegroom, so that the girl's father refuse to give him his daughter, the father-in-law shall return double what has been brought to his house, and the slandering friend may not marry the girl (§ 161).

As soon as the betrothal was completed the girl was called the wife of a man. During the period that elapsed between the giving of the bride-money and the marriage she might live in her father's house (§ 130), or in that of her

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*sharrum* as the father's name; Ranke, however, reads *Amnia*, (*Early Babylonian Personal Names*, p. 65).

prospective father-in-law or husband (§§ 141,<sup>15</sup> 151, 156).

When, however, she came to dwell in the house of her husband, she came also under his authority. If she proved foolish and neglected the house and her husband,<sup>16</sup> he might do either one of two things: he might send her away without giving her anything for her divorce, or retain her in the house as slave and take another wife (§ 141). In case all went well, however, the bride formally "entered the man's house", they were married and set up for themselves.<sup>17</sup> Of the rites and ceremonies connected with the marriage we know little. A marriage contract was required by law (§ 128), several of which have come down to us, with the names of the contracting parties, the conditions attached, of some of which we shall speak later, and the names of the witnesses.

The bride usually brought with her from her father's house a dowry (*sheriqtum*). This, like the bride-money, might be omitted (§ 176), and, of course, its amount varied according to the wealth of her family. The code contemplates a case where the dowry is larger than the bride-money (§ 164), and such was probably usually the case. The inventory<sup>18</sup> of several dowries has come down to us, and from them we learn that the bride received from her father's house such things as real estate, slaves, money in gold and silver, articles of personal adornment, clothing and household utensils.

This dowry was not merged with the property of the

<sup>15</sup> The expression *ashshat awelim sha ina bit awelim washbat*, "the wife of a man who dwells in the house of a man", appears to refer to the period of betrothal. See particularly § 151, where a contrast between the man and wife is referred to, which must have been antenuptial. Only after the woman had formally entered the house of her husband (*ana bit awelim erēbum*) was she fully his wife (§ 152).

<sup>16</sup> This seems to be the meaning of the original.

<sup>17</sup> *Innemdu*.

<sup>18</sup> Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII; probably Bu. 88-5-12; 229 in MAP. No. 7; Scheil. *Une Saison de Fouilles à Sippar*, No. 10, p. 98, and others.

husband, but remained distinct. If she died childless it returned to her father's house (§§ 163, 164), but if she had children it belonged to them (§ 162). If a man had two successive wives and each of these had children, after the man died the whole estate was not lumped, but the children received the dowries of their respective mothers, and all shared alike in the estate of the father (§ 167). If a woman had children by two successive husbands, when she died, her children, irrespective of fatherhood, shared her dowry (§ 173).<sup>19</sup> If the husband divorced the wife she received her dowry (§§ 137, 138, 142), likewise if she preferred to leave his house when a second wife was introduced (§ 149).

The regulations concerning the dowry were actuated partly at least by feelings of solicitude for the personal welfare of the bride. Her parents followed her as well as they could into her new home by providing that she should not come to poverty; and they protected her—very much as modern parents—against both her husband and herself, in providing that neither he could get full possession of her dowry nor could she dispose of it. In this way she had a position of independence that she would otherwise have lacked. This same watchful care is evidenced in another way. If a wife make an agreement with her husband before marriage that a debtor may not seize her, she may not be seized for his debts *contracted before marriage*, similarly the man may not be seized for the debts of the wife (§ 151).

What became of her and her dowry in case her husband died leaving her childless is not clear. Did they remain in the husband's family, or return to her father's family, or was the woman free from family control in respect to personal actions or the control of her dowry, or both? There

<sup>19</sup> Presents given to the wife by her husband were governed by the same law. She had the use of them while she lived, but after her death they went to her children (§§ 150, 171). If she preferred to leave her husband's house after his death, she might not take his gift with her, but must leave it with the children (§ 172).

would seem to be no evidence for the first of these. In favor of the second is the law that the dowry of a wife who dies childless shall return to her father's house (§ 163). The enactment that the widow *with children* has a right to live in the house of her husband and have the use of her dowry and what presents her husband may have given her, or failing this, a portion equal to that of one son, as long as she lives (§ 171), may also be regarded as implying that the childless wife had no such claims on the house of her husband. Priestesses, who received dowries also, but had no children, had only the life use of their dowries, unless otherwise specified in the deed of gift. At their death it returned to their brothers (§§ 178-181); an exception to this, however, is the law that the priestess of Marduk may dispose of her dowry and her share of the father's estate as she will (§ 182).

It will be seen, therefore, that the gift of a dowry with a wife had many strings attached to it; but we cannot be sure of the legal status of the wife herself in relation to her father's house and that of her husband up to the time she bore children. We must beware, however, of reading into the code the idea of the perpetual tutelage of women with respect to either personal or proprietary rights. It is true that, strictly speaking, according to the code the wife could not dispose of her dowry or the presents given to her by her husband. Until she had children the former belonged to her father's house; after that both belonged to her children. She had only the life use of them. This looks like tutelage. But we learn also, incidentally, that she could hold and sell property in her own name (§ 147). From this last fact, which is also apparently substantiated by private contracts (though it is difficult to say whether the "wife" there mentioned may not have been a widow), and because a widow at least could be a party to a suit (§ 172), and because of the high position borne by woman in general, it seems best to conclude that, whatever may have been the earlier usage, the woman of the time of Hammurabi, even when married,



as a matter of fact was not necessarily subordinate to her husband in business affairs.

In actual life the husband and wife seem to have worked harmoniously together and to have had almost equal rights and responsibilities. The husband was of course the head of the family and in case of need even his wife and children could be bound over for debt for the space of three years. He seems to have had the control of her dowry judging from the expression "he shall restore her dowry to her" (§ 149 *et al.*). They were however both responsible for debts incurred after marriage (§ 152), and the woman was given equal credit with her husband for all the property acquired during their married life (§ 176). So too in private contracts man and wife act conjointly not only in such family affairs as adopting children or giving presents to children but also in borrowing money or buying a slave.<sup>20</sup> They probably acted together in investing the wife's dowry.

It is when we come to the relation of husband and wife in respect to divorce that we see what a subordinate position the woman at one time occupied. But here too we can discern how custom and law were uniting in an endeavor to free the wife from the control of her husband and put her, if not on an equality with him, at least in a freer position than she had heretofore occupied. The husband had the right of divorce, the wife had not. Even the code of Hammurabi did not take this right from the man, but only restricted it. Provision was made, however, for the wife's leaving her husband in certain cases. Of *laws* earlier than the code of Hammurabi we can say nothing positively. But the bilingual series *ana ittishu* because written in Sumerian and also because of its content may belong to an earlier legislation or at least echo the ideas of an earlier time. In this we have the following provisions concerning divorce "If a wife hate<sup>21</sup> her husband and say 'thou art not my

<sup>20</sup> MAP. Nos. 7, 17, 94, 95, 97, *et al.*; *Leip. Sem. Stud.* I. Daiches, Nos. 23, 26.

<sup>21</sup> I have retained the ordinary translation of *sāru*, but it is not satis-

husband' they shall throw her into the river. If a man say to his wife 'thou art not my wife' (*i. e.* divorce her) he shall pay one half of a mana". According to this the wife was helpless. The power of divorce was entirely within the hands of the husband and he was restricted in its use only by his ability to pay the half mana divorce-money. When this law was promulgated we do not know. Also there may have been other conditions attached to it which have not come down to us. In any case we have probably to regard the injunction that the man, on divorcing his wife shall pay one half mana, as a restriction on the earlier custom whereby he could send her away at will without any provision whatever. It was therefore a great step in advance. Whether it came originally from the side of the government, or from the bride's parents we cannot be sure. In the time of the First Dynasty, however, we know that it was not in force, and, judging by the contracts we have, would not have been acceptable to many parents of the time. For we find the matter again in the hands of the contracting parties, and the conditions of divorce varying according to their respective position, wealth or influence. In some cases where the bride was a freed woman there is no fine or divorce-money spoken of. The man apparently may act as he will.<sup>22</sup> In another the sum for divorce was only ten shekels (one sixth of a mana, M A P. No. 90); in others it was one mana, and in one case the husband was to forfeit

factory. The word is used both of the man's attitude toward the woman (VR. 24d, 54) and of the woman's toward the man (in the passage quoted and Ham. Code, B VII, 60, and CT. VI, 26, 12, quoted by Meissner A. S. III, p. 44). In the former case Meissner translates "*er mochte sie nicht*"; in the latter "*(wenn sie ihn) feindlich behandelt*". This is inconsistent. In the passages cited the word *isr* seems to imply not only hatred but also a desire for a separation (cf also Ham. Code B XVII, 18). It seems, therefore, to be used technically in the sense of "desire a separation". In that case the use of *אָסר*, "to hate", in the *Assuan Papyri* in the technical sense of "to desire a divorce" is a direct parallel, and there is no need to go to Egypt to find its origin (cf Z. A. XX, p. 145).

<sup>22</sup> See the tablets quoted by Meissner, A. S. III, p. 42.

house and furniture if he divorced his wife.<sup>23</sup> This last provision makes divorce practically impossible. But the duty of the wife remained the same. If she wished a divorce or left her husband there was but one thing possible—she was punished by death.

It was while things were in this condition that the code of Hammurabi was promulgated, and by it the position of the married woman was materially bettered. If she desire a divorce (*izir*) her case shall be examined by the authorities; if they find that she is without fault and her husband blameworthy, she is to receive her dowry and be free to go back to her father's house (§ 142). If on the contrary she is in fault she is to be thrown into water (§ 143). So strong was ancient custom! Wilful desertion on the part of the man dissolved the marriage tie. The wife was then free to marry another husband and the first husband if he returned had no claim on her (§ 136). If however the husband was captured and so forcibly kept from home, she was allowed to enter another house (i. e. marry again), only on condition that there was not maintenance in that of her first husband; but she must return to him if he come back (§§ 134, 135). The power of divorce, however, was not taken from the man; it was only regulated and restricted in the following manner.<sup>24</sup> If he put away a childless wife he must restore her dowry and give her besides a sum equivalent to the bride-money which he had given for her (§ 138); or in case there had been no bride-money the sum of one mana<sup>25</sup> (§ 139). In case she had children she should receive her dowry and a portion from the field, garden and goods of the husband; she should rear the children and after they were grown

<sup>23</sup> For this text, see p. 233.

<sup>24</sup> One writing of divorcement has come down to us: "Shamash-rabi has divorced Naramtum. She has taken her . . . she has received her divorce money. If another marry Naramtum Shamash-rabi shall make no complaint." M A P. No. 91.

<sup>25</sup> Those of a lower rank (*MASH-EN-KAK*) were required to pay only one-third of a mana.

receive an amount equal to that received by each of the sons, and was then free to marry again (§ 137). But he could not put her away on every cause at will. If he accuse her of adultery and the charge is not proved she may clear herself by oath and return to her house<sup>26</sup> (§ 131). If the charge be brought by another man she shall submit to the trial by water<sup>27</sup> (§ 132). If the wife of a man be apprehended in lying with another male they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall bind them and throw them into the water; provided that the husband may save his wife and the king save his servant (§ 129). If the wife of a man be ill and so incapacitated,<sup>28</sup> he may take another or second wife,<sup>29</sup> but he may not divorce the first. She may either be supported by her husband or return with her dowry to her father's house (§§ 148, 149). Naturally after the death of a first wife the man may take another (§ 167).

It is clear therefore that a man was allowed to take a second wife, during the lifetime of his first, only in certain rare instances. In a certain sense then the code was monogamistic. If, however, the first wife did not present her husband with children he was allowed to take a subordinate or secondary wife,<sup>30</sup> but it is expressly stated that she shall not rank with the first wife (§ 144). If on the contrary the first wife did present her husband with children the husband might not take a secondary wife (§ 145). This secondary wife was not a concubine. She came to her husband with a dowry from her father's house (§§ 137, 183,

<sup>26</sup> Almost undoubtedly the house of her husband; otherwise we would have "to her father's house", as elsewhere.

<sup>27</sup> "She shall plunge into the (holy) River for her husband." We do not know the details of the test. It would be an interesting study to ascertain in just what cases oath and trial by water were resorted to. In the Code of Hammurabi, which is remarkably free from superstition, they are allowed only where proof was, in the nature of the case, impossible.

<sup>28</sup> A definite illness, *la'abum*, is mentioned; its nature is unknown.

<sup>29</sup> *Ashshatam shanitam*.

<sup>30</sup> *Shugetum*. See note, p. 220.

184), and the children she bore were the legal children of her husband (§§ 137, 145).

It will be seen from the foregoing that the possession of children was regarded as very important in ancient Babylon. If a wife did not present them to her husband she was in danger of having another wife introduced into the house—a very disagreeable position for the first wife even though the other was not legally of equal rank. Indeed this very enactment that “the *shugetum* shall not take equal rank with the wife” presupposes an unenviable condition of domestic affairs which this law was endeavoring to improve. If the wife died without children the dowry returned to her father’s house. And as far as we know, it was only when she had had children that she had a right to be supported in her widowhood by her husband’s estate, otherwise she returned to her father’s house or was thrown on her own resources. In a certain sense the marriage may be said not to have been fully consummated until there were children. It was therefore very important for a woman that she have children. Thereby one<sup>31</sup> ground of divorce would be removed, and she would have a permanent home of her own in case her husband died. Now in connection with this, and evidently to protect the wife there grew up in Babylon a strange custom that was afterwards sanctioned and regulated by the code of Hammurabi. A wife might present her husband with children in either one of two ways: either by bearing them herself or vicariously by giving her

<sup>31</sup> Meissner (A. S. III, p. 41) thinks that childlessness was the only ground of divorce. This he does by regarding only §§ 138-140 as divorce laws. That is, he excludes all those that deal with legal separation (as §§ 133-136, 142), accusations of infidelity (§§ 131, 132), and also with the divorce (by the man) of the secondary wife (*shugetum*) or votary wife (? *SAL + DIS*) (§ 137), or of the, apparently as yet, unmarried wife (§ 141). But even were the right to make such distinctions allowed, it is not clear that the phrase (§ 138) “if a man put away his wife (*chirtashu*) who has not borne him children” gives the ground of divorce any more than does the expression (§ 137) “if a man has determined to put away (a wife) who has borne him children”.



maid to her husband. In this way she might postpone the evil day of divorce or at least of the secondary wife. The sections of the code that deal with this are the following:

§ 144. If a man take a wife and that wife give a maid to her husband and bring children into existence,<sup>32</sup> (if) that man determine to take a secondary wife (*shugetum*) they (i.e. the authorities) shall not agree with that man. He may not take a secondary wife.

§ 145. If a man take a wife and she do not provide<sup>33</sup> children for him, (if) he determine to take a secondary wife he may take a secondary wife. He may bring her into his house. That secondary wife shall not take equal rank with the (first) wife.

§ 146. If a man take a wife<sup>34</sup> and she give a maid to her husband and she bear children, (if) afterwards that maid would make herself equal to her mistress, because she has borne children, her mistress may not sell her for money; she may put a fetter upon her and reckon her among the slaves.

§ 147. If she have not borne children her mistress may sell her for money.

It is important that this maid be distinguished from the man's concubine (*amazu*) of whom we have spoken earlier. The former is the property of the mistress and is entirely in her hands to sell or to give to her husband for the purpose of bearing children. The latter is *his* slave. The children of the former are the legal children of the father and of the wife, for she "provides them for him". In the case of

<sup>32</sup> *Ushtabshi*. As the verb *walādu*, "to bear children", is avoided, "wife" is probably the grammatical subject.

<sup>33</sup> *Usharshishu*. That is, either by bearing them herself or by giving him her maid.

<sup>34</sup> In this and the preceding sections just quoted the sign representing the word "wife" is SAL + DIS (see note, p. 220). Even though we adopt the view that SAL + DIS = "votary wife", it does not necessarily follow that other wives might not have recourse to this same method of providing their husbands with children. The phrase *mārê usharshu* is used also with *ashshatum* (§ 163). It might, however, mean that votary wives most frequently resorted to this measure.

the wife there must have been some sort of adoption pre-supposed. The children of the latter became legal children of their father only if he formally adopted them.

According to these sections the maid thus given to the husband by the wife occupied a higher position than the other slaves. To be degraded to their level was a punishment; she might not be sold for money as other slaves were; her position was such that she was tempted to put herself on an equality with her mistress. In spite of this insolence, however, the code protects her, at least to this extent, that if she have borne children for her mistress she has a permanent claim on her, and cannot be separated from her children. This last was an advance on the condition of affairs revealed in the contracts of the time. According to them the maid might be sold whether she bore children or not. One such tablet reads: "Bunini-abi and Belizunu have bought as slave-girl Shamash-nuri from her father Ibi-Shân. She shall be wife of Bunini-abi and maid (slave) to Belizunu. When Shamash-nuri says to her mistress Belizunu 'thou art not my mistress' she may put a mark upon her and sell her for money."<sup>35</sup> Apparently she may be sold whether she have borne children or not. In this contract the word "wife" is used in its wide sense. The maid Shamash-nuri is responsible to the wife alone, and consequently there is no mention of her possible rebellion against the husband. In this respect the contract differs markedly from the marriage contracts that have come down to us. It is interesting to note too that here the husband and wife act together in buying the slave-wife. In other cases we have seen that parents included slave-girls in the dowry of their daughters, thus ensuring them as it were against childlessness. Quite as interesting is another contract in which the husband presents his wife with a maid: "Sin-bilanu has presented to Shad-dashu his wife<sup>36</sup> a slave girl named Mutibashti. The chil-

<sup>35</sup> Bu. 91-5-9, 374; CT. VIII. The text is translated and commented upon by Daiches, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 26.

<sup>36</sup> Meissner, who first translated this text (MAP. No. 5) at first

dren of Sinbilanu shall make no claim against her. . . . All the children that Mutibashti bears shall be Shaddashu's." It is doubtful whether the last clause means that the children of the maid shall be reckoned as the mistress' own children, or merely as her property.<sup>87</sup>

Among the tablets bearing on this question are two that tell of the marriage of two sisters to one man, and show how the duties and relations of the sisters were regulated in the marriage contract. The first reads: "Warad-Shamash has taken to wifehood and husbandhood Taram-Sagila and Iltani the daughter of Sin-Abushu. If Taram-Sagila and Iltani say to Warad-Shamash their husband 'thou art not my husband' they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall throw them from the pillar (?); and if Warad-Shamash says to Taram-Sagila and Iltani his wife 'thou art not my wife' he shall forfeit house and furnishings. And Iltani shall wash the feet of Taram-Sagila, shall carry her chair to her god's house, if Taram-Sagila be in bad humor Iltani shall be in bad humor, and if she be in good humor she shall be in good humor,<sup>88</sup> her seal she may not open, 10 measures of meal (?) she shall grind and bake (?) for her." The other contract reads: "Iltani the sister of Taram-Sagila, from Shamash-tatum their father, Warad-Shamash the son of Ili-ennam has taken them in wifehood."<sup>89</sup> Iltani, when her sister is in

read "sister", but now reads "wife", A. S. III, p. 38; similarly Peiser, K. B. IV, p. 46.

<sup>87</sup> If the latter, the provision would seem to be superfluous, for the children of a slave belonged also to the slave's owner. However, it is elsewhere expressly stated on the transference of a slave girl to another mistress that the legal title to all the children goes with the gift (Bu. 91-5-9, 280; CT. VIII, translated by Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 18).

<sup>88</sup> *Zini Taram-Sagila Iltani i-si-ni salamisha isalim.* The parallel text (MAP. 89 7f) has *zinisha i-si-in salamisha isali[m]*, for which I would suggest *i-si-ni* (the end of the sign *zi* could easily be confounded with the beginning of the sign *in*) and derive it from *zinu*. The two phrases then give one idea: Iltani shall conform to the humor of her sister. The protasis contains the infinitive without any hypothetical particle.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. the other text, "to husbandhood and wifehood". There were

bad humor, shall be in bad humor, when she is in good humor, she shall be in good humor; she shall carry her chair to the house of Marduk. All children that are borne or that they bear shall be their children. If she (*i. e.* Taram-Sagila) say to Iltani her sister 'thou art not my sister' . . . [If Iltani say to Taram-Sagila her sister 'thou art not my sister'] she (Taram-Sagila) may mark her and sell her for money. And if Warad-Shamash say to his wives (wife?) 'not my wives (wife?)' he shall pay one mana of silver. And if they say to Warad-Shamash their husband 'thou art not our husband' they (*i. e.* the authorities) shall strangle (?) them and throw them into the river".

As the interrogation marks show the translation of these texts is not free from difficulty. Apart from purely grammatical questions, however, other difficulties present themselves. The contracting parties are the same in both—the man Warad-Shamash takes in marriage two sisters<sup>40</sup> Taram-Sagila and Iltani. But throughout both tablets the singular *her, she*, etc., and the plural *they, them*, etc., are used apparently almost without discrimination; moreover, the penalties imposed in case of divorce are not the same in both texts. These difficulties vanish, however, if we recognize that there are two almost irreconcilable interests back of this double contract. There is on the one hand the custom (and law) of the land, which demands that there be but one chief wife in a house, and that any other may not take equal rank

apparently different kinds or degrees of marriage, of which little is as yet known.

\* In what sense is not clear. According to the first contract, Sin-abushu is the father of one of the girls; according to the second they are both daughters of Shamash-tatum, and are called sisters. Meissner thinks they became sisters by marriage to one man (A. S. III, 46), but this does not explain *abishina*, "their father." Pinches' suggestion is more likely, viz., that Iltani, the daughter of Sin-abushu, was adopted by Shamash-tatum and so became the adoptive sister of Taram-Sagila (J R A S. XXIX, p. 612), that is to say, they were legal though not own sisters. An even simpler explanation is that either Sin-abushu or Shamash-tatum was the grandfather. (Cf. A. S. III, p. 510, for a similar case.)

with her; on the other there is the wish of the father and the two sisters that they stand on equal footing with each other and with respect to their husband. In deference to the first of these, Taram-Sagila is made chief wife; her sister Iltani takes the place (though not the name) of maid; she must wait on Taram-Sagila and should she prove rebellious may be sold as a slave. This difference made it advisable that there be two contracts drawn, one looking at the marriage from the standpoint of the husband's relation to his chief wife Taram-Sagila (our first); the other from his relation to Iltani. Accordingly we learn that if the husband break the marriage bond with Taram-Sagila he shall forfeit his house and its furnishings, but if he divorce Iltani he shall be required only to pay one mana. In deference to the wish of the sisters, the words "mistress" and "maid" are avoided, and whenever the marriage or divorce is mentioned both are included. That is to say, they are treated as far as possible as one individual. The husband may legally of course divorce one or the other, but the divorce of either in this case would mean in reality the divorce of both. But there is still another sign of sisterly affection here in the phrase "all children . . . shall be *their* children." In the case of mistress and maid as we have seen all children borne to the husband were reckoned as children of the mistress. In the contract before us Iltani takes the place of maid in several respects but in regard to motherhood she shares equally with her sister.

Let us turn now to the Bible and see how the marriage customs among the patriarchs compare with those of the early Babylonians. No excuse is necessary for making such a comparison. According to the Biblical account Terah came from the town of Ur in southern Babylonia. Abraham grew to manhood and took his wife there (Gen. xi, 28ff.). For this reason alone we should expect the Biblical account, if accurate, to show some resemblances to the Babylonian customs. In addition, however, it is related that Abraham



and his family for some time after him kept up their connection with the old home, or at least with that portion of the family which had remained at Haran. It is true that Abraham felt that he had made a definite break with the old land (Gen. xxiv. 6), but he received news of the welfare of his relatives in Haran (Gen. xxii. 20ff.), and sent for a wife for his son from among them (Gen. xxiv). At the instance of Rebekah, who herself had come from Haran, Isaac sent his son Jacob there to take a wife (Gen. xxvii. 46 ff). As far as we know this was not done again at any later time.

The question of dates need not detain us long. Hammurabi, the author of the code bearing his name, is identified by many scholars with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. 1. This would make him a contemporary of Abraham. Whether this identification be correct or not, (and it is not so sure as some scholars would have us believe), there can be no doubt that the period of the patriarchs corresponds in a general way at least to the time of the so-called "First Dynasty" of Babylon to which Hammurabi belonged. More than this is not necessary for our present investigation. But before proceeding further it should be remembered that the Babylonian literature which we have quoted is legal, and is worded with that exact precision which characterizes all legal documents; the Hebrew literature on which we are dependent is on the other hand narrative, and instead of the precision of legal documents we have merely the story of events told us as stories usually are.

In the first place, then, the patriarchs gave presents on the occasion of their betrothal. Of Abraham, it is true, we know nothing with regard to this, for he was married before the more detailed story of his life begins. In the case of Isaac and Rebekah, however, we read that Abraham's "servant brought forth jewels of silver and jewels of gold and raiment and gave them to Rebekah; he gave also to her brother and her mother precious things" (Gen. xxiv. 53). The amount or worth of the

presents is not stated, but in kind they correspond to the gifts mentioned in Babylonia. The presents given by the servant to Rebekah at the well were a golden ring for her nose of half a shekel in weight, and two golden bracelets for her hands of ten shekels in weight (Gen. xxiv. 22, 47). In one<sup>41</sup> dowry already mentioned one shekel of gold is allowed for earrings, that is half a shekel for each. In another<sup>42</sup> half a shekel is given for her "front" or "face" perhaps a nose-ring. In this connection we may appropriately notice that Rebekah's father Bethuel appears in the story only at the time of the actual betrothal (Gen. xxiv. 50), elsewhere Laban her brother and her mother play the leading part. The reason for this is not apparent, though many conjectures might be made. Similar difficulties present themselves in some Babylonian marriage contracts. For instance in one case<sup>43</sup> the mother and the brothers arrange the contract and give the bride the dowry that had been set aside for her by her father. It is not stated whether the father was dead or not. In another<sup>44</sup> a brother and sister give the bride to her husband. In another a sister is to give the bride in marriage.<sup>45</sup> In others the father acts alone or the father and mother together. The freedom of choice accorded to Rebekah (Gen. xxiv. 57) is quite in keeping with Babylonian custom. Jacob had nothing to offer in the way of gifts or bride-money but he served<sup>47</sup> seven years for each of his wives. Reckoning his

<sup>41</sup> MAP. No. 7.

<sup>42</sup> Bu. 88-5-12, 10, CT. VIII., *sha pani napshatisha*.

<sup>43</sup> Bu. 88-5-12, 10; CT. VIII.

<sup>44</sup> Bu. 88-5-12, 193; CT. VIII. If the reading *Ammititana sharrum* is correct, the father was alive when the contract was drawn, for the tablet is dated in the eleventh year of his reign (see Ungnad, *Die Chronologie der Regierung Ammititana's und Ammisaduga's*, B. A. VI).

<sup>45</sup> Bu. 91-5-9, 394; CT. II.

<sup>47</sup> Apropos of Jacob's complaint that he had been required to make good whatever was either torn or lost, the Code of Hammurabi prescribes that the shepherd is responsible for lost animals, but not for those torn, §§ 263, 266; see also Ex. xxii. 12f.

services at the average wage of a slave (which of course is too little)—six shekels a year—he paid as bride-money a little over two-thirds of a mana for each wife.<sup>46</sup>

Concerning the dowries of the wives of Isaac and Jacob we have only incidental references. With Rebekah went her nurse and her maidens (Gen. xxiv. 59, 61), but what else is not said. Laban also gave a female slave to each of his daughters at their marriage (Gen. xxix. 24, 29) quite in the Babylonian fashion; but what else is not stated here either. Jacob's wives' remark however: "Is there yet any portion or inheritance for us in our father's house" (Gen. xxxi. 14),—implying of course a negative answer—is quite in keeping with the Babylonian law (custom) of inheritance. The married daughter received only her dowry (§ 183),<sup>47</sup> the son received both bride-money for his marriage and a share in the father's estate (§ 166).

With regard to the position of the childless widow it will be remembered that Judah sent the childless Tamar to her father's house after the death of her husband (Gen. xxxviii. 11), as we have seen was probably the Babylonian custom. But the levirate marriage which is here mentioned for the first time in the Old Testament was unknown to the Babylonians as far as we are aware.

It is in regard to the actual relations between man and wife and the position of children that we find the closest correspondence. And here it may be remarked that Laban put into words the fear that lies back of many Babylonian

<sup>46</sup> The Hebrew word for bride-money was כֶּדֶן, and is found in Gen. xxxiv. 12; Ex. xxii. 16; 1 Sam. xviii. 25. The custom was common to other Semitic peoples also. A curious instance of the persistence of custom is shown by the fact that the Syrian laws of the early Christian era are almost identical with the Code of Hammurabi in respect to breaking an engagement and the return of the bride-money. Sachau, *Syrische Rechtsbücher*, Vol. I., p. 19, § 33. That other gifts besides the bride-money were usual is seen from Gen. xxxiv. 12. The כֶּדֶן is not mentioned in the stories of the patriarchs.

<sup>47</sup> This section refers only to the *shugetum*. If this means a secondary wife we have no general law concerning daughters. If, on the other hand, it mean 'marriageable woman', there is no such lack.

marriage contracts and laws when he said, "Jehovah watch between me and thee, when we are absent one from another; if thou shalt afflict my daughters and if thou shalt take wives besides my daughters, no man is with us; see God is witness betwixt me and thee" (Gen. xxxi. 49f.).

Abraham had only one legal wife at a time, as far as we know. His first, Sarah, bore him no children for many years and despaired of ever having any. As, however, the possession of children was of prime importance,<sup>49</sup> she gave her maid Hagar to her husband, saying, "It may be that I shall obtain children<sup>50</sup> by her" (Gen. xvi. 2). This is, of course, precisely the custom which we read of in Babylon.<sup>51</sup> Sarah, like her sisters in her old home, could hold property in her own name; she owned a maid. Where and how she obtained her is not said, but as Hagar was an Egyptian, it is probable that she did not receive her as a part of her dowry, as Rachel and Leah received their maids, but that she acquired her while in Egypt (Gen. xii.). It would be interesting to know, and it is not at all impossible that Abraham made his wife a present of Hagar, as Sin-bilanu presented his wife Shaddashu with Mutibashti. Sarah gave her maid to Abraham to bear children for her. The Babylonian custom explains how it was possible for her to expect to have children in this way.

"And Hagar conceived, and when she saw that she had conceived her mistress was despised in her eyes" (Gen. xvi. 4). As happened frequently in Babylon, so here Hagar presumed on her being with child to Abraham and was

<sup>49</sup> How important it was among the Hebrews may be gathered from Rachel's complaint, "give me children or else I die" (Gen. xxx. 1) and the blessing of Rebekah (Gen. xxiv. 60), not to mention many other similar passages.

<sup>50</sup> אִנְיָה a denominative from the word for son (בֵּן). The word is used only here and in Gen. xxx. 3 in this sense. The translation of the RV does not materially differ from this.

<sup>51</sup> If it should eventually turn out that only "votary wives" had recourse to this method of providing children for their husband, this would suggest the conclusion that Sarah had been in the service of a temple before her marriage to Abraham.

insolent. In Babylon such action on the part of the maid who had borne children was usually punished by her mistress selling her. The code of Hammurabi mitigated this to degradation to the rank of common slave. But in Hagar's case the matter was more complicated, for the child was not yet born. Sarah in her anger blames Abraham for her maid's attitude, and on being reminded that Hagar is her maid, and therefore at her disposal, she treats her harshly, so that Hagar flees (Gen. xvi. 5ff.). Later, however, the maid returns and Ishmael is born. Although the son of a slave, he is legally the firstborn son and heir of Abraham and Sarah according to Babylonian custom, and, as far as we can see, he is regarded as such in the book of Genesis, being frequently called Abraham's son (Gen. xvi. 15; xvii. 23, 25, *et al.*), and regarded as heir by Abraham (xvii. 18) and Sarah (xxi. 10). When Isaac was born there were two legal heirs and Sarah was unwilling to have it so. She now wished Ishmael to be classed as the child of a slave<sup>52</sup> (Gen. xxi. 10). So she persuaded Abraham, against his wish, to drive out Hagar and Ishmael, and in so doing she caused him to act contrary to the humanitarian principles of the code of Hammurabi, which forbids the sale, (and *a fortiori* the expulsion), of a maid that had borne children to her mistress' husband, and also the disinheriting of a son without good reasons (§ 168f.). The one good thing about the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael was that mother and son were not separated.

<sup>52</sup> The use of *אִמָּה* in this declaration of Sarah's is significant. Hagar in the previous chapters is always called *שִׁפְתָּהּ*. That the two words could be used almost interchangeably is evident from Chap. xxx. The latter is generally regarded as the lower term (I Sam. xxv. 41, and compare the contrast in Ex. xi. 5), and this may be so. But there is this difference between the words: the former (*אִמָּה*) is the customary legal term for a female slave, the feminine of *אָבִיר* (Ex. xx. 10, 17; xxi. 20, 26, 27, 32; Lev. xxv. 44), and the opposite of the hired servant *שָׂכִיר*. (Lev. xxv. 6), and would therefore be chosen to describe the legal position of a slave. The latter (*שִׁפְתָּהּ*), although applied to slaves, did not have the legal connotation of the former, and seems perhaps to point to the woman's position as a laborer (Ex. xi. 5; I Sam. xxv. 27, 41, contrasted with vs. 24, 25, 28, 31, 41).



This same institution of the maid bearing children for her mistress meets us again in the case of Rachel and Bilhah, with the explanatory statement that the offspring shall be the adopted child of Rachel (Gen. xxx. 3),<sup>53</sup> and of Leah and Zilpah (vs. 9). In later times we hear nothing of it.

The position of the other children of Abraham known to us is not so clear. On the one hand, the evident contrast between "the sons of the concubines that Abraham had" (Gen. xxv. 6) and "Isaac and Ishmael his sons" (vs. 9) is noteworthy. In the former of these the writer seems purposely to avoid the expression "sons of Abraham". This would be entirely in keeping with the Babylonian custom, whereby the sons of concubines were not reckoned sons of their father unless adopted by him. It is in agreement also with the position of Ishmael elsewhere, who is regularly called the son of Abraham and never the son of a concubine, and also with the fact that Hagar is not called a concubine; nor is Keturah. We would then have to suppose that by "concubines" (vs. 6) are meant a number of female slaves who bore children to Abraham, but of whom we hear nowhere else except in the general lists of his possessions (*e. g.* Gen. xii. 16; xxiv. 35). That would mean simply that Abraham acted as other men of his time in this respect, and the omission of any other reference to his concubines is explained by their unimportance to the narrative. They are mentioned here with propriety in connection with his death and the transference of his estate to Isaac, and have their proper place immediately after the children of the wives.<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, it has to be said that although Hagar herself is never called a concubine, but rather Sarah's maid ( שפחה ) or slave ( אמה ), there seems no good reason for not applying this word to her. Bilhah, who bore the same relation to Rachel that Hagar did to Sarah, is called

<sup>53</sup> Following Stade's interpretation, ZAW. 1886, pp. 143ff.

<sup>54</sup> Compare the arrangement in Gen. xxii, 20-24; I Chron. ii, 42-46; iii 9, *et al.*

Jacob's concubine (Gen. xxxv. 22). Also, with regard to Keturah; she is called Abraham's wife ( *אשה* Gen. xxv. 1), but the Hebrew word here used may mean also "woman" in the widest sense of the word. I Chron. i. 32 calls her Abraham's concubine, but at that late date the position of concubine, and so the meaning of the word itself, may have been somewhat modified.<sup>65</sup> If these are the concubines meant, Ishmael was degraded from his position as Abraham's son to the inferior one of son of a concubine.

Whoever these "sons of the concubines that Abraham had" were, however, Abraham gave them "gifts and he sent them away from Isaac his son while he yet lived, eastward, unto the east country". That is to say, he gave them their freedom and sufficient means to begin life. The code of Hammurabi, as we have seen, provides that a man may either adopt the sons of his concubines, in which case they stand on an equal footing with the other sons, or that he may not adopt them, in which case they and their mother shall receive their freedom, but nothing else, upon the death of the father-proprietor. Abraham's action, it will be noted, was midway between these. It is generally thought that this step was taken for Isaac's benefit, but, judged by Babylonian custom, it had also the effect of protecting these sons of concubines from Isaac, who as sole heir of his father might attempt to keep them in slavery.

In Gen. xxv. 5 it is said that "Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac". If Ishmael and the sons of Keturah were sons of concubines, they had no claim on the estate, and were generously treated for those times in being given their freedom and presents. If, however, we regard them as

<sup>65</sup> As a rule the sons of a man are distinguished from the sons of his concubine, *e. g.* I Chron. iii. 9: "All these are the sons of David, besides the sons of the concubines." Sometimes, however, the son of the concubine is called the son of the man, *e. g.* Jud. viii. 31. In this case we are left in doubt as to whether the child was adopted and so became the legal son of his father, or whether the legal position of the sons of concubines had changed during the centuries. In some cases we know that the child was adopted, *e. g.* Gen. l. 23, cf. I Chron. vii. 14.

legal sons of Abraham, they were disinherited. This power was in the hands of Babylonian fathers also, but the code of Hammurabi discountenances such action on the part of the father by enacting that he shall submit his reasons to the authorities for their approval, and shall not be permitted to cut off a son unless he has twice committed a grave fault against his father (§§ 168, 169). As a general rule, the sons shared equally in the father's estate (§ 166f.), but one text has come down to us (MAP. No. 107) in which we read of one son receiving the whole estate and afterwards giving portions to his brothers.

Before the birth of Ishmael, when Abraham had no legal son, he is made to say, "One born in my house ( *בן בית* ) is mine heir" (Gen. xv. 3). What this means is not clear. We have seen above that, according to Babylonian custom or law, when there were both children of a concubine and children of a wife, the former did not inherit with the latter unless adopted by the father. Whether this can be taken to mean that in the event of there being no legal children the children of the concubine were the heirs, is at best doubtful. In the time of the Judges something like this appears to have been known, for Jephthah, the son of a harlot ( *וניה* ), was apparently in possession of part at least of his father's estate until the sons of the wife were grown and drove him out (Jud. xi. 1f.). Whether he was adopted by his father or not we do not know. The "son of my house" in Gen. xv. 3 cannot mean a child of Abraham's, however, on account of the following verse: "This man shall not be thine heir, but he that cometh forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir." Another question that rises in this connection is whether the "house-son" ( *בן בית* ) and the "house-born" ( *יליד בית* , Gen. xiv. 14; xvii. 12f.) are the same. The latter expression has been found (though partly broken) in a Babylonian contract.<sup>56</sup> It has the same meaning in both languages, apparently. *i. e.* the

<sup>56</sup>CT. VIII. 28b 8 *wi-li-[-id bi-t]i-sha*. Translated by Schorr, *Alt-babylonische Rechtsurkunden*, No. 5.

slave born in the house in contrast to the bought slave.

Another thing of which we know nothing from the Babylonian side is the statement of Laban's, "it is not so done in our place to give the younger before the first-born" (Gen. xxix. 26). Jacob apparently knew nothing of such a custom. The code of Hammurabi assumes that the elder brothers will receive their bride-money before the younger (§ 166), but this we cannot press so far as to say that such was always the custom, nor can we apply the same to the dowries of daughters without further evidence.

Whether it was customary among the Babylonians to marry own sisters or half sisters, as Abraham did (Gen. xxi. 12), we do not know. Sections 154-158, which deal with incest, do not mention this relationship. It was forbidden later among the Hebrews (Lev. xviii. 9, 11; Deut. xxvii. 22, and compare 2 Sam. xiii. 11 ff.), but was common among the Egyptians.<sup>57</sup> The marriage of one man to two sisters did, however, occur, as we have seen above. It was forbidden in the Mosaic law (Lev. xviii. 18). The story of Leah and Rachel has new interest for us when read in the light of the marriage contracts of Taram-Sagila and Itani. Whether Leah had any superior rights over the younger Rachel is not stated; but the story of Gen. xxx. and the mutual jealousy of the two sisters stands in sad contrast to the agreement that the children of Taram-Sagila and Itani should be *their* children. The story in Genesis is to be viewed rather as an example of the unhappy state of many polygamous homes of that time which the humanitarian code of Hammurabi was combatting.

From this brief comparison it is evident that the account of family relations in Babylon and among the early patriarchs are in substantial agreement, which at times extends even to details. The fragmentary nature of the stories in Genesis, with only incidental allusions to family affairs, leaves us at times in doubt as to the proper interpretation. In some matters Abraham did not act exactly as the Baby-

<sup>57</sup> Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 85.

lonians did in the same circumstances (*e. g.* the treatment of Hagar and the sons of his concubines); but he never acted contrary to Babylonian principles, nor did his conduct differ from that of his Babylonian kinsmen any more than did theirs among themselves. On the other hand, both accounts are in agreement with regard to the general state of affairs presupposed, and also in details, whether specifically mentioned or only incidentally alluded to. Abraham in particular, in all his family affairs, appears to us as a normal Babylonian gentleman of wealth, neither in advance of nor yet behind his times, but actuated in the main by that same humanitarianism that we find in the code of Hammurabi. Of the other patriarchs the picture is not so clear.

The east is very conservative, and the customs which prevailed at the time of Hammurabi and Abraham may have continued for many centuries. Indeed, many of them are still to be found there. Unfortunately, we are not yet in a position to write the story of the later development of marriage laws and customs in Babylon. It should not go unnoticed, however, that the strange institution of the maid bearing children for her mistress is not met with in the Bible after the time of the patriarchs, nor has it yet been found in Babylonian literature of a later date, as far as we know. It is, of course, too soon to draw conclusions, but the fact just mentioned, and, indeed, our whole comparison,—the similarity of customs in Genesis and the Babylonian records from the end of the third millennium before Christ, and the non-appearance of some of these customs in later times,—favor that view of Hebrew history which holds that the Hebrews were in touch with and influenced by the Babylonians in the infancy of the race, as well as in the period of its decay, and that their literature faithfully reflects the conditions of these early times.

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## THE FUTURE LIFE IN HEBREW THOUGHT DURING THE PRE-PERSIAN PERIOD.

The abode of departed spirits, as it was pictured by the imagination of the early Semites is finely described in the story of the descent of the goddess Ishtar into the nether world, her forcible detention there, and her eventual release. The tale is a nature-myth. The goddess is a planet, commonly identified with the planet Venus, which blazes in the sky for a season, then disappears below the horizon, and after a time returns. The story is well known; it is repeated here only for the purpose of comparison. The goddess Ishtar, daughter of the moon-god, determined to visit

The land whence none returns,  
The house of darkness, the dwelling of the goddess Irkigal,<sup>1</sup>  
The house from which he who enters comes not forth,  
The pathway whose course returns not,  
The house where he who enters is deprived of the light,  
where dust is their nourishment, mud their food,  
where they see no light, but sit in darkness,  
where they are clothed like birds in raiment of feathers,  
where dust is spread over door and bar.

On arriving at the gate, she called to the porter, saying imperiously:

"Keeper of the waters, open thy gate!  
Open thy gate . . .  
Else will I crush the door, break the bar,  
crush the sill, tear open the doors;  
will bring up the dead that they eat and live,  
and take their places among them that live."

The gatekeeper persuaded the impetuous goddess to re-

<sup>1</sup> The habitation of the dead; and, personified, one of the deities of the place.

strain her violence until he should announce her name to the queen of the place. From his mistress he received command to admit the new comer and subject her to the ancient custom. Thereupon he opened the gate, saying:

"Enter, my lady, and let Cuthah rejoice;  
Let the palace of the land whence none returns exult in thine arrival."

On passing the first gate, the noble crown was lifted from the head of the goddess; after the second gate her earrings were taken away; after the third gate the chain was unbound from her neck; after the fourth gate the ornaments were stripped from her breast; after the fifth gate the jeweled girdle was loosed from her loins; after the sixth gate the bracelets and anklets were removed from her hands and feet; and on passing the seventh gate her only garment was stripped from her body. She had descended to the land whence none returns, and according to custom had entered it naked and divested of the insignia of rank. She was filled with wrath. On seeing Allatu, the queen of the place, she unluckily forgot herself so far as to revile the mistress of the realm. She soon learned her mistake. Allatu gave the word, and Ishtar was smitten with disease in the eyes, the loins, the feet, in heart and head, and throughout the body.

In consequence, however, of the absence of Ishtar from the earth, the processes of nature which are dependent on her agency ceased. Love languished, the impulse to fruitfulness was no longer obeyed. In this distress Ea, the god of wisdom, bethought him of a plan. He created a being to act as a messenger, and sent him to the nether world to placate the queen, put her into a good humor, and then conjure her by the name of the great gods and force her to let him have the use of certain water. The messenger followed his instructions, and finally proffered his request for the water. It met with a stern refusal from Allatu the queen. "Thou hast made a request that cannot be granted," said she.

"Away with thee: I will cast thee into the great prison;  
The slime of the city shall be thy food,  
The gutters of the city thy drink,  
The shadow of the wall thine abode,  
The threshold thy dwelling place.  
Imprisonment and restraint shall break thy strength."

But she had been exorcised, and must release Ishtar. So she bade her servant sprinkle the goddess with the water of life, which seems to have been vigilantly guarded beneath the palace by the sprites. The servant shattered the door-posts of the palace, led the sprites forth and set them on golden thrones. Then he sprinkled Ishtar with the water of life, conducted her back through the seven gates, and restored to her her raiment and her ornaments.

The tablet on which this story is written bears the name of Ashurbanipal, king of Assyria. It belonged to the library which he gathered about the year 650 before Christ. The story itself is unquestionably older; exactly how much older it is impossible at present to determine. It doubtless dates from the myth-making age of the Babylonians. At any rate its descriptions are largely derived from old conceptions of the place of the dead.

Besides this myth of the descent of Ishtar to the nether world there are occasional allusions in the native literature to the abode of the dead and to the conditions that prevail there. From these several sources it is learned that

1. The abode of the dead was thought of as situated under the earth. "Ishtar has descended into the earth and has not come up again" (Rev. 5, 6). If men are in distress, they speak of "going down into Aralu". The earth opened and Eabani ascended from sheol. The scorpion men, those fabulous monsters that guard the pathway that leads to the island of the blessed and keep it closed to mortal man, are described as being so immense that their back touches heaven while their breast reaches beneath to sheol. Sheol is called "wide". It is spoken of as a land; "the land whence none returns". And so too Gilgamesh speaks of it

as a country, but it was as readily conceived of as "the great city;" walled and entered through gates, seven in number, or, according to another tradition, fourteen, and having its palace and its prison, its queen and her servant and a gatekeeper.

2. The existence of this place of itself implies the continuance of the soul after death; otherwise "the great city" would be tenantless. The separate existence of soul and body after death was the current belief. If the corpse remained unburied, the soul wandered restlessly on earth; conversely when the body was interred, the soul went down to sheol. All men without distinction descend thither. No class or condition is exempt. "In the land whence none returns, in the house of darkness, the abode of the goddess Irkalla, in that house, my friend, crowns lie on the ground whose wearers of old ruled the land; there dwell the priest and his fellow, the exorcist and the conjuror". And according to venerable custom, those who enter are stripped of all earthly insignia of rank and wealth, and are ushered naked into their lasting home. Even a goddess who lived there, none else than the mother of a husband of Ereshkigal, was like others unclothed; her shining hips were not covered by any garments. The multitude who inhabit "the great city" dwell in darkness and feed upon dust.

3. Yet they possess the power of perception; for Eabani's spirit, which had descended to the region of the dead and returned to the upper world, had seen the country and had a tale which he could tell if he would, but which he hesitated to tell. The soul after death is capable of experiencing distress; for the provisions in sheol for imprisonment and bodily torments imply the consciousness of the soul and its capacity for degrees of suffering. The soul of the deceased is capable of some measure of comfort also. The fallen warrior possesses it. "Upon a couch doth rest and pure water drink he who hath been slain in battle". "Thou sawest it?" asks Gilgamesh. "Yes"; replies Eabani,

"I saw it. His father and his mother support his head, and his wife is at his side".

4. Thus varying degrees of happiness and misery are remotely alluded to, based on civic virtues practised during the earthly life and on behavior in sheol. Warriors who lose their life in battle are rewarded in the other world with a place for rest and water to drink, with the presence of parents and wife. Insubordination to authority in the nether world is punished by disease, by imprisonment, by water from the gutters of the city to drink and the city's slime for food. The tradition of the flood as reported by Berosus, himself a Babylonian, states that the principal survivors because of their piety were translated to dwell with the gods. This may possibly be an ancient feature of the story.

5. While sheol is characteristically a land whence none returns, yet a return to the regions of light and life is not unthinkable. The gods devised and carried out a plan for the release of Ishtar. This goddess herself threatened to lead forth the dead and restore them to life. The queen of the place has water of life which she can dispense at pleasure.

The Hebrews were a branch of the same Semitic stock as the Babylonians and Assyrians, and in the earliest ages they naturally had the same general conception of the future state. In a casual remark the patriarch Jacob gives utterance apparently to the common belief. When his heartless sons laid the bloody coat of Joseph before him, he said: "It is my son's coat; an evil beast hath devoured him; Joseph is without doubt torn in pieces." And the bereaved father refused to be comforted, saying: "I will go down to sheol to my son mourning." (Gen. xxxvii. 33, 35). In these words Jacob doubtless expressed his belief that Joseph's body had been devoured by a beast, but that Joseph was in sheol; and that one day he himself would descend



thither to his son. It is safe to say that here are three fundamental points of the early Hebrew belief concerning the dead: 1. There is a distinction between the body and the person or soul. 2. The body may be destroyed by violence or may moulder to dust, but the person survives the destruction of the body. 3. The soul or person dwells in sheol. These three articles belonged to the common Semitic belief concerning the dead. They are found in the creed of the Christian also. He confesses them to be truths. But respecting the dwelling place of the dead, he regards it naive to locate sheol, even in imagination, underneath the world.

**ABRAHAM DECLARING THAT HE WOULD RETURN WITH  
THE LAD.**

Abraham was accustomed to reason. He had long been promised an heir; but no child had been born to him, and he and Sarah were both old, well stricken in years. He had pondered the question how the promise was to be fulfilled; and he and Sarah had decided that he might become the father of a son, but by the young Egyptian maid. Now, however, Isaac has been born to Abraham and Sarah, and God has promised a numerous posterity to Abraham through this son. But the command comes to him to offer the lad for a burnt offering. What becomes, then, of the promise that "in Isaac shall thy seed be called"? Abraham reasoned. He knew of only one way by which the promise could be fulfilled in case Isaac was sacrificed on the altar. He believed in the omnipotence of God. He had faith that the Almighty, the creator and possessor of heaven and earth, who had given a son to him when his wife was past age and he himself as good as dead, had power to bring that child back to life, to restore him even from sheol. And as he went forward with his son to the appointed place of sacrifice, he calmly said to his servants: "Abide ye here, and I and the lad will go yonder; and we will worship, and come again to you."

And thus the inspired author of the Epistle to the Hebrews traces the secret workings of Abraham's mind. "He that had gladly received the promises was offering up his only begotten son; even he to whom it was said, In Isaac shall thy seed be called: accounting that God is able to raise up, even from the dead". (Heb. xi. 17-19).

Such reasoning was within the bounds of even the heathen thought of the day. In the traditions of the race to which Abraham belonged the restoration of the dead to life, release from sheol, a return to the abodes of men, were conceivable. The story of Tammuz was, indeed, a myth concerning a natural phenomenon, but even so it spoke of the release of dead vegetation from the power of death. The story of Gilgamesh told of the faith of a man that his companion might be brought back even from the land whence there is no return. And in the fancies of men about that dread place was not the water of life there, although carefully guarded? The thought of the possible restoration of the dead to life was present to the mind of the Semite; and Abraham, with his higher doctrine of God and under the pressure of God's promise concerning Isaac, passed from careless fancy to lively hope and sure conviction. "I and the lad will come again to you."

#### ABRAHAM LOOKING FOR THE CITY THAT HATH THE FOUNDATIONS.

Abraham waited for a country that was not yet his. He believed that in and through him God was laying the foundations of a heavenly kingdom among men. He indeed should go to his fathers in peace, but in and with him his descendants should have the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession (Gen. xiii. 15; xvii. 8), and, expanding (xii. 2, 3; xiii. 16; xv. 18; xxii. 17), constitute God's kingdom of righteousness on earth (xvii. 1, 7; xviii. 19), and form an integral part of God's universal realm (xiv. 22; xxiv. 3, 7). Actuated by this hope and to obtain this reward he willingly left kindred and native land and became a pil-

grim in a country not his own. For God rules in righteousness (xviii. 25); and his kingdom in heaven and, coming down thence, on earth also is the city that alone hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God (Heb. xi. 10, 16; xii. 22; xiii. 14; Rev. xxi. 2). The kingdom is one and indivisible. To this kingdom Abraham belonged, although in this earthly life he was sojourning in a part of God's earthly dominion still unpossessed by the people of God. The Canaanite was still in the land. He had reason to cherish the hope of a continuance of blessed association with God in the life beyond (see remarks on "the God of Abraham").

#### ACQUAINTANCE WITH CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN THOUGHT.

A new era dawned. During the centuries from the close of the patriarchal period to the exile the Hebrews and the Egyptians were in almost uninterrupted contact. The relation was sometimes that of master and slave, or at least of ruling race and oppressed people, to the sorrow of the Hebrews; but more often the association was friendly and close, that of husband and wife, parent and child, teacher and pupil. There was also intercourse with travelers, resident business men, and proselytes; and there were alliances between the two nations for the purpose of waging war against the common foe. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire what notions the Egyptians entertained regarding the future state. Without entering upon an elaborate discussion, it is sufficient to recall the consensus of opinion among modern Egyptologists. Briefly stated, the Egyptians believed: 1. In a distinction between soul and body. 2. In the continued conscious existence of the soul after death. Belief in an after-existence can be traced back into the time of the second dynasty, some four thousand years before Christ. 3. That final happiness in the world to come is conditioned upon a righteous life on earth. The idea of a future judgment was entertained as early as the fourth dynasty at least, or about three thousand years before

Christ. And in the New Empire, which began shortly after the exodus of the Hebrews and continued until the Persian conquest of Egypt, there is everywhere evidence of the thought of judgment, and of the belief that the awards of the future world are distributed according to the moral character of the life on earth. In the presence of the forty-two gods the heart of the deceased is weighed over against righteousness, and the soul must make specific confession that it has practised the moral virtues and fulfilled religious duties during life. 4. That they who successfully pass through this ordeal attain to an active existence, recover bodily and mental powers, and devote themselves to the service of the gods.

And among the Israelites during this period, as in former days, it was the general belief that the soul continues its conscious existence after death.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Did any of the Israelites believe in the dissolution of conscious existence at death? Perhaps there were skeptics who did. But no basis for such a belief on their part is found in the psychology of the Hebrews which is involved in the account of man's creation given in the second chapter of Genesis.

The logical foundation for a doctrine declaring the cessation of man's conscious existence at death has been discovered, it is alleged, in the account of man's nature as given in Gen. ii. 7, "God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul". It is true that the asserted psychology of that account, or a kindred psychology, is an essential postulate of the doctrine of annihilation; but the converse is, of course, not true. The doctrine of annihilation is not the necessary corollary of the hypothetical psychology. But what is the asserted teaching of the second chapter of Genesis concerning the constitution of man? In his book on Eschatology, Hebrew, Jewish, and Christian, Professor Charles of Trinity College, Dublin, says:

The "later view, which practically denies knowledge and life to the inhabitants of Sheol, follows logically from the account in Gen. ii. 4—iii, according to which the material form when animated by the spirit became a living soul. . . . The soul is the result of the indwelling of the spirit in the material body, and has no independent existence of its own. It is really a function of the material body when quickened by the spirit. . . . When the spirit is withdrawn, the vitality of the soul is destroyed, and it becomes a dead soul (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה), or corpse (Num.

The worship of ancestors, if it existed in Israel, would reveal such faith. But proof of this practice among the Hebrews, even sporadically, either as a relic of past heathenism or as a recent importation from contemporary paganism, is entirely wanting. Schwally, it is true, after an exhaustive investigation concludes that ancestor-worship did have vogue among the Israelites, but he admits that conclusive evidence is lacking (Zandstra, *Princeton Theological Review*, April, 1907, p. 282). The popular belief in the continued conscious existence of the soul after death man-vi. 6; Lev. xxi. 11). . . . The annihilation of the soul ensues inevitably at death, that is, when the spirit is withdrawn." Pp. 41-43.

By way of general comment, it is proper to remark first, that Professor Charles identifies "the breath of life" in Gen. ii. 7 (J) with "the spirit of life" in Gen. vi. 17; vii. 15, passages attributed to P, and in vii. 22, where the asserted "conflation" involves the admission that "spirit" comes from P or some other source foreign to J. Yet surely when J's doctrine is under discussion, the investigation should be rigidly restricted to the document assigned to him. The introduction of P is legitimate for purposes of comparison only, not as an essential part of the argument. Second, Professor Charles understands, and expressly states, that the teaching of the writer who penned Gen. ii. 7 clearly involves the doctrine of trichotomy; but if so, this ancient Hebrew conceived of the spirit, and not of the soul, as the animating principle, and in this respect he differs from the current modern trichotomistic exposition of the Scriptures. Third, biblical writers do not make the sharp distinction between soul and spirit which J observes according to Professor Charles' interpretation of him. In general what the teachers of Israel predicate of the soul, they predicate of the spirit also. But notwithstanding these strictures, it may be well to assume the correctness of Professor Charles' exposition of the psychology that underlies Gen. ii. 7, and to devote inquiry merely to ascertaining, first, whether the Hebrew writer entertained the views regarding the nature and fate of the spirit which Professor Charles holds to be involved in this account of man's origin; and second, whether these opinions were actually confessed by a biblical writer of later date, as Professor Charles asserts.

And, first, the nature and fate of man's spirit. "Since 'the breath of life' (J), or 'the spirit of life' (P), is common to man and the rest of the animal creation (Gen. vi. 17; vii. 15, both P), the spirit of life conceived of as thus existing in all living things is life in an impersonal sense. The spirit, therefore, in man can never in this sense be the bearer of the personality."

This argument for the impersonality of the spirit has no validity. For  
1. The soul also is common to man and the rest of the animal crea-



ifests itself, however, in another heathenish custom. The attempt was made to consult familiar spirits. During the entire period of Hebrew national history professional necromancers kept appearing in Israel, who pretended to exorcise the dead and obtain revelations from the spirits of the departed. The people were warned against them by Moses; but they were plying their nefarious trade in Saul's day, they were in great request in Isaiah's time (Is. viii. 19), and they were still making profit of credulity in the reign of Josiah (2 Ki. xxiii. 24). The prophets strenuously opposed

tion, according to the document J (Gen. ii. 7, 19); and hence, by parity of reasoning, the soul should be impersonal. But it is not. In man it has all the elements of personality, as Professor Charles rightly insists. According to J the soul has life (Gen. xii. 13; xix. 19; xxxvii. 21), and feelings (Gen. xxxiv. 3; xlv. 30; Judg. xviii. 25); and it represents the *ego* (Gen. xxvii. 4, 25; xlix. 6). In beasts it was doubtless considered to be, as in man, a center of life and feeling.

2. Moreover, contrary to the hypothesis of Professor Charles, according to J the spirit is itself a bearer of the personality. The human spirit is referred to perhaps three times only in passages that may be assigned to the school of J; yet from one of these it appears that disposition and character were attributed to the spirit (Num. xiv. 24, see Charles' citation on p. 46). In this respect J's statement agrees with the references to the matter which are found elsewhere in the Scriptures. The spirit feels emotions, according to E (Gen. xli. 8; Judg. viii. 3, cited by Charles on p. 45); and according to P it suffers emotions and possesses intelligence (Gen. xxvi. 33; Ex. vi. 9; xxviii. 3; xxxv. 21; Num. v. 14).

3. It is natural to understand J to mean that the person, the *ego*, goes down to sheol, the abode of the departed (Gen. xxxvii. 35).

The conclusion, therefore, seems to be warranted that in the conception of the school of J the spirit, which according to Professor Charles was thought of as existing in man "a thing apart by itself," could bear personality, and bore it even when separated from the body at death.

Second, the views of that later biblical writer to whom Professor Charles ascribes belief in the impersonality of the spirit.

"This dissolution of the personality at death is frankly recognized in Eccl. xii. 7, and the impersonal breath of life returns to the Supreme Fount of Life: 'the spirit shall return to God, who gave it' . . . And thus all personal existence ceases at death", pp. 43, 44.

The writer of Ecc. xii. 7 does not, however, speak of God as "the Fount of Life"; and there is no allusion in the divine title which he employs to suggest that the spirit returns like a drop of water to a reservoir, to lose its identity in the great body of water. The verse is

necromancy, but not the belief in the continued conscious existence of the soul in sheol. And of this belief there is evidence in the writings of the accredited teachers of Israel. It does not appear as formulated doctrine, for that was unnecessary, but in allusions to the accepted faith. Yet although there was known to be a continuance of conscious existence after death, the future life had no attractions. For some, indeed, this state, so different from that on earth, held out the only hope of relief; for "there the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest". But to most men it loomed up cheerless, dreary, forbidding, the end of pomp and power, the end of opportunity and achievement, the end of all service for one's family, for the nation, for the kingdom of God. It was a cessation of activity; a sleep, as it were; "the night when no man can work".

The place of the departed spirits was thought to lie beneath the earth. This location was not doctrinally assigned to sheol; it was not a tenet of religion, and no teaching was based upon it. It was due to a naive conception of the universe, and apparently undisputed. The uniform term employed to describe the going to sheol is "go down or

couched in the words of plain, unfigurative speech; and the idea of absorption, if sought in this verse, must be imported from the figurative language of the preceding verse. But there is no necessity for so interpreting the words. The spirit of man can dwell in the presence of God without absorption into the divine Spirit. Compare Luke xxiii. 46, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit".

And Professor Charles should quote the entire conception of the spirit as entertained by the Preacher. To him the spirit is more than Professor Charles' impersonal existence, which cannot be the bearer of personality, for it is distinctly a bearer of the emotions. Patience or hastiness, pride or anger, may belong to it, as in vii. 8, 9. It may experience displeasure, according to x. 4.

What becomes of the spirit after its departure from the body? Certain statements in the book about the conditions which prevail in sheol have sometimes startled the readers (ix. 5, 10). They must not be exaggerated. Beware of ascribing absolute universality to the Hebrew negative. Beware of excluding from the Preacher's words the belief of his age that the dead in sheol possess a certain degree of consciousness. Beware of ignoring the Preacher's own allusions to the human spirit as the seat of the emotions.

descend". When great contrasts are sought, heaven above is set over against, not the earth, but sheol beneath. The prophet Amos places the earth between sheol and heaven (ix. 2). There is no escape for the wicked from God, he declares. "Though they dig into sheol, thence shall my hand take them; and though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down". Ezekiel, using trees as symbols, says: "The trees of Eden . . . were comforted in the nether parts of the earth. They also went down into sheol" (xxx. 17). As a sign that Korah and his crew were rebels against divinely constituted authority, Moses said: "If the Lord make a new thing — something unprecedented — and the ground open her mouth and swallow them up, and they go down alive into sheol, then ye shall understand that these men have despised the Lord. . . . So they went down alive into sheol, and the earth closed upon them" (Num. xvi. 30, 33). Thought of either as a region or as a pit, sheol has boundaries, outermost and inmost parts, and depths (Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 13; Prov. ix. 18; Is. xiv. 15; Ezek. xxxii. 23). When it is said that the enemies of God and his kingdom are thrust into the deepest depths or inmost parts of sheol, the meaning is that they are imprisoned there beyond the hope of escape.

Into this nether world all men without distinction, righteous and wicked, go down at death. Pharaoh was "cast down to sheol with them that descend into the pit" (Ezek. xxxi. 16). The young Joseph, the good king Hezekiah in the noontide of his days, and the aged Jacob, might descend into sheol. The wicked go down to sheol (Job xxi. 13, comp. 7; xxiv. 9, comp. Ps. xxxi. 17; ix. 17; lxiii. 9). Their beauty is for sheol to consume (Ps. xlix. 14). Such a sheol needs illumination.

#### THE GOD OF ABRAHAM, THE GOD OF ISAAC, AND THE GOD OF JACOB.

It was the common belief of men in the age in which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived that the life of man con-

tinues beyond the grave. It was also an accepted truism in those days that the place of departed souls is under divine government. Deity is there, and in full control. According to the Scriptures Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob acknowledged the existence of one God only; and therefore, without question, they thought of Him as their Lord both for this life and for that which is to come. They could have said with the later psalmist: "Though I make my bed in sheol, thou art there".

The same belief was shared by Moses, and the same conclusion was involved. This particular aspect of the truth was not, however, most prominently before his mind when at the bush God appeared to him and announced Himself as the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob (Ex. iii. 6; Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37). Precious though this title was when viewed in relation to the future life, it was of cardinal interest just then in its bearing on the sore distress of the descendants of Abraham in Egypt. It reminded them of the everlasting covenant, of the promise of redemption, of intimate fellowship with God, and of an almighty friend.

The truths of continued conscious existence in sheol and the authority of God there were truths of God; and it was He who chose for Himself the title "God of Abraham". To God there lay in His own chosen designation the fact that He was the God of the patriarchs both for this life and for that which is to come.

#### THE JURISDICTION OF JEHOVAH OVER SHEOL.

There is but one God; He is everywhere, and is everlasting. Monotheism and the doctrines of the omnipresence and eternity of God at once introduced the thought of Jehovah's presence and authority into any conception that man forms of the place of departed spirits. It is not strange, therefore, that in Israel the openness of sheol to the gaze of Jehovah early became proverbial (Prov. xv. 11, a section of the book expressly ascribed to Solomon; Job xxvi. 6), nor that poet

and prophet taught that God is present there (Ps. cxxxix. 8) and that His power there is irresistible (Amos ix. 2). And lo! so far as known, it is theology alone that has brought these truths concerning the other world to the apprehension of men. The doctrine concerning God illumined the darkness of the grave with a ray of blessed light. For the believer in Jehovah its gloom had already begun to pass away. And further, as will be observed on noting the last citation at least, the dawn had risen centuries before the exile.

#### FELLOWSHIP WITH GOD BEYOND THE GRAVE.

In three psalms particularly a great hope finds expression. In the Davidic Psalter, Ps. xvi. 10:

Thou wilt not abandon my soul to sheol,  
Neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one[s] to see the pit.

In the hymnary of the Sons of Korah, Ps. xlix. 15:

But God will redeem my soul  
From the power of sheol, for he will take me.

And among the Songs of Asaph, in Ps. lxxiii. 24:

Thou wilt guide me with thy counsel,  
And afterward take me to glory.

In the 16th Psalm the expression "abandon to" is peculiarly strong, as is shown by every passage where it occurs.<sup>3</sup> In the 49th Psalm the order of words in the second clause, and the gender and historical expressiveness of the verb "he will take me" (Gen. v. 24), naturally yield for the meaning a reference to the future life.<sup>4</sup> In its tone the

<sup>3</sup> "Thou shalt leave them (the vineyard and its fruit) for (to) the poor;" hand the gleanings over to the poor, for them to take and use at will (Lev. xix. 10). It was commonly supposed that the ostrich, having laid her eggs on the ground, abandons them; "leaveth her eggs on (to) the earth, and warmeth them in the dust" (Job xxxix. 14). Men "perish and leave their wealth to others" (Ps. xlix. 11 [10]). In view of these passages the words "abandon my soul to sheol" appear to be equivalent to saying "have nothing further to do with it, hand it over to sheol to be used by sheol at will".

<sup>4</sup> The phrase of two rhythmical beats, "from the power of sheol," belongs rhythmically to the second member of the verse, while it limits



psalm is distinctively the voice of a preacher. Wisdom is crying aloud in the streets, a prophet is instructing the peoples on "the folly of trusting in riches" (vs. 1-4; comp. Mic. i. 2; Num. xxiii. 18; Prov. i. 20). In the 73d Psalm, whether the first word of the second member be regarded as an adverb, according to the accentuation, or be construed as a preposition governing "glory",<sup>5</sup> the reference is to the future life, especially in view of the verb "thou wilt take me".

Certain expositors, particularly Graetz, Wellhausen, and latterly Cheyne (Book of Psalms), construe Psalm 49 harshly or ignore its text, and alter the text of Psalm 73, although it is not in any wise suspicious from the standpoint of textual criticism.<sup>6</sup> Among biblical scholars who interpret the text as it is, whether they regard the verses under consideration as original or interpolated, a reference in some one or in all these passages cited from the Psalms at least to the future life with God is discerned, for example, by Hupfeld, Alexander, Delitzsch, Klostermann, Oehler, Dillmann, Schultz, Cheyne (Origin of the Psalter), Baethgen, Duhm, Briggs. And these exegetes, as will be noticed, are representative men of the three schools of higher criticism.

How early did it fall within the range of Hebrew thought the meaning of the first member. The same phenomenon appears elsewhere, as Ps. l. 4; xcvi. 8, 9; Lam. v. 6.

<sup>5</sup> So Hitzig, Ewald, Hengstenberg, Schultz, neglecting the accents. Comp. "after glory" (Zech. ii. 12 [Eng. 8]), and "before glory" (Prov. xv. 33). The verse may then perhaps be best interpreted in this wise, "By thy counsel thou wilt guide me to glory." i. e. to good success and the esteem of men (Josh. i. 8; Prov. iv. 8) in contrast to his present shame and suffering (vs. 14, 20), "and after having attained honor thou wilt take me". The word rendered "glory" often denotes honor as opposed to contempt, esteem (1 Sam. ix. 6; 2 Sam. vi. 20); that respect from men and true success in life which result from humbly heeding instruction and walking in the fear of the Lord (Prov. xiii. 18; xv. 33; xviii. 12). Humble submission to God's guidance comes before honor, and after honor comes reception into God's presence.

<sup>6</sup> The text is attested by LXX (translated by *meta* with the genitive, as in Ex. xxiii. 2), Symmachus, Jerome, Targum, Syriac.

confidently to expect fellowship with God in the future world? Could the hope of a blessed communion with God after death have been attained by any of his children before the exile; as early, for example, as the eighth century before Christ? The Israelites believed, and had believed from time immemorial, in the continuance of personal existence after death, and their teachers were publishing the doctrine of Jehovah's presence and power in sheol. The world of departed souls lies within his dominion. His eye is still upon its inhabitants, his power reaches unto them. At death his people do not remove from his knowledge and his might. From this truth, which has its foundations laid firmly and securely in monotheism, it was but a short step to the further truth that death does not deprive his people of communion with him. Being a spiritual function, it is quite as possible in the world to come as in this life.

Not only was the truth of continued fellowship with God beyond the grave within their easy grasp, but the stimulus to lay hold on it was present. To every one who prized fellowship with God above earthly treasure, and had more joy in it than others have when their corn and wine are increased; to him who could sing the song of Habakkuk (iii. 18), and to those who could say: "One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in his temple", who "had rather be a door-keeper in the courts of the Lord than to dwell in the tents of wickedness"; to those to whom fellowship with God had become a passion of the soul;—for such yearners after God, possessors of such a theology, it was natural both to see and to seize the truth of continued blessed fellowship with God in the world to come.

If more stimulus was needed, it was furnished by the hard pressure of long and grievous suffering and reproach entailed by fidelity to God, or by enforced thought upon the moral problem presented by the life-long suffering of the righteous, and the frequent exemption of the wicked

from trouble and their uninterrupted and unexampled prosperity. It only required these things to thrust the hope of fellowship with God in the future life into the forefront.

And these psalmists found themselves in such circumstances. In the 16th Psalm the solace of communion with God is mentioned side by side with confidence of deliverance from the domination of sheol. In the 49th and 73d psalms the singer is driven by the thought of his own hardships and troubles in contrast with the unbroken prosperity and the pomp of the wicked to find the solution for the moral problem that vexes and perplexes his soul in the hope that is held out to the righteous of companionship with God. "God will take me." The problem has been argued and the solution found. God will take the righteous. The godly man has herein his compensation for the earthly loss and reproach caused by his fidelity to God. Theology and experience made it possible for the people of God even in the centuries before the exile to grasp the hope of their continued fellowship with God in the future life; and the intellectual and spiritual impulse to do so was there.

The Hebrews might well be independent of the thought of the world in the development of this doctrine, for they had all the elements of it in their own noble theology, and the impelling forces thereto emerged in their individual and national experiences. It is, however, interesting to observe that the apprehension of this truth was due in the period before the exile, when viewed in the light of contemporary gentile thought. The race to which Abraham belonged were telling in story the translation of the hero of the flood to dwell with the gods, and the Egyptians were teaching that the reward of righteous living on earth is life with the gods hereafter, engaged in their service, with renewed faculties and bodily powers.

#### THE VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTEOUS AFTER DEATH.

In Job xix. 25-27 there may perhaps be a reference to the resurrection of the body; but that question of exegesis

does not demand attention now. Common to the divergent translations represented in the text and on the margin of the revised version is the assurance: "I know that my Redeemer liveth; and that he will at last (or as the last and final participant) arise to vindicate me: and after my death and the decomposition of my skin I shall see God."

The doctrine of the moral government of God, which was a part of Israel's creed centuries before the exile (Gen. vi. 5; xviii. 25), underlies this triumphant declaration of Job. A perversion of this doctrine formed the premise in the exhaustive argument that was carried on between Job and his friends. They based their entire reasoning on the assumption that all human suffering is a punishment for personal sin. Job's friends insisted that his grievous afflictions were clear proof of guilt. He protested his innocence; but he could not answer the argument, for his premise was at first the same as theirs. Still he knew that their accusation was untrue. He was conscious of his integrity; and he could at length only declare that, although God was thrusting him down to the grave (xiii. 15, 16; xvii. 1; xix. 6), yet he was innocent of crime (xvi. 16, 17); and his innocence was known to God (xvi. 19-21), and would eventually be made manifest by the Lord and he himself would know of his vindication (xix. 25-27).

Job's faith, though it was not formulated in his words, was contained in all its essentials in the Egyptian teaching that at death the soul of man passed into the presence of the forty-two gods and the heart of the deceased was weighed before them in the scales over against righteousness. The earthly life was brought into judgment and its morality determined. The result of the inquiry was the condemnation of the guilty and the justification of the righteous. It was practically a vindication of the righteous after death. Job's discovery of the truth, in whatever age of the world he lived, was not in advance of contemporary thought. But whether it was suggested by Egyptian teaching or not, it had its own doctrinal foundation; it rested definitely on the

truth that God is just, and it was wrought out of that truth under the stress of suffering while conscious of innocence.

#### THE RESURRECTION OF THE RIGHTEOUS.

"Thy dead [O Jehovah] shall live", exclaims the remnant of Israel, "my dead bodies shall arise; . . . for thy dew shall be as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast forth the dead" (Is. xxvi. 19).

These words of the godly remnant of Israel have been understood (1) Figuratively: God will raise his people from the dust of degradation and oppression, and restore them from exile as from a grave, where they had long seemed dead (Alexander, Reuss, Delitzsch). (2) Literally; and this either as a hope or prayer (Gesenius, Ewald, Oehler, Dillmann, Driver) or as an assurance (Delitzsch, Cheyne) that God will call the dead members of the nation to life again, to increase the population of the kingdom and share in its duties and privileges.

The literal interpretation yields a doctrine of the resurrection of the righteous. Such a doctrine, whether expressed by the prophet in this passage or not, was not inopportune as early as the eighth century before Christ. For the resurrection is thought of by the prophet as effected by the creative power of God, comparable to the influence of the reviving dew, and thus the conception is akin to the faith of Abraham, recorded in Gen. xxii. 5, that though he obeyed the divine command to offer up Isaac as a burnt offering, yet God would enable him to return with the lad. At the end of the eighth century the Israelites could also point to the history of Elijah and Elisha and tell of the dead brought to life again, of corpses reanimated. Furthermore, the Semites did not hesitate to speak of release from sheol. To be sure, it was sometimes a myth, in which the processes of nature were described under the guise of persons; but even so it was talk of the potent influence of the gods to secure deliverance from sheol, and it kept the thought suggestively before the minds of men. So, too,



was the possibility of a return dreamt of when men spoke of the water of life that was kept in sheol, and which, sprinkled upon the deceased, enabled them to go back to the land of the living. And the thought of the possible return of the dead, and of divine power as the effective means, found clear expression when the goddess of the nether world is made in the story to threaten to bring the dead from the grave. The prophet does not go beyond this thought when, strong in his faith in Jehovah's omnipotence, his jurisdiction over sheol, his loving kindness to his people, and his ultimate vindication of their cause, he declares: "Thy dead, O Jehovah, shall live; my dead bodies shall arise."

#### THE DOOM OF THE UNGODLY.

"And they shall go forth, and look upon the dead bodies of the men that have transgressed against me: for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh."

This scene, described in Is. lxvi. 24, is not located in the underworld, but in the environs of Jerusalem in the new world of the future (vs. 6, 20; comp. "worship before me", vs. 23). The corpses of the enemies of Jehovah are lying unburied round about Jerusalem, being continually eaten by worms and burning forever in the fires of the scavengers; an enduring and terrible spectacle to the godly, which bears witness day and night that the wicked have been completely overthrown and that their destruction is everlasting. The prophet speaks of eternal doom. He says nothing of torment; and that he had penal pains in mind cannot be affirmed. He exhibits pictorially the complete triumph of the cause of truth and holiness and the eternal overthrow of its foes; and he also sets forth by his picture that these things are not hidden from the inhabitants of Zion, but come under their observation. It is a grand, though ghastly, picture; and the portrayal retains its aptness to delineate the doom of the ungodly even after the particulars of their punishment become apprehended.

## GLOOMY THOUGHTS OF SHEOL.

There is no evidence of a retrogression of doctrine after these advances. The creed was standard. It bore the stamp of prophetic authority and was imbedded in irrefutable logic. But the creed did not dispel the gloom of sheol from the mind of every man. It was not the creed, however, that was at fault; the hindrance lay in the man. For the wicked the future world still had its terrors. They knew that they would still be under the searching gaze of God, that his eye would be fixed upon their guilt, and that his power would reach to them. The stories of the Semites might, perhaps, also cause them anxiety, which told of a prison in sheol and disease and degradation for those who offended the ruler of the place. They had, too, the moral teaching of the Egyptians that character in this life determines destiny in the world to come. It would not be surprising were the voice of despair heard in Israel when the conscience was ill at ease.

But the wicked were not alone in failing to derive comfort from Israel's doctrine of the future life. There were skeptics in Israel, and in some of the literature it is intended to let the voice of skepticism be heard. Then there were godly men who were spiritually dull. Their experience in life had not forced them to throw themselves for succor on God alone, had not compelled them to find their solace in the truths of religion, had not brought the unseen world into the foreground of their hopes. Their need to obtain strength for the present from the truth concerning the future world was not pressing, and consequently their thought had not been directed to the world to come and their view of it was not clear. And there were men of keen spiritual vision who yet felt dismay at the approach of death. There is here no denial of the ultimate bliss that awaits the people of God. But the gloom of sheol was still lying like a pall over the hearts of men, with its check upon human activity and its blasting of earthly hopes. The pious Israelite might have believed that he would be with God and

be the recipient of divine loving-kindness in the future life, and yet have dreaded sheol. Does the true Christian man of to-day amidst the full light of the gospel, when like Hezekiah he is brought to the verge of the grave in the noontide of his days, with a family dependent upon him, with grave national affairs resting upon his shoulders, or the determination of the religious life of his people for years to come in his hands, never think of the inability of men in sheol? Do Christians never earnestly plead with God for a further lease of life and opportunity to labor? We know that they do. The saints of the Old Testament often mean just what Christ meant when he said: "The night cometh when no man can work."

These different classes of men, and these various causes for dismay at the approach of death, must be duly considered in connection with every utterance concerning the future world, else the would-be interpreter will surely go astray; and also the period in the creedal history of Israel when the cry of despair arose. The expositor and the critic must discriminate. Does the cry come from the time before these higher stages of teaching had been reached by psalmists and prophets? In point of fact, the cry may be a mark of the early date of the literature in which it is heard. Does the complaint proceed from the wicked, or from a skeptic, or from a man of little knowledge of doctrine, or from one whose work in the world is of great moment and is yet undone? For the apprehension of all the truths regarding sheol which have been mentioned there was adequate opportunity in the period of Israel's creedal growth before the advent of the Persians. Notwithstanding the creed, there was faltering faith on the part of some and a reluctance to die. But this is explicable.

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### AUTONOMY IN ETHICS.

Objection is frequently raised on philosophical grounds, to the idea of a specifically Christian ethics. As an eminent professor once put it: "I do not recognize a distinction between Christian ethics and philosophical ethics. There can in the nature of things be only one true science of ethics. I teach, I hope, in my class-room Christian ethics. At all events Christianity has no claim to set up a system of ethics of its own, outside of and distinct from philosophical ethics."

The question here raised is only a branch of a wider question, viz.: Can there be a satisfactory treatment of ethics which bases on reason only and separates morality from religion?

Philosophy not infrequently, indeed commonly, has attempted to set up an autonomous ethical system based on reason, which dispenses with religion, and, of course, with aid from the Christian religion, altogether. As Martensen says: "While religion without morality cannot in our day count upon many advocates, morality without religion finds no lack of such."<sup>1</sup> This lays the foundation for a broad distinction between philosophical ethics and Christian ethics which may be stated at the outset.

The first and all important element in this distinction is connected with the relation of the moral subject to God. It is the reference to God which, first of all, differentiates philosophical ethics—the ethics of the moral philosophy class-room—from the ethics of religion in their respective judgments upon conduct. Moral science like religion works with the ideas of law and duty, of right and wrong; but its standard is the law of reason or conscience, and, so far as it keeps within its sphere as philosophy it does not go outside

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Ethics*, p. 15. The same writer observes that history everywhere corroborates the assertion that abstract autonomic morality only appears at those seasons when there is also religious decay (p. 17).

of that law. Kant, *e. g.*, finds in humanity what he calls a morally legislating reason. Reason on its practical side as distinct from its theoretical activity prescribes laws to conduct which carry with them their own authority. The categorical imperative of the practical reason is the final word on the question of duty. Reason, on this view of Kant's, legislates within the soul by its own right. The human mind gives law to itself. The will of God has nothing to do with it. To act from any other motive than that of simple reverence for the law as revealed in reason would be to introduce a foreign or heterogeneous element which would vitiate the purity of the moral act.

But just here is the broad distinction from the ethics of religion. What philosophical ethics does not do, or refuses to do, is to bring deeds into the light of God's judgment or regard them, if evil, as offenses against Him.

Religion, on the other hand, has its starting point in the thought of God. It views the world and man as part of it in the relation of dependence on God; it contemplates everything in that light. The effect on the ethical side is obvious. Moral science grounds ethics in the law of reason; religion on the other hand views moral law itself as emanating from God, and having its ground in His essential Being. It brings conduct, and behind conduct the state of the heart into the light of the divine holiness. It judges of the quality of the wrong deed by its contrariety to the divine purity, and its enormity as disobedience to the divine will. Every term in the ethical vocabulary now assumes a new meaning. Duty is no longer obedience to an abstract law, but is obedience to God whose moral will the law expresses. Obligation and responsibility become obligation to do God's will and accountability to Him. Sin is not simply violation of moral law but violation of duty towards God, offence against Him. "Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned." (Ps. li. 4.) We cannot indeed properly speak of sin except in the sphere of religion; and only that religion can yield an adequate idea of sin which, like the Christian, is based



on a right conception of God as the All-holy and the All-good. There is one word of which philosophical ethics does not know the meaning—the word holiness. Religion gives that word its significance by interpreting it to mean ethical purity like to God's.

With this first distinction between philosophical and Christian ethics there necessarily go others. For instance philosophical ethics does not in the nature of the case reach beyond the duties which man owes to himself and to his fellow-men. The ethics of religion on the other hand discloses a new set of duties, those which man owes to God. Take up any text-book on ordinary ethics: you find the sphere of duties divided into duties to self and duties to one another. God being left out of account, there is no special class of duties which relate directly to God. Duty is completed when we have discharged our obligations in the two above-named directions. But religion, starting from the standpoint of dependence upon God, goes far beyond this. If we stand in relations with our fellow-men, far more fundamentally do we stand in relation to God, and owe to Him our love, trust and obedience. Nay, our duties to our fellow-men will not, from the religious point of view be rightly discharged unless this higher duty to God is fulfilled. To love God with all our heart and soul and strength and mind—this, Jesus says, is the first and great commandment; and the second is like unto it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," (Matt. xxii. 39.). In brief, philosophical ethics takes no account of such duties as love to God, reverence to God, worship of God, prayer, while this relation to God is the vital breath of Christian ethics. What would the ethics of Jesus be, if cut off from the life He lived in the Father?

To note only one other distinction between the ethics of the schools and Christian ethics; the former treats human nature in light of its essential constitution, not of its actual condition; it treats man as if he were in a normal state; regards him as a being constituted for the practice of virtue

and able to realize his destiny in the exercise of his freedom. But the fundamental proposition of the Christian religion is that man is not in this normal state. He is a being in the state of sin. He has broken with his dependence upon God. His nature is in a wrong moral condition, and cannot be put right save by a supernatural work of God's Spirit. There is need of renewal, or regeneration. Here, then, is a further profound distinction between philosophical and Christian ethics. Who ever hears a philosophical teacher in his classroom hinting at the need of regeneration? But Christian ethics is meaningless without that supernatural presupposition.

With these fundamental distinctions before us between philosophical ethics and the ethics of religion we are now in a position to deal more intelligently with the question of the *possibility* of an autonomous morality, and of the *blessedness* of such, assuming it to be in any degree possible. The attempt as already said has often been made to lay down the lines of an autonomous morality—the whole history of philosophy, nearly, is an illustration of that attempt. It is seen in its various forms in Socrates, with his grounding of morality in right knowledge, in Aristotle, in the later Stoical and Epicurean schools; and the whole course of modern ethical philosophy, with slight exceptions, is governed by the same attempt. We need not do more than refer to the various forms of the intellectual, sentimental, utilitarian, evolutionary, and idealistic schools. The view here taken is that an adequate ground for morality being discovered in man's own nature, there is no need for going higher or deeper, and religion may be dispensed with as something superfluous to a true morality, if indeed not a hindrance to the realization of the highest form of it. At first sight also there seems a good deal of plausibility in this view, and various reasons may be alleged in support of it. For—

1. It is admitted by all schools and specially in the higher schools, that the ideas of duty and obligation in man have

a relative independence of religion. They have their ground in the constitution of human nature itself and are as inseparable from man as reason itself. This is sometimes expressed by speaking of the indestructibility of conscience. A man may continue to possess these ideas even though he lose his faith in, or deny God Himself. We speak sometimes of a moral proof of God's existence. This is a proof drawn from the consciousness of moral law within ourselves. But the very foundation of such a proof is our consciousness of this moral law, which therefore antecedes the idea of God we derive from it. Why then, it may be urged, if such a substratum of moral knowledge exists in human nature, should it not be the basis of a morality which is independent of relation to God?

2. It will be granted that even if we think of moral laws as deriving their sanction from divine command, it is still not God's will which makes an act right or wrong, but rather the rightness or wrongness of the act which causes God to will it. This brings us back to the old scholastic question—Is a thing right because God wills it? Or does God will it because it is right? Most will be agreed that the latter is the correct view. This also is the Bible standpoint. "The righteous Lord loveth righteousness" (Ps. xi. 7). Righteousness is here regarded as something that has a being of its own: which is not made by God, but is loved by Him. What then is the foundation of this right which is recognized but not created by God? And may philosophy not say, If reason can get at that foundation, will it not afford an adequate basis for morality, without taking account of the will of God?

3. Yet another fact may be pointed to, viz: that the moral idea within certain limits, does exist as a natural possession of men apart from religion. We see this both in the Greek and in the modern philosophies. We see it also in the case of many who have high ethical ideals—who are upright, truthful, affectionate, loyal, patriotic, in whom there is a high sense of honor—but whom we cannot

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call religious. It is indeed possible to say of many such persons that they live in a Christian environment, have received an early Christian training, are unconsciously moulded by Christian ideas and influences, and in any case are controlled and restrained by the customs and opinions of a Christian society. This is true, but, if we turn to religions outside the Bible, we find very remarkable developments of the same thing. This is what the study of ethnic religions is constantly teaching us. In early Egypt for example, we have the Precepts of Ptah-hotep and the Negative Confession of the Book of the Dead. In Zoroastrianism we have the ideas of the conflict of a good and evil principle, and of a final victory for the good. In Confucian ethics we have many excellent moral precepts. So in Buddhism with its remarkably high ethical code, and yet in this system there is no God. Here then is a testimony beyond dispute to the reality of morality, and its ground in human nature; but may it not be argued that it shows also the possibility of an autonomous morality—a morality independent of religion. May not an Ethical Society suffice instead of a Church?

All this which has been advanced is in itself true and may be granted unreservedly. But the matter may be looked at from another point of view, and then it may come to be perceived that this conception of an autonomous morality is, when closely regarded, manifoldly defective and inadequate, needs imperatively to be vitalized from a higher source, and only when taken up into a higher relation, that of religion, obtains the power needed to sustain it, to give it the breadth adequate to man's need and to make it a living reality in human hearts. This may be briefly illustrated in light of what was formerly advanced on the relations of religion and morality.

1. Such a view of morality as is now indicated is defective because it goes on the assumption—a false one to begin with—that man's nature is something rounded off and complete in itself: that man is a self-sufficing, self-de-

pendent being, and can wisely, or successfully live his life on a basis of self-sufficiency. But against this view of human nature every consideration of reason and religion cries aloud. Man has only to be studied as he appears in history to show that he is not a self-sufficing being. He is a being who in the deepest ground of his consciousness feels himself to be dependent on a higher power or powers. On this consciousness of man's dependence on a higher power, all religion rests. The question then arises—What is the nature of this power on which man feels himself dependent? Here theism—not to speak of the Christian revelation—comes in with its assertion that this power is the Living, Personal God. Of course the grounds of this theistic interpretation of the Universe may be challenged; but at least it is evident that for him who accepts this theistic position, the problem of ethics must undergo a complete transformation. It is not open any longer to treat man, or for man to treat himself, as if he had no relation of dependence on God, as if he were sufficient for himself. That relation of dependence must now be devoutly acknowledged. More still, a certain attitude of soul is now a duty of the being towards God. The God on whom he depends ought plainly to be the center of his life, the object of his reverence, trust, love and worship. The powers derived from God must now be used as given for God's ends and not for man's own, are to be used, as we say, for God's glory. Morality in the nature of the case has already become merged in religion.

2. There is another and yet deeper consideration in which philosophy comes to our aid. The old Stoics already took a great step in rising from reason in man to the thought of a universal world-reason, and the best philosophy of our own time agrees with this in recognizing that reason in man both on its theoretical and practical sides is only construable on the assumption of a rational basis of the universe as a whole. This means that the ethical ideal in man with its unconditional claim on man's obedience, rests ultimately on



the fact of an ethical power at the basis of the universe. One starts no doubt from the ethical ideal in conscience, but the ethical ideal in conscience is not its own explanation. It drives us back as before on the power on which our whole being depends, and is itself one of the surest grounds of our assurance, that this power is Personal, and ethically good. An impersonal reason may as an abstraction be thought of, but an impersonal ethical power is a contradiction in terms. Ethical quality is an attribute only of personality. Combined with the theism formerly reached, we have now the idea of dependence on God as a Being, ethically good or holy. This still further transforms the conception of morality, and indissolubly binds it together with religion.

3. Suppose now it be replied, All this is transcendental metaphysic in which the educated mind has no interest; if we reject it and prefer to walk on our own feet as moral beings, what worse are we off? It might be replied (1), that if God exists it is hardly in one's option to decline to take up his due relation to Him, and great responsibility rests on the man who does this. But the further reply is, (2), that the result is not the same. Revert for a moment to the former assumption that there is a Personal Living God and that it is our duty to live in daily, hourly dependence on Him. The question is—Is it the same to a man's moral life whether he does this or not? That question has only to be asked to be answered. Take it first, generally. Is it possible to suppose a being like man living in true dependence on God without the result being new light to his mind, new power to his will, new support in temptation, new elevation of his feelings and purification of his affections. Or take it, next, on grounds of actual experience. Here everyone must speak for himself, but at least those who claim the higher blessing from religion, have the experience of all the ages—of psalmists, of prophets, of apostles, of saints in all ages and generations—to back them up in their assertion. The question in short returns to this, was man as created ever intended to be a self-sufficing unit, living for

himself, and to himself? Or was he intended to live his life in dependence on God, drawing daily his supplies of grace and strength from Him. According to the answer given to that question will one judge of the possibilities of a right human life apart from religion.

4. The subject need not be pursued much further, but the final remark may be made that the fatal weakness of every morality divorced from religion has shewn itself to lie in a lack of power. Individuals here and there may maintain a relatively high level of thought and inspiration, but even they will confess how little inward power they are conscious of possessing; and the ideals they cherish have no power over the masses of mankind. A purely preceptive morality has always this weakness. Law alone could not save Israel even with faith in Jehovah behind it. Paul found that when he would do good, evil was present with him. (Rom. vii. 21.). In Chinese Confucianism, in Buddhism, in the ethics of ancient religions, it is the same. Only through the supernatural reinforcement furnished by religion and peculiarly by the religion of Jesus can the moral commandment be made a living reality. Only through His Spirit is the righteousness of the law fulfilled in those who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit. (Rom. viii. 4).

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## THE BEGINNINGS OF SAINT WORSHIP.

The point of view of the present student of the early Christian Church is quite different from that of fifty years ago. For one thing, he is more wary in accepting the statements of the fathers on church usages, having found that ingenious citation from their writings may be made to prove the wildest theory. It is realized now that the church fathers, particularly in the early period, are rarely completely unprejudiced in their allusions to Christian belief and practice, and that they are frequently contradictory in their statements. The dictionaries of Christian antiquities, once of the type of Bingham's *Origines* (which is still represented by Smith) and based on the evidence afforded by patristic literature, must now conform to the high standard set by that latest product of Benedictine learning, Cabrol's *Dictionnaire de l'archéologie Chrétienne et de la liturgie*, whose profuse illustrations testify to the predominant part played by the archæologist in the composition of the articles. Christian archaeology has in fact lately come into its own, and the catacombs are nearly as often appealed to now, to prove a point in ecclesiastical origins, as Tertullian or Clement of Alexandria.

The reason for this is of course the immense extension which our knowledge of early Christian monuments has received in recent years. It is no reflection on the work of the great De Rossi to say that the thirteen years that have elapsed since the death of the author of *Roma Sotteranea* have more than quadrupled the monumental material which he collected in the course of his laborious life. For instance, although much has been written on early Christian painting, there were no accurate copies of the frescoes in the Roman catacombs until Mgr. Wilpert brought out the magnificent plates of his *Pitture delle Catacombe romane*

(Rome, 1903). Delattre, Monceaux and others have recently made us acquainted with the antiquities of the African church, and expeditions like that sent by Princeton to Syria have thrown a flood of light on early Christianity in the country where the Christian name was first spoken. The French School at Athens has promised a complete Corpus of Greek Christian Inscriptions, while we already have a special collection of the Christian inscriptions of Africa by Monceaux. The "*Acta Sanctorum*," a fruitful source of information about early Christianity which was long neglected because these Acts were supposed to be generally corrupt, have been put through a sifting process, chiefly by the Jesuit successors of Bollandus and the scholars of the French School in Rome. The result has been a vindication of some of the Lives of the Saints in their entirety, while a framework of fact can be traced in nearly every one. All this vast material is contained in the Bollandist edition of the *Acta Sanctorum*, now approaching completion, and is supplemented by volumes of scholarly commentary in the *Analecta Bollandiana*.

Historians of the early church, being now able to control the statements of the fathers by comparing them with the unequivocal expressions of Christian belief and practice contained in monuments like the catacomb paintings, sarcophagi and inscriptions, may generalize to some purpose. Two conclusions of far-reaching importance have been added to their data by the entrance of archaeology into the field. One was elicited by Le Blant from the sculptured reliefs of the sarcophagi of Southern Gaul, which prove that the ideas of the early Christian, so far as we can judge from the way in which they expressed them on their tombs, were formed by the every-day ritual of the church and do not always coincide with the doctrinal utterances of the fathers. The other conclusion may not be altogether new, but has only recently been completely demonstrated, and has reference to the different character which distinguishes the Christianity of the fourth from that of the

first three centuries. We find, for instance, that the spiritual symbolism which animated Christian art in the first three centuries and reduced it to a kind of pictorial alphabet with which to write a very limited number of conceptions—principally two, the fulfillment of the Old Testament by the New, and the future life—was replaced in the fourth century paintings and reliefs by didactic motifs and a preference for historical and dogmatic subjects. So too, the efforts of half a dozen students of architecture to show a continuity in the development of the basilica form of the Christian church have amounted to nothing, and, as no one has been able to find a real basilica which antedates Constantine, the old assumption that the form was first produced in his reign has now become practically a certainty. Such facts point to a thorough transformation of Christianity, at least in its outward manifestations, after the accession of Constantine, and should warn us against insisting too much on the modern principle of historical unity in tracing the development of the Christian church.

The effect on the church of the momentous events of Constantine's reign brings me to the subject of this paper, for I hope to show, by a brief review of the present archaeological evidence on the antiquity of saint-worship, that the essential features of the cult were all developed in the fourth century and are directly traceable to forces released by Constantine's recognition of Christianity.

The features of saint-worship may be said to be five in number: (1) the commemoration of the saint, or the celebration of his day, (2) the invocation of the saint for spiritual or material aid, (3) the representation of the saint in art as an object of worship, (4) the attribution to the saint of superhuman qualities such as ubiquity and power over nature, and (5) the worship of relics. The first, which is not an essential feature of saint-worship, is a custom as old as the persecutions; but while some traces of the invocation of saints may be detected in the third century, it can be demonstrated that the usage became fixed in the



fourth, and that the same period witnessed the addition of the other features, images, superhuman attributes, and relic worship.

The great body of Christian saints is made up of the martyrs who fell in the persecution of the first three centuries. It is obvious that the lives and heroic deaths of these early witnesses were the source of keenest interest and inspiration to the faithful. Thus, as early as the end of the first century, we are told by the *Liber Pontificalis* that Clement, Bishop of Rome, charged his notaries in each of the seven ecclesiastical regions of the city to collect the histories of the martyrs.<sup>1</sup> Duchesne doubts whether the *Liber Pontificalis* is correct in assigning such functions to these notaries, in view of other facts which seem to show that the *Gesta Martyrorum* were not looked after as carefully in Rome as elsewhere. But early collections of the "Acta" are well attested for Africa and to some extent in the East. The Christian community at Lyons in Gaul, which suffered terribly under Marcus Aurelius, wrote a letter to the churches of Asia and Phrygia, which Eusebius has preserved for us, in which they describe their trials and losses during the persecution.<sup>2</sup> Such letters were no doubt read in the course of the service, like the New Testament Epistles, and possibly received like them a place in the early liturgy. When Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, was cited for the first time before the proconsul during the persecution of Valerian in 257 A. D., he sent a letter describing his examination to the Christian confessors in the mines of Sigus in Numidia and we have the epistle which they wrote in reply thanking him for telling them "like a good and true master, how we, your disciples, should answer the governor".

The final trial and death of Cyprian are described in his "Acta", which are reckoned among the most authentic of the Lives of the Martyrs. There is in fact abundant evidence to prove that the account of his trial which is given in his

<sup>1</sup> *Liber Pontificalis*, ed. Duchesne 1, p. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *H. c. V. i.*

Acta was taken verbatim from the short-hand minutes of the court in which it took place. Much of this literature was destroyed when Diocletian ordered the burning of all Christian books, but enough remained to form the nucleus of the immense collection of the *Acta Sanctorum* which we have today.

The piety which preserved the record of the martyr's trial and death was also the motive in the commemoration of his "day". This day was always the day of his death, and its significance to the Christians is exhibited by the name they invariably gave to it, *dies natalis*, "birth-day", the day of release from earthly bondage and of re-birth into heavenly blessedness. The commemoration seems to have taken the form of a solemn banquet at the martyr's grave. This was no innovation on ancient custom, for the funeral feast held on the anniversary of the death of a friend or relative was a common observance in the later pagan world and is mentioned on epitaphs. Christians also held this feast in memory of their friends, as is shown by several frescoes found in the catacombs of Rome in which the actual banquet is represented.<sup>3</sup> But the sentiment which animated the Christian feast was diametrically opposed to that of the pagan. The pagans called the day of death *dies atra*, the "black day", and many epitaphs show that their attitude toward the power which robbed them of life was one of revolt. The most curious example is the famous "blaspheming epitaph" in the Vatican which bears upon it the carved imprint of two uplifted hands, with the inscription: "I lift my hands against the god who took me away, having done no wrong". The Christian feeling on the other hand is indicated by the term they gave to the day of death, *dies natalis*, but more especially by the importance which the day of the month on which the deceased passed away gradually assumes in their epitaphs. They begin in the third century to note the day of death, and in the fourth

<sup>3</sup> Wilpert, *Op. cit.*, Plates 62.2; 65.3; 167.

century this element is the distinguishing mark of the Christian epitaph as opposed to the pagan.

The martyr's "day" then was probably nothing more than an extension of the old funeral feast, and a doctrinal significance can scarcely be ascribed to such celebrations during the first three centuries. They were only expressions of love and reverence for those whom the faithful delighted to honor, whose memory was kept green for the sake of the support it afforded in the trying times of persecution. "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" says Tertullian, and the day that their blood was shed or, more often, the day of burial was the one naturally selected for commemoration, as well as that which ancient custom recommended. But the commemoration of martyrs is not the worship of saints.

The invocation of saints, which is the second feature of saint-worship to be considered, involves the belief in their intercession on behalf of the faithful on earth, and consequently in their immediate translation to heaven after death. It is true that the early fathers differ in their opinion as to the fate of the ordinary Christian, but fortunately for the strength of our premises, they all agree, from the first century on, that the martyrs were received into heaven immediately upon their departure from this life. Thus Clement of Rome asserts the assumption of Peter and Paul;<sup>4</sup> and Irenaeus, in the second century, says that "the church sends to the Father, in all places and at all times, a great number of martyrs".<sup>5</sup> In the writers of the third century we find that the martyrs are even described as the assessors of God. Origen (*Exhort. martyrii*, 27) tells us not only that "he who drinks the cup that Jesus drank (referring to martyrdom) shall sit upon the throne", but also that he "shall judge with the king of kings". Hippolytus, too,<sup>6</sup> says that "they are not judged but judge". With only these

<sup>4</sup> 1. *Ep.* ed. Funk p. 66

<sup>5</sup> *Adv. haeres.* IV. 33. 9.

<sup>6</sup> *In Danielelem*, 2, 37, ed. Bonnetsch 112, 23.

quotations to guide us, we might conclude that by the third century the martyrs were held to share the judgment seat with God and to decide the fate of departed souls. If this belief was prevalent, the martyrs at this time must have been objects of prayer and the doctrine of the intercession of the saints was full grown.

It has been proved, however, again and again, that the testimony of the fathers is not final with reference to the actual usages of the church in the first three centuries. In the third century particularly Christianity was on the defensive, attacked within by heresy and without by an aroused paganism, with the consequences that the fathers one and all were writing in the spirit of apologists and exhorters. We may therefore doubt whether their exaltation of the martyrs may not be due to the necessity of spurring the fainting Christian hope against the prospect of persecution. Again, we are not seeking the doctrinal theories of Origen and Hippolytus, both of them schismatics, but the current beliefs of the Christian body in general, and as has been pointed out above, Le Blant has proved that our safest guide in such a case is the evidence of contemporary Christian art and epigraphy.

So far as we can date the monuments, the evidence of Christian paintings and inscriptions indicate that the ordinary Christian of the first three centuries did not invoke the saints either for spiritual or material aid. It is true that the praying figures (*orantes*) found in such numbers on Christian tombs and tombstones have been interpreted by Wilpert as representing the souls of the dead praying for the remission of the sins of their friends below.<sup>7</sup> We also find early epitaphs containing phrases like "pray for us", "pray for thy sister", addressed to the departed. Ignatius expresses the hope that his spirit may hallow the faithful, "not only now but when I come to God".<sup>8</sup> Cyprian<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Ein Cyklus Christologischer Gemälde*, pp. 30ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Trail.*, xiii.

<sup>9</sup> *Epist.* lvii.

writes, "whosoever of us shall go before by the swiftness of divine selection, let our love continue before the Lord, and our prayers for our brothers and sisters be unceasing in the presence of the mercy of the Father". But neither such utterances nor the *orantes* imply more than the custom of imploring the intercession of departed friends, while the formulæ on the epitaphs which I have mentioned were undoubtedly substituted by Christian piety for the old pagan acclamations so common on tomb-stones, such as *Sit tibi terra levis*, and *Ossa tua bene quiescant*. The usage current in the first three centuries with reference to prayers both to and for the dead is well expressed by an early liturgical fragment that has come down to us: "May the souls of the faithful dead who enjoy beatitude help us, and those who are without consolation be absolved by the prayers of the church". There is a considerable difference between requests for intercession addressed to departed friends and prayers addressed to martyrs, and no dated epitaph before Constantine nor for some time after him, shows any trace of the invocation of saints.

Certain catacomb frescoes of the third century, published by Wilpert,<sup>10</sup> depict Christ in judgment with several figures seated beside him, which Wilpert interprets as apostles or saints. It is possible that the conception of the artist was similar to that expressed by Origen and Hippolytus in which the martyrs are regarded as co-judges with God. But the figures are given no names, and it is hard to tell whether the painter had such a notion or merely introduced the accessory figures by way of localizing the scene in heaven. These vague compositions and the words of Origen and Hippolytus may be taken to indicate that the idea of the intercession of the saints was in the air as early as the third century, and certainly the invocations of departed friends offered an easy precedent by which it could enter into Christian usage; but the archæological evidence shows

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 36off.



that it had not yet been generally incorporated into the practice of the church.

There is absolutely no evidence in the third century for the representation of saints as objects of worship, of supernatural attributes, or of relic worship.

It appears, then, that the only element of saint-worship which developed in the first three centuries was the commemoration of the martyrs, and that to find the really essential features we must look beyond 300 A. D. And as a matter of fact, once past the accession of Constantine and the series of edicts in support of Christianity which was inaugurated by the toleration proclaimed at Milan in 313, the evidence for the cult of the saints comes thick and fast. The limits of this paper make it impossible to give more than a small part of this evidence, and it is only necessary to cite examples drawn at random from Christian epigraphy, art and literature.

Beginning with the fourth century, we find a number of epitaphs showing that burial near the body of a martyr was a distinction eagerly sought. One inscription tells us that the deceased was buried *ad domnum Hippolytum*, "near St. Hippolytus". *Domnus* and *Domna* were the current titles for saints replaced later by *Sanctus*. Another epitaph reads: "Serpentius bought this sepulchre near Saint Cornelius", and still another records an interment "in the new crypt behind the Saints". These formulæ seem to be explained by the belief that burial near the martyr put the departed within the penumbra of sanctity which surrounded his tomb, although another theory has lately been proposed by Leclercq in his article "Ad Sanctos" in Cabrol's *Dictionnaire*, to the effect that such locations were chosen to prevent the violation of the grave. Either explanation points to a heightened conception of the martyr. Actual invocations are not rare, as "Saint Basilla, we Crescentinus and Micina commend to thee our daughter Crescentina, who lived ten months and so many days". The saints were regarded as second only to God and Christ by the Christian who composed the following phrase, from a fourth cen-

tury epitaph: "Nourished (*nutricatus*) by God, Christ and the martyrs". The doctrine of intercession could scarcely be better expressed than on the tombstone of a Christian in the cemetery of Cyriaca: "For whom", says the epitaph, "by virtue of the testimony of his life, the holy martyrs shall be advocates before God and Christ." We even find votive offerings to the saints, one being referred to by an inscription found in the catacomb of St. Felicitas, reading: "Peter and Pancara have made this offering to the martyr Felicitas", while another records the fact that "Caucasius has paid the gift he vowed to the holy martyrs Saints Papias and Maurus".

The catacomb paintings tell a similar story. The vague conceptions expressed by the third century frescoes above referred to, which depict Christ, and possibly saints, in judgment, have developed into compositions wherein the saint is actually represented introducing the defunct Christian into heaven. One of the best examples of this kind of scene is the fresco in the catacomb of Domitilla, in which we see the Christian Veneranda conducted to heaven by her patroness St. Petronilla. Both figures are carefully labelled with their names. Near the crypt where this fresco was discovered, De Rossi excavated a basilica which was built in the fourth century in honor of Saints Nereus and Achilleus. A fragment of a column belonging to this basilica bears a sculptured relief representing a soldier in the act of decapitating St. Achilleus. This and a fourth century fresco found in the house of the martyrs John and Paul on the Caelian hill are doubtless the earliest representations of martyrdom. But the best illustration of the change in the attitude of the believers of the fourth century is afforded by the series of representations of the Virgin in the frescoes of the catacombs. The Virgin, of course, appears early in Christian art, by reason of her inseparable connection with her infant Son. Thus we find her with her Son as early as the second century in a fresco of the catacomb of Priscilla, forming the pendant to the figure of Isaiah and symbolizing

the fulfilment of his prophecy, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isa. vii. 14). Throughout the third century she appears with the Child as a necessary accessory in the scenes of the "Adoration of the Magi", and once with a symbolical meaning in a curious representation of the veiling of a nun. But not once does she appear with her Son as an isolated group until the fourth century, when we find her represented in an extremely hieratic attitude, in full face, with hands uplifted in prayer, and her Son upon her lap.<sup>11</sup> There is an evident feeling for the sanctity of the Virgin in this picture, she is plainly the important figure, and there is no essential difference between her representation here and in the Byzantine *Cultusbilder*. This Madonna then denotes a cult of the Virgin antedating by nearly a hundred years the formal recognition of her dignity by the church, for it was at the Council of Ephesus in 431 A. D. that the unity of the divine and human natures of Christ was affirmed, and the opponents of Nestorius vindicated for Mary the title of Mother of God. Thus did popular piety outstrip the theologians!

The evidence of the fathers offers some contradictions, as usual. Augustine, after indignantly denying<sup>12</sup> that worship was offered to apostles or saints, asserts, nine chapters farther on, that miracles were performed at their tombs. His attitude is probably that of many of his contemporaries who recognized the cult of the Saints but insisted on ascribing to the popular mind the purer conception which prompted their own reverence for the martyrs. Yet in the East, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa preached sermons in praise of the martyrs and recommended their potent aid to the sick and distressed. Belief in the ubiquity of saints and of the Virgin is betrayed by some passages in fourth and fifth century literature. Prudentius, the Christian poet of the fourth century, celebrated the sanctity of

<sup>11</sup> Wilpert, *Op. cit.*, Plate 163.

<sup>12</sup> *Civ. Dei*, VIII, 27.

Hippolytus and described the troops of pilgrims which visited his tomb. Lastly, a startling commentary on the rapidity of the growth of relic-worship is afforded by a law of Theodosius the Great, in 386 A. D., to the effect that "no one shall dismember the martyrs nor sell them".

The impulse which Constantine himself gave to saint-worship, by the building of the great basilicas over the tombs of Peter and Paul and other martyrs, does not need discussion. Damasus (366-384 A. D.), the greatest of the Roman bishops of the fourth century, gave an additional stimulus to the cult by restoring and decorating the tombs of martyrs in the catacombs, notably the crypt of St. Cecilia and of the bishops of the third century, and providing stairways by which pilgrims could descend to their shrines. The innumerable invocations scribbled on the walls of these crypts are the best evidence of the ardent worship which rewarded Damasus' efforts. In fact, burial in the catacombs, which had fallen into disuse in the earlier half of the century, was revived in his time, and most of the epitaphs cited above as containing references to burial near the tombs of saints are contemporary with his activity in the catacombs.

We see that the four really essential features of saint-worship, invocation, pictorial representation, superhuman attributes, and relic worship, are products of the fourth century, and that Constantine and Damasus both aided the development of the cult. But its rapid rise must be assigned to another and more general cause than the influence of these two men, and this cause is not far to seek, nor has it been overlooked by the historians of the church. It was the influx of paganism into Christianity which followed the recognition of Christianity by the state and the consequent peace of the church. The edicts of Constantine put the stamp of imperial approval on the Christian religion, and multitudes flocked to the new faith who brought with them neither the ability nor the desire to assimilate the truths of Christianity. It was the fashionable fad of the day, and

no doubt the detractors of Damasus, who called him the "ear-tickler of the ladies of Rome", viewed him quite in the light in which the uninitiated of the present day look upon those exponents of "isms" who minister to the spiritual aspirations of fashionable people in our large cities. Christianity spread faster than the understanding of its meaning, and curious mixtures of Christian and pagan habits of mind resulted. An interesting instance may be seen in the reliefs on a sarcophagus of Constantine's time, which was found during the excavations in the Roman Forum in 1901. One of the scenes represents Jonah reclining under the gourd-vine which as usual takes the form of an arbor. The figure of Jonah is copied after the similar type of the shepherd Endymion asleep on Latmos, and this too is the regular practice of the Christian artists. But this sculptor's Christianity was apparently too recent to obliterate the stories of old mythology, and he has been to some pains to insert Endymion's sheep above Jonah's gourd.

The pagan influx in the fourth century had at least two results. It brought to bear on the pure reverence for the martyrs, which had survived three centuries almost untainted, the tendency of the polytheistic pagan mind to obscure the deity by innumerable lesser and nearer recipients of vows, and second, it lowered the spiritual intelligence of the church body and made the abstract truths of Christianity still harder to grasp. One of the products of the mixture was saint-worship, the polytheistic Christianity of the masses, which succeeded in perpetuating itself along with the loftier dogmas of our faith.

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CHARLES R. MOREY.



## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

THE STOIC CREED. By WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, Author of "The Logic of Definition," "Theism as Grounded in Human Nature," "Christian Ethics," etc., etc. T. & T. Clark: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 8vo; pp. xxiii, 274. \$1.75 net.

This volume is issued as one of the series bearing the general title "*Religion in Literature and Life*." It presents to us what is not only a very interesting exposition but also a fine appreciation of Stoicism. It is quite common to think of Stoicism as a frame of mind rather than as a body of principles, nor do we conceive this way of regarding it as wholly wrong. It is a nice question, if this be so, which is the antecedent and which the consequent; whether the principles follow the psychological attitude or the state of mind, the acceptance of this view of things. The history, the teachings and the life-products of Stoicism furnish a fascinating study. The subject has its speculative and its practical side.

This volume traces the development of Stoicism, founded as it was by a Cypriote, born in Greece and transplanted to Rome. Metaphysically it was a *prioris* as shown in the maxim of Chrysippus, "Give me the principles and I will find the proofs for myself." Epistemologically, it was a Spencer-like franchise for Agnosticism. It differed from Epicureanism in that it was fatalistic rather than libertarian and in that it made virtue and not pleasure its *summum bonum*. It differed from Cynicism in that it was positive and not negative. It differed from Calvinism in that it saw no degrees in the heinousness of sin. The Stoic's physic was geocentric, his ethic was homocentric, his psychology had no place for the emotions, and if Epicurianism made too much of pleasure, he made too little of pain. Renan said that the "*Meditations*" of M. Aurelius were the gospel of those who do not believe in the Supernatural. Our author is able to make a long list of English writers who have been influenced by Stoicism (p. 176); but with all its merits, it has the dread entail of a pagan faith. It is the reign of Fate; *irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit*. (*Seneca De Pro.* v6.)

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. New Series, Volume VII.

Containing the papers read before the Society during the Twenty-eighth session, 1906-7. WILLIAMS AND NORGATE. 14 Henrietta street. Covent Gardens, London, W. C. 1907. 8vo., pp. 244. Price 10 shillings and sixpence nett.

This attractive volume presents some strong literature to readers philosophically inclined. In the "Rules" of the Society, we find that its full name is "*The Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy*", and that the object of this study shall be, first, the historic development and, secondly, the method and problems of philosophy. The president of the Society is the Rev. Hastings Rashdell and the list of members includes the names of some of the strong philosophical minds in England of the younger generation.

The papers here presented show great scholarship and careful thinking. Of course, there are differences among them in interest and ability. The first paper, read by the president, on *Nicholas De Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume*, is very informing; the one *On the Nature of Truth*, by the Hon. Bertrand Russell, is exceedingly suggestive; that on *Fact, Idea and Emotion* by Shadworth H. Hodgson is interesting because of its nearness to the border line between Metaphysics and Philosophy; and that on *Philosophy and Education*, by Benjamin Dumville, is an able and fine discussion of a very live question.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

## MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENTS. VOL. VIII. No 3, June, 1907. Whole

No. 34. *The Psychological Review*; Yale Psychological Studies. Edited by CHARLES H. JUDD, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory, Yale University. The Review Publishing Company, 41 North Queen street, Lancaster Pa., and Baltimore, Md. Paper, 8vo., pp. 227-423.

This issue of the *Yale Psychological Studies* completes the first volume of the new series and presents five papers upon subjects of technical psychological interest. The nice analyses and distinctions that are characteristic of modern psychological research are in evidence in the very subjects of the papers here presented. The new psychology is largely a scientific study of objective phenomena and the wonderful fact in it all is that the human soul is thus able to be at the same time the subject at one end of the glass and the object at the other. The subjects discussed in the first three of these papers are related, namely: "Tonal Reactions", "Preliminary Experiments on Writing Reactions" and "Reactions to Equal Weights of Unequal Size". The entire collection is a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A PLAIN MAN'S WORKING VIEW OF BIBLICAL INSPIRATION. By ALBERT J. LYMAN, D.D., Brooklyn, N. Y. 8vo, pp. 47. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1907.

This booklet is in answer to the inquiry: "Can you tell me in what sense, if any, I can reasonably regard the Bible as an inspired and trustworthy guide in life, without wanting to settle all the critical questions?" It is, we think, a real answer, in addition to being a very bright and readable one. Indeed, we do not see why the author does not go further and on the basis of his argument boldly affirm, at least as "a working view," the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. Certainly the book, which "in many of its writings exhibits a very high degree of the inspiration of genius;" which "in most of its writings exhibits a supreme degree of moral or ethical inspiration;" which "here and there exhibits marks of a special and spiritual inspiration, that is to say, gleams of insight so profound and wonderful, into the depths of religious truth and the spiritual life of man as to be apparently beyond any natural power of production possessed by the plain men who, on any theory of the Bible, originated those writings in a rude land and age;" the book which contains "so many of these special flashes or headland lights so distributed in the texture of the writings that they become *interpretative and corrective of all the remainder of the Biblical record* and thus the Bible as a whole becomes *self-adjusting, self-explaining, self-correcting*"—certainly the book which is so evidently supernatural must, as it itself declares, have been composed by "men who spoke from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit" (ii Peter 1:21), and who, therefore, 'spoke, not in words which man's wisdom taught, but which the Spirit taught' (1 Cor. ii. 13). In short, the Bible would be a lie or a mistake if it were not, since it so claims, inspired even to its words; and a supernatural book, as our author shows the Bible to be, simply could not be a lie or a mistake. To suppose this would deny our necessary conception of God as perfect.

Nor is this all. Our author's argument has other defects than that it does not go far enough; and just because it is so practical that, if corrected, it might well become "a plain man's working view of Biblical inspiration", we hope that it will not be deemed ungracious to point them out.

1. Is it quite true that the "argument lies beneath the critical discussion as to the precise date or the authorship of the documents"? Undoubtedly it does not depend for its force on who wrote Genesis; but would it not lose its force, if we knew that Moses did not write or compile it? In that case, how could we have "the supreme Christ" up to whom our author claims that his argument "leads without a break." The Christ that we should then have would be, as regards knowledge of the Old Testament at least, so far from supreme as to be inferior to the Destructive critics. In a word, it may be an easy proposition, but it is

not a tenable one, that faith has nothing to do with criticism. No amount of criticism can make faith; but if the destructive criticism were right, there could not be faith. How could we honestly continue to believe a book that had been proved to be on its face, as to its origin, either a lie or a mistake? To suppose that such a book could be "self-adjusting, self-explaining, self-correcting" would be to suppose that, in the sphere of religion, the human mind contradicted itself.

2. Is not such a statement as the following incorrect, not to say uncalled for? "Verbal infallibility, in the sense of the literal mechanical inerrancy of every separate text and phrase, taken by itself, is an irrational and impossible dream in regard to a book which is to be translated into a hundred different languages, and re-translated from age to age." We must confess that we do not see what the translation or the re-translation of the Scriptures has to do with the question. No intelligent person ever claimed inerrancy for the translation of the Bible or even for the present text of it. Nor can we see why the inerrancy of the original autograph carries with it a "mechanical" theory of inspiration. To hold that it must is to deny the divine omniscience and omnipotence. Surely He who can "work in us both to will and to work for His good pleasure" and yet leave us so free that we "work out our own salvation with fear and trembling" is not and can not be shut up to merely mechanical methods.

But enough. *A Plain Man's Working View of Biblical Inspiration* in itself is fitted to do great good. Its arguments should constrain one "to regard the Bible as an inspired and trustworthy guide in life, without waiting to settle all the critical questions." It should do more. It should lead him, as his "working view" of the Bible, to allow to it that plenary inspiration which it claims for itself. It should do even more. It should raise a very strong antecedent presumption against the conclusions of the destructive criticism. But the argument will do much harm if it even insinuates, as our author seems to do, that the religious worth of the Bible can be disconnected from rational considerations and its infallibility be maintained though its inerrancy be denied. In this case, as in many others, a way may be made so short and easy as to miss the truth

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

ISLAM A CHALLENGE TO FAITH. STUDIES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION AND THE NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, F.R.G.S., Secretary, Student Volunteer Movement, Missionary in Arabia. 8vo.; pp. xx, 295. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. 1907.

This is a powerful plea for missions to Mohammedans and it will take its place with the best of our abundant and admirable missionary literature. By heredity, by training, by long observation and experience

in the home and stronghold of Islam, by intensity of conviction, by intelligence and strength of faith, the writer may, without exaggeration, be pronounced uniquely qualified for his great work. He has not, however, relied on this, but has undertaken his task as if he had every thing to learn and limitations of many kinds to overcome. Hence, he has spared no pains in the investigation of authorities, in the verification of statements, in the massing of facts, in the weighing of evidence, in the perfecting of his style. The result is that he has given us, not only an interesting as well as unanswerable argument for the immediate and more vigorous prosecution of missions to Mohammedans, but also a thoroughly scientific study of their religion. Indeed, were one to enter on this study, he could not do better than to take this book for his point of departure. He will find in it, not only inspiration, but the wisest guidance with regard to the literature of the subject.

The headings of the chapters clearly indicate the course of Mr. Zwemer's argument. These are: "The Origin and Sources of Islam"; "Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam"; "The Spread of Islam"; "The Faith of Islam"; "The Practice of Islam"; "The Ethics of Islam"; "Division, Disintegration and Reform"; "The Present Condition of the Moslem World"; "Missions to Moslems"; "Methods and Results"; "The Problem and the Peril"; "A Challenge to Faith". The presentation of these subjects is much aided by five maps and twenty-eight illustrations. It is also facilitated by tables giving "Mohammed's Genealogy", an "Analysis of the Borrowed Elements of Islam", an "Analysis of Islam as a System Developed from its Creed", "Some Arabic Controversial Literature", and a "General Statistical Survey of Mohammedan Lands". Appendices are added as follows: "Chronological Table of Important Events in History of Islam and of Missions to Moslems", "William Gifford Palgrave's Characterization of Allah", "Thomas Patrick Hughes' Characterization of Mohammed", "List of Missionary Societies Working Among Moslems", "Select Bibliography for Further Reference and Study". The book closes with a clear and minute Index.

The excellencies of this work are so many and so striking that it is well nigh impossible to distinguish among them. Perhaps, the deepest impression that it will make will be with regard to the missionary activity of Islam, the danger that this presents, politically as well as spiritually, and the demand that it lays on the church for immediate and enormously increased missionary effort in all Moslem lands.

At but a single point would the reviewer take exception. It is with regard to the statement of the doctrine of Predestination on page 95, which doctrine the author correctly pronounces "the keystone in the arch of Moslem faith." Nevertheless, he gives but little over a page to it. Nor are we compensated for this extreme brevity by the general lucidity of the passage. No attempt is made to distinguish between the Moslem and the Scriptural doctrine of predestination. On the contrary, we are told that "the terminology of Moslem teaching is Calvinistic, but its practical effect is pure fatalism". Now Calvinism, and even



"ultra Calvinism", claims nothing so much as that it is Scriptural, and not least so in its doctrine of the decree. Calvinism, moreover, is still the creed of a large and an important branch of the church. It is the confession, too, of that most honorable communion to which we believe that the author himself belongs. He ought not, therefore, to leave us with the impression that Calvinism and Islam with regard to predestination are alike in terms. Or if such be the case, then he ought to go on and show how the terms differ in meaning, and why it is that Calvinism, though in terms "pure fatalism", is "in effect" the very reverse. To say the least that may be said, the teachings of the greatest of the reformers ought not thus to be confounded with the doctrine of the False Prophet, and a slip of this kind—for this is all that we are willing to regard it—ought not to mar a book which in its influence on the missionary activity of the church may well be epoch-making.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

**THE BIBLE UNDER TRIAL** in View of Present-Day Assaults on Holy Scripture. By the REV. JAMES ORR, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow. (Second edition.) 8vo.; pp. vii, 323. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth Street: 1907.

As the author states in his preface, "the papers composing this volume were prepared in response to urgent request as a popular apologetic series in defense of the Bible from the attacks made on it from different quarters. They are now published in the hope that they may do something to steady the minds of those who are in perplexity, owing to the multitude and confusion of the opinions that prevail in these times regarding the Sacred Book. The papers are written from the standpoint of faith in the Bible as the inspired and authoritative record for us of God's revealed will. The author has no sympathy with the view which depreciates the authority of Scripture in order to exalt over it the authority of Christ. He does not acknowledge that there is any collision between the two things or that they can really be severed, the one from the other. He finds the word of God and of Christ in the Scriptures, and knows no other source of acquaintance with it".

The Papers thus described are on the following topics: "The Present-Day Trial of the Bible," "An Instructive Object Lesson," "Presuppositions in Old Testament Criticism," "Settled Results in Criticism," "Israel's God and Worship," "Archaeology as Searchlight," "The Citadel-Christ," "The Bulwark of the Gospels," "Oppositions of Science," "The Bible and Ethics: God and My Neighbor", "Discrepancies and Difficulties," "The Bible the Hope of the World." In an Appendix there is a brief discussion of an article on *Recent Developments of Old Testament Criticism* in the January number of the *Quarterly Review*, from the pen of Dr. G. A. Smith, and the volume closes with an Index.

"As designed for the general Christian reader, these papers make no pretence to exhaustive treatment." Those who would have that may

well be referred to the more scientific apologetic works of the author, viz.: *The Christian View of God and the World* (8th edition), *The Problem of the Old Testament* (4th edition), and *God's Image in Man and its Defacement* (3d edition). And yet it should be said in passing—and higher praise could scarcely be given—that these papers are as remarkable for “tracing broad outlines of defence and vindication” as the treatises just named are for profound and illuminating discussion.

*The Bible Under Trial* should prove a great boon to three distinct classes. To the rank and file of our church membership, who must read and study just such a book as this, and particularly its treatment of the critical attacks on the Bible, if they would obey the apostolic injunction and be ‘ready always to give answer to every man that asketh of them a reason concerning the hope that is in them.’ To our hard working pastors, who can find presented in this book with unique clearness and brevity the material for such preaching as will tend directly to enlighten and confirm the faith of their congregations and who will catch from the author’s calm and invincible because Scriptural optimism that rational and holy confidence and boldness which are stronger than any mere argument. And, finally, to the professional apologist, who may wish to turn from the special combat in which he himself is engaged and inquire how the battle goes all along the line. May the profound and genial scholar who in *The Bible Under Trial* has given us a book as popular as it is scholarly and as scholarly as it is popular, be long spared “to contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints”!

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION IN JAPAN. American Lectures on The History of Religions. Sixth series. 1905-1906. By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, D.D., LL. D., Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Sometime Professor of Philosophy and Ethics in the Imperial University, Tokyo. 8vo.; pp. xxi, 204. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York and London. The Knickerbocker Press. 1907.

This is a small volume; but it is so instructive and suggestive, so philosophic in spirit and so fascinating in style, as to be remarkable. It does not give us a scientific description of Shinto, the state religion of Japan, or of Buddhism, the religion of the people, or of Confucianism, the religion of the literati: but within its few pages it does make us acquainted with the genius of each one of these as does no formal treatise of which the reviewer is aware. It does more. It describes the characteristic beliefs and rites, the natural religion of primitive Japan, before the beginning of the Empire. It shows how Shinto is “the natural religion of the people reorganized and completed as myth” in order to ‘support the new Imperial house and power’. It sets forth the subsequent introduction of Buddhism, or “supernatural religion”, from

China, how it modified the existing religion and was itself modified by it. It dwells next on the coming of Confucianism or "ethical religion", its influence, and the many and important transformations which it sustained. It closes with a singularly clear, comprehensive, and just "Review and Outlook".

One of the rules governing this lectureship is that "Polemical subjects, as well as polemics in the treatment of subjects, shall be positively excluded". This, doubtless, explains why it is that some questions of absorbing interest to many are studiously ignored. Such, for example, is the relation of the powerful Shin Sect of Buddhists to Christianity: Did they borrow from our religion? Could they have approached it so closely, if they had not?

With our author's conception of religious development and of historical progress in general as due to "contact with foreign peoples and civilizations" rather than "to resident forces"; and with his doctrine that natural religion has its origin, not in anything external or accidental to man, but in his nature as man, his instinctive response to his environment, we are in heartiest accord. To his doctrine of the nature of religion, that it "essentially has to do with the feelings," we cannot assent. Religion essentially has to do with "the whole man," intellect and feelings and will. Indeed, man is an indivisible unit; and, as Prof. Francis Bowen well said, "Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of some idea". This error of our author appears frequently throughout his discussion and causes him to under rate the importance of theology and to misstate its relation to religion.

On page 190 we have "the St. James version" where the King James version is meant.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, Jr.

**MATTER AND INTELLECT. A Reconciliation of Science and the Bible.**  
By ANDREW ALLAN. London. A. Owen & Co., 38 Regent Street.  
8vo., p. 224.

This book is not a reconciliation, but rather a reconstruction of some parts of Science and some parts of Scripture, after a pantheistic pattern. According to it, God is not a definite personality, and the human soul is not God-created; and instead of a Gospel dealing with sin, and sacrifice, and Christ, the Apostle Paul is censured for misleading the world; and by help of errors of science and an extraordinary handling of a few parts of Scripture, a Gospel of Pantheism is presented.

The author refers much to Evolution, and the survival of the fittest; but he is ignorant of the scientific meaning of these terms, and he is astray in nearly everything which he writes as to science. He errs in declaring that high-type animals exterminate low-type animals, and in calling this (if it were correct) an exception to the struggle for existence. He is astray in declaring the germ of an acorn to be identical with that of an animal, and in making environment and nutrition the only

difference. He is astray in alleging that the Coal Age, or any other geological age was rainless. (The Bible refers to a rainless district, but shows that it had rivers which proved rainy regions in other parts, and the Coal Age is proved by its swamps and lakes and rivers to have been rainy). He errs when he derives birds from pterodactyles, and serpents from dinosaurs. If he were a zoologist he should have known that birds and serpents were certainly not derived from the sources which he assigns to them. His most extraordinary error is his discovery of "a remarkable agreement between Genesis and Science" in deriving the man and the woman, both of them from the jelly fishes, away back in the oldest geological times. By this hypothesis the starfishes, which are closely related to the jellyfishes, and hosts of other humble forms, should be closer relations to both man and woman, than either of them have been of the other. It is ignorant guessing of this sort that bewilders the laity, and drives men of science mad with the "reconcilers".

The point where he first goes astray in handling the Bible is in assuming that the second chapter of Genesis (that is, from its 4th verse) is a second account of creation. Many eminent men hold this view, but it is counter to the evidence, as the late Prof. W. H. Green, of Princeton, has shown, and it is always misleading. After the account of the creation in chapter 1 (continued for three verses of the second chapter), that subject is dropped, and we have the settlement of man in his appointed home and his experiences through some generations until the end of chapter four. The expressions, "these are the generations" (ii. 4) and "the book of the generations" (v. 1) mark new stages as distinctly as the second and third books of Xenophon's *Anabasis* are marked; and just as Xenophon begins the new books with a sentence as to the topics of their predecessors, so the *Genesis* record starts with referring to the creation of man as previously recorded. Man, male and female, had both been mentioned as created by God in his own image; and there is no repetition.

The narrative in Gen. ii. 21, about the deep sleep of the man and the formation of the woman from his side, is not a historical report of her origin, but a dream sent to prepare the man for the helpmeet who was nigh at hand. The graphic language is precisely parallel with that used for Pharaoh's dream, in Gen. xli. 1, "Pharaoh dreamed, and behold he stood by the river", etc., as if his standing, and the coming of the kine were external occurrences; but nobody has ever been misled by the style as to Pharaoh; it is only about the early chapters of Genesis, like the later chapters of the Apocalypse, the unknown past, and the unknown future, that we find ourselves free to blunder as we like.

Correcting these errors, we have no ground left either for harmonizing or antagonizing the parts of the narrative. It is odd to find Allan attempting to harmonize by assigning the rib-incident away back to something derived from jelly fishes, or some other remote ancestors; and seeming to think that "inspiration" enabled the writer

to contemplate these scientific mysteries ages in advance of Mr. Darwin.

We may now leave the subject, with the remark, that by making the fall an ascent of man to a higher stage, so that man is able respectably to sin, and by arguing that evil is after all a blessing, goodness in disguise, and then by showing that in a future life good people are happy, not being tempted any more, and bad people are happy, because they are free to torment each other, the author naturally proceeds to reject the doctrine of vicarious atonement, deploring the fact that it has wormed its way into Christian doctrines.

We observe that there is a clergyman located near Glasgow bearing the author's name; but it is difficult to understand why a man holding such views should be a preacher in any place where Christians worship. He deploras as gross and superstitious the faith which most of us Christians hold to be the charm and solace of our present life, and the foundation of our hopes for hereafter.

*Princeton University,*

G. MACLOSKEY.

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### EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

**The International Critical Commentary. A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF PSALMS.** By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopædia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and EMILIE GRACE BRIGGS, B.D. Vols. I and II. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906 and 1907. 8vo.; pp. cx, 422, and viii, 572. Price \$3.00 net each.

These two volumes from the pen of an American biblical scholar form the most elaborate commentary on the Psalms that scholarship of the modern type has produced, not excepting Hupfeld's work of fifty years ago or Delitzsch's later production. These eleven hundred pages contain a general introduction to the Psalter, covering one hundred and ten pages, and for each psalm a special introduction, a criticism of the text and a formal exegetical discussion, and the resulting exposition.

Dr. Briggs believes it to be a legitimate critical procedure to alter the Hebrew text of a psalm in order to conform it to his theory of the rhythm of that psalm, and to employ the rhythm of a particular passage as evidence for or against its genuineness. He reforms the text quite frequently for these subjective reasons. Professor Cheyne also adjusts the text to a theory, but his theory lacks sanity and he does not apply his method with moderation. Dr. Briggs understands scholarly restraint. Nor does he modify the text after the manner of Professor Grätz. He is too careful a scholar to do so. Nor does he follow



Wellhausen in this matter. Dr. Briggs has, indeed, accepted Wellhausen's theory of the development of Israel's religious life and institutions; but like Professor Duhm, another prominent adherent of the same school of criticism, Dr. Briggs is quite independent of Wellhausen in textual criticism. Dr. Briggs' emendations on the ground of rhythm are numerous, more so probably than Baethgen's. There is one matter in this connection which seems to us to be an incongruity. We believe that there is a place for the limited use of even subjective textual criticism, although it is extremely elusive. But this perplexes us. Dr. Briggs assigns the composition of about one-half of the psalms in the psalter to late Persian, Greek, and Maccabean days. Yet numerous verses that are pronounced unrhythmical are attested by the LXX as in the psalter during approximately the same period. At any rate they were an integral part of these poems when they were used in the musical service of the sanctuary. It would seem that their lack of rhythm, if it really existed to the Hebrew ear, should have sadly interfered with their use as hymns by the temple choir.

Dr. Briggs explains the reference to David in the title of many psalms as meaning that these psalms were taken from a psalter of David. The theory formulated in broad terms is good. It may be held and explained thus: In the service of Solomon's temple a hymn book was used known as "The Prayers of David" (Ps. lxxi, 20). The kernel of this collection consisted of psalms which David composed and of other sacred odes, perhaps, which he collected. Not unlikely as the centuries passed hymns by poets of a later date were added, without changing the name of the collection. Such a procedure has its analogies in all periods of the history of literature. But of course, the admission that there are psalms in the psalter dating from the time of David cannot be made by the adherents of the school of Wellhausen, or at most in the case of three or four that are colorless; for they cannot grant that deep spirituality of worship existed so early in the history of Israel, nor can they tolerate the evidence, which such psalms would afford, of an elaborate ritual and of the recognition of but one legitimate altar at that early date. The advocates of the Wellhausian hypothesis are under pressure to assign the psalms to as late an age as possible. Cheyne in his Bampton Lectures asserts that no psalm in the psalter, except perhaps a portion of the eighteenth, is pre-exilic. Wellhausen in his commentary disallows the eighteenth, and does not expressly allow any other, to be pre-exilic. Dr. Briggs holds that "it is evident from the internal character of these Pss., with a few possible exceptions, that David could not have written them". He grants that five, namely vii. and xiii. and xviii. and xxiv. 7-10 and lx. 6-9, were composed in the time of David and only twenty-seven others in the days before the exile. Ewald held a different theory from Wellhausen respecting the origin and growth of Israel's religion. His likewise is not the teaching of the Bible; nevertheless, Ewald on his theory can and does admit the Davidic authorship of psalms like viii. and xv. and

xxix. and lxviii. 13-18, and the pre-exilic date of psalms like xix. 8-15 and lv. 9-24 and lxxv.; but Dr. Briggs, because he holds the Wellhausen theory of the development of Israel's religion, must and does deny both the Davidic authorship and the pre-exilic date of these psalms. A glance at his argument makes it evident that investigation is largely controlled by the tenets of the school.

It is difficult to speak generally of a matter of such detail as exegesis. The writer of this brief review desires to express the satisfaction he has found in Dr. Briggs exposition. It is careful and candid. He finds great thoughts and lofty religious teaching. He exegetes even those passages which he regards as interpolations. Of course, his exegesis will meet with dissent at countless points, and that, too, from scholarly men who cordially acknowledge the great merits of the work (compare, e. g., on "the Pit," Zandstra, *Princeton Theological Review*, October, 1907, pp. 631-641).

We cannot close without expressing our joy at beholding the beautiful spectacle of a daughter sharing in the learned literary labors of the father. "O the happiness" of the father who has such a daughter!  
*Princeton.* JOHN D. DAVIS.

STUDIES ON THE BOOK OF GENESIS. By H. B. PRATT, Spanish Translator of Seymour's *"Evenings with the Romanists"* (Noches con los Romanistas) and author of the *"Modern Version"* of the Bible in Spanish, and also of *"Estudios sobre el libro del Genesis,"* and of *"Estudios sobre el libro del Exodo"*. Translated from the Spanish. "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world" (Gk. "in order that the world be saved through Him"). John 3, 17. Sold by the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. 1906.

The title of this book rightly represents its contents. It is not strictly speaking and in the ordinary use of the term a commentary. For common readers of the Bible, perhaps for all readers of the Bible, it is all the better, it may be, for that. It does not confuse with a multitude of details, so that the main purpose and trend of the passages are lost. It is readable, interesting, and instructive from beginning to end. It is refreshing and novel, nowadays, to find a writer treating a book of the Bible as inspired and authoritative in its teachings, as it stands, without continuous references to supposed documents, and endless discussions of assumed and unproved origins. We feel sure, that the primary design of the Spanish original, to provide the Spanish speaking people with a protestant work upon the book of Genesis, has been fully carried out. We are sure, also, that, in its English dress, it will benefit all its readers,—not merely by calling their attention to many subjects, which may well have escaped their notice; but in answering the questions, and in elucidating the dark places, which must loom up in the

mind of every reader of a book, treating, as Genesis does, of the origins of things.

The notes containing dissertations on such subjects as marriage and divorce, the origin and binding character of the Sabbath, the sins of the Old Testament saints, the obligation and nature of tithes, and the position of the cities of the plain, are quite thorough and generally convincing. Even so dry a matter as the discussion of the meaning of a technical term, such as "to know" (in the phrase, where God says; *I know him*, i. e. Abraham), becomes vivid and interesting, as the author treats it. Every one can see what the author means, and what the verse means.

One of the attractive features of the book are the glaring side-lights, which are cast upon the life and beliefs of the South American people. This alone will make it worth the purchase and perusal by those who want to know how others think and live, and also, a valuable book for the missionary library, and for the instruction of the student volunteers.

*Princeton.*

R. D. WILSON.

**BIBLE SIDE LIGHTS FROM THE MOUND OF GEZER.** A record of Excavation and Discovery in Palestine. By R. A. STEWART MACALISTER, M.A., F.S.A., Director of Excavations, Palestine Excavation Fund. With illustrations. "Thou has made of a city an heap; of a defenced city a heap of ruins."—Isaiah xxv. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 153-157 Fifth Avenue. 1906.

This volume is designed especially to answer the objection to the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund, that the plain bible student, who is not concerned with the science of geography or anthropology, derives little benefit from the work of excavation; and to show, that the Society and its officers are not blind to the claims of the bible student. Mr. Macalister, the author, has been the efficient agent of the Society in the work of excavation; a work for which he was specially prepared at Cambridge, England, by a thorough course in archaeology under the supervision and stimulus of his father, Prof. David Macalister, the eminent anthropologist. The son of a Scotch-Irish Presbyterian elder, he has been fittingly prepared on the biblical side to produce an essay on the light thrown by his scientific discoveries upon the Scriptures of the Old Testament. While we cannot accept all of his conclusions, yet we are thankful for the suggestiveness of his remarks. It is a book that one will read through at a sitting, and sit until one has read through. The style is attractive, the print good, the illustrations superbly fine. We know of nothing that has been written that will better demonstrate the beneficent results to be derived from the work of the Society which he so ably represents.

*Princeton.*

R. D. WILSON.

**A DEVOTIONAL COMMENTARY.** Edited by the REV. A. R. BUCKLAND, M.A. Genesis I-XXV. 10, by the Rev. W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D., Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford. London: The Religious Tract Society. 1907. Pp. viii, 299.

It is refreshing to find a work on Genesis that is not only willing to see, but anxious to show to others, the unity of plan that pervades this book. Dr. Thomas has sought to convey to his readers the spirit and purpose of Genesis, the composition of which is inconceivable as a bit of redaction, but demands a real author, whether we can or cannot discern the written sources that lie back of his product. The method of this "devotional commentary" is simple. A portion of Genesis complete in itself is printed at the beginning of each section, and is then followed by a free and suggestive discussion of just those questions that rise in the reader's mind and demand an answer. References are given to literature that handles the same questions, preference being always given to literature dealing with subject-matter rather than the form of the text. Finally, "suggestions for meditation" introduce to the reader those religious bearings of the passage by which he may be led to a deeper appreciation of its significance for Christianity in general and for his own spiritual life in particular. The author's simple but luminous treatment of Gen. xxii. is especially to be commended. The book is most attractively gotten up, and is worthy of large use by Christians to whom as to Christ and His Apostles Genesis is as much the word of God as any part of the canon.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

**THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH,** a Revised Translation with Introductions and Short Explanations. By the REV. S. R. DRIVER, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. lvi, 382.

**THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH.** By PROF. CHARLES RUFUS BROWN, D.D., of the Newton Theological Institution. The American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1907. Pp. xxxvi, 256. Also, **THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH,** a New and Critical Translation. Same author and publishers. Philadelphia. 1906. Pp. 48.

These two new helps for the student of Jeremiah are arranged on different plans. Prof. Brown's larger book, which is one number of the American Commentary on the Old Testament, follows closely the usual type of commentary. There is an elaborate introduction, followed by the text with the commentator's notes below. For the text he has placed in parallel columns the authorized version, and a special translation made by himself, into which he introduces various typographical devices to indicate his departures from, or rectifications of, the massoretic text. It is this special translation that has been brought out in separate and attractive form by the same publishers, as indicated

above; introduction and notes are omitted, but the critical devices are retained, together with an explanation of them.

Dr. Driver's book, on the other hand, departs from the usual make-up of a modern commentary, in limiting the material treated in his introduction to a brief outline of the prophet's life and times, and an exceedingly succinct statement of the peculiarities of Jeremiah's style and the problems of his text. The author's translation occupies the great bulk of the book (pp. 1-335), the explanatory notes or comments being so subordinated and abbreviated that many pages of text have few or no notes, and but few, if any, pages are half notes, half text. At the end of the book are gathered such longer explanations of renderings adopted, as are unsuited for the English reader because discussion of the Hebrew original is involved. Dr. Driver appended a glossary of the archaisms in the Revised Version, with some interesting comments on these English terms. An index renders the book the more useful for reference purposes.

Of these two works, Dr. Driver's is the more moderate in tone. Dr. Brown has built largely upon Duhm's Jeremiah, of which Driver himself remarks: "Duhm is original and brilliant, but arbitrary; and the principle task of the future commentator on Jeremiah will be to discover the right mean" between Duhm and Keil. Driver's work here as elsewhere is essentially mediating. It represents practically the position assumed by Graf in his commentary on Jeremiah published nearly a half century ago. It is difficult to see what advance is represented in either of these recent works over the comprehensive and temperate commentary of Orelli, the English translation of which appeared in 1889.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

**HANDBOOKS FOR BIBLE CLASSES AND PRIVATE STUDENTS.** Edited by PROF. MARCUS DODS, D.D., and REV. ALEXANDER WEHTE, D.D. **THE BOOK OF JOB.** By REV. JAMES AITKEN, M.A., Minister of Onslow Presbyterian Church, Wellington, New Zealand. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons: New York. Pp. 114.

What Mr. Aitken has done in this little handbook for students of the Book of Job, is to put in compact form, admirably suited for the class-room, the essence of Dr. Davidson's views on Job as presented in his volume in the Cambridge Bible Series. In a brief introduction the author discusses the usual introductory topics, the authorship, date, classification, source, argument, purpose and integrity of the book, and attempts also a comparison of its teachings on suffering with what Christianity has to say on the same subject. He makes the same mistake as may be observed in many other treatises, both long and short, on this Old Testament composition,—the mistake of underestimating the importance of the question, "Doth Job serve God for naught?" Unless a commentator on Job is prepared to put this problem, is there



such a thing as disinterested piety? side by side with the problem of sin and suffering in his estimate of the book, he will inevitably be led to a one-sided view of its purpose, and from this again to a false conclusion on a number of subordinate questions in the detailed treatment of the text. Apart from this, the little volume is worthy of all praise, especially for its luminous paraphrasing abbreviations of the argument at the beginning of each new section. The low price (45 cents) puts it within the reach of all classes of students.

*Princeton,*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

DE FILISTIJNEN, HUN AFKOMST EN GESCHIEDENIS. By DR. A. NOORDTJIJ. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1905. Pp. 247.

This important work on the origin and history of the Philistines should have been reviewed two years since in these columns, but the following review has been delayed till a time when European scholars have already pronounced a favorable opinion on the book. In joining heartily in this encomium the reviewer desires also to present in brief the result which Dr. Noordtjij reaches on the vexed question of the origin of this nation.

After a minute examination of the evidence, epigraphic, industrial and pictorial, including all the light that both the older and the more recent discoveries in Egypt and Crete are able to shed, the author reaches a conclusion nearer to that of Hitzig in 1845 than to that of Movers and Stark and most of the recent writers on the Philistines. We cannot do better than translate the paragraph in which Noordtjij sums up, at the close of his chapter on name and origin. "The Philistines, as they appear in history, were originally no really unified nation. Like the Hittites, they were a complex of tribes brought together by a common interest, and belonged to the Indo-Germanic group. The principal people, into whom the others were finally absorbed, the Purasati, who gave their name to the whole, dwelt anciently in Crete (and the islands of the Aegean Sea?): from there they carried on an extensive trade with Egypt and apparently also with the Palestinian coast, but at the same time practised piracy. For reasons that are obscure to us a small portion of this tribe migrated at an early period to the Palestinian coast, where it made itself master of the neighborhood of Gerar. These would, however, have disappeared among the surrounding Canaanites, if they had not been from time to time reinforced by new emigrants from the mother-country, though of this no account has come down to us. Thereby it even became possible for them to absorb into themselves completely the Hivites and the Rephaites. From the days of the 18th dynasty onward they, like the Canaanites, were in subjection to Egypt. In conjunction, however, with the movement of the "sea-folk" that after the reign of Meneptah II became steadily greater, they too contrived to recover their independence from Egypt by force of arms. As soon now as they were strengthened by new detachments

of the Purasati, united with the Takkara, Shakrusha, Dano and Vashasha, they began to make predatory incursions directed principally towards the north. But when with the 20th dynasty there arose stronger princes in Egypt, Rameses III marched against them and succeeded in subjecting them again and obliging them to pay tribute. It must not, however, be concealed that in this sketch much still remains obscure. Our sources do not always give us the needful light, and sometimes they are quite silent. But in view of the astonishing liberality of Egypt's soil the reasonable hope may be cherished, that with continued search many a point still obscure will be illuminated, and among others this history of the origin of the Philistines."

In his second chapter Dr. Noordtzijs collects and discusses the allusions to the five cities, and thus presents a picture of the territory which the Philistines occupied. In chapters three and four are grouped the interesting topics of their language and religion, and their civil and social life. Finally, the last two chapters trace their history from the earliest times to Alexander, and from Alexander to the Moslem conquest. Little can be affirmed of their language, inasmuch as our knowledge of it is confined to proper names and the one word *seren*, "lord". If they were of Cretan origin, as the author believes, their original language was, doubtless, the same as that represented by the odd linear inscriptions found on Cretan pottery in the Egyptian, Cretan and Palestinian excavations of recent years. But whatever the original tongue, it is plain that, as in the case of many another invading and conquering nation, the Philistines soon took over the language of the land in which they settled, and by the time of Samson already spoke a dialect so nearly akin to that of the Hebrews as to be practically the same language. A similar experience tells the story of their religion, for with the ancient language they said farewell to their ancient gods. "Not in this sense, however," the author cautions us, "as if all remains of their original worship had been lost. . . . The Canaanitish gods felt the influence of the old Philistine gods, even to the extent that they acquired thereby a peculiar type that differentiated them from other gods."

The peculiar organization of the Pentapolis politically, the relation the tyrants bore to their respective cities and to one another, and the varying fortunes of Philistine democracy, make an instructive introduction to the history; but not more so than the interesting notices of their customs in war, and their wide and varied trade-relations. It is in the former of the two strictly historical chapters that the author reveals his sympathy with the Old Testament narratives. Dr. Noordtzijs takes his stand plainly on the side of those who respect the Biblical data as worthy of a primary place among the historian's sources. In connection with his discerning treatment of the Philistine-Israelitish wars of the time of Saul, we venture to refer to the admirable discussion of the battles of Michmash, the Vale of Elah, and Mount Gilboa, in Principal Miller's "Least of All Lands," which embodies in a way that no purely historical work does, the evidence afforded by a minute local survey of

the sites in question. The history of Philistia falls naturally into three periods: first, the period of the struggle for supremacy over Canaan, second, the period of the struggle for independence against the great empires, generally in alliance with Egypt and Phenicia, but rarely with Israel or Judah; and third, the period of Hellenism, when these Philistine cities were the centers of the struggle, first against Judaism, then against Christianity.

The close relation of all this course of Philistine history to the course of biblical and ecclesiastical history makes the career of this region and people a matter of the keenest interest to Christian students of antiquity. And the thorough, masterly way in which Dr. Noordzij has treated this his fascinating subject not only supersedes earlier works and articles on the same topic, but also renders it highly desirable that a translation of his book into English may soon see the light, for the benefit of English and American scholars and Bible-students who are not at home in the Dutch.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD

Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, herausgegeben von Prof. D. A. Schlatter, Tübingen, und Prof. D. W. Lügert, Halle a. S. (1). DAS GEHEIMNIS DER FRÖMMIGKEIT UND DIE GOTTMENSCHHEIT CHRISTI, von Lic. W. BLEIBTREU. (1) TEXTKRITISCHES ZU DEN KORINTHIERBRIEFEN, von D. F. BLASS. (3) REICHGOTTESSPUREN IN DER VOLKERWELT, von Lic. Dr. J. BOEHMER. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1906. 8vo. Pp. 124.

The central one of the three dissertations which make up this part of the well known "Contributions to Theology," founded by Drs. Schlatter and Cremer—the first part for the year 1906—is a brief discussion by Dr. Blass of two textual points in the Epistles to the Corinthians. The former concerns the well-known section, 2 Cor. vi. 14-vii. 1, so frequently treated as an interpolation. Blass assumes the likelihood of this opinion and attempts to show that nothing in the rhetorical form of the section stands in the way of it. Here he is dealing with the niceties of rhythm, in accordance with the rules governing the artistic prose of the ancient Asiatic school. The mark of the New Testament writers, according to Norden (*Das antike Kunstprosa*, vol. II) was, from the rhetorical point of sight, just their formlessness. But in a work published in 1905, Blass sought to exhibit the use of the rules of the prevalent rhetorical school in the New Testament books. Applying these rules here, while he finds that there is no need arising from the rhythm of the passage in question for removing it from its present place, he yet finds that the removal raises no difficulty on the score of broken rhythm. Nor would any difficulty result on this score from inserting it between verses 22 and 23 of 1 Corinthians x. Thither he would, accordingly, transport it, arguing that the section may have occupied just one page in some papyrus exemplar which might have

got misplaced. The second passage with which he deals is 1 Cor. v. 9. The difficulties of taking this verse, as is so commonly done, as an allusion to a previous (lost) letter of Paul's to the Corinthians are well summarized. The words *ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ*, Blass remarks, supply the sole occasion for favoring an allusion to such a letter. Are they genuine? According to the findings of Seth R. Gifford, in a dissertation on "Paul's Epistles as read by John Chrysostom", 1902, they were not in Chrysostom's text. "If, however", says Blass, "Chrysostom did not have the words in a ms., of at least the 4th century, they must either justify themselves as necessary or at least good, or else must be condemned." They give difficulty, however, in any interpretation. They must therefore be stricken out, and the rhythm permits this. Such textual criticism seems to us too facile to be convincing: the secondary considerations appear to be depended on to the neglect of the primary.

Licentiate Bleibtreu's "contribution", with which the part opens, is a careful study of 1 Tim. iii 16, upon the details of which we shall not enter.

The closing "contribution", Dr. Böhmer's, "Traces of the Kingdom of God in the heathen world", is intended, as he tells us, as a continuation of studies begun in his work on *Der alttestamentliche Unterbau des Reiches Gottes* (1902) and prosecuted in a series of articles *Zum Verständnis des Reiches Gottes* published in *Die Studierstube* from July to November 1905. Here, he points out that the conception of God as King is very widespread, and hardly less so the idea that a king, and that an earthly, empirical king, shall usher in the time of consummation, the new world, the perfected glory. Throughout the whole Orient, from a very early age, there was current the conception of a *βασιλεὺς σωτήρ*: and we need only point to the famous fourth Eclogue of Virgil to show that the West was no stranger to the notion. In the prophecies of the Old Testament the two lines of expectation,—of the future Kingdom of God and of the ideal Son of David,—scarcely unite. But in the Gentile expectation we may rather say the earthly king and the Divine King are never quite kept separate. In any event, we cannot deny that we have in Gentile records ideas parallel to what we call in Israel the Kingdom of God and even its Messianic expectations. If now we start from these parallels and ask how far we find traces in extra-Biblical religions of the Kingdom of God in the genuine Israelitish and Christian sense and especially in its eschatological conception, we think at once of the Germanic doctrine of the "Götterdämmerung", or if that is supposed to rest on Christian traditions, especially of Parseeism. No doubt the originality of the Parsee eschatology also is suspect. But it can scarcely be entirely explained as of Jewish origin. Perhaps, a careful study of the data will commend to us the conclusion, that "neither has Parseeism been directly influenced by Judaism nor Judaism by Parseeism (at least so far as the Kingdom of God is concerned), but that both religions, each after its own fashion, have

developed conceptions and ideas, which belong to humanity as a whole, and their notable resemblances find therefore their explanation ultimately and simply in the earnest ethical bases of both." The essay is confessedly fragmentary and seems rather suggestive than conclusive. It will repay reading, however, by those who are interested in the questions now so vigorously debated concerning the origin of Christianity and Judaism in oriental thought.

*Princeton, May, 1906.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

**THE APOSTOLIC AGE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN CRITICISM.** By JAMES HARDY ROPES, Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in Harvard University. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906; pp. 327.

As Dr. Ropes himself tells us, the view of the Apostolic age and its contribution to history underlying his book is substantially that maintained by Ritschl. The book is intended for a wider circle than that of technical scholars; and while the acquaintance and interest of the author with the detailed problems shines through on every page, these are not brought unduly to the attention of the reader. The author writes in a vivid, interesting style, which from the point of view of form raises his work above the average and renders it eminently suited to serve its popular purpose.

On the teaching and work of Jesus as the presupposition of the development of the Apostolic age Dr. Ropes scarcely touches. In this lies a serious disadvantage of the method of treating the Apostolic age by itself. It is only fair to say, however, that in the present case this is in no wise due to scepticism with regard to the trustworthiness of the Gospel-traditions, at least so far as the synoptical record is concerned. The author does not belong to the group of critics who think that the first safe ground from which to approach the history of the Apostolic age are the Pauline records. "The picture of the life and character of Jesus as given in the synoptic gospels shows on the whole a remarkable and convincing consistency and credibility." With regard to the Fourth Gospel his views are less conservative. We are told that "its chief value lies rather in the realm of truth than of fact," but this does not mean that its teaching, rather than its history, is authentic. "Truth" in this antithesis means that sort of super-historical truth which can coexist with the total or partial fictitiousness of its setting. The Gospel is great as a product of human thought. In regard to Acts Dr. Ropes takes the position recently advocated by Harnack. The book as a whole as well as the *we* pieces, and, consequently, the Gospel are the work of the man named Luke. This does not preclude, however, a semi-sceptical attitude towards the tradition of the earliest history recorded in the pre-Pauline part of the book. While the results of criticism give a fair degree of confidence in the pictures of the general development of events, the detail is held in many cases to be merely a part of the telling of the story. The speeches are probably no more than the free composition of the writer. On page 78 we get a suggestion of



Von Dobschütz's hypothesis, that the account of John xx, 19-23 represents another version of the story of Pentecost. The early disciples are characterized as "fundamentally Jews, and Jews of a popular, semi-pharisaic, messianistic type; a measure of the spirit of freedom of Jesus with regard to Jewish legal prescriptions is supposed to have lingered among them. Soteriologically they combined the methods of salvation by law and by the death of Christ. The representation of Acts with reference to the persecution or non-persecution of the early disciples is not criticized. The epoch-making character of Stephen's speech from a doctrinal point of view is denied. On the conference of Acts xv. Dr. Ropes' view both as to the reliability of the account and the significance of the proceedings is conservative. In this connection we meet with the following curious statement: "A Christian Church excommunicated by the mother church . . . would probably have been a failure. What form the presentation to the world of pure spiritual religion would have taken we cannot know, but Christianity as we know it would never have come into being (*i. e.* in the case of failure of the leaders to agree at Jerusalem). This suggests a theory about the separability of the essence of pure spiritual religion from all its historic embodiment, which we confess it is hard for us even to imagine. It is assumed that after the conference the Jewish Christians grew more and more one-sidedly Judaistic, a body of sectarian separatists, although James continued faithful to the attitude of approval of Paul. What the church owes to Jewish Christianity are the following four things: (1). The tradition of the life of Jesus in the Gospels; (2). The idea of the Messiah and the whole theological system which this implies; (3). The apocalyptic spirit, *i. e.*, interpreted in modern language, historical optimism; (4). The Old Testament. In passing we observe, that the First Epistle of Peter is, with some hesitation, accepted as genuine; that the Second Epistle is declared a late production of the second century; and that the Epistles of James and Jude are not mentioned anywhere by Dr. Ropes.

The chapters on Paul and Paul's theology are easily the most interesting and eloquent part of the book. The personality of the Apostle is drawn in bold lines. All the epistles, with the possible exception of II Thessalonians and the positive exception of the Pastorals, are recognized as genuine writings of Paul, Ephesians included. We have only two criticisms to make here. The one relates to the somewhat insistent protestation that Paul was not a theologian. It has become a vogue of late to celebrate the Apostle as a man of energy, will, action, organizing talent, the prototype of the ideal modern minister, or, so far as his mental qualities are concerned, the mystic, the poet. He is permitted to be all things to all men, only not a theologian to the theologians. Dr. Ropes exclaims with a degree of pathos: "Has ever a man been so misunderstood and shamefully entreated as Paul out of whose poetry men have made the propositions of a logical system?" We venture to assert, that, if Paul could come back, he would look upon the theological treatment of his teaching as among the least hard to bear of all

the perversions to which he has been subjected. It is quite possible that he would even sympathize with theologians in their present reproach and eclipse. At any rate, the only basis on which such a denial of the theological strand in Paul's preaching and teaching can be made is an arbitrary definition of a theologian as one who cultivates the intellectual and speculative interest for its own sake. But to how many of those who have nobly borne the name of theologian in the history of the Church will such a definition apply? It is simply a modern, vulgar caricature. Dr. Ropes himself admits that Paul was trained in the Jewish theology, and that he carried over this substantially Jewish view of the world and of history into his Christian consciousness, only reorganizing it by the new principle given with the latter, nay on a later page speaks of the Apostle's flight of noble speculation, which the church as a whole was not able to follow. And if Paul was not a theologian, then the title of the author's fifth chapter, "Paul's Theology", is a misnomer. There surely is an inconsistency here. On the other hand, we are thankful for the emphasis which is laid (and to which even the one-sidedness just dwelt upon in a way contributes) on the inseparable connection between fact and truth, history and theology, in the Apostle's mind, on what Dr. Ropes felicitously calls the "dramatic" element in his conception of religion: "Paul's thought of God and Christ and the world is not as of an eternal, unchanging organism, whether mechanical or biological. It is rather always that of a moving panorama. He views the universe not as static, but as dramatic. In history the infinite and the finite meet. This is thoroughly Jewish, and for the religious life thoroughly wholesome." Only we do not quite like the implication of the qualifying adjective "religious" in the last clause, suggesting, as it were, that side by side with the religious view of the world there may be another to which other standards of wholesomeness do apply. We should also like to know how much of this dramatic conception of life is included in that "background of thought and a view of the world" of which we are told on another page that it has now "disappeared", and is the cause of "the repellent strangeness" of much of Paul's method and thought. Nor must it be overlooked that, while the dramatic, eschatological view-point preponderates, another more static representation involving the contrast of the eternal and the temporal worlds as coexisting spheres, is also to be found in Paul, and met merely in the later epistles, but from the beginning, as a passage like II. Cor. iv. 18 clearly shows. The two do not form a contradiction, the temporal world not being eternal; the static dualism is resolved into the dramatic eschatology, but it was reserved for the author of Hebrews to work out this adjustment more clearly. It is not necessary to derive this strand in Paul's teaching from Hellenic influence, as Pfleiderer and others do; but certainly it is an element that comes to meet the Greek type of thought, and we would not go quite so far as to speak of "the peculiarly unhellenic character of Paul's view". Its presence is also noticeable in the Apostle's doctrine of the Spirit, as the element con-

stituting and characteristic of the heavenly world. Dr. Ropes entirely neglects this side of the Pauline conception of the *Pneuma*; he deals with the Spirit exclusively from the point of view of a soteriological power.

The other point on which the author's treatment of Paulinism seems to us open to criticism concerns the manner in which he defines the historical connection between the Christianity of Jesus and that of Paul. "Paul's thought is not a continuous development from the thought of Jesus, but is in a measure a new start, yet so controlled by the supreme expression of Jesus' nature, not in words but in his life and death, that it is fully dependent upon Jesus and in fundamental harmony with Him." In other words, because Paul interpreted the life and death of Jesus as a supreme manifestation of God's love, the new start he made happened to coincide with the central principle of our Lord's teaching, viz., that God is love. And Paul thus interpreted the life and death of Jesus, because indirectly he had come under the influence of the revelation of divine love made in the historic life of Jesus and in his teaching. We would remark upon this: 1.) That in order to establish a true historical connection here it must be shown that the Pauline or the earlier apostolic doctrine of the saving significance of the death of Christ was the outcome of Jesus' revelation of the love of God in his life and teaching. Did the early Christians and did Paul come to believe that Christ's death was a saving act, because they had learned to view his whole life and appearance as a revelation of love, or did this idea spring from other sources? 2.) The close resemblance which Dr. Ropes traces between the Pauline doctrine of the death of Christ and what he takes to be our Lord's teaching on the love of God exists only because in his rendering of the thought of Paul the substitutionary, penal significance of the cross is obscured. To be sure, the cross reveals the love of God, but it likewise reveals the divine justice according to Paul. Of the latter Dr. Ropes does not speak at all. He admits the death was to Paul vicarious, but vicarious he curiously enough interprets as equivalent to "non-penal". What the real rationale of the cross was for Paul, how and why it expressed the love of God, apart from his righteousness, we do not learn. No one who rules out the idea of justice as entering into the transaction of the cross has ever succeeded or will ever succeed in explaining this. The Pauline doctrine becomes irrational when everything is thus staked on the divine love to the exclusion of God's righteousness. Once we take the Pauline statements at their full substitutionary value, the assumed harmony with what is alleged to be the Synoptical teaching on the fatherhood of God disappears, and not merely in the point of historical nexus, but also in the point of identity of conception the proposed theory of the continuity of development between Jesus and Paul appears unsatisfactory. There is no escape on such premises from the position of Wrede, that Paul was the true founder of Christianity, that is, of Christianity historically and soteriologically considered and not as a mere abstraction. The only remedy here lies in a different

interpretation of our Lord's teaching, such as will do justice to some other elements contained therein as well as to that of the divine love.

The Ritschlian predisposition of the author in a theological and not merely historical sense reveals itself in the reserve which he maintains towards the intrusion of the supernatural as a veritable reality in the historical sphere. His observations on the appearances of Christ and on the conversion of Paul go no farther in each case than that the reality of the experience as an experience is affirmed: "There can be no doubt that the first disciples passed through real experiences which they believed to be the appearance to them of the crucified and risen Christ." . . . "There were real events and their effect was momentous." And with regard to St. Paul's conversion we learn that his experience must be conceived in analogy with other conversions; and that, while thus "the non-natural and anti-natural character of the conversion is abandoned", this is by no means equivalent to denying "the divine character of this great event". These quotations sufficiently indicate how the supernatural is here reduced to mode of divine operation by way of immanence. In one of the opening pages of the book occurs a passage which distinguishes between the critical and the non-critical historian after this fashion, that the former takes history as a chain of causes and effects, in which immanent divine forces have wrought out the purposes of God, whereas the latter makes out of it an inscrutable series of divine acts, which one may observe, but the processes of which he cannot expect to understand except as God may directly reveal knowledge of them to us. But such a supernaturalism as would deny itself all recourse to immanence and make everything a miracle has never existed in fact, nor can it be shown that this is the logical outcome of any sane form of it. It is a pure figment of the critical imagination. The exclusiveness of this matter lies with the positivistic theologian, not with the supernaturalist. Dr. Ropes would, in the sphere of history, explain everything from immanent processes. While professing his willingness to accept miracles, he will treat them only as "ultimate facts", i. e., he is not willing to deal with them in his capacity of a historian, and recognize them as direct supernatural interpositions, and so to accord them the significance wherein their value as miracles consists.

By a strange oversight the quotation about the muzzling of the ox in I. Cor. ix. 9 is on page 195 derived from Proverbs instead of from Deuteronomy.

Princeton.

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THE FOURTH GOSPEL: ITS PURPOSE AND THEOLOGY. By ERNEST J. SCOTT, M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1906. (The Literature of the New Testament.) Pp. vii, 379 Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00 net.

A certain lassitude with regard to the discussion of the Johannine problem, so far as the external evidence is concerned, has of late become



perceptible, especially in advanced critical quarters. The feeling seems to be gaining ground that the opponents of the historicity of the record and its discourses can, to say the least, secure no advantage of position by approaching the Gospel on this side of its external attestation, or even from the point of view of its internal evidence so far as the latter is of the nature of a direct self-witness and not merely inferential or based on a comparison with the Synoptical narrative and teaching. In Mr. Scott's book we have an exposition of the Gospel which entirely and on principle dispenses with every presentation of the Johannine question. The author tells us that he simply takes for granted the results of the critical investigation, his position being that "which is now generally accepted by continental scholars". The first or second decade of the second century is broadly fixed upon as the date of composition. But, far from being enthusiastic about this preliminary assumption, the author says: "It may be granted that the external evidence is not sufficient to warrant a decisive verdict on either side." Some might consider this an understatement, but the interesting point to observe is the admission that the external evidence is at least equally balanced. Time was when opponents of the Johannine authorship would not have lightly made such an admission. But, whatever the motive, whether the conviction that the debate about externals has led to an *impasse*, or a general sense of weakness, at any rate Mr. Scott and others with him take refuge into the discussion of what the Gospel itself can teach concerning its date and origin. The whole discussion before us, far from being purely biblico-theological, is professedly critical, and throughout keeps in sight the purpose of solving the Johannine problem by feeling, as it were, the theological and ecclesiastical pulse of the Gospel. Now, it ought not to be overlooked that this is different from placing the internal evidence above the external in weight, because the latter is believed to be inconclusive; it amounts to favoring unduly a very particular kind of internal evidence, that derived from doctrinal and historico-philosophical considerations, and passing by a not inconsiderable volume of internal evidence of much more concrete and direct and emphatic character which the Gospel offers concerning its own origin and claim to truthfulness. Even *a priori* it would seem somewhat precarious to stake everything on an enquiry of this kind, for, as the author himself seems fully to realize, the results which his investigation yields ought to appear entirely untenable for anyone who should feel constrained by the sheer weight of external testimony to accept the Johannine authorship of the Gospel in the old solid sense of ascribing it to the Apostle, the son of Zebedee. In the preface he quite summarily, but we are compelled to believe justly, waives aside the view of Drummond, who would unite the Johannine authorship with the interpretation of the story and teaching as in large part unhistorical. The Damocles-sword of an exceptionally strong external witness (and we need only to read Zahn's and Drummond's presentations to be profoundly impressed with the strength of it) must perforce continue to



hang above every such argument as Mr. Scott endeavors to weave. As to the nature of the argument itself, it is evident that the subjective factor must to a considerable extent enter into this. The explanation of the ideas and tendencies of a document out of an assumed historical milieu, and the dependence on this for fixing its approximate origin and date, will always remain a very delicate procedure. Notwithstanding his deftness of touch and uncommon skill in dovetailing the characteristic outlines of the Gospel into the historical situation as he sees it, we cannot altogether acquit the author of the fault of being too imaginative and credulous in his search for adjustments to environment. He thinks the Gospel is essentially "a work of transition in which primitive Christianity is carried over into a different world of thought". The transition is, in the first place, one from the time in which the primitive tradition was still a living force to a modern time which felt itself separated from the historical origins. The message had to be reinterpreted into new modes of thinking, specifically its universalism required new expression. In the second place, the transition was one from Jewish to Hellenic culture, and the transposal in this sphere was made by means of the language of Greek speculation, which, while it modified the ideas of Jesus and was something alien to the whole spirit of His teaching, yet proved in some respects more adequate to the expression of the substance of the gospel than the Jewish modes of utterance Jesus actually employed, as is illustrated from the ideas of the Messiah and the Kingdom of God. In the third place, the Gospel carries over the revelation of Christ from the world of outward fact to that of inward religious experience, thus avoiding the twofold danger, threatening at the time, of sublimating the history of the life of Jesus into a philosophical allegory on the one hand, or of making religion a matter of mere tradition, destitute of inward impulse and spiritual reality, on the other hand. It is obvious that a view like this offers the largest conceivable opportunity for elucidating the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel almost without a residue of the mysterious. What cannot be explained from the goal of the process of transition can always be explained as a remnant of the stage that formed its point of departure. As Mr. Scott assures us, the author, writing in such a period, is continually striving to find place within the same system for opposite types of thought and belief. There is in the Gospel "a union of opposites". It is gnostic and anti-gnostic, sacramentarian and anti-sacramentarian, traditional and allegorical alike. Nearly every sentence in it might be paralleled with another which appears to indicate a view of different tenor. We confess that we are vividly reminded by all this of the old Tübingen-criticism, and that not only so far as its general tendency-principle is concerned, but specifically so far as it made every doctrinal precipitate the product of the union or compromise of opposites. In the present case this method ascribes to the author of the Gospel a complexness and refinement of theological, polemical and ecclesiastical purpose which it seems difficult to reconcile with the

impression of simplicity and straightforwardness it makes on the average reader. And, besides this, it carries the tracing of divergent strands of thought and the discovery of cross-purposes of policy to such an extreme as to place the Evangelist at not a few points flatly in contradiction with himself and to make him an object of our pity on account of the clumsiness of his methods. As a concrete instance, we may mention what is said about his attitude towards the Lord's Supper. The omission of the account of institution and the substitution for it of the account of the footwashing are interpreted as expressive of the view that not a ritual ordinance but the inward spirit of love, truth, and peace was Christ's real bequest to his disciples. And yet, in the discourse following the feeding of the five thousand in chap. vi. the spiritual process of assimilating the nature of Jesus is associated quite definitely with the ordinance of the Eucharist. The statements towards the close of the chapter are direct allusions to the Eucharist as "the medicine of immortality". And it is granted "that John in this chapter lays an emphasis on the outward rite, which cannot be wholly reconciled with his higher, more spiritual view". "We are compelled to recognize that he himself was affected with the sacramental ideas, against which, in their crude and unreasoned form, he makes his protest." We must confess that the combination of such things in one mind and purpose appears not merely a strange inconsistency, but a psychological riddle to us. The living personality of the Evangelist seems to evaporate under such criticism. What we have left is the pure abstraction of a mental field in which the various theological and ecclesiastical tendencies of the date of writing cross each other. And this dualistic self-contradictory signature is more or less characteristic of the Gospel as a whole. The inconsistencies "to a great extent have their root in one grand antinomy which pervades the Gospel from end to end, and creates an actual cleavage in its religious teaching. The revelation through Christ is explained in the prologue as a temporary appearance in the flesh of the external Logos. This doctrine of the Logos, borrowed through Philo from the Greek philosophical thinkers, had nothing to do with the original Christian message. For the ethical view of the personal life of Jesus it substituted a view which can only be described as metaphysical. . . . No one can read the Gospel in any spirit of sympathy without feeling that the theological view is combined with another of altogether different character. . . . The doctrine of the Logos was . . . by its very nature inadequate to his purpose. It belonged to a world of abstract speculation, and Jesus had revealed the Father by His love and goodness, by the moral glory and divineness of His life. In the Fourth Gospel we have really two distinct conceptions, which are constantly interchanging but can never be reconciled." We gratefully observe that in these statements and throughout the book due recognition is given to what the author calls the metaphysical element in the Gospel. Over against the attempt of Harnack and others to confine this to the prologue, as a mere accommodation to

prevailing modes of thought, and to explain it away in the body of the Gospel, this is gratifying. The Logos-name may be confined to the prologue; the substance of the Logos-doctrine, with its implications of the preexistence, the deity and the life-giving power of the Son of God, is everywhere. Nor could we have seriously objected, if the author, for the purpose of sharply defining the peculiarity of this strand of teaching, had somewhat abstractly separated it from the other aspect of the religious significance of Christ in the conscious spiritual and ethical sphere of redemption. One might even become reconciled to Holtzmann's well-known distinction between a "theological" and "soteriological" hemisphere, although the terminology of this is unfortunate, since obviously to the mind of the Gospel the "theological" is preëminently "soteriological". But Mr. Scott goes much farther than all this. Wherever in his book he happens to touch on the distinction in question, he treats it, either explicitly or by implication, as an out and out antinomy. The metaphysical category and the religious or ethical category are to him mutually exclusive. Now, of course, it is not the historian, but the theologian, who pronounces this judgment. And yet in the hands of Mr. Scott it becomes a quasi-historical judgment, because in a certain sense it is affirmed that the contradiction had historic reality in the consciousness of the Evangelist, that it represented two different and antagonistic forces in his thought, explainable from two distinct sources. The one, the purely religious element, came from the impression made upon him by the historical Jesus; the other, the metaphysical element, he borrowed from the philosophy of Philo; the latter stood related to the former as the form to the substance; and the form in this case was not only inadequate to express the substance, but at bottom incommensurable with and injurious to it. He who is not an entire stranger in the theological world of the present day, will without difficulty diagnose this procedure as virtually a carrying back of the principle of Ritschlianism into the religious experience of John. There was first a time when the Evangelist had an entirely unmetaphysical spiritual consciousness; the Son of God and the Son of man, life and light and truth were to him purely religious and moral conceptions. Then he adopted the Logos-philosophy and subsumed these purely spiritual ideas under its metaphysical categories, and in result of this his theology is at war with the religious experience it seeks to express and convey. We do not hesitate to affirm that this is a construction suspended in the air. There is absolutely no evidence that to the mind of the Evangelist the religious and the metaphysical were ever separated for a moment, much less that he ever felt the latter in any way to be antagonistic to the former. The two are so closely wedded that their union must have been a much profounder process than the hypothesis of borrowing from Philo suggests. This we believe to be true even of the explicit Logos-idea, and much more of the high Christology and soteriology in the body of the Gospel itself. The simple reason why the Evangelist felt no disharmony here is that he was not a Ritschlian,

but had a very pronounced realistic sense of the process of salvation as belonging to the noumenal and not merely to the phenomenal sphere. And, altogether apart from the main issue of the authenticity of the discourses, shall we not have to say, that the same consciousness of a metaphysical background of salvation, though not in so pronounced a form, is yet substantially present in the teaching of the earlier New Testament documents? Mr. Scott might have found more of it, and accordingly estimated the distance between the Synoptists and John more moderately, if he had not interpreted the Synoptical teaching of Jesus after so one-sided a Ritschlian fashion. He does, in our opinion, scant justice to the passage Matt. xi. 27. And he tones down the Pauline Christology so as to make it appear essentially a lower, less metaphysical product than the Logos-Christology of the Fourth Gospel. Even in "the form of God" of Phil. ii. he seems to find nothing higher than in "the man from heaven" of 1 Cor. xv., which latter designation he connects (we think erroneously) with the preëxistent Christ. The whole definition of the difference between the Pauline and Johannine Christologies is vitiated by this.

There is one more point we must briefly touch upon. Mr. Scott, just as little as other advocates of the same position, offers us any psychological explanation of the free handling of the Gospel-tradition, both as regards history and teaching, which he ascribes to the Evangelist. The writer of the Gospel not merely adapted and modified his material after the most unscrupulous fashion, but he also freely composed the discourses. Not to speak of the ethical complexion of this alleged procedure, is there not, from the advanced critical standpoint, a serious psychological problem here? Even if we assume that the writer had not been an eye-witness or disciple of Jesus, it seems difficult to believe, that he, who (as Zahn well puts it) makes all knowledge of the truth and all possession of eternal life absolutely dependent on veracity, who traces back all deception and treason to the devil, that he should have pronounced upon himself a judgment almost too fearful to repeat, by representing as acts and words of Jesus things of which he knew better than his critics that Jesus could never have spoken or performed them. And, of course, if the author claims to be an eye- and ear-witness, as we are practically compelled to understand him, the problem becomes even more grave. It will not do to appeal to the Evangelist's own principle that the Spirit continues the teaching of Christ, so that later insight into the truth attributed to the illumination of the Spirit might be represented as originating from the Saviour and accordingly carried back without serious detriment to the truth into the earthly life of Jesus. For the Evangelist with the utmost clearness distinguishes between the Jesus-teaching of the days of our Lord's humiliation and the Spirit-teaching of the post-resurrection period, and emphatically declares that the latter could not be anticipated because it was dependent on the completion of our Lord's career. By carrying back this large body of Spirit-teaching into the earthly life he would have acted contrary



to his own principle and distinction. Here also the least that can be required of an interpreter is, that, in order to honor the Gospel's veracity, he shall recognize that the Evangelist was in his own mind sincerely and firmly convinced of the truthfulness of his record. To be sure, after that the problem would more urgently than ever appear to press for a solution, how such a conviction could exist in such a mind otherwise than as a result of the fact that Jesus had actually so lived and taught.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE JOHANNINE LITERATURE AND THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By HENRY PRENTISS FORBES, A.M., D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Canton Theological School. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907. Pp. vi, 375. Price \$2.00 net.

With this volume the series of *International Handbooks to the New Testament*, edited by Orello Cone, D. D., has been brought to completion. The series consists of four volumes:—*The Synoptic Gospels*, by George L. Cary, L. H. D.; *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians*, etc., by James Drummond, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.; *Hebrews, Colossians, Ephesians*, etc., by Orello Cone, D. D.; and the present volume, which contains the index of the series. The "General Preface to the Series" indicates the character and point of view of the several volumes:

"These handbooks constitute an exegetical series covering the entire New Testament and constructed on a plan which admits of greater freedom of treatment than is usual in commentaries proper. The space generally devoted in commentaries to a minute examination of the grammatical construction of passages of minor importance is occupied with the discussion of those of special interest from a doctrinal and practical point of view. Questions of the authorship and date of the several books are treated in carefully-prepared Introductions, and numerous Dissertations are inserted elucidating matters of graver moment.

"The books of the New Testament are treated as a literature which in order to be understood must be explained, like all other ancient literatures, in accordance with the accepted principles of the grammatical and historical interpretation. The aim of the writers has been to ascertain and clearly set forth the meaning of the authors of these books by the application of this method in freedom from dogmatic prepossessions.

"The purpose has been constantly kept in view to furnish a series of *Handbooks to the New Testament* which should meet the wants of the general reader, and at the same time present the results of the latest scholarship and of the most thorough critical investigation.

"Accordingly, more prominence has been given to the statement of the results of the critical processes than to the presentation of the details of these processes by means of extended discussions of Greek grammar, philology, and exegesis."

Judging Dr. Forbes' book by this plan there can be little doubt that



it fills well its place in the series. The "freedom from dogmatic prepossessions" said to be characteristic of the series is indeed realized in this volume—as in other volumes which make a similar claim—only in a freedom from a certain kind of prepossessions. The claim as formulated is somewhat misleading, but its meaning is now very generally understood.

Dr. Forbes writes concisely, with a directness well adapted to the presentation of critical results. His Introductions are interesting and instructive, showing thorough acquaintance with the problems involved in his subject, as well as ready mastery of the more important—including the recent—literature of his subject. The most noticeable defect in this latter respect is the failure to make use of Dr. Harnack's *Lukas der Erst* in his introductory discussion of Acts.

Dr. Forbes rejects the Lukan authorship of Acts, placing its composition late in the first century. After calling attention to the phenomena which in his judgment justify this conclusion, Dr. Forbes remarks (p. 4):

"Where evidence of a positive nature is wanting, dogmatism is offensive; but some weight may safely be allowed to tradition; a very reasonable supposition is that Luke was the author of the chief source used, the 'we sections'; and that thence the completed work was attributed to him, just as our first Gospel obtained its name and tradition of authorship from its large use of the Logia of Matthew."

Holding this view of its authorship and date, Dr. Forbes does not estimate very highly the historicity of Acts; and in confirmation of his estimate he points out certain concessions made by Prof. Ramsay which are thought to be damaging not only to the consistency of Prof. Ramsay's view but also to the historicity of Acts as well. Similar damaging concessions have recently been made by Prof. Harnack in his reply to Prof. Schürer (cf. *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1906, Nr. 16 S. 466ff.), but neither Prof. Ramsay nor Prof. Harnack seems disposed to yield his major thesis in favor of a theory constructed on these concessions.

Similar conclusions are reached in regard to the Fourth Gospel (pp. 172f.):

"Some time during the last third of the first century a disciple in the second sense indicated (i. e. not an immediate disciple of Jesus but an early Palestinian believer), John by name, perhaps a priest (Acts vi. 7), resident at Jerusalem, familiar with Jewish learning and with the earlier and later forms of Christian tradition as they developed at Jerusalem, went to Asia Minor, came into high esteem, lived on into the opening years of the second century, died of old age. He brought much Jewish Messianic apocalyptic tradition, was the chief agent in its collection into the book of Revelation, of which he was perhaps a redactor; he became to the "elders" of Asia Minor a venerable source of Christian tradition, a "witness", a great authority; even during his lifetime, as the "memoirs" of the Synoptics came into circulation, his venerable age and his Palestinian origin brought about the beginning of confusion of his personality with that of the Galilean John, of whose end there was no widespread tradition. Soon after the death (for he

was dead when xxi. 23 was written) of this "disciple," "elder," "witness," an Asian Christian, discerning the demand for a presentation of Jesus in accordance with the higher Christology and other current conditions, composed from the traditions of this "witness," from the Synoptics, from oral sources, from ideal invention, a "spiritual" Gospel, and put it forth under the authority—not in the name of this ancient witness, whose personality was in the common mind already confluent with that of the Galilean John."

In regard to the character of the Fourth Gospel Dr. Forbes says (p. 174f.):

"From the standpoint of historical criticism it is inferior to the Synoptics, its tone toward the unbelieving world is cold and repellent, its Christ is somewhat unreal, for to picture the finite and the infinite as united in one consciousness will always surpass human endeavour. To its age it was of the greatest service, its polemic rendered it useful for immediate exigencies; its prologue with the Logos-Christology disarmed the Gnostic and won for the Christian faith great masses of the Gentile world who would have turned their backs to a Jewish Messiah and who because of their former polytheism could never have accepted as Saviour any lesser personality than a deity, its appendix won for it and its doctrine the support of Rome and the West. Also to every age it has a message: its lofty teaching of God the Father, its fine mysticism, its exalted conceptions of future existence, its emphasis upon the *life* of Jesus as a revelation of the divine, its pleas for brotherhood, are all of perpetual worth and power; even those who cannot accept the Logos Christ of its pages can follow the Jesus whose "meat and drink it was to do his Father's will."

"Thus even historical deficiencies may become a source of charm and command; the truth of fiction may be most life-giving; it is the ideal which endures."

The book of Revelation is regarded as composite and its redaction in Asia Minor by the Jerusalem John is placed late in the first century toward the end of Domitian's reign, 93-96 A. D. The theory that the author of the First Epistle of John was the same as the author of the Gospel is regarded as not irrational, "especially if an interval of some years separates their origin". The Second and Third Epistles are assigned to the elder of Ephesus, John the Presbyter, or to some one writing in his name; and to a time when "the era of monarchical episcopal authority had not come but was near at hand".

The comments, based on the English text, take up the greater part of Dr. Forbes' volume, and are necessarily concise. In the case of the Fourth Gospel a comparison with the Synoptic Gospels is frequently made, generally with the result of discrediting its account. The "Introductions" really furnish the key to the commentary which follows.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE MESSAGES OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, the Discourses of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, arranged, analyzed, and fully rendered in paraphrase. By JAMES STEVENSON RIGGS, D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism in Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. xvi, 374. \$1.25 net.

This volume is the tenth of the series entitled *The Messages of the*

*Bible*, edited by Professor Frank K. Sanders, Ph.D., and Professor Charles F. Kent, Ph.D. It aims "to give an interpretation of the Gospel and to set forth the Gospel's peculiar structure and nature". While it is concerned mainly with the discourses of Jesus, as the subtitle indicates, they are given their proper place and value in the unfolding of the history; so that the entire contents of the Gospel are passed in review.

The book is convenient and attractive, pleasant to the hand and to the eye.

A few errors have been noted: Hieropolis for Hierapolis, p. 20, line 12; bishop for bishops, p. 37, line 5; hear for bear, p. 147, line 9; descend for descent, p. 191, third line from the end; some for sons, apparently, p. 196, line 2; our for one, p. 197, line 2; the second dash is misplaced on p. 205, line 19; *the* Perca, p. 224, line 13; their for three, p. 237, line 13; hear for bear, p. 297, line 8, Bernhard for Bernard, p. 296, last line, and p. 376, fourth line from the end; promise for province, apparently, p. 356, line 20, change for charge, p. 362, line 16; *every man* is omitted in the quotation on p. 362, third line from the end.

The plan of the work is excellent. The introduction discusses with sober judgment and ample learning the question of authorship, the influences formative of the Gospel, and the life of the apostle. Marginal notes give in a few words the substance of a paragraph. The Appendix treats briefly but clearly of the narrative of the woman taken in adultery, and gives a list, short but helpful, of books of reference. There is an index of Biblical Passages, confined to the Gospel. The analysis of the discourses is careful and clear, and it is a pleasure to follow Dr. Riggs as he expounds the teaching of Jesus with the ripe scholarship and loving sympathy of one who has long been accustomed to sit at the Master's feet. The devout and reverent spirit with which the great themes of the Gospel are approached wins our confidence. The book, like the Gospel with which it deals, is the fruit of long and loving meditation. Dr. Riggs has brought to the study of John not only the trained intellect of the scholar, but the docile mind and humble heart of the disciple. It is delightful to turn aside for a time from controverted questions, and surrender ourselves to the truth and grace of the Gospel as it is unfolded here.

The work is at once critical and devotional, a book for the study and for the closet. While the marks of careful and discriminating criticism are everywhere apparent, the style is so lucid and the matter so clearly arranged and presented that the unlearned may read with pleasure and profit. The volume is commended to all who are interested in the study of the life of Christ, and we know of no book which may better serve the purpose of an introduction to the Fourth Gospel.

Prof. Riggs' point of view is distinctly though moderately conservative, and his work is characterized by a certain judicial quality which commends him to us as a safe interpreter. John the beloved disciple is held to be the author, and the evidence both external and internal is ably and clearly presented. His residence in Ephesus is accepted. The

historic accuracy of the Gospel is maintained, even against the synoptic narrative, as in the account of the cleansing of the temple, and the date of the Last Supper; while it is held that the evangelist is not a reporter but an interpreter, and has given us not the very words of the Master, but rather a free though faithful rendering of his thought. It is justly remarked that this does not conflict with any tenable theory of inspiration. The skill shown in the analysis of the discourses and in tracing the sequence of thought is especially admirable. The parallel drawn upon pp. 76-80 between the prologue and the subsequent teaching of the Gospel is good and helpful.

While we find ourselves in hearty accord with the spirit and general teaching of the book, there are points in which we believe Prof. Riggs to be in error.

There is no good reason to question whether John the Baptist "understood that the sufferings of Jesus were to be expiatory"; and to hold therefore that he pointed to Jesus simply as the Lamb of God, while the words which follow, "that taketh away the sin of the world", are due to the evangelist (p. 92). The thought of expiation is clearly and explicitly set forth by Isaiah in the passage to which John refers, a passage which the Jews themselves originally applied to the Messiah. When John recognized in Jesus the Messiah, he at once applied to him the prophecy. It is said that these words carry us beyond the teaching of John as recorded in the earlier Gospels. That is true. But surely it is easy to believe that John has preserved for us the profounder teaching of the Baptist, as of Jesus. The Synoptic Gospels confine themselves to the period before the baptism of Jesus, and the Fourth Gospel records only his words after the baptism. The burden of his message in them is repentance and judgment, in John it is the atoning Saviour. There he cries, The Christ is coming; here he affirms, The Christ is come. There is no reason to doubt the literal accuracy of the evangelist.

We think that Dr. Riggs is in general too ready to ascribe to the evangelist what the narrative appears to ascribe to others. It should not be said of ch. 3 "We certainly have in verses 16-21 reflections of the evangelist rather than the direct words of Jesus" (p. 144). There is no indication of a change of speaker in the discourse itself, which flows on without pause or break.

Why may there not have been two cleansings of the temple, at the opening and the close of our Lord's ministry? We are not compelled to choose between the Synoptic narrative and John, but may accept them both (p. 103).

The explanation given of our Lord's words in ii 19, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up", is not satisfactory (pp. 105-6). The reference to his body is said to be simply the later interpretation of the evangelist, who after the crucifixion and the resurrection "reads into the words of Jesus this deeper meaning". The phrase is unfortunate. Men may *discover* deeper meaning in the words

of Jesus, they never *read it into them*. There is no reason to question the literal truth of John's words, that Jesus had in mind the temple of his body. The passage has its difficulties, but they are not relieved by transferring the thought to the evangelist.

To render *hast a demon by insane* (p. 199) is to forsake the thought both of Jesus and of the Jews. Their charge was not that he was deranged but that he was possessed by an evil spirit, and these are not equivalent terms. Whatever difficulties demoniac possession may present, it was plainly the belief of the people and of our Lord himself.

The voice from heaven saying, "I both glorified it, and will glorify it again" (xii. 28), is resolved into a peal of thunder—a mode of interpretation to which we are glad to note that Prof. Riggs rarely resorts, and in the absence of prejudice against the supernatural it is difficult to see why he employs it here.

Prof. Riggs discovers the hand of John in framing narrative and discourses alike, and observes that all the persons introduced speak in the same uniform style, which is the style of the evangelist. The words of Jesus are cast in the same mould, and bear the impress of the same master hand. Yet nowhere is it suggested that the style of John may not be imposed upon the words of the Master, but rather drawn from them—that it is not John who has shaped the speech of Jesus, but Jesus who has shaped the speech of John. Here, indeed, in the relation between the Master and the most sympathetic and receptive of the disciples is a field which has not yet been thoroughly explored and which promises rich reward.

In spite of the work of Dr. Stroud, it is by no means established that Jesus died "literally of a broken heart" (pp. 328, 339). Dr. Edward M. Merrins, in two articles published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of January and April, 1905, has shown that, physiologically considered, the theory is at least extremely doubtful. After a careful review of Dr. Stroud's argument, he reaches the conclusion that "it is doubtful if a single medical writer would, in these days, support the contention of Stroud, that rupture of the healthy heart may be caused by mental emotion". "The Gospel narratives of the death of Christ do not support the theory under examination, for they do not record the usual and unmistakable symptoms of a complete rupture of the heart." "Even in those cases where the heart is diseased, and rupture occurs from the stress of mental emotion, seldom, if ever, is the rupture due to the depressing emotion of grief. It is more apt to be caused by the invigorating passions . . . under the influence of mental and spiritual depression, the heart beats languidly, and there is really less strain upon its tissues than if the patient were in a normal frame of mind." "This theory . . . does not satisfactorily account for the flow of blood and water". "In any event, neither passive grief, nor the stormy stress of emotional conflict, is ever sufficient to rupture the walls of a heart not previously diseased."

It is difficult to resist the impression that the evangelist regarded the



flow of blood and water as a miracle, and the most recent expert testimony confirms his judgment. John has given us his interpretation of the sign in his First Epistle—v. 6-8.

Too much is made of the influence of Paul upon John's mode of conceiving and presenting truth. Prof. Riggs does not push the theory so far as some critics have done, for here, as always, he observes the bounds of moderation. But it is of itself misleading to set the Old Testament, the Teaching of Paul, and the Ephesian Environment side by side as coördinate factors in the formation of the Gospel. There is no evidence, external or internal, to sustain the view that Paul exercised a considerable influence upon the theology of John. The formative influences which conspired to shape his interpretation of the words of the Master, as the Gospel itself indicates, were the Old Testament, the course of events, and the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit. It is not necessary, of course, to affirm that he was a stranger to the teaching of Paul, or even that he was entirely unaffected by it; but that it exercised an appreciable influence which may be traced in his unfolding of the truth there is no reason to believe. Beyond the general substance of their teaching, which they hold in common with all the writers of the New Testament, the points of difference are far more striking than the points of resemblance. There is in all literature no style more thoroughly individual than that of John. It would not have been amiss to omit some one of the references to the supposed influence of Paul, and suggest at least that the intimacy of the apostle with Mary the mother of Jesus may have left its mark upon this Gospel of her Son.

It is pleasant to close with words of praise, and we heartily commend the volume of Prof. Riggs to all who desire a thorough, reverent, and sympathetic exposition of the Gospel.

*Harrisburg, Pa.*

J. RITCHIE SMITH

THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS CONCERNING THE FUTURE LIFE. By WILLIS JUDSON BEECHER, D.D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12mo., cloth, pp. 197. Price 75 cents

Not the least valuable feature of this brief discussion is the insistence placed upon the figurative nature of the language universally employed in reference to the future life. This was true of the Egyptians and Greeks, as well as of the Old Testament writers. So, too, in considering the teachings of Jesus, and of His disciples, we are cautioned against confusing figures of speech with the realities which underlie the pictorial imagery. If the scope of these teachings is limited by this suggestion, their character is shown to be definite and positive. "Jesus treats of the future life as a matter of revelation from God." Its nature is that of "conscious individual existence", characterized by experiences of knowledge, faith, hope, love, for the redeemed, and of suffering for the impenitent. The resurrection body is identical with the present body, but the identity is not that of constituent material.

The judgment is depicted in figures of speech, beneath which is a reality of such tremendous importance, and such immanence, that our daily lives should be adjusted to the Saviour's word: "What I say unto you, I say unto all. Watch" Such are the chief features of this admirable and scriptural discussion.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING HIS OWN PERSON. By WAYLAND HOYT, D.D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12mo, cloth, pp. 200. Price 75 cents.

In his peculiarly picturesque and lucid style the author has placed before us, first, *The Fact of Jesus*, his universality, teachings, claims, sinlessness, power; and, secondly, *The Answer of Jesus*, in which our Lord is shown to have claimed and revealed, not merely sinless and ideal humanity, but absolute deity. Some "conclusions" are added in relation to the "Supernatural Birth", "The Miracles", "The Resurrection". The discussion is most helpful and convincing and cannot fail to attain the purpose of the writer, which is to lead the reader to closer "personal allegiance, to the Personal Christ".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE LYNCHING OF JESUS. By E. T. WELFORD, Pastor First Presbyterian Church, Newport News, Virginia. Cloth; pp. 110. Price, 50 cents net.

The author gives us a careful review of the legal aspects of the trial of Christ, and demonstrates the injustice and illegality of the condemnation and crucifixion of our Lord. The purpose is established by careful citations from existing Jewish laws, and by following the incidents of the arrest and successive trials which culminated in the death of Christ. The purpose is, of course, no novel one, and the facts discussed are as familiar as they are important. The original features of the book are its startling title and its striking phrases. It is to be questioned whether either the title or the phrases are to be commended. The word "Lynching" necessarily conveys certain implications quite foreign to the events connected with the death of our Lord, and there are facts in connection with that event which the title of this book by no means includes. Among these latter might be suggested, the bitter envy, the dark treachery, the malignant cunning of the rulers, and the proud selfishness and weak vacillation of Pilate. The discussion is clear and logical, but it is possible that its most striking features are the least fortunate and felicitous.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE FORMATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By GEORGE HOOVER FERRIS, A. M. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. 1907. Pp. 281. Price 90 cents net

The studies which have resulted in this book on the Formation of the New Testament were begun some fourteen years ago while Mr. Ferris was still a student in the Theological Seminary. As his investigations in early Christian literature were pursued he became interested in "the ground of authority underlying the Christianity of Clement of Alexandria." Among many related subjects suggested by his investigations Mr. Ferris says he has tried only to trace the conflict between the early principle of an "open vision" and the ecclesiastical principle of a closed "canon" (p. 7).

Mr. Ferris has written an interesting and readable book. The view presented is not entirely new but it is ably and attractively presented. The book is not burdened with learned footnotes but the sources are cited when occasion demands and some incidental references are made to the literature of the subject in addition to the general acknowledgments of the Preface. Perhaps in the absence of more frequent references to the literature in the footnotes the failure to give a selected bibliography constitutes the chief formal defect of the book.

The author's point of view as well as the end toward which his discussion moves is revealed by his remark that "a New Testament church is a church without a New Testament" (p. 13, cf. pp. 20, 104, 121, 134, 169). Near the end of his book Mr. Ferris seeks to explain the history and influence of the New Testament as "due to the true and reliable picture of the spirit and character of Christ which it contains", and concludes:—"Therefore, no sharp line is to be drawn between the New Testament times and ours, save that which exists between the character of Christ, and its unrealized expression in the church that now bears his name" (pp. 275f). The point at issue in the discussion is thus the validity of the idea of a New Testament canon. In his view the New Testament church had no New Testament canon, i. e. no authoritative New Testament, and the New Testament has no authoritative value for those who adopt the standards of primitive Christianity. This view raises at once the question of the origin of the idea of a New Testament canon, and with this also the closely allied question of the idea of authority in religion. The connection of these ideas has not escaped Mr. Ferris' attention. He states the issue plainly in the form of questions which present a familiar alternative:—"In order to get a closed canon must we admit the Catholic doctrine of an inspired church? If we reject the Catholic doctrine of an inspired church can we get a closed canon? Indeed, how did we get our New Testament anyway, and just what attitude must a man manifest toward it, who cannot accept it unquestioningly, merely because it has been so accepted for many centuries by the great Christian body? These are questions of living interest, involving claims to catholicity put forth by others than

the Roman Church, entering into the foundation of every Protestant body, and raising anew the very problem of the seat of authority in religion" (p. 13f.). These questions suggest the trend of the subsequent discussion. If the New Testament canon be conceived as a closed authoritative collection and as such the creation of the Catholic Church of the second century or of its leaders, the conception of the New Testament as a canon must be given up by all who do not adopt also the conception of an authoritative church. In other words the idea of a New Testament canon has a rightful place in the Roman Catholic Church but not in the Churches of the Protestant Reformation.

The issue raised by Mr. Ferris' book concerns then the nature and source of authority in religion, or, more specifically, in the Christian religion, since Mr. Ferris is treating of the relation of the New Testament to the idea of authority. The validity of the idea of the New Testament canon, i. e. of the idea of the authority of the New Testament in the Christian religion, alike in the Roman Catholic Church and in the Churches of the Protestant Reformation, is one thing. The history of the process by which the books of the New Testament were collected, the principles on which the collection was made, and the final determination and general acceptance of the extent of this collection, is another thing. Knowledge of this process must be gained, of course, from the fragmentary remains of Christian literature dating from the close of the first century to the last quarter of the second century, by which time the process was practically complete. The account given of this process by different writers depends on their interpretation of this literature, and with their interpretation not infrequently a considerable amount of questionable inferential reasoning is intermingled. Differences of opinion may well arise concerning Mr. Ferris' interpretation of early patristic literature or concerning his judgments of value. Mr. Ferris, for example, estimates some of this early Christian literature very highly, comparing not unfavorably the Epistle of Barnabas with the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Shepherd of Hermas with the Apocalypse of John. These differences, however, are of comparatively little importance. A more fundamental difference of opinion lies back of them. This concerns the validity of two ideas which form an essential part of Mr. Ferris' view of the formation of the New Testament; viz., the idea that the authority of the canon depends on the authority of the Church and the idea that the canon is to be conceived of as a "closed" collection.

That the idea of a canon is very closely related to the idea of authority, we have seen, is recognized by Mr. Ferris. A careful investigation of the origin and nature of the idea of authority in the early Church would, however, require some qualification of his statement that "the New Testament church was a church without a New Testament". For the New Testament Church at a very early time certainly had in its possession some elements of the New Testament. These were preserved, read in the churches, collected, and cannot have been altogether without authority in view of their character and the sources

from which they came. Such an investigation of the idea of authority in the early Church, would, moreover, have made plain the fact that the New Testament Church began its life with a very clear idea and very vital conviction of an external authority in religion, *i. e.* in the Christian religion. In this respect the New Testament Church does not differ from the Catholic Church of the second century. However much the two may have differed in other respects, they had in common the idea of an external authority and the idea of a canon. That which differentiates the New Testament Church from the Judaism from which it sprang is not its freedom from the notion of external authority, but the fact that along with its recognition of a canon (*viz.*, the Old Testament canon), it recognized also another authority from which another canon came. The possession of this other canon in greater completeness and not the creation of a new canon constitutes the distinguishing feature in this relation of the early Catholic Church.

But if the early Catholic Church did not originate the idea of an external authority in the Christian religion or introduce the idea of an external authority, its work of collecting the New Testament books cannot be regarded as the creation of the canon. Only when the collection of the New Testament books is regarded as giving them an authority which they did not possess before, collecting being made equivalent to canonizing, can the authority of the New Testament be regarded as dependent on the authority of the Church. But if the authority of the books of the New Testament be grounded in their nature and source, then the question in regard to what books are authoritative must be settled by the data which reveal the character of the several books and the source from which they come; and the question in regard to the validity of the extent of the collection must be settled by the correctness of the application of this principle. The Church's work, as well of inclusion as of exclusion, must submit to the test of sufficient reason. Did the Church act in accordance with a valid principle, and did she rightly apply this principle? To regard the Catholic Church as the creator of the New Testament canon confuses the work of collection, whether of inclusion or of exclusion, with the ground of authority. The books included in the collection did not receive their authority from their inclusion but were included because for sufficient reason they were regarded as authoritative. In other words the New Testament canon is not an authoritative collection of books but a collection of authoritative books.

But if the authority of the New Testament books resides not in the fact of their inclusion in a collection made by the Catholic Church at the close of the second century, but in the source from which they come, then the New Testament was in principle complete when the various elements coming from this source had been completed. The realization of this completeness, the gathering of these elements together and thus actually accomplishing the unification and general recognition of the complete canon, was the result of a long process in which many



forces were operative and in which many differences of opinion found expression. This conception, however, involves a distinction which is not allowed by Mr. Ferris, for Mr. Ferris conceives of the canon as a closed authoritative collection. The distinction however certainly exists in the word *kanon* which has an active "*norma normans*", as well as a passive meaning, "*norma normata*" (cf. Holtzmann, *Einleitung*, p. 143), and is borne out by phenomena in patristic literature which point to the early existence of small collections of different elements of the later and more complete collection. But if this be true, then the New Testament was in existence in more or less incomplete form in the Church before the collection had attained a completed and more or less generally recognized extent. With this distinction in mind a study of the patristic literature will yield a view of the historical process, by which the collection of the books of the New Testament was made, very different from the view presented by Mr. Ferris.

But in any event it should be borne in mind that the conception of the New Testament Church "as a church without a New Testament"—however long or short this Church's life may be supposed to have been—does not alter the fact that the New Testament Church from the beginning of its life acknowledged an external authority. The issue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Protestant Reformation did not and does not now concern the fact or validity of such an authority but simply the seat of this authority. The fact constituted an essential element of that primitive Christianity from which both Catholic and Protestant Churches have sprung. He who would reject the principle of external authority in the Christian religion must not only go back of primitive Christianity; he must also ground his position by other means than historical evidence.

Princeton

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

BIBLIOTHÈQUE DE THÉOLOGIE HISTORIQUE, publiée sous la direction des Professeurs de Théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. LA THÉOLOGIE DE SAINT HIPPOLYTE par ADHÉMAR D'ALÈS. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie. 1906. 8vo.; pp., liv, 242. Price 6 francs.

In 1905, M. Adhémar D'Alès, prêtre, published as one of the early issues of the "Library of Historical Theology", prepared "under the direction of the Professors of Theology at the Catholic Institute of Paris", a thoroughly worked out treatise on the *Theology of Tertullian*, in a thick, closely printed volume of over 500 pages. He has now added to this, under the same auspices, this thin, loosely printed volume of half the number of pages, called *The Theology of Saint Hippolytus*, though in fact it is less occupied with the theology of Hippolytus than with his enigmatic personality and the puzzling questions which cluster about his relations to the Church and the Bishop of Rome. On a surface view of their contents the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus appear to give us at once a heretical pope and a schismatic saint. As a good son

of the Roman Church Father D'Ales is disinclined to accept this presentation without first attempting to look below the surface. And, looking below the surface, he thinks himself entitled to say that he finds there reason to believe that the pope was misrepresented by the saint and the saint was (afterwards) recovered from his schism. There is nothing, of course, new in this; and Father D'Ales has avoided some of the extremities of opinion which others before him have fallen into,—as, for example, Hagemann's identification of Callistus with Tertullian's Praxeas and the transformation of Tertullian into the real heretic of that controversy. But he has not escaped the temptation to explain Callistus' errors away by a very much too "benign interpretation". And in his engrossment with this task, "the theology of Hippolytus" has very nearly slipped through his fingers. He has given us a very interestingly written book; but we shall go to it in vain to obtain any full exposition of Hippolytus' theological teaching, or even any connected view of his theological conceptions.

If, however, Father D'Ales' discussion of Hippolytus' theology is slight, we have no complaint to make against it on the score of injustice. If we compare the estimate placed on Hippolytus' theological ideas with that placed on Tertullian's, we may even think it overfavorable. Tertullian is supposed to have borrowed from Hippolytus, for example, in his anti-Monarchian polemic; and yet is interpreted as having attained less clarity than Hippolytus in the elements of the doctrine of the Trinity. Not, however, as if Hippolytus had reached exactitude in his conceptions of the nature and relations of the Divine Persons: that is reserved for Callistus. But only as if Tertullian had fallen below even Hippolytus' erroneous construction. On the whole, Hippolytus' conceptions on the subject are very fairly estimated: but on the one side Tertullian is unduly depressed, and on the other Callistus is very much unduly exalted. Such sentences as the following, for example, in which the relations of the three with respect to the Monarchian controversy are summed up, seem to us as misleading as they well could be:

"Illuminism complicated by rigorism led Tertullian into heresy; intellectual pride and a certain rigoristic tendency betrayed Hippolytus into schism. The two sects approached each other at many points, but probably did not coalesce. Between the fanaticism of the one and the arrogance of the other, the pope Callistus governed the Church with prudence and not without boldness. In recalling the minds of men to the consideration of the divine unity he deserved well of catholic doctrine, and we may well believe that in raising himself above the reproach of feebleness he equally deserved well of souls" (pp. 69-70).

What appears to us to emerge from the confused history of the times as the actual facts in this controversy, on the contrary, is that it was "the pope Callistus" and "the saint Hippolytus" who lapsed into heresy, while it was Tertullian who, beating his way upwards, laid the foundations of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The actual teachings of Hippolytus, however, though in such passages as the foregoing there seems to be a disinclination to brand him with

the name of heretic, are not unfairly characterized by Father D'Alès. Take, for example, the following passage:

"Less grossly materialistic than Tertullian in his conception of divine things, Hippolytus is not less incorrect in his explication of the Trinity. For he defends this mystery against the Modalistic attacks only at the expense of the eternity of the divine processes. If the Word exists before all time, He does not take possession of His personality as the Son of God except at the price of a double temporal generation, one divine and the other human. The Person of the Holy Spirit is still more effaced. The fragment *Against Noëtus* does give Him some place; the *Philosophumena* leave Him almost entirely to one side, and explain only for the use of the great public, how the Word appears at the side of the Father; and the explanation too strongly recalls the *deot yewvrotol* of Plato not to arouse the reproaches of those who objected to the intrusion of Greek speculation into the domain of Christian dogma" (p. 30).

The simple fact is that Hippolytus' speculative gifts were of too low an order to enable him, under the spur of the Monarchian attack, to advance from his inherited Logos Christology towards that higher and better construction which gave us the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. His thought moved wholly within the limits of the Logos Christology and over against the subtle Monarchianism of a Callistus he fairly enunciated a developed ditheism. This, Tertullian, with his indefinitely greater intellectual vigor, escaped; and in escaping it he became the father of the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

Had the Church been left to the leading of Rome at this epoch, it is scarcely likely, then, that she would have found in this century the pathway to the formulation of this fundamental Christian doctrine. Rome was divided between rival heresies. It was from Africa that there broke in the light. And at Rome it was not the official leaders of the Church who were in the van. Father D'Alès says truly (p. 208):

"The career of Hippolytus is intellectually the most brilliant of primitive Christian Rome; he personifies Roman Christianity, somewhat as Tertullian at the same date personifies Carthaginian Christianity, with a mingling of light and shadow. . . ."

And this means that the Church of Rome had not yet come to her hegemony in the Western Church. Served by bishops who, so far from being, as Father D'Alès represents, "the exact guardians of orthodoxy", were themselves fomenters of heresy—through four successive episcopates the modalistic theology seems to have been the official faith at Rome—the Roman Church did not produce even among her less highly placed children, a single capable theologian throughout this whole age. The diligence of Hippolytus was, indeed, beyond praise; and he possessed a certain sanity of judgment which enabled him not merely to escape the snares of the modalists to which the official heads of the Church succumbed, but greatly to moderate the Chiliasm of his master Irenaeus. But his intellect was plodding rather than creative, and he was wholly incapable of fulfilling successfully the rôle of leader in the strenuous times in which his lot was cast. He was, however, the best Rome had, and by enrolling his name in the catalogue of her "saints" time soon revenged him on the Church which branded him as

a heretic and cast him out of her bosom as a schismatic. Thus the children of those who stoned the prophets are once more found building their tombs: and not only ready but eager to give them the advantages of as 'benign' an interpretation as is consistent with their greater loyalty still to those who stoned them.

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U. S. A. AND ITS ALUMNI ASSOCIATION. By JAMES CURRY, D.D. Vacaville: Reporter Publishing Company. 1907. 8vo, pp. 206.

This volume presents, in lucid outline, the history of one of the important theological schools of the Presbyterian Church. This seminary has not filled so large a place in the work of the Church as some of its older sisters. Its remoteness has made it small, but it may well be, by and bye, that that same remoteness may make it great. It was the vision of a statesman that led those pioneer Presbyterians to plan and plant for a distant future. Scott and Burroughs and Poor and Alexander were strong men, and they laid firm and deep the foundations of Pacific Coast Presbyterianism. How they did it and why and with what small resources, this book tells. It also tells the story of their successors in the faculty, of the students now scattered over all that far west and not unheard of and unfelt in the east, and of the devoted men who as givers and directors have had their part in making this seminary. Schools, like men, must grow. This school has passed through its infancy and early youth and now enters upon the strength of its course and the maturity of its powers.

The material is admirably handled, the plan is clear, and the whole book altogether attractive. It was obviously a labor of love by one of the oldest and most honored of the alumni of the seminary.

*Trenton.*

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Ph.D., D.D. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 8vo, pp. 239. Price \$1.00 postpaid.

This volume is one of the "College and Academy Series of Constructive Bible Studies". It is designed "to furnish Bible students a guide and companion in their investigation of the apostolic age". The book is attractively illustrated, carefully divided into parts, chapters and sections, and to each chapter is added "Questions and Suggestions for Study" and "References to Literature". The spirit of the book is catholic and its methods admirable, but its value is much impaired by an apparent distrust of the New Testament narratives, and by a denial or minimizing of the supernatural elements.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

**SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.** *A Compendium and Commonplace Book.* Designed for the use of Theological Students. By AUGUSTUS HOEKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. In three volumes. Volume I, *The Doctrine of God*, pp. 370; Volume II, *The Doctrine of Man*, pp. 371-776. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press, 1907.

We have here the first two volumes of Dr. Strong's well-known Systematic Theology. They are a "revision" and "enlargement" of the author's work on this subject, which was first published in 1886, and which has gone through seven editions previously to the present one. The first edition was reviewed, in *The Presbyterian Review* of April, 1887, by Dr. F. L. Patton (vol. VIII, pp. 365-367).

Volume I, which is on Prolegomena and Theology proper, is divided into four parts entitled respectively Prolegomena; The Existence of God; The Scriptures a Revelation from God; The Nature, Decrees, and Works of God. The first volume, however, closes with the chapter on the Decree, so that volume II begins with the closing chapter of Part IV, which chapter treats of "The Works of God", and closes with a section on Angels.

Volume II, after concluding Part IV with a chapter on the Works of God, contains Part V entitled "Anthropology or the Doctrine of Man", and Part VI under the title "Soteriology or the Doctrine of Salvation through the Work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit". This volume, however, closes with the Work of Christ; the Application of Redemption by the Holy Spirit being left for volume III.

Dr. Strong upholds the authority of the Scripture, and bases his theology upon the Bible. He maintains the validity of the theistic arguments, devoting 19 pages to their discussion. This is an improvement upon the manner in which this subject is too often dealt with in current hand-books on Systematic Theology, the theistic arguments being sometimes misconceived and dismissed in two or three pages. The chapter on the Trinity reiterates the author's Trinitarianism, and his doctrine of the decree remains Calvinistic.

In his chapter on Sin and Imputation, Dr. Strong reasserts his former teaching that inherent depravity involves guilt, and also his doctrine as to the way in which the race participates in the guilt of Adam's sin, which doctrine Dr. Strong calls the "theory of Adam's natural headship", but which is in fact the "realistic" view.

Under the head of Soteriology, the author discusses the Person and Work of Christ, and reaffirms his previous conception of the Atonement which he calls the "ethical theory". He holds that Christ, by His Incarnation, became a member of the guilty race in a "realistic" sense, and consequently was Himself involved in the guilt of Adam's sin in the



same way in which we all are. This, he holds, explains how Jesus bore the sin of the human race both by "sharing" and by "substitution"; for it is because Christ was realistically involved in the guilt brought on the race by Adam, that our sins also can be laid on Him.

Dr. Strong shows in these volumes that he is still an Augustinian in his theological views. We are glad to see that his philosophical opinions have led him to depart so little after all from the theological position which he maintained in the first edition of his work. For we cannot agree with Dr. Strong that his "idealistic" and "monistic" conception of God and the world has worked or can work any improvement in his statement of Christian doctrine. On the contrary, we think that it is out of harmony with the supernaturalism of the Christianity of the New Testament, and we rejoice to note that the author's philosophy has, after all, wrought so little havoc with his conception of Christianity. For what is this "ethical monism" as stated and accepted by Dr. Strong? He defines it for us as follows (vol. I, p. 90): "Ethical monism: Universe = Finite, partial, graded manifestation of the divine life; Matter being God's self-limitation under the law of necessity. Humanity being God's self-limitation under the law of freedom, Incarnation and Atonement being God's self-limitation under the law of grace." This monism, Dr. Strong affirms, is entirely consistent with what he calls "Psychological Dualism or the doctrine that the soul is personally distinct from matter on the one hand and from God on the other".

We confess that we are unable to see how this can be. If, as Dr. Strong seems to hold, the whole external world is force and that force the divine will energising, and if humanity is also a "self-limitation" of God, it would seem to follow that there is no place left for any real distinction between either the body and soul or humanity and God. Idealistic Pantheism, according to Dr. Strong, must affirm that God is impersonal, whereas "Ethical Monism" maintains the personality of both God and man. But if the universe and humanity are each God's "self-limitations", it is difficult to see how any doctrine of Creation can be maintained or how idealistic pantheism, with its destruction of Christian doctrine, can be avoided. We have no desire to maintain an "atomic" rather than a "dynamic" conception of matter. That is a question for physical science. But if the "dynamic" conception shall prove to be the true one, this physical force must be conceived as finite and created. Any view which identifies it with God, or regards it as a "self-limitation" of God, cannot be kept from deforming Christian doctrine.

Accordingly, we shall find Dr. Strong's doctrinal views showing the bad effects of his metaphysics just at those points where it was to have been expected.

Take, for example, the case of Miracles. If the external world and all physical forces are simply the divine energy, no basis remains for the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Accordingly we find that Dr. Strong's idea of a miracle is defective. His "prelim-

inary definition" is not so bad. Thus he says (vol. I, p. 117): "A miracle is an event palpable to the senses, produced for a religious purpose by the immediate agency of God. . . ." But in what way, we ask, according to Dr. Strong's metaphysics, is the immediate agency of God to be discriminated, since it would seem that His is the only agency so far as the physical universe is concerned? Hence we find that Dr. Strong's supernaturalism weakens in his "alternative and preferable" definition of a miracle, and that it disappears altogether in his explication of that definition. Thus (I, p. 118) his "alternative and preferable" definition is: "A miracle is an event in nature, so extraordinary in itself and so coinciding with the prophecy or command of a religious teacher or leader, as to fully warrant the conviction, on the part of those who witness it, that God has wrought it with the design of certifying that this teacher or leader has been commissioned by him". Does the distinguishing mark of a miracle, then, lie simply in its purpose, or merely in the subjective conviction that God has wrought it? What is its relation to nature? Dr. Strong tells us what this relation is, and in his explication of his definition we see, as was said, that any distinction between the natural and supernatural, and consequently Christian supernaturalism, vanishes. Thus, he says (p. 119) that his definition of a miracle "leaves it possible that all miracles may have their natural explanations and may hereafter be traced to natural causes, while both miracles and their natural causes may be only names for the one and self-same will of God". Also (p. 119) he says: "Miracle is an immediate operation of God; but, since all natural processes are also immediate operations of God, we do not need to deny the use of these natural processes, so far as they will go, in miracle".

Here, then, is an explicit avowal that there is no warrant for distinguishing a miracle from any other event in the external world, so far as the question of its cause is concerned. And this view, which if carried out would be fatal to evangelical Christianity, is simply the result of Dr. Strong's "Ethical Monism". It is no more consistent with the Christianity of the New Testament writers than any other form of monism which breaks down the essential distinction between the Infinite and the finite.

In the chapter on Creation at the beginning of volume II, precisely the same kind of conflict can be seen between Dr. Strong's older and more Scriptural views and his monistic philosophy. His statement of "Ethical Monism" in the first volume would leave no room for any doctrine of Creation, for we saw that humanity, as well as the physical universe, was regarded as a self-limitation of God. Nevertheless, the author's scriptural inheritance with its more adequate doctrinal implications again intrudes upon the monistic metaphysics in the case of his formal definition of Creation. "By Creation", he says, "we mean that free act of the triune God by which in the beginning for his own glory he made, without the use of preëxisting materials, the whole visible and invisible universe" (vol. II, p. 371). This is a fairly ade-

quate definition of Creation. But in the immediately following explanation of this definition, we see the leaven of the monism at work, when he describes Creation as a "self-limitation" on the part of God. This shows that what Dr. Strong has done is simply to superimpose his monism upon his previous and more adequate views, without ever really having effected a reconciliation between them. The question is not whether the "dynamic" conception of matter is correct or not. The question is whether, when God created the world, He created a something which was not part of Himself and which has some principle of relative persistence. By affirming that the whole of finite existence is a "self-limitation" of God, Dr. Strong really leaves no room for asserting the creation of finite persons, so that his view cannot consistently be made to harmonize with that of Lotze, which latter view Dr. Strong affirms to be very like his own.

There are other sections in these volumes which we cannot but regard as unsatisfactory.

One is the section on the imputation of Adam's sin (vol. II, pp. 593ff.). Dr. Strong affirms that the guilt of Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity because it really was their own, or rather, because it was their own in a "realistic" sense. In other words, he accepts the doctrine known as "Realism", *i. e.* that the race was in Adam *realiter*, and so sinned in him. The federal or representative basis for the doctrine of imputation Dr. Strong rejects, and says that it makes the idea of imputation "arbitrary" and "mechanical". This criticism of the federal view is unfair. This view does not regard the imputation as either arbitrary or mechanical. The federal theologians held that Adam was appointed the federal head of the race because he was its natural head. The sin of Adam or the guilt of his first sin is imputed to his posterity because it is properly theirs in accordance with this representative principle. This, we believe, gives not only a more Scriptural, but also a more adequate ground for the participation of Adam's posterity in the guilt of his sin. For what is sought is precisely a just ground for the participation of the race in the guilt of Adam's first sin. Now, the "realistic" view, besides resting on a well nigh exploded metaphysics and one that would have a destructive influence on other Christian doctrines, seeks a ground for the personal responsibility of each individual, in regard to Adam's sin, in an act that was totally unconscious and involuntary so far as each is concerned. This appears to us far more arbitrary than the principle of representative responsibility.

The author's conception of the Person of Christ and of the Humiliation of Christ (vol. II, pp. 669-710) is also inadequate. Dr. Strong formally accepts the Chalcedonian Christology. But he asserts that the doctrine of two consciousnesses and of two wills is an unwarranted addition to the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures, and he affirms that Christ had but one will, consciousness, and knowledge. But what meaning, then, can attach to the bare assertion that there were two natures in Christ? Was the one will omnipotent? If

so what becomes of the reality and completeness of the human nature? Or was the one will finite and limited? If so what becomes of the divine nature? In other words, the doctrine of the two wills is a necessary implication of the doctrine of the two natures, and the assertion that our Lord after the incarnation had but one will, consciousness, and knowledge, must lead either to docetism or to kenoticism. It has led to the latter in the case of Dr. Strong. He distinguishes his view from the kenotic theory, it is true. He says that the kenotic theory holds that in the Incarnation, the Logos laid aside some or all of the divine attributes; while his view is that the Logos incarnate gave up the "independent exercise" of these attributes. But when we ask what this vague phrase means, we find Dr. Strong affirming that "omniscience gives up all knowledge but that of the child, the infant, the embryo, the infinitesimal germ of humanity. Omnipotence gives up all power but that of the impregnated ovum in the womb of the Virgin." This, of course, is just the extreme form of the kenotic theory, as held, for example, by Gess.

The theory of the Atonement set forth by the author we cannot but regard as being as unsatisfactory as his doctrine of the Person of Christ. To begin with, it is unfair to call the Anselmian view "the Commercial theory." It is still more unfair to fail to recognize the advances over Anselm's statement made by the Satisfaction doctrine since Anselm and especially in its modern advocates. For example, as Dr. Patton pointed out in his review of the first edition of Dr. Strong's book, it is neither in accordance with fact nor is it just to apply to the view of the Atonement advocated by Dr. Charles Hodge a term that is most generally understood to indicate a view of this doctrine which Dr. Hodge always opposed.

Dr. Strong reaffirms what he calls the "Ethical theory", holding that Jesus by His incarnation became really or rather, we should say, "realistically" involved in the guilt of the race, and that for this reason our sins also can be laid upon Him. This is what Dr. Strong calls a combination of the ideas of "substitution" and "sharing." This we regard as an eclectic view which raises more difficulties than it solves. According to Dr. Strong, Jesus in His incarnation assumes human nature which was in Adam *realiter*, and had been corrupted by him. Our Lord, however, had no guilt resulting from any personal sin: He had none of the depravity of human nature; for, according to Dr. Strong, the Savior was purified from this by a special action of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin. Jesus had, then, by a participation in the "realistic" sense, the guilt of Adam's sin which attached to humanity. In a word, sin was not imputed to Him, but He had just as much of the race sin as He was not relieved of. The question, then, would naturally arise whether our Lord did not owe the penalty of death on His own account. Dr. Strong is, of course, ready with an answer to this obvious objection to his view. He says that, while it is true that Christ owed the penalty of death for Himself on account of

this Adamic guilt, nevertheless, this realistic relation to humanity explains why the guilt of all our sins could also be imputed to Him. This guilt Dr. Strong affirms that Christ bore for us.

This, however, does not help matters for Dr. Strong's theory. According to his doctrine of responsibility, it can attach only to a sin which one has "originated" or "in the origination of which" one has "had a part" (vol. II, p. 510). Here, then, is a dilemma, viz.—if Christ can be said to have "had a part" in the origination of our sins, by reason of his connection with humanity, then, He would be responsible, according to the logic of Dr. Strong's view, just in the sense in which He is held by Dr. Strong to be responsible for Adam's sin. Hence, Christ would owe the penalty of death on His own account for our sins, and, hence, could not be our substitute. On the other hand, if Christ had no part in the origination of these sins of ours, then, according to Dr. Strong's theory of responsibility, Christ would have no actual responsibility for our actual sins, in which case it is, to say the least, a fair question whether the representative relationship on the basis of the Covenant is not a more adequate basis for the imputation of our sins to Christ, than the realistic view of Dr. Strong. Indeed, the logic of Dr. Strong's view demands a responsibility of our Lord *on His own account* for all human sin, as Dr. Strong acknowledges (vol. II, p. 758). But if this is so, how can Christ be said to bear our sins as our substitute? This will suffice to show that the ideas of "sharing" and of "substitution" cannot be harmonized or brought into one consistent view of the nature of the Atonement.

There are some inaccuracies in these volumes to which attention should be called. We have alluded already to the author's characterization of the view of the Atonement which is usually known as the "Satisfaction" doctrine. Another error is the attribution to Gausson of the mechanical or "dictation theory" of Inspiration (cf. vol. I, p. 209). It is true that, in his work on Inspiration, Gausson does use the word "dictation" in giving his view of the nature of the inspiration of the Scripture. But when Gausson comes to explain his view, he again and again repudiates what is generally known as the "dictation theory", and it is a mistake to classify his view under this head.

Another and more serious historical error is the statement in vol. I, p. 46 that Cocceius "founded" the Federal or Covenant Theology; and also the statement, in vol. II, p. 612, that the Federal Theology "had its origin" with Cocceius. This is not the fact of the matter. It is not accurate even to say that Cocceius was the first to give this idea a central place and teach what may be called a Covenant Theology. In Holland, for example, Cloppenburg taught a Covenant Theology before Cocceius (cf. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* III p. 200; also G. Vos, *De Verbondsleer in de Gereformeerde Theologie*). And if we look simply for the idea of the Covenant of Grace we can find it long before Cocceius, in Zwingli, Bullinger, and Calvin, and quite fully treated by the Heidelberg theologian Ursinus, a contemporary



of Calvin (*op.* vol. I, pp. 98ff.), and also by Olevianus in his *De Substantia Foederis* (cf. Südhoff, *Ursinus und Olevianus*, p. 573ff.), and by Sohnius, *Met. Theol.* (cf. Bavinck, *op. cit.*), and in Switzerland by Musculus, *Loci Com.* 1599, Polanus, *Syntagma* 1609, and Wollebius, *Compend.* 1625. For a fuller statement compare the works of Bavinck and Vos already cited. Dr. Vos has shown clearly that the Covenant idea in theology had a development in England and Scotland long before the time of Cocceius. When, now, we turn to the Covenant of Works, we find that it is taught clearly though briefly by Ursinus (*Summa op.* I, p. 10). Also in the Roman Catholic theology, we find the idea of the Covenant of Works and the federal headship of Adam clearly affirmed by Catharinus at the time of the Council of Trent (cf. Sarpi, *Hist. of the Council of Trent*, E. T. ed. 1640, pp. 175, 176). Indeed, the roots of this idea can be traced way back to Scotus in the middle ages (cf. Scotus, *In Sententiæ 2 dist. 22, n. 8*, quoted by Schwane in his *Dogmengeschichte d. mittleren Zeit*, pp. 411, 412).

In closing this review of Dr. Strong's theology, we do not wish to leave upon our readers the erroneous impression that our attitude to the book is simply one of adverse criticism. This is not the case. These volumes of Dr. Strong in their statements of doctrine and definitions as contained in the larger print, are remarkable in most instances for their clearness and conciseness. It is only when the author comes to the further elaboration of his views, that the leaven of his "monism" is found to enter. The volumes, moreover, exhibit Dr. Strong's wide culture in the sphere of Systematic Theology. We rejoice, furthermore, in his defense of generic Augustinianism, and wish to congratulate him upon the completion of the first two volumes of the eighth edition of this his *magnum opus*.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

JESU IRRTHUMSLOSIGKEIT. Von Professor D. LUDWIG LEMME. Heidelberg: Gr. Lichterfelde; Berlin: E. Runge. 1907. 8vo, pp. 43.

This pamphlet is one of the series of "Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen" now publishing by the conservative theologians of Germany as some sort of a reply to the popular liberal series called "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher". It presents a striking contrast to the contemporarily published brochure of Arnold Meyer in the rival series, entitled *What is Jesus to us to-day?* both in positiveness of tone and in definiteness and strength of argument. Prof. Lemme introduces the problem which he takes up and states the issue in a striking and trenchant way. Ours, he says, is a time which rejoices in freedom from all authority and rejects especially the absoluteness of the Christian revelation. It prefers a Relativism which admits its superiority but not its finality. In other words, the issue is one between naturalism and supernaturalism, between relative superiority and absoluteness;

for with the denial of Jesus' infallibility, which is necessary to his divinity, the absoluteness of Christianity falls to the ground. That Jesus claimed to be infallible is evident from the Synoptics (Matt. xi. 27) as well as the Fourth Gospel. The author puts the alternative rightly: Jesus' claim is that of a self-deceiver or of a divine being. There is no redemption without an absolute revelation, and no absolute revelation without a transcendent personality, one that is infallible. The roots of the present denial of Jesus' infallibility are found in the theory that religion and knowledge can be separated. After Kant's blow to religious metaphysics, Schleiermacher located religion in the feelings. The truth of the Christian revelation was not a question to him. Ritschl separated religion and knowledge still further. Prof. Lemme's refutation of this false position is clear and strong, showing that the absoluteness of the Christian religion includes in itself the claim to absolute truth.

An inexplicable digression occurs at this point. A long excursus is inserted on the superiority of Jesus' world conception (*Weltanschauung*), i. e. that of the kingdom of God or New Testament Theism, to Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, and evolutionistic Immanence. It is an excellent piece of work, but seems nevertheless to wander from the subject immediately in hand, which is the errorlessness of Jesus. The author ultimately, however, returns to his proper subject and brings his argument to a close by raising and attempting to meet the objections that Jesus betrayed his fallibility in that he was deceived as to the time of his second coming and in that he shared the superstitious beliefs of his contemporaries regarding demons. Similar objections, drawn from the case of the fig-tree, the reference to Jonah, and the ascription of Ps. cx to David, he postpones the discussion of to a later occasion; thus leaving his present discussion regretfully incomplete.

To the first of the two objections which he takes up the reply is offered that it is based on a mistaken exegesis. Jesus, in Lemme's view, did not mean to promise a sensible, visible "coming in the clouds of heaven", in the literal sense. He meant only to promise the coming of the kingdom of God in power, the spreading and effective working of the Gospel. His words to the high priest, "From now on" (Matt. xxvi. 64), indicate, says Lemme, not a momentary event, but a permanent manifestation. His coming will not be local, but as the lightning's shining from horizon to horizon, which prophecy was and is being fulfilled. Whether or not one recognizes the truth of Christ's prophecy of His coming depends, therefore, on whether one admits the reigning power and authority of the resurrected and ascended Lord. The second objection Lemme seeks to meet by a definition of his own of what are called "demons" or "devils". They are, he says, psycho-physical powers, mysterious in origin and character, which injure the soul in an unethical way ("widersittlich" or "unethisch"), and leave the nervous system in bondage to disease. Jesus did not, he says, like the common folk, consider them personal beings, for He did not use the

customary superstitious formula (cf. Josephus) when expelling them. He commanded them to go out of the possessed, no doubt; but this no more proves that He shared the contemporary superstitions than does His rebuking the winds and the sea. His parable of the unclean spirit is readily explained as symbolic-poetic phraseology. He meets His greatest difficulty in applying that view in the account of the Gadarene demoniac. But really, he remarks, the critics (such as Edouard von Hartmann) have no right to employ this incident for their purposes, since they declare it unhistorical. It is, however, as great a stumbling block to Lemme as to the "critics" he is criticising; and he can get over it only by himself supposing that Mark "fructified" his recollection of Peter's teachings with Palestinian enquiries, which resulted in the creeping in of the popular tradition. This belief of the people Jesus himself, however, Lemme insists, by no means shared.

This brochure is, as we have seen, but a partial treatment of the theme. It is to be commended, however, at least as exhibiting a courageous attitude toward the present rationalistic tendencies which would fain whittle Christianity down to nothing. It is one thing to say that Jesus "increased in wisdom" and even late in life was ignorant of some things (Mark xiii. 32), but it is quite another thing to accuse Him of positive error in thought and speech, as Beyschlag, Meinhold, Schwarzkopf, and Max Meyer, for example, do. Unquestionably His authority as Revealer is thereby threatened. The attribution of ignorance of certain things to Him may easily be borne by those who believe in the two natures. But when we speak of error, where will be our anchoring ground? If one statement is untrustworthy, why not another? If it be suggested that his fallibility extended only to things of no soteriological importance, we are constrained to ask how we are to decide between things soteriologically important and things soteriologically unimportant? And can we include under the latter such matters as the authority of the Old Testament Scriptures or the fact of our Lord's second coming? The question is a large one. And it is to be hoped that Prof. Lemme will return to it later and give it a more exhaustive treatment and from an even more positive point of view.

Halle.

H. D. DAVIES.

WAS UNS JESUS HEUTE IST. Von Professor D. ARNOLD MEYER. Zurich, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1907. 8vo, pp. 56.

This brochure is one of the series of "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" now publishing in Germany on the part of the liberal theologians in an effort to deal in a scientific way with the many significant religious problems which confront the thinking Christian public. The contributors include in their number such writers as Wernle, Bousset, Wrede, Schmiedel, Pfeiderer, etc. The appearance of their brochures has occasioned the publication of an opposing conservative series entitled "Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen", to which such scholars as

Zahn, Karl Müller, Grützmacher, König, Kähler, and Haupt have contributed.

The author of the pamphlet now before us begins by enumerating the various views of Christ's person which have been held heretofore, though, to be sure, even this preliminary estimate of the history of the subject will not command the assent of all readers. To Peter, we are told, though Jesus was the Messiah, He was no more than a human personage. Matthew, no doubt, adds "Son of the living God" to his confession; but this is a later gloss. Nor was Paul's Messiah God. His strict Jewish monotheism forbade that. Not until the Gospel came to the Greeks was Jesus called God. The Greeks were familiar with divine powers and appearance-forms, ascribing divinity to Godlike men. The Fourth Gospel took the bold step of asserting the incarnation of the highest of these divine powers, the Logos, in the man Jesus. Athanasius needed the deity of Christ to secure the doctrine of immortality. To the Romish Church Jesus was its heavenly king, as Jupiter was the ruler of the civil state. To Anselm Jesus was the knight who paid the people's ransom to God as an offended King. The German mystics saw in Christ the world-principle of life poured out from God, Luther's Christ was the mighty Victor over Death and Satan, conceived as personal powers. Following Strauss and Renan German investigation found in Jesus a child of his own time, sharing its ideas and errors.

But what is Jesus to us to-day? Certainly an overwhelming majority of his followers hitherto have believed in His deity. But now it is only by denying his deity that men can stand on the sure ground of truth and religion. There are three cogent reasons for denying it: (1) The doctrine was a late development of Christian thought. Paul did not teach it. The persistency of the doctrine rather astounds the author, but is explained as follows. A god-man was necessary so long as men believed that such personal powers as Death, the Devil, and Demons stood between them and God. Now, men see that these powers are only a part of the natural course of things and that there is no need of God's descending from heaven. He can now speak to men through nature and especially through the one real man Jesus. (2) Jesus Himself did not claim to be divine. He presented Himself for the baptism of the forgiveness of sin; and He refused the title "good", as belonging to God alone. (3) The religious ground for rejecting the deity of Christ is the need of a direct, immediate relation to God. Hence it is a contradiction to speak of Jesus as a Mediator. Christ completed His work when He secured for us an immediate communion with God, such as He Himself had.

The author's positive reply to his question he has summarized as follows: Jesus is for us the founder of our faith, that unique personality that draws us into its own faith and love; the one whose cross signified the victory of the good; the one who redeemed us from sin and guilt by bringing us into relation with his conquering love, which awakens in us self-reliance and new joy; the one who above all recog-

nized the value of humanity; the voice of God to us, revealing His love and calling us home to the eternal Father heart. In one sentence: "Jesus draws us into his own belief in the holy Father-love of God and into His holy life of love and makes us thereby truly happy and free, and gives our life true worth and significance."

The author expects, of course, much contradiction to this reply. A fuller list of objections to it could scarcely be drawn up, indeed, than the one he has himself given us. It does not recognize the essential deity of Christ, His preëxistence with God, His incarnation, His miraculous birth, His miracles, His claims to divine honor, His foreknowledge of His death and resurrection, the atoning significance of His blood, His resurrection and ascension, His permanent mediatorship, His second coming, or His office in the last judgment. The author fully admits that he has broken with the church doctrine, saying, "We do not believe in the deity of Christ in the ecclesiastical sense, but see in Him rather the real man". In thus severing his connections with the church multitude, he in effect confesses that he is speaking for a very small number, when he says that Jesus "for us to-day" is but a simple man. But at least the frankness of his statement of his position is admirable. He wishes to avoid all compromise, and takes his stand firmly on openly Unitarian ground. He will not pray to Jesus, but only to God. To criticize his reply, then, would be only to criticize the general Unitarian position.

We cannot help seeing in this brochure, however, an illustration of what Prof. L. Lemme has spoken of, viz., that "theological rationalism lives on half-truths and obscurities". Particularly obscure is the author's explanation of how his human Jesus can be our Saviour from sin and guilt. No pretense is made of elucidating the declarations of the Scriptures on the matter; there is only a casual, poetic, sentimental reference to the parable of the prodigal son. Vagueness is indeed characteristic of the whole pamphlet, except at the one point where the author rejects the deity of Christ. In that he is clear and emphatic enough. It is a composition surcharged with the strongest negatives but containing only a few weak positives as a compensation therefor.

Halle, Germany.

H. D. DAVIES.

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## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE FOREIGN MISSIONARY. An Incarnation of a World Movement. By ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, author of *New Forces in Old China*, etc. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1907. Pp. 412.

This volume is in no sense an encyclopædia in its form, but it is in a very true sense encyclopædic in its scope. Such a fund of fact pertinent to any single subject is rarely found within so limited a



compass. Indeed, one of the first things which strikes the reader of this book is the comprehensiveness of the author's treatment of his subject. The table of contents promises completeness of treatment and it accurately indicates what the book contains. Its promises are faithfully fulfilled. We are never tempted by its title to read a chapter only to discover it all title and no treatment.

And the discussions are as clear and convincing as they are complete. We are always sure of Dr. Brown's meaning. He knows what he thinks and why he thinks as he does. This is no hasty compilation of borrowed opinions. He has evidently thought out each problem presented to a conclusion which under present conditions is as satisfactory to him as any can be. He does not pretend to have said the last word on any topic, but he does say with a definiteness which is refreshing what is in his judgment the best word. He is modest always, but none the less masterful. He is fair always, but none the less firm. He is charitable always, but none the less conclusive. Therefore, Dr. Brown's conclusions are hard to escape. Founded on irrefutable facts, presented often in a charming style and always with a love for the laws of logic, his missionary policy commends itself as scriptural, as sensible and as suited to the situation in which the church finds the mission fields to-day.

And Dr. Brown's conclusions are the more decisive because of the standpoint of the whole book. As he most pertinently remarks in the preface, it is "the missionary who incarnates this enterprise". He is "the chief human factor in the success or failure of the missionary movement", and it is he "whose character and methods are the objects of the sharpest criticism". Now, it is this "incarnation of a world movement", this "chief human factor" in this world movement, who speaks through these pages in trumpet tones. He opens up to us his heart that we may see his motives and aims and rewards. He admits us to his life that we may behold his back-breaking burdens and his heart-breaking problems. He listens patiently to our questions and answers them, and to our criticisms and makes us ashamed of them. He convinces us not only that his work is absolutely necessary, but that it is marvelously successful, so successful that naught but divinely approved men and divinely appointed methods with the divine blessing can explain the results attained in a single century. In a word, the foreign missionary is himself in his conceptions, character, conduct, and conquests, one of the very best arguments in the concrete for foreign missions. Of course, Dr. Brown is not the first to use this argument, but he has the honor of being the first to develop it in detail and to demonstrate its full power. And for this the church owes him a debt of gratitude.

*Princeton,*

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

LISTENING TO GOD. By HUGH BLACK. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1907. Pp. 310. \$1.25 net.

This collection of sermons obtains its title, according to well estab-

lished custom, from the first in the series. The volume is dedicated to "The Congregation of St. George's United Free Church, Edinburgh, in happy memory of ten years ministry", and is in the nature of a valedictory. These sermons, however, need no other introduction to the American public than that which their own merit gives them. They are abundantly able to make their own way to the hearts of those who now read them, as doubtless they did to the hearts of those who first heard them.

These are simple sermons, simple in the best sense. Their meaning is as clear as crystal. Their diction is direct and yet dignified. There is no straining for effect or rhetorical display, nor are the ideas of the author obscured by his idioms.

These are scriptural sermons. To the reader with an average knowledge of the letter of Scripture, many of the texts used will be quite unknown. And when the text employed is well known it is sometimes viewed from an uncommon angle. But whether it is the text or the viewpoint which is unfamiliar, the topic selected is suggested in and sustained by the text chosen. In a word, in no case is a passage used merely as a point of departure, although these are topical rather than textual sermons. And these sermons are not only based on Scripture, they are buttressed by Scripture. Scripture quotations are abundant and appropriate, and that the author's mind is full of Scripture is made evident from the amount of Scriptural phraseology prominent where definite Scripture passages are not cited.

These are spiritual sermons. They are not polemical, holding a brief for some school of criticism. Nor are they merely ethical in the interests of some code of morals. They are evangelistic in that they present the essence of the Gospel, and they are evangelical in that they embody the great doctrines held in common by the Reformed Churches.

We commend these sermons to the pulpit, to the pew, and especially to those who now sit in the pew but who are preparing to stand in the pulpit. To the last named class they should serve not perhaps as ideals, for with all their excellencies they can hardly be called great sermons, but as models. And as models in those respects in which the pulpit of to-day is often weak, clear comprehension, careful expression and compelling statement of fundamental truths.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

OUR MISUNDERSTOOD BIBLE. By H. CLAY TRUMBULL. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1907. Pp. 308. \$1.00 net.

Those who were readers of *The Sunday School Times* while Dr. Trumbull was the editor will find in this book much which first appeared in that periodical in the form of editorials. The matter selected for publication in book form is well worthy of thus being given more permanent shape. All the chapters are interesting and illuminating. The first five, which deal with some general rules for Biblical interpre-

tation, are especially helpful and should be read and remembered by every student of the Bible. The chapters following, which deal with specific texts and truths, command our attention even if they do not always win our assent to their assertions; as, for example, when, in the chapter entitled "Are children born condemned or redeemed?" Dr. Trumbull takes the Arminian position. In the main, however, we can heartily commend this little volume, especially to those who have no acquaintance with the original languages of the Scriptures. For, as the author writes in his preface, whether we agree with him or not, "good can hardly fail to come of readers being stimulated to a closer examination of the grounds for believing or of questioning as to the ideas they have been accustomed to connect with certain Bible words and terms and truths".

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

**TAKING MEN ALIVE.** Studies in the Principles and Practice of Individual Soul Winning By CHARLES GALLAUDET TRUMBULL, Editor of *The Sunday School Times*. New York: Young Men's Christian Association Press. 1907. Cloth, 8vo. Pp. 199.

It is not often that a son is able to extend the influence of a father along its most helpful lines; yet this has been the privilege of Mr. Charles G. Trumbull in his studies and addresses, on soul-winning, of which this volume is in large measure the embodiment and result. When Henry Clay Trumbull published his little book entitled "Individual Work for Individuals", he declared that, looking back upon fifty years of active Christian service, he could see more direct results of good through individual efforts with individuals than through the words spoken to thousands of auditors, or through the pages of periodicals and books; and it is interesting to note that of the thirty volumes which came from Dr. Trumbull the one which seems to have the widest circulation and influence is this which treats of personal religious work for definite individuals. It was to this book, which consists largely in the narration of incidents from the life of the author, that Mr. Charles G. Trumbull turned as a text book from which to give instruction in soul winning. In the experience of his father he finds certain simple principles clearly set forth. These principles he classifies by continual references to his father's book, and by forceful extracts from its narratives.

Stress is laid upon the effectiveness and difficulty of this method of Christian work, upon the simple equipment of a personal knowledge of Christ, upon the necessity of a winning and sympathetic approach, upon the careful use of the Bible, and the acceptance of every possible opportunity for definite work. The book is arranged for the use of study classes, with topics and questions for discussion and review, but every individual reader will find here a personal message, and an impetus and an aid in Christian service.

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**THE FRIENDLY YEAR.** Chosen and arranged from the Works of Henry van Dyke. By GEORGE SIDNEY WEBSTER, D. D., Pastor of the Church of the Covenant, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. 12 mo., cloth. Pp. 185. Price \$1.25.

A true service was rendered to the wide circle who enjoy the writings of Dr. van Dyke, by the publication of this tasteful little volume of selections from his writings, so arranged as to bring a brief message for every day of the year. The necessity for this new edition demonstrates how truly the service has been appreciated. The extracts are marked by the broad sympathy, the genial optimism, and the felicitious style which characterize the writings of this popular author.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN LIFE** By GERARD B. F. HALLOCK, D. D. New York: The American Tract Society. 12 mo. Cloth pp. 193. Price 75 cents.

This is a most suitable book to place in the hands of enquirers and young converts, and is full of suggestion for the mature Christian. In relation to the Christian life, as set forth by Jesus, the author considers, its importance, evidences, conflicts, maintenance, joys, trials, duties and rewards.

Each subject is treated with simplicity and clearness and with distinct reference to the exact words of Jesus. The volume well merits its place in the series on the Teachings of Jesus.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**THE MAKING OF SIMON PETER.** By ALBERT J. SOUTHOUSE. Eaton & Mains. New York: Crown 8vo. pp. 291. Price \$1.25 net.

In a series of concise chapters, the author traces the development of the disciple from "Simon the Learner" into "Peter, the Man of Rock". In each chapter some historic incident is reviewed; the moral principle which it illustrates is stated; and then is made the application to life and experience. The reader is stimulated to seek a close and faithful fellowship with Christ.

*Princeton.*

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

**THE COMING MAN.** By Gardner S. Eldridge. Eaton & Mains. 12 mo., pp. 197.

"The Coming Man" is a volume of brief compass which bears evidence of wide reading and studious thought. But, while there is much that will be found stimulating and helpful, we cannot but feel that the author's viewpoint is not well taken. His aim is apparently the exal-

tation of the human "Man is slowly vindicating himself by essential worth" (p. 7). We read of "The deathless, intangible, almighty spirit of a man that sets out to conquer the world, develop humanity and invade heaven" (p. 60), of "The eternal spirit of manhood" (p. 62), of "A man's profound faith in his own underlying manhood" (p. 109). Such expressions accord but ill with Paul's, "In me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing."

Salvation in the author's view lies in "the better impulse that lifts its protests till it wakes the echoes of the Eternal Spirit" (p. 65). Man "builds himself towards nobler things" (p. 147). "Through his strivings after righteousness he is moralized" (p. 111). The method is that of evolution. "God holds himself responsible for the evolution of the race" (p. 103). Not only is "the evolutionary process the method of the Maker", "it is also to be the method of man". Sin, atonement, regeneration receive utterly inadequate treatment at the author's hands.

He betrays a curious inexactness in his Biblical quotations. Paul's use of "mystery" is misapprehended by him (p. 137). He reads Biblical history after a fashion of his own. Jacob's wrestling was "a battle with himself". Israel in its later history including the time of Christ "grew broader, deeper, nobler, diviner." (p. 116). His desire to be impressive leads him not infrequently into grandiloquence, e. g. "Prof. Drummond served modern thought in a large way when he wrested the universe from egoism and handed it over to otherism" (p. 128). We wonder whether the universe has yet recovered from the shock.

Huntington, L. I.

GEO. T. EDDY.

**PATHS TO THE CITY OF GOD.** By FRANK W. GUNSAULUS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 12mo., pp. 311. \$1.25 net.

The title of this book has its origin not only in the themes of the first four sermons, but in a unity of purpose which runs through all its varied themes and treatments. One marvels at the extent of Dr. Gunsaulus' grasp. He seems equally at home in the domains of history, poetry, science, or art; and from each he exacts a tribute to be brought to the feet of Immanuel. We gratefully recognize in his volume a loyalty to the great fundamental principles of the gospel which are too often called in question in these present days. A strong emphasis is laid upon such facts as the divine sovereignty, the sinfulness of sin, the atoning blood and saving faith. There is subtle discernment of the characteristics of the time, its difficulties and its needs, and a clear declaration as to the sovereign remedy for them. Lofty truth is made tributary to lowly duty.

Despite an occasional sentence which may seem obscure or involved from the richness or profundity of its thought, Dr. Gunsaulus' style is on the whole one of remarkable vividness, eloquence and power.

It would be difficult to single out any of these sermons for special mention. They are all of high worth.

Huntington, L. I.

GEO. T. EDDY.



RESTS BY THE RIVER. By the Rev. George Matheson, D. D., LL. D.  
A. C. Armstrong & Son. 12 mo. Pp. 367. \$1.25.

The felicity of the title of this devotional work by the late Dr. Matheson is borne out by the character of its contents. There is the most happy union of spiritual insight with practical helpfulness, the blending of scholarly acumen with religious fervor. The book arouses thought while it inspires to duty. We feel as well that it has its value in revealing a personality of rare charm and power. A depth of personal experience is evidenced, the experience of one who has passed through the shadow and found the light beyond.

In Dr. Matheson's hand familiar passages often gleam with new light. Indeed the eliciting of surprise is his characteristic method. His thought is marked by compression as well as originality and is often eminently suggestive. The brief sentences are as clean-cut and beautiful as cameos. The method of expression is often poetic. Perhaps Dr. Matheson's evident fondness for alliteration is due to this element in his style and thought. He falls into rhythm and even into rhyme in one instance in a passage printed as prose (p. 86).

The book worthily fulfils its high purpose. It bears the test of practical use and affords a constant stimulus to thought. Dr. Matheson's place as a writer of devotional meditations must apparently wait long before it may be filled.

*Huntington, L. I.*

GEO. T. EDDY.

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## GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE ESSENTIAL KAFIR. By Dudley Kidd, with one hundred illustrations from photographs by the author. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1906.

We have always been interested in everything written about South Africa ever since as a boy we read Livingston's unabridged diary of his travels. Of all the books on South Africa which we have seen, however, this of Mr. Kidds is the best illustrated and the most uniformly interesting from beginning to end. The author has attempted to give us the essential spirit of the Kafir, to show us his real self, as he believes, and thinks, and works, his laws, customs, superstitions, folklore, wars, and prospects. He has succeeded in his attempt. He has shown also that the Kafir is "drifting along the surface of time in a rudderless bark", "in the presence of mighty and restless forces, which the economic development of the country has liberated". He has shown him to be thriftless, wasteful, and prodigal; cruel, superstitious, and lustful; without God and without hope for time or for eternity. The only remedy he can suggest seems to be that pointed out by Carlyle: to plant "knowledge into his deep infinite faculties,

his fantasy and heart, to help him to unlearn what he has wrongly learned, and to teach him to use his limited powers to the best advantage". The author ignores the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ, His Son, as the quickening power of a new and abounding life. The one who believes in Jesus as the Saviour of the world, cannot but rise from the perusal of this book with a prayer of thanksgiving, that he and his have long and forever been delivered from the terrible curse of those who are ignorant of Him and with a prayer of supplication, that God in His mercy would speedily deliver those who sit in darkness and in the bondage of heathenism into the light and liberty of the Gospel of love, and righteousness, and peace.

*Princeton.*

R. D. WILSON.

Free Public Library, Newark, N. J.

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# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY AND ITS WORK.

In the last number of this REVIEW\* some account was given of the calling of the Westminster Assembly and of its historical meaning. It was pointed out that its really significant work was the preparation of formularies designed to serve the churches of the three kingdoms as a basis for uniform establishments. Some account of its work on these so-called "four parts of uniformity" is now to be given.

Of these "four parts of uniformity", the one which was at once the most pressing and the most difficult for the Assembly, was the preparation of a platform of government for the churches. Both Parliament and Assembly were, indeed, fairly committed to the Presbyterian system under solemn sanction; and the majority of the members of both bodies were sincerely Presbyterian in conviction.<sup>66</sup> But sincerity and consistency are very different matters; and so soon as the details of church organization were brought under discussion, a bewildering variety of judgments was revealed. The Scots, though prepared to yield in the interest of harmony all that it was possible to yield,

\* Number for April, 1908, pp. 177-210.

<sup>66</sup> Baillie, writing in 1645, says (ii., p. 320): "The bodie of the Parliament, City, and Countrey are for the Presbyterie." Cf. i., p. 287, from Dec., 1640: "The farr greatest part are for our discipline."



perhaps more than it was altogether wise to yield, were yet peremptory for a really Presbyterian establishment, as they were bound to be under the engagements of the National Covenant and were fully entitled to be under those of the Solemn League and Covenant. In this they were supported by the overwhelming majority of the Assembly. It fell, indeed, to the lot of the Scots to hold back the English Presbyterians from precipitate and aggressive action. It was their policy to obtain if possible a settlement not so much imposed by a majority as at least acceptable to all.<sup>67</sup> They therefore gave themselves not merely to conciliate the minor differences which emerged in the debate,—on the part of those, for example, who preferred a mixed Presbyterian and Episcopal system (Twisse, Gataker, Gouge, Palmer, Temple),—but even “to satisfy” the small but able band of Independents in the Assembly (Goodwin, Nye, Burroughs, Bridge, Carter, Caryl, Phillips, Henry), who wished all authoritative government in the church to stop with the congregation. The Independents, on their part, adopted an obstructive policy, and set themselves not only to obtain every concession it was possible to wring from the majority, but to delay the adoption of its scheme of Presbyterian government, and if possible, to defeat its establishment altogether. They were supported in this policy by the Erastians

“For example, with respect to the office of ruling elders, Baillie tells us (ii, pp. 110, 121, 116) of the procedure thus: “Sundrie of the ablest were flat against the institution of any such officer by divine right. . . . The most of the synod were in our opinion. . . . There was no doubt but we would have carried it by far most voices; but, because the opposites were men verie considerable, above all gracious and learned little Palmer, we agreed upon a committee to satisfie if it were possible the dissenters. . . . All of them were ever willing to admit Elders in a prudentiall way. . . . We trust to carie at last, with the contentment of sundrie once opposite, and the silence of all, their divyne and scripturall institution.” Again, more generally (ii, p. 122): “We doubt not to carrie all in the Assemblie and Parliament clearlie according to our mind; but if we carie not the Independents with us, there will be ground laid for a verie troublesome schisme. Always [i. e., nevertheless] it’s our care to use our outmost endeavour to prevent that dangerous [evil].”

who, though not largely represented in the Assembly (Lightfoot, Coleman, Selden), were dominant in Parliament,<sup>88</sup> which accordingly showed itself ultimately averse to establishing any church government possessed of independent or final jurisdiction even in spiritual matters.<sup>89</sup> In the vain hope of escaping the schism threatened by the Independents and of avoiding an open breach with the Erastian Parliament, the Presbyterian majority in the Assembly proceeded slowly with their platform of government, contenting itself meanwhile with debating and voting a series of detached propositions, which were moreover couched in the simplest and most comprehensive language, while they postponed for the present framing a systematic statement. This delay was, however, itself as great an evil as could have been encountered; and as the differences it was hoped to conciliate were such as in their nature were not subject to "accommodation," the assembly was compelled in the end to report its scheme of government, which it had thus reduced to its lowest terms and in so doing shorn of much of its strength and attractiveness, in the face of the

\* Baillie (ii. p. 307) remarks: "The most part of the House of Commons, especially the lawyers, whereof they are many, and divers of them very able men, are either half or whole Erastians, believing no Church government to be of divine right, but all to be a humane constitution, depending on the will of the magistrates." Again (p. 316), he tells us that (in 1646) two thirds of Parliament was made up of worldly men who would have no ecclesiastical discipline if they could avoid it, Erastians, and Erastianizing lawyers, together with a small but influential band of Independents. Cf. also pp. 250, 265, 267, 297, 315. Very properly Baillie remarks therefore, that "the power of the Parliament in ecclesiastick affairs" was the greatest of the questions which were to be determined (ii. p. 205).

\* The position of Parliament laid down in the resolution with respect to the Convocation of 1640, passed Dec. 15, 1640, *nulla contrahente*, gives a fair expression to its fundamental attitude towards all religious conventions, which was adhered to throughout. "The Clergy of England Convented in any Convocation or Synod, or otherwise, have no power to make any Constitutions, Canons, or Acts whatsoever in matter of Doctrine, Discipline or otherwise, to bind the Clergy or the Laity of the Land, without common Consent of Parliament." (*Commons' Journal*, ii., p. 51, cf. *Lords' Journal*, iv., p. 273, Rushworth, iii., p. 1365.)

protest of the Independents and to a determinedly Erastian Parliament.<sup>70</sup>

The first portion of the Assembly's work presented to Parliament was the *Directory for Ordination* which was sent up on April 20, 1644.<sup>71</sup> This was followed the ensuing Autumn, (Nov. 8 and Dec. 11, 1644) by certain *Propositions concerning Church Government*, compacted out of the several separate declarations upon points of government which had from time to time been voted by the Assembly in the course of its debates, now gathered together and thrown into some semblance of order. It must be confessed that the work of collecting and ordering these propositions was somewhat carelessly done. Now and then, for example, in transferring them from the Minutes clauses are retained which have no proper meaning in their new setting. We are told, for instance, that "the pastor is an ordinary and perpetual officer in the church, prophesying of the time of the Gospel"; and it is only from the *vidimus* of the votes of the Assembly preserved by Gillespie that we learn that the clause "prophesying of the time of the Gospel", here sheer nonsense, was a comment on Jer. iii. 15-17 which was on this ground adduced as a proof text for the proposition "that there is such an ordinary and perpetual officer in the church as a pastor".<sup>72</sup> Again there is enumerated among the offices of a pastor as if it were an independent function, "to dispense other divine mysteries;" and we have to go to Gillespie's *vidimus* to learn that the Assembly meant just the sacraments (along with the benediction) and no "other divine

<sup>70</sup> "The Pope and the King", says Baillie (ii., p. 360), "were never more earnest for the headship of the Church than the pluralitie of this Parliament."

<sup>71</sup> *Commons' Journal*, iii., p. 466, *Lords' Journal*, vi., p. 524.

<sup>72</sup> *The Form of Presbyterian Church Government*: "The pastor is an ordinary and perpetual officer in the Church, prophesying of the time of the Gospel" *Votes passed in the Assembly of Divines*, etc., in Gillespie's *Works*, II., 3: "That there is such an ordinary and perpetual office in the church as a pastor, proved by Jer. iii. 15 17 (prophesying of the time of the gospel), 1 Pet. v. 2-4."

mysteries" by this phrase.<sup>78</sup> The document nevertheless contains a firm enough, though cautiously worded, presentation of the essentials of the Presbyterian system; and was therefore followed, of course, by a protest from the Independent members of the Assembly, which naturally occasioned a reply from the Assembly itself. These documents were later (1648) published together under the title, *The Reasons Presented by the Dissenting Brethren Against Certain Propositions Concerning Church Government, together with the Answers of the Assembly of Divines to these Reasons of Dissent*; and republished in 1652 under the new title, *The Grand Debate concerning Presbytery and Independency by the Assembly of Divines convened at Westminster by authority of Parliament*.

The *Propositions* themselves, to which the *Directory for Ordination* was adjoined, so as to form a single document, were dealt with very freely by Parliament. Intent only on

<sup>78</sup> *The Form*, etc. "It belongs to his office, To pray for and with his flock. . . . To read the scriptures publicly. . . . To feed the flock, by preaching of the word. . . . To catechise. . . . To dispense other divine mysteries. . . . To administer the sacraments. . . . To bless the people from God. . . . To take care of the poor. . . . And he hath also a ruling power over the flock as a pastor." In the *Votes* (in Gillespie, ii, p. 3): "That which the pastor is to do from God to the people," is distributed under the heads of "Reading," "Preaching" and "the dispensation of other divine mysteries"; and then "That which the pastor is to perform in the behalf and name of the people to God" is taken up and distributed into praying, ruling and caring for the poor. Under "Preaching" is subsumed both preaching and catechising; and under the general head of "the dispensation of other divine mysteries" we have the following two specifications. "That it is the office of a pastor to feed the flock by the dispensation of other divine mysteries, proved by 1 Cor. iv, 1, 2. the administration of the sacraments, Matt. xxviii, 19, 20. Mark xvi, 15, 16; 1 Cor. xi, 23, 25, with 1 Cor. x, 16. That he is to bless the people from God, Num. vi, 25, 26, with Rev. i, 4, 5 (where the same blessings and persons from whom they came are expressly mentioned), and Isa. lxvi, 21, where, under the names of priests and Levites, to be continued under the gospel, are meant evangelical pastors, who therefore are, by office, to bless the people, Deut. x, 8; 2 Cor. xiii, 14; Eph. i, 2." The "other divine mysteries" are therefore just the sacraments and benediction; they are enumerated as other than "reading" and "preaching" the word.

the practical settlement of the church while it preserved to itself all ecclesiastical as well as civil authority, Parliament on the one hand, undertook to extract from *The Propositions* only so much of a practical directory as would enable the church to go on; and on the other, precipitated the Assembly of Divines into what threatened to become endless debates on the *jus divinum* of the details of the Presbyterian system and the autonomy of the Church and particularly the right of the Church in the exercise of its own spiritual jurisdiction to exclude the scandalous from participation in the Lord's Supper.<sup>74</sup> In these debates, and in the whole con-

<sup>74</sup> Parliament was in no sense averse to a Presbyterian settlement. What it was unalterably opposed to was a *jus divinum* settlement of any kind. It was of the strongest conviction, in even its most Puritan element, that the church derived all its authority and jurisdiction from the state, and it identified the state with itself. As Nathaniel Fiennes, son of Lord Saye, put it in the debates of Feb., 1641: "By the law of the land not only all ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but also all superiority and pre-eminence over the ecclesiastical state is annexed to the Imperial crown of this realm, and may be granted by commission under the Great Seal to such persons as his Majesty shall think meet". Parliament, acting as the ultimate source of authority, was to set up a government for the church; and the government was to be the Parliament's government through and through. What government the Parliament would set up was from the first determined to be the Presbyterian. "Nor shall we need", said D'Fwes in May, 1641, "to study long for a new Church government, having so evident a platform in so many reformed Churches". Only, it was Presbyterian government, not *jure divino*, but "in a prudential way" which was steadily contemplated. Accordingly when the *Propositions concerning Church Government* came up to Parliament this was the rock on which it struck. Parliament was very willing to order the churches on the Presbyterian model, but not to erect independent judicatories, founded in a divine right, and exercising their functions uncontrolled by Parliament. "We passed proposition 3, about which there had been some dispute among the divines," says Woultraker, (*Diary*, p. 371), "with this alteration, leaving out the words, 'that the Scriptures doth hold forth', and resolving it thus, that many several congregations may be under one Presbyterial Government." Cf. *Commons' Journal*, iv., pp. 20 and 28. And when the question of the administration of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper and the exclusion of the scandalous from it, came up, Parliament absolutely refused to commit to the church officers, in congregational or classical assemblies, the determination of what sins should be accounted scandals excluding from the sacrament, and insisted upon itself



duct of its negotiations with Parliament during this dispute, the Assembly manifested the highest dignity, firmness and courage. If Parliament utterly refused to set up a series of ecclesiastical courts with independent jurisdiction even in purely spiritual matters, and insisted on reserving to itself, or to secular committees established by and directly responsible to it, the review of even such spiritual functions as the determination of fitness to receive the sacrament of the Lord's Supper,<sup>75</sup> the Assembly on its part respectfully

making an enumeration of such scandals, and reserving in all other cases appeal to itself. It thus intruded into the very penetralium of the spiritualia and raised with the Assembly the precise question which Calvin had raised in Geneva in the matter of Berthelier. It was on this point that the sharpest conflict between Parliament and Assembly took place.

"In the Elizabethan Articles of 1563, while it is asserted that "the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be ecclesiastical or civil, in all causes" appertains to the throne, yet "the administration of the word and sacraments" is expressly excluded from the sweep of this supremacy. Parliament in 1645 was unwilling to permit even the administration of the sacraments to remain in the unreviewed power of the ecclesiastical authorities. On the other hand, of course, the Westminster divines in their insistence on the autonomy of the church, were claiming far more independence of action for the church than the Acts of Supremacy no less of the Elizabethan settlement than of that of Henry VIII allowed. The Erastian temper of Parliament, which was inclined to push the traditional control of the church by the civil powers to extremes, was met thus by an anti-Erastian principle in the Assembly to which the old settlement seemed unendurable. There was no wish on the part of the Westminster divines, to be sure, to take from the magistrate what is his. "We do not rob the magistrate of that which is his", says Gillespie (*Aaron's Rod*, p. xvi), "by giving unto Christ that which is Christ's." "I do not plead against 'the power of the sword' when I plead for 'the power of the keys'." But they were determined that the magistrate should not take from Christ that which is His. "Is it so small a thing", asked Warriston in his speech of May 1st (see *infra*), "to have the sworde that they must have the keyes also?" This the divines could not in conscience acquiesce in. On the Long Parliament's assumption of the entire ecclesiastical jurisdiction, see Dr. Shaw, *A History of the English Church During 1640-1660*, I., pp. 227 sq. ("the unscrupulous and revolutionary seizure by the Parliament of every part of the domain of ecclesiastical jurisdiction which had hitherto in whole or in part belonged peculiarly to the spiritual courts", p. 236). Dr. Shaw, on the other hand, seems to consider the Parliament justified in refusing to commit to the ecclesiastical courts unreviewed powers in

but firmly protested against such an intrusion of the secular arm into spiritual things, and refused to be a party to any ecclesiastical arrangement which denied to the church what it deemed its divinely prescribed rights and responsibilities. It took for its motto the ringing phrase, "The Crown rights of Jesus Christ," and declared that on His shoulders the government is, and that all power in heaven and earth has been given Him, and, ascended far above all heavens, He has received gifts for His church and has given to it officers necessary for its edification and the perfecting of His saints. It showed itself, in the noble words of Warriston, "tender, zealous and carefull to assert Christ and his Church their priviledge and right . . . that Christ lives and reigns alone over and in his Church, and will have all done therein according to his Word and will, and that he hes given no supreme headship over his church to any Pope, King, or Parliament whatsoever."<sup>76</sup> On the matter of the spiritual jurisdiction of the church, the Assembly remained unmoved and insisted that Christ has instituted in the church a government and governors ecclesiastical distinct from the civil magistrates.<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, realizing that it was of the first

determining the scandals excluding from the sacrament; which surely is a very remarkable position to take up in these later days,—or at least it seems so to "the clerical mind".

<sup>76</sup> Speech of Lord Warriston in the Assembly, May 1, 1646, in the breach of privilege matter, printed in Mitchell and Christie, *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland*, I., pp. 82-98. Cf. W. Morison, *Johnston of Warriston*, 1901, pp. 96-99.

<sup>77</sup> "I am confident", said Warriston (as above) to the Assembly, . . . "ye will all look to and hold out the maine, Christs kingdome distinct from the kingdoms of the earth." This was said May 1, 1646. On the 6th of the previous March, the proposition "that Jesus Christ as King and Head of His Church hath appointed an ecclesiastical government in His Church in the hand of Church Officers distinct from civil government", had been brought in for discussion; and it was vigorously debated with Coleman as the leader of the dissent until his death, at the end of March, and then against Lightfoot through April. On July 7th it was passed with Lightfoot alone dissenting. Ultimately it was made the first paragraph of Ch. xxx. of the *Confession of Faith*, in the wording: "The Lord Jesus, as king and head of his church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate." This chapter was not accepted by Parliament.

importance to get the framework of the Presbyterian government established and in operation, the ~~English~~ <sup>English</sup> under the leadership of Alexander Henderson, passing by these doctrinal matters for the moment, had drawn up a *Practical Directory for Church Government*, which they had presented to Parliament July 7, 1645. In this document, which avoided as far as possible all questions of principle, very full and definite expositions were given of the actual framework of Presbyterian government. It commended itself in this aspect of it to Parliament and was ultimately in large part adopted by it in an ordinance passed on August 29, 1648, and was published in this somewhat diluted shape as *The Form of Church Government to be used in the Church of England and Ireland*.

In Scotland this document was never formally approved, as the earlier *Propositions*, which were approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, were never ratified by the English Parliament. Thus neither became of authority in both churches. The modified Presbyterianism set up by the Long Parliament in England, under the direction of the one document, moreover, was soon swept away; while the other document, approved indeed by the Scottish General Assembly but never ratified by the Estates of the Scottish Parliament, though it has held its place among the formularies of the Scottish churches until to-day, has been largely superseded in the churches deriving their descent from them. The permanent influence of the labors of the Westminster Assembly in the great matter of church organization—supposed at the time, as they were, to be its most important, as they certainly were its most pressing and its most difficult labors—has been largely unofficial and somewhat indirect. It has doubtless been exerted nearly as powerfully, indeed, through such treatises as *The Grand Debate*, already mentioned, or the *Ius Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici*, published by some of the ministers of London at the end of 1646, but supposed to

incorporate the Assembly's answers to the *jus divinum* queries propounded to it by Parliament, as through their formal advices to Parliament. Indeed, it is questionable whether the really great works of individual members of the Assembly on these topics, such as Gillespie's *An Assertion of the Government of the Church of Scotland* (1641) and *Aaron's Rod Blossoming* (1646), Rutherford's *Due Right of Presbytery* (1646), and Henderson's *The Government and Order of the Church of Scotland* (1641, and again 1690), must not be conceived the chief vehicles of this influence. The most that can be said for the formal work of the Assembly in this field is that it gave ungrudgingly an immense amount of self-denying labor to preparing advices for the use of Parliament in settling the government of the Church of England on a Presbyterian model, but was prevented by the circumstances in which it did its work from doing full justice in these documents either to its own clear and strong convictions or to the system with which it was dealing.

Next to the elaboration of a new scheme of government for the Church of England which should bring it into harmony with the established government of the Church of Scotland, the most pressing task committed to the Assembly of Divines was the preparation of a new form of worship to take the place of *The Book of Common Prayer* now to be abolished, by which the modes of worship in the Church of England should be conformed "to the example of the best Reformed Churches". The prosecution of this task was attended with no such difficulties as beset the formulation of the scheme of government. There existed no doubt differences enough in usage and preference among the several parties in the Assembly in this region of church life also; and these differences ranged all the way from a distaste among the Independents to all prescriptions in worship to a predilection in the case of some of the English churchmen for a complete liturgy.<sup>78</sup> But they were less deeply rooted

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Baillie, ii., pp. 122, 242.

and more easily conciliated in a middle way than the differences by which they were divided in the matter of church government. The work of formulating forms of worship acceptable to all was, therefore, pushed through comparatively rapidly, and the whole *Directory for the Publique Worship of God throughout the Three Kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland* was sent up to Parliament by the end of 1644. By an ordinance of Parliament, dated January 3d.[ 4th], 1645, it was established in England and Wales "to be henceforth used, pursued, and observed in all exercises of the publique worship of God in every congregation, church, cappell and place of publique worship"; and a month later it was approved and established in Scotland by Acts of Assembly (Feb. 3d) and the Estates of Parliament (Feb. 6th). After some slight adjustments it was printed and put into circulation in both countries during the ensuing spring (the English edition bears on its title-page the date 1644, but that is "old style"). As is indicated by the title, the book is not "a straight liturgy", but a body of agenda and paradigms. Some of these paradigms, to be sure, are so full that they are capable of being transmuted into liturgical forms by a mere transposition of their clauses into the mode of direct address, but they were not intended to be so employed and are too compressed to lend themselves readily to such use.<sup>79</sup>

The first draft of the document was prepared by a sub-committee of the Great Treaty Committee, and, as in the case of the *Practical Directory for Church Government*, it was largely the work of the Scots.<sup>80</sup> The suggestions for the prayers of the Sabbath-day service, and for the administration of the Sacraments, were in the first instance their work;<sup>81</sup> and they ultimately had the drawing up also of the suggestions for preaching and for catechizing.<sup>82</sup> Naturally,

<sup>79</sup> See the Preface to the document and compare Marshall's explanation in the MS. *Minutes*, ii., folio 286b, as quoted by Mitchell, *Baird Lectures*, Ed. 2, p. 240.

<sup>80</sup> Baillie, ii., pp. 117, 137.

<sup>81</sup> Baillie, pp. 131, 140.



therefore, there is much in the book which is derived from Scottish usage. The Sabbath service, for example, is in its general structure practically identical with that of the *Book of Common Order* (commonly called "Knox's Liturgy"), and the materials for the consecration prayer in the directory for celebrating the Lord's Supper are mainly derived from the same source. But, on the other hand, the latter part of this same prayer and the concluding thanksgiving are more reminiscent of the English *Book of Common Prayer*.<sup>83</sup> The book as a whole, in fact, does not so much follow Scottish as offer a compromise between Scottish and Puritan usage. Acquiescence in this compromise must have cost the Scots a great effort, as it was, in effect, a reversal of a deliberate policy which had been adopted by the Scottish Church. After the recovery of its purity of worship consequent upon the outbreak of 1637, the Scottish Church was considerably disturbed by the intrusion of certain "novations" into its worship, which were really Puritan customs, seeping in, no doubt, in part, from England, but mainly brought in by returning Scottish emigrants to Ulster. These "novations" were made the subject of earnest conference at the General Assembly of 1641, and again at that of 1643; and, in order to meet the peril which they appeared to threaten, it was determined at the latter Assembly that "a Directorie for the worship of God" should "be framed and made ready, in all the parts thereof, against the next General Assembly" (that of 1644), Henderson, Calderwood and Dickson being charged with the drafting of it. This whole undertaking was naturally superseded, however,

<sup>83</sup> Baillie, ii, pp. 148-160.

<sup>84</sup> The directory for the thanksgiving after Sermon has been attributed to Dr. Edward Reynolds, from whom came also the General Thanksgiving which was added to *The Book of Common Prayer* after the Restoration (cf. Cardwell, *Synodalia*, p. 658; Proctor and Frere, *A New History of the Book of Common Prayer*, 1901, p. 428; E. H. Eland, *The Layman's Introduction to the Book of Common Prayer*, 1896, p. 135; L. Pullan, *The History of the Book of Common Prayer*, 1900, Index, p. 328).

by the inauguration of the broader attempt to introduce, through the mediation of the Westminster Assembly, a common Directory for the Three Kingdoms. But the odd effect of this supersession was that the "novations" for the exclusion of which from the Church of Scotland the first undertaking was set on foot, were in large measure constituted the official usage of the Church by the new Directory. By the very conditions of its formulation this Directory became a compromise between the Scottish and the Puritan modes of worship rather than a bar to the introduction into Scotland of Puritan modes of worship.

By these "novations" the use of "read prayers",<sup>84</sup> and even of the Lord's Prayer, in public worship, was discountenanced, as was also the use of the Gloria Patri, and of the Apostles' Creed in the administration of the Sacraments, and the habit of the minister to bow in silent prayer upon entering the pulpit. No one of these usages, on which the Scots laid much stress, except the use of the Lord's Prayer, is prescribed by the Directory; but as none of them are proscribed either, the Scots were able to "save their face" by attaching to the Act by which the Assembly adopted the Directory the proviso: "That this shall be no prejudice to the order and practice of this kirk in such particulars as are appointed by the book of discipline, and acts of General Assemblies, and are not otherwise ordered and appointed in the Directory." By a supplementary Act of the same Assembly, however, they voluntarily laid aside—"for satisfaction of the desires of the Reverend Divines in the Synod of England, and for uniformity with that Kirk so much endeared to us",—the "lawful custom" of "the minister bowing in the pulpit".<sup>85</sup> Of more importance

<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, *extemporary* prayers had been prohibited on pain of deprivation in the Canons which had been imposed on the Scottish Church during the tyranny of Charles (1637). This question was a burning one.

<sup>85</sup> The objection (Baillie, *Letters*, II., p. 122) of the English Puritans (and the Scotch innovators, too; for this was one of "the three nocent ceremonies" objected to by them) to the minister's private prayer in the

than any of these usages, at least for the conduct of the public services, was the loss by the Scots, through the Westminster Directory, of the office of "Reader". From the Reformation down, the former or liturgical portion of the Scottish Sabbath service—the opening prayer, the lessons from Scripture, and the singing of a Psalm—had been conducted by a "Reader", the Minister taking charge of the services, and indeed commonly entering the church, only when he ascended the pulpit to preach. The Westminster Divines

pulpit, seems to have been made insistent by an abuse of it by the prelatical party "to bow to the east and the altar" (Baillie, ii., p. 259). It appears, however, to rest ultimately on a maxim widely adopted by the Puritans, "that all private worship in the time and place of public worship is to be discharged". The Puritans, therefore, consistently objected also to private prayers by the people on assembling for worship, and to private praying by the recipients of the Lord's Supper before and after participation. Cf. Baillie's letter to his colleagues in opposition to this sentiment, printed as Appendix E to Dr. Leishman's edition of *The Westminster Directory*, pp. 188 sq.; cf. also Dr. Leishman's notes, pp. 86, 132. Dr. Leishman thinks that the clause in the Directory, "Let all enter the assembly, not irreverently, but in a grave and seemly manner, taking their seats or places *without adoration, or bowing themselves* towards one place or other", does not forbid the offering of private prayer before the service has begun, but only superstitious recognition of sacred places in the sanctuary (p. 86). But it is clear that private praying on the part of late comers is forbidden in the clause: "If any, through necessity, be hindered from being present at the beginning, they ought not, when they come into the Congregation, to betake themselves to their private devotions, but reverently to compose themselves to join with the assembly in that Ordinance of God which is then in hand." Perhaps we may say the exception proves the rule, and the prohibition of private devotions to late comers, that they may not be inattentive to the public worship, implies the approval of private devotions for early comers, before public worship has begun. But we must have in mind also the general sentiment against such private devotions in public places. In Gillespie's notes of the debates in the sub-committee concerning the Directory (*Works*, II., p. 102) we read "Some debate was about the clause forbidding private adoration at coming into the church", which seems to imply that the purpose was to forbid all such adoration. But then it is added: "Mr. Marshall, Mr. Palmer, and others said, This is very necessary for this church, for though the minister be praying, many ignorant people will not join in it, till they have said over the Lord's prayer", which seems to suggest that late-comers were at least conjointly and perhaps chiefly in mind.

found no Scriptural warrant for the office of "Reader", and, much against the wishes of the Scots, enacted that the minister should conduct the entire service. "Reading of the Word in the congregation", they set down in their Directory, "being part of the public worship of God (wherein we acknowledge our dependence upon Him, and subjection to Him), and one mean sanctified by Him for the edifying of His people, is to be performed by the Pastors and Teachers."<sup>86</sup> The only exception they would allow was that they permitted candidates for the ministry occasionally to perform the office of reading, as also that of preaching, on permission of their Presbyteries.

On the other hand, besides the general structure of the services, as already noted, Scottish usage was followed in the Directory in many important points. This was particularly true in the regulations for the celebration of the Sacraments. The Baptismal service, for example,—although the Creed, the Lord's Prayer and God-parents were omitted,—yet followed in general the Scotch order; and it was thought a great gain for the Scots when, in opposition to practically the universal English custom, they got it ordained that Baptism was never to be administered in private, but always in "the place of public worship, and in the face

"The "Teacher" or "Doctor" was a coördinate officer with the "Pastor", which the Divines (again without the cordial assent of the Scots) found provided for in the Scriptures: "The scripture doth hold out the name and title of teacher, as well as of the pastor, who is also a minister of the Word, as well as the pastor, and hath power of administration of the sacraments" (*Propositions for Church Government*). With respect to the difference about the "Reader", Baillie writes (*Letters*, II, p. 122): "Here came the first question, about Readers: the Assemblie has past a vote before we came, that it is a part of the Pastor's office to read the Scriptures; what help he may have herein by these who are not pastors, it is not yet agitat. Alwayes [nevertheless] these of best note about London are now in use in the desk, to pray, and read in the Sunday morning four chapters, and expone some of them, and cause sing two Psalms, and then goe to the pulpit to preach. We are not against the minister reading and exponing when he does not preach; bot if all this work be laid on the minister before he preach, we fear it put preaching in a more narrow and discreditable rounge than we would wish."

of the congregation". It was over the mode of celebrating the Lord's Supper, however, that the most strenuous debates were held. The manner of celebrating that rite prevalent among the Independents, seemed to the Scots to be bald even to irreverence; while many of the details of the Scottish service were utterly distasteful to the extremest Puritans. In the end, things were ordered fairly to the satisfaction of the Scots, although in one matter which they thought of very great importance, they were ultimately compelled to content themselves with an ambiguous rubric. This concerned the place and manner of the reception of the elements. The Scots were insistent for their own custom, in which the communicants arranged themselves at the table and served one another with the elements as at an actual meal. This usage was, after strenuous debate, at last ordered: but the rubric was subsequently so changed that it ultimately read, merely: "The table being so conveniently placed, that the communicants may orderly sit about it, or at it." Accordingly the Scotch Assembly, in adopting the Directory, added this proviso: "That the clause in the Directory of the administration of the Lord's Supper, which mentioneth the communicants sitting about the table, or at it, be not interpreted as if, in the judgment of this kirk, it were indifferent, and free for any of the communicants not to come to, and receive at the table; or as if we did approve the distributing of the elements by the minister to each communicant, and not by the communicants among themselves." In a supplementary Act the Assembly further laid down a series of details for the administration of this Sacrament. It was in accordance with the Scottish usage, also, that in a concluding section, the Directory abolished all Festival Days, and affirmed that "there is no day commanded in scripture to be kept holy under the gospel but the Lord's day, which is the Christian Sabbath".<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> This fact is adverted to by the House of Commons in the short account they gave to the Scotch Commissioners in July, 1644, of what it had already accomplished, that the Assembly in Scotland might be



A document formed as this was by a series of compromises was not very likely to command the hearty loyalty of any section of its framers. We are not surprised, therefore, that it was much neglected in England, though in Scotland it gradually made its way against ancient custom and ultimately very much moulded the usages of the churches. Even in Scotland, however, this gradually perfected assimilation to the Directory has of late suffered from some reaction; and in some of the churches deriving their formularies from the Scottish Church, the Directory was early superseded by new models of their own.<sup>88</sup> At this distance of time we may look upon it dispassionately; and, so viewed, it can scarcely fail to commend itself as an admirable set of agenda, in spirit and matter alike well fitted to direct the public services of a great church. It is notable for its freedom from petty prescriptions and "superfluities" and for the emphasis it places upon what is specifically commanded in the Scriptures. Its general tone is lofty and spiritual; its conception of acceptable worship is sober and restrained and at the same time profound and rich; the paradigms of

informed: "The Book of Common Prayer and festival days, commonly called Holy days, are by ordinance of Parliament taken away, and a Directory of Worship established by the same ordinance" (*Commons' Journal*, iv., p. 11). How strong the Scotch feeling on these matters was may be observed from Rutherford's letter of Sept. 23, 1637, to his parishioners at Anworth, in which he exhorts them to stand fast in the faith he had taught them (Bonar's edition, Letter 68; ed. of 1692, Letter 148 of Part I). Here he warns them that "no day (besides the sabbath, which is of his own appointment) should be kept holy and sanctified with preaching and the publick worship of God for the memory of Christ's birth, death, resurrection and ascension; seeing such days so observed are unlawful, wil worship, and not warranted in Christ's word". With respect to the Lord's Supper he warns them, "that ye should in any sort forbear the receiving the Lord's supper but after the form that I delivered it to you, according to the example of Christ our Lord, that is, that ye should sit as banquetters, at one table with our King, and eat and drink, and divide the elements one to another".

<sup>88</sup> E. g., the American Presbyterian Churches, for whose Directory and its relations to the Westminster Directory, see L. F. Benson, in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, VIII. 418.

prayers which it offers are notably full and yet free from overelaboration, compressed and yet enriched by many reminiscences of the best models which had preceded them; and it is singular among agenda for the dominant place it gives in the public worship of the church to the offices of reading and preaching the Word.<sup>22</sup> To both of these offices it vindicates a place, and a prominent place, among the parts of public worship, specifically so called, claiming for them distinctively a function in inducing and expressing that sense of dependence on God and of subjection to Him in which all religion is rooted and which is the purest expression of worship; and thus justifying in the ordering of the public services of the churches the recognition of the Word as a means, perhaps we should say the means, of grace. It expends as much care upon the minister's proper performance of the offices of reading and preaching the Word, therefore, as upon his successful performance of the duty of leading the congregation in prayer and acceptably administering to it the Sacraments. The paragraph on the Preaching of the Word is in effect, indeed, a complete homiletical treatise, remarkable at once for its sober practical sense and its profound spiritual wisdom, and suffused with a tone of sincere piety, and of zeal at once for the truth and for the souls which are to be bought with the truth.

One of the sections of the Directory is given to the Singing of Psalms, and declares it "the duty of Christians to praise God publicly by singing of psalms together in the congregation, and also privately in the family". This rubric manifestly implied the provision of a Psalm Book, and it was made part of the function of the Assembly in preparing a basis for uniformity of worship in the churches of the three kingdoms, to supply them with a common Psalm Book. The way was prepared for this by the submitment to the

<sup>22</sup> In this it had a worthy forerunner in Cartwright's *Directory*, a copy of which was found in his study in 1585 when he was arrested. It was reprinted in 1644 and a modern edition has been published by Principal Lorimer.

Assembly by the House of Commons on Nov. 20, 1643, of the query whether "it may not be useful and profitable to the Church that the Psalms set forth by Mr. Rouse be permitted to be publicly sung". The result of the Assembly's examination of Mr. Rouse's version (first printed in 1643) was to recommend it, after it had been subjected to a thorough revision at its own hands, to Parliament as a suitable Psalm-Book for the Church (autumn of 1645). The Commons accordingly ordered the book printed in this revised form (it appeared in 1646, *i. e.*, Feb. 1647), and (April 15, 1646) issued an order establishing it as the sole Psalm Book to be used in the Churches of England and Wales, though the House of Lords never concurred in this order. The Scotch Assembly subjected the book to a still further more searching revision, and by an act passed in 1649 (ratified by the Estates of Parliament in 1650) approved it in this new form for use in the Scottish Churches. It is in this Scottish revision alone (printed in 1650) in which they can only by courtesy continue to bear the name of Francis Rouse as their author, that these Psalms have passed into wide use.<sup>80</sup>

To the punctual completion of "the third part of uniformity", that is to say, the preparation of a new Confession of Faith for the contracting churches, the Divines were urged by no immediately pressing necessity in the situation of the Church of England. The existing Thirty-Nine Articles were recognized by them as a soundly Reformed Creed, the doctrine of which required only to be vindicated and cleared from the false interpretations which the reactionary party was already endeavoring to foist upon it. With the internal needs of the Church of England alone in view, they might possibly have felt contented with a simple revision of these articles, somewhat more thorough than that they had been engaged upon early in their labors.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>80</sup> On the Scottish Psalter see especially J. Laing in the Appendix to his edition of Baillie's *Letters*, iii., pp. 528-556.

<sup>81</sup> Compare what they say in the Preface to their revision of the Articles (*Minutes*, pp. 541-2).

The duty of preparing an entirely new Creed was imposed on them solely by the Solemn League and Covenant, by which a common Confession of Faith was made one of the bases of the uniformity in religion which the contracting nations had bound themselves to institute. It was not supposable that either Church would be content simply to accept and make its own the existing Creed of the other. Indeed, neither Church possessed a Creed which it could seriously propose to the other as suitable to the purpose or adequate to the needs of the times. The old Scotch Confession of 1560, breathing as it does the fervor of the Reformation era and full of noble expressions as it is, is too much of an occasional document, too disproportionate in its development of its topics, and too little complete in its scope or precise in its phraseology to serve as the permanent expression of the faith of a great and comprehensive Church; and the new Confession brought forward by the prelatical party in 1616, though sound in doctrine and in parts finely wrought out, suffered from the same defects. The Scots themselves recognized that they had no Creed which they could ask the English to adopt as the common Confession of the unified churches, and therefore, when contemplating seeking such unification had it in mind to undertake the preparation of a new Creed for the purpose.<sup>22</sup> There was greater reason for the English to feel similarly with regard to their own formularies. The Thirty-Nine Articles had, in their past experience, proved an inadequate protection against the most dangerous doctrinal reactions. It was therefore that the ecclesiastical authorities had been compelled to put forth, a half-century earlier, those "orthodoxal assertions" which have come down to us under the name of the Lambeth Articles (1595). It had long been the desire of the Puritans that these Articles should be set alongside of the Thirty-Nine Articles, as an authoritative exposition of their real meaning. This desire had been given expression at the Hampton Court Conference (1604), and had

<sup>22</sup> Hallie's *Letters*, i, pp. 365, cf. 376; ii, pp. 1, 2, 24.

been met in the Church of Ireland by the incorporation of the Lambeth Articles along with the Thirty-Nine Articles into those Irish Articles of 1615, to which we may be sure the Westminster Divines would have turned rather than to the Thirty-Nine Articles, had they thought of recommending the simple adoption of an existing Creed as the doctrinal standard of the unified Churches, and which indeed they did make the basis of their own new Creed. Although the necessity of a new Creed was a result of the new conditions brought about by the Solemn League and Covenant, therefore, these conditions imposed an absolute necessity for the preparation of such a document; and as time passed on the demand for the accomplishment of the task became ever more urgent. The "woeful longsomeness" of the Assembly in all its work was bringing the fulfilment of the engagements into which the nations had entered into jeopardy, and the Scots, who had paid the price of the covenant on the faith of the fulfilment of its provisions, not unnaturally began uneasily to urge their more speedy fulfilment. It was accordingly under pressure from Scotland that the Divines at length entered actively upon the accomplishment of this "third part of uniformity".<sup>93</sup>

It must not be inferred, however, from their slowness in entering upon it, that the work of drawing up a Confession of Faith was one uncongenial to the Assembly of Divines, or one for which its members possessed little native fitness or had made little direct preparation; or one which presented for them special difficulties. On the contrary, there was no work committed to them for which they were more eminently qualified, or in which they acquitted themselves with more distinguished success; nor was there any work committed to them in the prosecution of which they were less impeded by differences among themselves. The deep-seated antagonisms which divided them into irreconcilable parties, lay in the region of church organization and gov-

<sup>93</sup> Lightfoot, xiii., p. 305; Baillie, ii., pp. 220, 221—Aug. 20, 1644; *Minutes*, p. 77 (cf. p. 28 sq.) of April 9, 1645.



eriment. Doctrinally they were in complete fundamental harmony, and in giving expression to their common faith needed only to concern themselves to state it truly, purely and with its polemic edges well-turned out towards the chief assailants of Reformed doctrine, in order to satisfy the minds of all. There were indeed differences among them in doctrine, too; but these lay for the most part within the recognized limits of the Reformed system, and there was little disposition to press them to extremes or to narrow their creed to a party document. To the Amyraldians, of whom there was a small but very active and well-esteemed party in the Assembly (Calamy, Seaman, Marshall, Vines), there was denied, to be sure, the right to modify the statement of the *ordo decretorum* so as to make room for their "hypothetical universalism" in the saving work of Christ (cf. the Confession, iii. 6, viii. 5, 8). But the wise plan was adopted with respect to the points of difference between the Supralapsarians, who were represented by a number of the ablest thinkers in the Assembly (Twisse, Rutherford), and the Infralapsarians, to which party the great mass of the members adhered, to set down in the Confession only what was common ground to both, leaving the whole region which was in dispute between them entirely untouched. This procedure gives to the Confession a peculiar comprehensiveness, while yet it permits to its statements of the generic doctrine of the Reformed Churches a directness, a definiteness, a crisp precision and an unambiguous clarity which are attained by few Confessional documents of any age or creed. In its Third Chapter, for example, in which the thorny subject of "God's Eternal Decree" falls for treatment, the Westminster Confession has attained, by this simple method, the culmination of the Confessional statement of this high mystery. Everything merely individual and as well everything upon which parties in the Reformed Churches are divided upon this deep doctrine, is carefully avoided, while the whole ground common to all recognized

Reformed parties is given, if prudent, yet full and uncompromizing statement.

The architectonic principle of the Westminster Confession is supplied by the schematization of the Federal theology, which had obtained by this time in Britain, as on the Continent, a dominant position as the most commodious mode of presenting the *corpus* of Reformed doctrine (so *e. g.* Rollock, Howie, Cartwright, Preston, Perkins, Ames, Ball, and *cf.* Dickson's *Sum of Saving Knowledge* and Fisher's *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, both of which emanated from this period and were destined to a career of great influence in the Scottish theology). The matter is distributed into 31 comprehensive chapters. After an opening chapter "Of the Holy Scripture" as the source of divine truth—which is probably the finest single chapter in any Protestant Confession and is rivalled in ability only by the chapter on Justification in the Tridentine Decrees—there are successively taken up the topics of God and the Trinity, the Divine Decree, Creation, Providence, the Fall and Sin, and then God's Covenant with Man, and Christ the Mediator of the Covenant, while subsequent treatment is given to the stages in the *ordo salutis* in the order first of the benefits conferred under the Covenant (Vocation, Justification, Adoption, Sanctification) and then of the duties required under the Covenant (Faith, Repentance, Good Works, Perseverance, Assurance). Then come chapters on the Law, Christian Liberty, Religious Worship, Oaths and Vows, followed by others on the relations of Church and State, the Church and the Sacraments, and the rubrics of Eschatology. All the topics of this comprehensive outline are treated with notable fullness, with the avowed object not merely of setting forth the doctrine of the churches with such clearness and in such detail as to make it plain to all that they held to the Reformed faith in its entirety,<sup>94</sup> but also to meet and exclude the whole mob of

<sup>94</sup> "It being necessary that the Protestant churches abroad, as well as the people of this kingdom at home, may have knowledge of how that the Parliament did never intend to innovate matters of faith" (*Lords' Journal*, viii, p. 558).

errors which vexed the time.<sup>22</sup> In the prosecution of their work as practical pastors protecting and indoctrinating their flocks, the Divines had acquired an intimate acquaintance with the prevailing errors and a remarkable facility in the formulation of the Reformed doctrine in opposition to them, which bore rich fruit in their Confessional labors. The main source of their confessional statements was, thus, just the Reformed theology as it had framed itself in their minds during their long experience in teaching it, and had worked itself out into expression in the prosecution of their task as teachers of religion in an age of almost unexampled religious unrest and controversy. This work, however, had not been done by them in isolation. It had been done, on the contrary, in the full light of the whole body of Reformed thought. It is idle, therefore, to inquire whether they depended for guidance in the scholastic statement of their doctrine on British or on Continental masters. The distinction was not present to their minds; intercourse between the British and the Continental Reformed was constant, and the solidarity of their consciousness was complete. The vital statement of Reformed thought ripened everywhere simultaneously in the perfect interaction which leaves

<sup>22</sup> An order sent to the Divines from the Houses of Parliament July 22, 1646, urges the hastening of the Confession, and Catechism, "because of the great use there may be of them in the kingdom, both for the suppressing of errors and heresies, and the informing of the ignorance of the people". The Divines themselves say in a petition presented to Parliament, in Oct., 1646: "The Confession being large, and as we conceive, requisit so to be, to settle the orthodox doctrine according to the Word of God and the Confession of the best Reformed Churches, so as to meet with common erroris" (*Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, 1646-7*, edited by A. F. Mitchell and James Christie, p. 82). Cf. the speech of George Gillespie in the General Assembly, Aug. 6, 1647 (*Baillie's Letters*, ed. Laing, III, p. 451): "The Confession of Faith is framed, so as it is of great use against the floods of heresies and errors that overflow that land: nay, their intention of framing it to meet with all the considerable errors of the present tyme, the Socinian, Arminian, Popish Antinomian, Anabaptistian, Independent errors, etc. The Confession of Faith sets them out, and refutes them, so far as belongs to a Confession."

open no question of relative dependence. The Federal mode of statement, for example, came forward and gradually became dominant throughout the Reformed world at about the same time; and the Westminster Confession owes its preëminence among Reformed Confessions, not only in fullness but also in exactitude and richness of statement, merely to the fact that it is the ripest fruit of Reformed creed-making, the simple transcript of Reformed thought as it was everywhere expounded by its best representatives in the middle of the seventeenth century. So representative is it of Reformed theology at its best, that often one might easily gain the illusion as he read over its compressed sections that he was reading a condensed abstract of some such compend as Heppe's *Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*.

In giving form and order to their statement of the Reformed faith, however, it was but natural for the Westminster Divines to take their starting point from the formularies in most familiar use among themselves. The whole series of Reformed Confessions, as well as all the best Reformed dogmaticians, were drawn upon to aid them in their definitions, and it is possible to note here and there traces of their use. But it was particularly the Irish Articles of 1615, which are believed to have been prepared by Usher, to which they especially turned. From these Articles they derived the general arrangement of their Confession, the consecution of topics through at least its first half, and a large part of the detailed treatment of such capital articles as those on the Holy Scripture, God's Eternal Decree, Christ the Mediator, the Covenant of Grace, and the Lord's Supper. These chapters might almost be spoken of as only greatly enriched revisions of the corresponding sections of the Irish Articles. Nothing, however, is taken from the Irish Articles without much revision and enrichment, for which every available source was diligently sought out and utilized. There are traces, minute but not therefore the less convincing or significant, for example, of the use for the

perfecting of the statements of the Confession, of even the Aberdeen Articles of 1616 and of the Assembly's own revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles. So minutely was every phrase scrutinized and every aid within reach invoked.

The work of formulating the Confession of Faith was begun in Committee as early as the mid-summer of 1644 (Aug. 20).<sup>96</sup> But it was not until the following spring (April 25, 1645)<sup>97</sup> that any of it came before the Assembly; and not until the next mid-summer (July 7, 1645) that the debates upon it in the Assembly began. Time and pains were lavishly expended on it as the work slowly progressed. By the middle of 1646 the whole was substantially finished in first-draft, and the review of it begun. The first nineteen chapters were sent up to the House of Commons on Sept. 25, 1646, and the entire work on Dec. 4. Proof texts from Scripture were subsequently added, and the book supplied with them was placed in the hands of Parliament on April 29, 1647. Immediately on its completion the book was carried to Scotland, and by an Act of the General Assembly of 1647, ratified by the Estates of Parliament Feb. 7, 1649, it was constituted the official creed of the Church of Scotland. Meanwhile action on it dragged in the English Parliament. It was not until June 20, 1648, that, curtailed of chapters xxx and xxxi, on "Church Censures" and "Synods and Councils", and certain passages in chapters xx ("of Christian Liberty and Liberty of Conscience"), xxiii ("of the Civil Magistrate") and xxiv ("of Marriage and Divorce"), it was approved by Parliament and printed under the title of *Articles of the Christian Religion*; and not until March 5, 1660, after the interval of the Protectorate, that it was declared by the so-called "Rump Parliament" to be "the public Confession of the Church of England", only to pass, of course, out of sight so far as the Church of England was concerned in the immediately succeeding Restoration.

The book was not one, however, which could easily be

<sup>96</sup> Lightfoot, xiii., p. 305; *Minutes*, p. lxxxvi.

<sup>97</sup> Baillic, ii., p. 266.



relegated to oblivion. Thrust aside by the established Church of England, it nevertheless had an important career before it even in England, where it became the creed of the Non-Conformists. The Independents, at their Synod, met in 1658 at the Savoy, adopted it in the form in which it had been published by Parliament (1648), after subjecting it to a revision which in no way affected its substance; and the Baptists, having still further revised it and adjusted it to fit their particular views on Baptism, adopted it in 1677. By both of the bodies it was transmitted to their affiliated co-religionists in America, where it worked out for itself an important history.<sup>88</sup> It was of course also transmitted, in its original form, by the Scotch church to the churches, on both sides of the sea, deriving their tradition from it, and thus it has become the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Churches of the British dependencies and of America. In the latter it has been adapted to their free position relatively to the state by means of certain alterations in the relevant chapters, and in some of the churches it has been subjected to some other revisions. It has thus come about that the Westminster Confession has occupied a position of very wide-spread influence. It has been issued in something like 200 editions in Great Britain and in about 100 more in America.<sup>89</sup> It was rendered into German as early as 1648 (reprinted, somewhat modified, in Böckel's *Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-reform. Kirche*, 1847); and into Latin in 1656 (often reprinted, e. g. Niemeyer's *Collectio Conf.*, appendix, 1840, and Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, 1878); and into Gaelic in 1725 (often reprinted). More recently it has been translated into Hindustani (1842), Urdu (1848), German (1858), Siamese (1873), Portu-

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Williston Walker, *The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism*, New York, 1893; Underhill, *Confessions of Faith in Illustration of the History of the Baptist Church of England in the 17th Century*, London, 1854; *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Philadelphia, 1902, vol. xiii., pp. 380 sq.

<sup>89</sup> *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Oct., 1901, pp. 616 sq.; Jan., 1902, pp. 60 sq.; Oct., 1902, pp. 551 sq.

gese (1876), Spanish (1880 and again 1896-7), Japanese (1880), Chinese (1881), Arabic (1883), Gujurati (1888), French (1891), as well as into Benga, Persian and Korean (as yet in M.S.). It thus exists to-day in some seventeen languages<sup>100</sup> and is professed by perhaps a more numerous body than any other Protestant creed.<sup>101</sup>

The labors of the Divines upon the "fourth part of uniformity", that is to say, in the preparation of a Catechism for the unified churches, reached a similarly felicitous result. The Westminster Assembly was eminently an assembly of catechists, trained and practiced in the art.<sup>102</sup> Not only were its members pupils of masters in this work, but not fewer than a dozen of themselves had published Catechisms which were in wide use in the churches (Twisse, White, Gataker, Gouge, Wilkinson, Wilson, Walker, Palmer, Cowdrey, Sedgewick, Byfield, and possibly Newcomen, Lyford, Hedges, Foxcroft). A beginning was made at a comparatively early date towards drawing up their Catechism; but this labor was successfully completed only after all the other work of the Assembly had been accomplished. In the earlier notices of work on the Catechism it is not always easy to distinguish between references to the preparation of the Directory for Catechising for the Directory for Worship and references to the preparation of the Catechism itself. But as early as November 21, 1644, Baillie speaks of "the Catechise" as already drawn up; and on the 26th of December following, as nearly agreed on in private in its first draft. And we learn from the Minutes (p. 13) that on December 2, 1644, a committee was appointed "for hastening the Catechism", and that this committee was augmented on February 7th following (p. 48). On August 5, 1645, the material of this Catechism was under debate

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, April, 1902, pp. 254 sq.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. the statistics in the Art. *Puritaner und Presbyterianer*, in Herzog<sup>2</sup>. Also J. N. Ogilvie: *The Presbyterian Churches* (1807); Henry Cowan: *The Influence of the Scottish Church on Christendom*.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Mitchell, *Baird Lectures on The Westminster Confession*, Ed. 2, p. 419, and the passage quoted from Heppie, p. 81.

in the Assembly itself; and by August 20 it would seem to have been so far nearing completion that a committee was appointed to "draw up the whole draught" of it. Nothing, however, came of this work. It appears, in effect, that one or two false starts were made upon the Catechism before the Divines got down to their really productive work upon it. After midsummer of 1645 we hear nothing about the Catechism for a year, when, writing July 14, 1646, Baillie tells us that all that had been hitherto accomplished was set aside and a new beginning made. "We made, long agoe", he writes, "a prettie progress in the Catechise; but falling on rubbes and long debates, it was laid aside till the Confession was ended, with resolution to have no matter in it but what wes expressed in the Confession, which should not be debated over againe in the Catechise."

Accordingly, the Confession being now finished and in process of review, the new Catechism<sup>103</sup> was taken up (September 11), and from September 14, 1646, to January 4, 1647, was rapidly passed through the Assembly up to the questions which dealt with the Fourth Commandment. This, however, was only another false start. In the prosecution of this work, the Assembly became convinced that it was attempting an impossible feat; as the Scottish Commissioners express it,<sup>104</sup> it was essaying "to dress up milk and meat both in one dish". It therefore again called a halt and "recomitted the work, that tuo formes of Catechisme may be prepared, one more exact and comprehensive, another more easie and short for new beginners".<sup>105</sup> Recommencing on this new basis, the "Larger Catechism"

<sup>103</sup> An order from the Commons to hasten the Catechism had come in on July 22, 1646.

<sup>104</sup> Writing to the Commission of the General Assembly. See the published records of the Commission, i. p. 187.

<sup>105</sup> *Do*: cf. *Minutes* for Jan. 14, where the order for preparing the two Catechisms is noted and it is added that in the preparation of them, eye is to be had "to the Confession of Faith, and the matter of the Catechism already begun". Cf. also Gillespie's account in his speech in the General Assembly, August, 1647 (*Baillie's Letters*, iii., p. 472).

The first of these is the fact that the British  
 Government has been unable to secure the necessary  
 financial resources to carry out its policy of  
 maintaining the status quo in the Middle East.  
 This has been due to a combination of factors,  
 including the high cost of maintaining a large  
 military presence in the region, and the fact that  
 the British economy has been unable to generate  
 sufficient surplus to meet these needs.

The second factor is the increasing pressure  
 on the British Government from the United States  
 to take a more active role in the Middle East.  
 This pressure has been based on the fact that  
 the United States has a strategic interest in  
 the region, and that it has been unable to  
 secure its own interests without British support.

The third factor is the growing influence of  
 the Arab states in the Middle East. These states  
 have been able to secure the support of the United  
 States, and this has enabled them to challenge  
 the British position in the region.

The fourth factor is the increasing influence of  
 the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The Soviet  
 Union has been able to secure the support of the  
 Arab states, and this has enabled it to challenge  
 the British position in the region.

The fifth factor is the increasing influence of  
 the United States in the Middle East. The United  
 States has been able to secure the support of the  
 Arab states, and this has enabled it to challenge  
 the British position in the region.

The sixth factor is the increasing influence of  
 the United Nations in the Middle East. The United  
 Nations has been able to secure the support of the  
 Arab states, and this has enabled it to challenge  
 the British position in the region.

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periods, but also by the obvious independence of the Westminster Divines in giving form to their catechetical formularies, and their express determination to derive the materials for them, as far as possible, from their own Confession of Faith. The contents of the first Catechism taken in hand by them—the Catechism of 1644-1645—have not been transmitted to us. We may infer, however, from the meagre details which have found record, that it was probably based on the Catechism of Herbert Palmer, published in 1640 under the title of *An Endeavour of Making Christian Religion Easie* (5th ed., 1645). The matter of the second Catechism prepared by the Assembly—that of the autumn of 1646—is preserved for us in the Minutes, so far as it was debated and passed by the Assembly.<sup>100</sup> It professedly derives its material as far as possible from the Assembly's Confession of Faith, but as it covers in large part ground not gone over in the Confession, much of its material must have an independent origin. Palmer's Catechism still seems to underlie it, but supplies no material for its exposition of the Commandments; and the influence of the manuals of Usher seems discernible. Much the same must be said of the sources of the Catechisms which the Assembly completed, "Larger" and "Shorter". The doctrinal portion of the "Larger Catechism" is very much a catechetical recension of the Assembly's Confession of Faith; while in its ethical portion (its exposition of the Ten Commandments) it seems to derive most from Usher's *Body of Divinity* and Nicholl's and Ball's *Catechisms*, and in its exposition of the Lord's Prayer to go back ultimately through intermediary manuals to William Perkins' treatise on the Lord's Prayer. The "Shorter Catechism" is so original and individual in its form, that the question of its sources seems insoluble, if not impertinent. It in the main follows the outline of the "Larger Catechism"; but in its

<sup>100</sup> It has been extracted and printed in consecutive form by W. Carruthers in his *The Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Divines, . . . with Historical Account and Bibliography* (London, 1897).



modes of statement it now and again varies from it and in some of these variations reverts to the Catechism of the autumn of 1646. In their striking opening questions both Catechisms go back ultimately to the model introduced by Calvin, possibly but certainly not probably through the intermediation of Leo Judae.<sup>107</sup> Perhaps of all earlier Catechisms the little manual of Ezekiel Rogers most closely resembles the "Shorter Catechism" in its general plan and order; but there is little detailed resemblance between the two. After all said, the "Shorter Catechism" is a new creation, and must be considered in structure and contents alike the contribution to the catechetical art of the Westminster Divines themselves. No other Catechism can be compared with it in its concise, nervous, terse exactitude of definition, or in its severely logical elaboration; and it gains these admirable qualities at no expense to its freshness or fervor, though perhaps it can scarcely be spoken of as marked by childlike simplicity. Although set forth as "milk for babes" and designed to stand by the side of the "Larger Catechism" as an "easie and short" manual of religion "for new beginners", it is nevertheless governed by the principle (as one of its authors—Seaman—phrased it), "that the greatest care should be taken to frame the answer not according to the model of the knowledge the child hath, but according to that the child ought to have". Its peculiarity, in contrast with the "Larger Catechism" (and the Confession of Faith), is the strictness with which its contents are confined to the very quintessence of religion and morals, to the positive truths and facts which must be known for their own behoof by all who would fain be instructed in right belief and practice.<sup>108</sup> All purely historical matter, and

<sup>107</sup> Leo Judae: "Q. Dic, sodes, ad quem finem homo creatus est?  
R. Ut optimi maximi ac sapientissimi Dei Creatoris majestatem ac  
bonitatem agnoscamus, tandemque illo aeternum fruamur."

<sup>108</sup> Accordingly the course of salvation alone is traced in questions 20-28 with no reference whatever to the career or end of those not elected to everlasting life. The theory is that the catechumen is interested, or ought to be, exclusively in what has been done for him and what he is to expect. This is the account to give of the fact which

much more, all controversial matter—everything which can minister merely to curiosity, however chastened—is rigidly excluded. Only that is given which, in the judgment of its framers, is directly required for the Christian's instruction in what he is to believe concerning God and what God requires of him. It is a pure manual of personal religion and practical morality.

To whom among the Westminster Divines we more especially owe these Catechetical manuals,—and particularly the "Shorter Catechism",—we have no means of determining. It is, of course, easy to draw out from the records of the Assembly the names of the members of the committees to which the preparation of the materials for them was entrusted. But this seems to carry us a very little way into the problem. On the whole, Herbert Palmer, who bore the reputation, as Baillie tells us, of being "the best catechist in England", appears to have been the leading spirit in the Assembly in all matters concerned with catechetics: and he apparently served on all important committees busied with the Catechisms up to his death, which occurred, however, (Aug. 13, 1647) before the "Shorter Catechism" seems to have been seriously taken in hand. We have no direct evidence to connect him with the authorship of this Catechism, only the first—evidently a purely preliminary—report upon which he was privileged to be the medium of making, and the contents of which certainly show much less resemblance to those of his own manual than there is reason to believe was exhibited by the earliest Catechism undertaken by the Assembly. There is still less reason, of course, to connect with its composition the name of Dr. John Wallis, Palmer's pupil and friend, who attended the committee charged with its review as its secretary (from Nov. 9,

seems strange to some (see Mitchell, *Baird Lectures*, p. 450) that there is no reference here to the future retribution of the lost. This is only a portion of a larger fact. The Catechism proceeds on the presumption that the catechumen is a child of God and gives only what the child of God needs to know of the dealings of God with him and the duties he owes to God.

1647), and whose mathematical genius has been thought to express itself in the clear and logical definitions which characterize the document. Dr. Wallis' close connection with the "Shorter Catechism", in the minds of the contemporary and following generations, appears to be mainly due to the publication by him at once on its appearance (1648) of an edition of it broken up into subordinate questions according to the model of the treatise of his friend and patron, Palmer. Still less have we evidence to connect the Scotch commissioners directly with the composition of the "Shorter Catechism". The record may give us reason to infer that the earliest Catechism undertaken by the Assembly may have been in the first instance drafted by the Scots.<sup>109</sup> But we lack even such faint suggestions in the case of the Catechisms which were ultimately prepared. Indeed, these Catechisms, and especially the "Shorter", are precisely the portion of the Assembly's constructive work, in the composition of which the Scotch Commissioners appear to have had the least prominent part. Henderson had died before the Confession of Faith was finished; Bailie left immediately after its completion; Gillespie in the midst of the work on the "Larger Catechism"; while Ruth-erford, who alone remained until the "Shorter Catechism" was under way, judged that his presence until the completion of the "Larger Catechism" justified the declaration that the Scots had lent their aid to the accomplishment of all "the 4 things mentioned in the Covenant",<sup>110</sup> which is as much as

<sup>109</sup> How far this first draft may be represented by *The New Catechism according to the forms of the Church of Scotland*, published by the Scots in 1644 (reprinted in *Mitchell's Catechisms of the Second Reformation*, 1886) we have no means of determining: but there is reason to believe that if this document was prepared by the Scots as a draft for the consideration of the Assembly, it was much departed from in the Assembly's work, which seems rather to have taken its start from Palmer's Catechism.

<sup>110</sup> *Minutes*, Oct. 15, 1647. Before he actually took his leave (Nov. 9), the Shorter Catechism, which ran rapidly forward, was on the point of completion. See the *Minutes* for Nov. 8, when the Commandments, Lord's Prayer and Creed were ordered to be added to the Catechism.

to say that he looked upon the completion of the "Shorter Catechism" as largely a matter of routine work unessential to the main task of the Assembly.<sup>111</sup> It does not follow, of course, that the Scots had nothing to do with the composition of the "Shorter Catechism". We do not know how fully its text had been worked out before any of it was brought before the Assembly, or how hard it rested on previous work done in committee or in the Assembly, or to whom the first essays in its composition were due. Of course, the Scots served with all committees up to the moment of their departure, and may have had much to do with the framing of the drafts of documents with which we have no explicit evidence to connect their names. But they appear to have had less to do with giving the Catechisms their final form than was the case with the other documents prepared by the Divines for the use of the united churches. The Catechisms come to us preëminently as the work of the Assembly, and we are without data to enable us to point to any individual or individuals to whom we can confidently assign their characteristic features.

With the completion of the Catechisms, the work of the Assembly under the engagement of the Solemn League and Covenant was done. The Scots, as we have seen, caused a minute to this effect to be entered upon the records of the Assembly (October 15, 1647), reciting that some of them had given assistance to the Divines throughout the whole of their labors looking to uniformity. And on the return to Scotland of Rutherford, the last of the Scots to leave London, the Commission of the General Assembly dis-

<sup>111</sup> It would seem that the Shorter Catechism was not seriously taken in hand until October 19, 1647, and that as late as Sept. 29, 1647, it could still seem doubtful in Scotland whether the Divines would not content themselves with the Larger Catechism. On that date the Commission at Edinburgh, acting on the assumption that there might be no Shorter Catechism prepared by the Divines, appointed a committee of its own to draw up a primary Catechism for use in Scotland. (See *Records of the Commissions of the General Assemblies*, etc., edited by Mitchell and Christie, I., p. 306.) The Assembly of Divines was already disintegrating and it was hard to get together a quorum.

patched a letter to the Assembly of Divines (November 26, 1647)—with whom it joins in the address “the Ministers of London, and all the other well-affected brethren of the Ministrie of England”—which accurately reflects the state of affairs relatively to the work of the Divines at the end of the year 1647. In this letter the Scots express their unwavering purpose to abide by the Covenant they had sworn, and exhort their English brethren to do the same, noting at the same time the difficulties they saw besetting the way, and recommending in view of them diligence in the fear of God. In pursuance of its covenant engagement, the letter goes on to declare, the Scottish Church had approved and ratified the *Directory for Worship* “being about two yeares agoe agreed upon by the Assemblies and Parliaments of both kingdomes”, and the *Doctrinal Part of Church Government*—that is, the *Propositions for Church Government* of 1644—“agreed upon by the reverend and learned Assemblie of Divines”; and had also approved the *Confession of Faith* “as sound and orthodox for the matter, and agreed unto on their part, that it be a part of the Uniformity, and a Confession of Faith for the Churches of Christ in the three kingdomes”; while it purposed to consider and expected to approve the *Directory of Church Government*, the *Catechism* and the new *Paraphrase of the Psalms* at the next Assembly, to meet in the summer of 1648. From this statement we perceive how far Scotland had outrun England in fulfilling the terms of their mutual engagement, and how uneasy the northern kingdom was becoming over the ever growing prospect that they would never be fully met in England. Meanwhile all the work of the Divines for uniformity was done; there remained only the completion of the proof-texts for the Catechisms, with the completion of which their entire function, as enlarged and given international significance by the provisions of the Solemn League and Covenant, was performed. We find the Assembly, therefore, on the day on which Rutherford took his leave of it, appointing a committee “to consider of what is fit



to be done when the Catechism is finished" (November 9, 1647). For a time the Assembly turned back to the controversies of the great days of its past, with the Independents and the Erastians; to its responses to the *jus divinum* queries;<sup>112</sup> and especially to its answers to the reasons of the Dissenting brethren against the Presbyterian system of government, which it now prepared for publication (1648, and again 1652). It had ceased to have any further function, however, than that of a standing advisory board to Parliament; and as the significance of Parliament decreased ("Pride's purge", December 6, 1648, was the precursor of the end, which came in 1653) its own importance necessarily fell with it. It became increasingly difficult to get a quorum together; and its work dwindled into the mere task of an examining committee for vacant charges, until it passed out of existence with the Parliament from which it derived its being.

What the Divines could do for the institution of the proposed uniformity of religion in the three kingdoms, we see, then, had been done and well done, by the beginning of 1648. The institution of uniformity on the basis formulated by them did not lie within their powers. That was a matter of treaty engagement between the two nations. We have seen that the Scotch were in no way backward in the fulfilment of their part of the engagement. The same cannot be said for England. The political situation was very different at the opening of 1648 from what it had been in midsummer of 1643; and Parliament was now perhaps little inclined, and, to do it justice, was certainly little able, to carry out all it had felt constrained to promise five years before.<sup>113</sup> The rise of Independency to political power and

<sup>112</sup> These queries had been laid aside "till the Confession and Catechism were ended" (Baillie, *Letters*, ii, pp. 378, 388), so that to return to them at this point was only to carry out a long-determined plan.

<sup>113</sup> What was done by Parliament, however, was not little, though it was done slowly and proved not lasting. This is how it is sketched by a not very friendly hand: "The years 1640-60 witnessed the most complete and drastic revolution which the Church of England has ever undergone. Its whole structure was ruthlessly demolished—Episcopacy,

the usurpation of the army were the supersession of the Covenant and all its solemn obligations: and after the usurpation came ultimately, not the restoration of Parliamentary government and Presbyterianism, but the restoration of monarchy and prelacy. The dream of an enforced uniformity of religion in the three kingdoms on a Presbyterian basis, under the inspiration of which the Divines had done their constructive work, had vanished; and so far as the successful issue of their labors depended on alliance with a friendly state, their work, as regards England at least, had failed. But this alliance was not the strength of the Assembly, but its weakness. Its work was not in character political, but religious; and its product needed no imposition by the civil power to give it vitality. Whatever real authority the formularies it had framed possessed, was inherent in them as sound presentations of truth, not derived from extraneous sources. And by the inherent power of their truth they have held sway and won a way for themselves to the real triumph of the voluntary adhesion

the Spiritual Courts, Deans and Chapters, Convocation, the Book of Common Prayer, the Thirty-Nine Articles, and the Psalter; the lands of the Bishops and of the Deans and Chapters were sold, and the Cathedrals were purified or defiled. On the clean-swept ground an entirely novel Church system was erected. In place of Episcopal Church Government a Presbyterian organization was introduced, and a Presbyterian system of ordination. For the Spiritual Courts were substituted Presbyterian Assemblies (Parochial, Classical and Provincial), acting with a very real censorial jurisdiction, but in final subordination to a parliamentary committee sitting at Westminster. Instead of the Thirty-Nine Articles the Confession of Faith was introduced, and the Directory in place of the Book of Common Prayer. New Catechisms and a new metrical version were prepared, a parochial survey of the whole country was carried out, and extensive reorganization of parishes effected. Finally, the equivalent of a modern ecclesiastical commission (or let us say of Queen Anne's Bounty Scheme) was invented, a body of trustees was endowed with considerable revenues for the purpose of augmenting poor livings, and for years the work of this ecclesiastical charity and reorganization scheme was earnestly pursued. There is hardly a parallel in history to such a constitutional revolution as this."

. . . (W. A. Shaw, *A History of the English Church during . . . 1640-1660*, I., pp. vii.-viii.).

of multitudes of Christian men. It is honor enough for the Westminster Assembly that it has provided this multitude of voluntary adherents with a practicable platform of representative government on Scriptural lines, and a sober and sane directory of worship eminently spiritual in tone; and above all, with the culminating Reformed Confession of Faith, and a Catechism preëminent for the exactness of its definitions of faith and the faithfulness of its ethical precepts.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

## BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.

The intelligent reader need not be told that the title of this paper is taken from Nietzsche's *Jenseits von Gut und Bose*, which has recently appeared in English dress,<sup>1</sup> and that I do not intend to discuss the problem of good and evil, but rather to use this heading as a point of departure for some observations in regard to the author of *Beyond Good and Evil*. The attempt to add still another to the many interpretations of that bizarre and irritating genius, Friedrich Nietzsche, needs no apology. The teacher of Beyond-man has now become a problem like Hegel, or, let us say, Ibsen and Mr. Bernard Shaw. He is both widely read and much misunderstood. Whether he is really worth reading, is a question I do not raise; and it is only because I do not know just how widely he is read that I pocket both pride and shame and venture to offer to readers of this REVIEW anything so 'popular' as the purely descriptive part of this paper. I desire to add by way of farther explanation that the article is mainly expository, not critical, and that in writing it in the first instance for another public I was guided by Huxley's maxim for popular lecturing and presupposed nothing but total ignorance.

Prof. Sorley's happy reference to Nietzsche<sup>2</sup> as "the *enfant terrible* of modern thought", is the best characterization of him I know. He makes ill-timed and shocking remarks, he has no reverence for etiquette and convention, he makes awkward enquiries and asks embarrassing questions. He will touch the ark without fear, and without reverence penetrate into the holy of holies. He will not be repressed

<sup>1</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.* By Friedrich Nietzsche. Authorized translation by Helen Zimmern. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 32.

or silenced and the only hope is to deal with him patiently and seriously and show where his strange vagaries would lead. If the metaphor here goes somewhat lame, the fault is mine for over-working it. One must not expect a metaphor to run on all fours. Even the real *enfant terrible*, however, must in the first place be understood, and not ignored or refuted. Nietzsche himself says; "one refutes a thing by laying it respectfully on ice—it is just so that one refutes theologians also". But one cannot refute Nietzsche by laying him respectfully on ice. Orthodox theologians might be tempted to give the retort courteous that there is at all events no ice where Nietzsche now is; but apart from that, he has far too much vitality to freeze to death. Though the comparison is a compliment which Nietzsche does not deserve, he is in more respects than one the legitimate successor of Hobbes, about whom Warburton wrote in 1741: "the press sweat with controversy; and every young Churchman militant would needs try his arms in thundering upon Hobbes's steel-cap".

Nor can one refute Nietzsche, or even insult him, by calling him hard names. That is too often his own method of argument; but it is no use to call a man a liar if he only smilingly admits the imputation. It is easy enough to judge Nietzsche's morality by the traditional standards and condemn it. But this is as unnecessary and inconclusive as it is easy. He calls himself 'anti-Christian', 'atheist' and 'immoralist,' and one need not waste breath in calling him names which he takes as compliments. It is his primary purpose to put in question the worth of the very standards according to which his morality is condemned. That is his real significance.

In his life-time Nietzsche was ignored by the many, disdained by the few who were acquainted with his writings, deserted by one after another of his intimate associates. While lamenting the coldness of the public and the apostasy of his friends, he always asserted that he wrote for posterity. "It is only the day after to-morrow that he-



longs to me. Some are born posthumously. . . . This book belongs to the 'select few' . . . of what account are the rest?—The rest are merely mankind'. Thus he writes in the Preface to *The Antichrist*; and now the 'select few' have grown into the many, the *canaille*, whom he scorns. 'Europe's Flatland', where he says he was least read and least wished to be read, has recently added to the two standard editions formerly published, a complete pocket edition of his works in chronological order,<sup>3</sup> and five of the eleven volumes of the authorized English and American editions have already been published. Nietzsche has been called 'the man of the day', and on the one hand the spread of his cult has been lamented as the evil sign of a materialistic age, while on the other hand he has been welcomed as the original teacher of a new moral ideal. He has been called *Der Modephilosoph der Zeit*; and while this is perhaps a doubtful compliment, it is at least ample evidence of his popularity when this phrase is used by such a competent witness as Riehl, who says that Nietzsche is to-day the most widely read of serious writers.<sup>4</sup> In a recent review of 'Contemporary Philosophy in Germany', Prof. Oscar Ewald says that "the traces of Nietzsche's influence on our modern thought are deeper than those of any other thinker".<sup>5</sup> Before his death, in 1900, a few articles about him had been written by competent hands,<sup>6</sup> and Riehl and Lichtenberger had published their excellent monographs, but very little of the mass of Nietzsche-literature had been contributed by serious students of philosophy; and while I do not profess to be well-read in this literature I have examined enough of it to venture the asser-

<sup>3</sup> *Nietzsche's Werke: Taschen-Ausgabe*. Leipzig, G. C. Naumann's Verlag 1906. 10 Bände.

<sup>4</sup> *Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Künstler und der Denker*.<sup>2</sup> 1898, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *The Philosophical Review*, May, 1907.

<sup>6</sup> The best I have seen are von Hartmann's essay entitled *Nietzsche's 'neue Moral'*, published in *Ethische Studien*, 1898, and Prof. Seth Pringle-Pattison's admirable article in *The Contemporary Review*, May, 1898.

tion that three-fourths of it is worthless. Now, however, we have careful studies of Nietzsche by such competent interpreters as (among others) Richter,<sup>7</sup> Fouillée,<sup>8</sup> Vaihinger,<sup>9</sup> Simmel,<sup>10</sup> Dolson,<sup>11</sup> and Drews.<sup>12</sup> Nietzsche is much in evidence in the philosophical periodicals,<sup>13</sup> and his name falls from the lips of professed philosophers as well as litterateurs. He has found a place in Falckenberg's and Ueberweg-Heinze's histories of philosophy and in the last edition of Eucken's *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, and his teaching has been expounded from the professorial chair.

Now both of these facts—to wit, that Nietzsche first became *à la mode* with 'the people' and only after some lapse of time came into his own as not beneath the notice of competent students of philosophy—admit, I think, of ready explanation. In the first place, the public in default of any better standard, and before time has had a chance to determine values, is rather apt to take new issues at the price fixed by somebody's *ipse dixit*; and Nietzsche set a high value upon his own wares. In one thing he remained true to his master Schopenhauer—he displayed no mock-modesty. He regarded himself as a European event, like Hegel and Goethe. He vilified Socrates, Plato, Kant, the Reformation, the Germans, the Jews, the English, Christianity; in short almost everything except the Renaissance, Napoleon, Goethe and Heine. He never failed to run counter to all traditional opinion and to make his own unproved assertions with an air of infallibility. How could one refrain from

<sup>7</sup> *Friedrich Nietzsche, Sein Leben und sein Werk.* 1903.

<sup>8</sup> *Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme.* 1902.

<sup>9</sup> *Nietzsche als Philosoph.* 1902.

<sup>10</sup> *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche.* 1907.

<sup>11</sup> *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.* 1901.

<sup>12</sup> *Nietzsche's Philosophie.* 1904.

<sup>13</sup> *The International Journal of Ethics* and *The Contemporary Review* for April come to my table as I write. The former has two articles, and the latter one, dealing with Nietzsche. The latest contribution to Nietzsche-literature in book form (*The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, by Henry L. Mencken, 1908) is altogether worthless.

curiosity concerning an author who announces himself thus: "People often ask me why in the world I write in German: I was nowhere less read than in my own country. But who knows after all if I even want to be read at present?—To create things on which time vainly tries its teeth; as regards form, *as regards substance*, to make an effort after a little immortality. I was never yet modest enough to require less of myself. Aphorism and the sentence, in which I, as the foremost among the Germans, am master, are the forms of "eternity"; my ambition is to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book,—what everyone else does *not* say in a book. . . . I have given to mankind the profoundest book it possesses, my *Zarathustra*: I shall shortly give it the most independent one".<sup>14</sup> "I have given to the Germans the profoundest books they at all possess—a sufficient reason why they should not understand a word of them."<sup>15</sup> "My 'Genealogy of Morals' furnished the first information concerning the contrast between 'noble morality' and 'Christian morality'; there is perhaps no more decisive modification of thought in the history of religious and moral knowledge. That book, my touchstone for what belongs to me, has the good fortune to be accessible only to the most elevated and the most rigorous minds; *others* have not got ears for it."<sup>16</sup> In February 1888, he wrote to von Seydlitz: "It is not impossible that I am the first philosopher of the age—perhaps even something more—something decisive and fatal, standing between two milleniums." Nietzsche, then, proclaims himself as a European event, a 'free-spirit' writing for free-spirits, a revolutionising genius, a setter-up of new tables of values, the teacher of a new morality, a new religion, a thinker with a profundity, a gaiety, a seriousness, and a mastery of style hitherto unknown; and—the innocent public have taken him at his own valuation.

<sup>14</sup> *The Twilight of the Idols*, pp. 217-218.

<sup>15</sup> *The Case of Wagner*. Second Postscript

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* Note to the Epilogue.

But this is not all. Nietzsche really plays with great problems, problems of music, of culture, of psychology, of morals and art and religion. If he does not work seriously, cautiously, thoroughly, he at least toys with great and perennially interesting issues. The fact that he is unsystematic and non-sequacious is a point in his favor. It is convenient to be able to begin or leave off reading wherever fancy chooses. The general reader does not wish a system, does not wish hard consecutive thinking, cares nothing about the logical development of a thesis; it is much easier to memorize aphorisms and to appropriate *obiter dicta*, the striking novelty of which is largely due to ignorance. Nietzsche skips about in the world of great philosophical ideas; but he eschews the phraseology of the schools, he is guiltless of philosophic calm and method; he employs a vocabulary which is in part the language of common life and in part of his own invention, but which soon becomes intelligible enough to answer the needs of the enthusiastic neophyte. His sentences stick in the memory: "Nothing is more compromising than a thought". "Nothing is less expensive than passion". "Man does *not* strive after happiness; only the Englishman does so". "By seeking after the beginnings of things people become crabs. The historian looks backwards; he finally *believes* backwards also". "Nothing is true, everything is allowed". "Plato is a coward in presence of reality; consequently he takes refuge in the ideal". "Ye say, 'a good cause will hollow even war'? I say unto you: 'a good war halloweth every cause.'" "Morality *negatives* life". "Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage". "Remorse of conscience is indecent".

Nietzsche was moreover a past-master in the art of coining or appropriating striking and equivocal catch-words. Who has not heard of the Overman or Superman, of Eternal Recurrence, of the Will to Power, of the Transvaluation of all Values, of Master-morality and Slave-morality, of Human all-too Human, of Beyond Good and

Evil? These phrases contain Nietzsche's philosophy, and it is convenient to have one's intellectual valuables done up in small parcels and neatly labelled. That the real content of these packages is not always known, that the meaning of the phrases is somewhat obscure—what does that matter? They are easily passed from hand to hand or mouth to mouth. The real significance of his views is a problem which need not in the least trouble the average patron of the circulating-library. The latter doubtless thinks that he understands Nietzsche, that his meaning is so plain that he who runs may read—though Nietzsche himself held otherwise. He tells us that it is not only his habit, but perhaps even his malicious fancy "to write nothing else but what may drive everybody to despair who is pressed for time". He is a "teacher of slow reading". "It is almost necessary to be a cow. . . . :chewing the cud is necessary". "Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy". "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood". "Posthumous men—myself, for example. . . . are never understood—therefore our authority".<sup>17</sup> There is much truth in these statements, especially the last one.

Nevertheless Nietzsche's 'shocking epigrams' are readily enough intelligible to fascinate the attention and fire the imagination of shallow minds. Here are a few samples from the *Twilight of the Idols*. "To have to combat the instincts—that is the formula for *décadence*". "Morality and religion belong entirely to the psychology of error". "There is no such thing as a moral fact". "Moral sentiment has this in common with religious sentiment; it believes in realities which do not exist." Christianity is "undying Chandala revenge as the *religion of love*". "An altruistic morality, a morality which causes selfishness to languish, is, under all circumstances, a bad sign." "Vigorous eras, noble civilizations, see something contemptible

<sup>17</sup> Preface to *The Dawn of Day*, Foreword to *A Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 258, *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 99.



in sympathy, in brotherly love". "The preaching of chastity is an incitement to antinaturalism". Pity is "the virtue of the decadents".

But these sentences are taken out of their context; in repeating them in their naked isolation we are making illegitimate use of them and perhaps misrepresenting their author. That is undoubtedly true, and I believe it is just because Nietzsche's views are most frequently known in this fragmentary way that his influence upon the half-cultured is so dangerous. Nietzsche himself has a basis for his opinions. He has reasons for regarding our softening manners as signs of decadence, for decrying democratic institutions, for condemning all that comes under the concept of what he calls slave-morality, for his hatred of Christianity: all of his judgments, literary, aesthetic, ethical, religious, have a common basis. Now we think these reasons bad, very bad indeed, and this common basis weak. There are those who do not agree with us; but even the youthful members of Nietzsche-clubs would, I am convinced, fail to yield assent to his round and radical assertions, if they recognized the premises on which they rest and the conclusions to which they lead. Nietzsche calls himself 'immoralist', 'anti-Christian., atheist'; and many profess to follow him and quote his words without knowing at all why he rejected not only the ideals of Christendom, but all morality. They only know that he wrote in this way; "Nothing amidst our unsound modernism is unsounder than Christian sympathy". "All concepts of the Church have been recognized as what they are, as the wickedest of all forms of false coinage invented for the purpose of *depreciating* nature." . . . . In the last section of *The Antichrist*, he says: "I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity. . . . the one immortal blemish of mankind". "With this I am at the conclusion and pronounce my sentence. I *condemn* Christianity". "This eternal accusation of Christianity" he 'will write on all walls in letters that even the blind may see'. The colossal

egotism of that pronunciamiento is surely indicative of imperfect mental balance.<sup>18</sup> The title which he proposed to give to his unpublished autobiography—'Ecce Homo'—is an exhibition of bad taste which amounts to dementia. Though I believe that a true principle of criticism must compel one to judge the value of Nietzsche's writings by what they are, and not as the products of a diseased brain, it is certainly not altogether fanciful to see in his later writings the signs of the approach of that hopeless insanity which brought his literary activity to a close at the end of the year 1888.

It should now be evident why Nietzsche has compelled attention and awakened the most bitter opposition. If it is less evident why he has a following, this will perhaps appear more fully presently. It is not merely that he is gifted with a preternatural cleverness for making striking observations. We are to remember that he does not rest in mere negations. He preaches the gospel of strength, hardness, pitilessness, power, self-assertion; but all this under the guise of what some would call a new idealism. Against Schopenhauer and all the race of pessimists, he never tires of preaching the worth of life; and consequently he has a message for people grown weary and impoverished upon the dry bones of Schopenhauer's negation of the will to live or an over-emphasis upon the ascetic aspect of Christian ethics. His egotism affords a wholesome, though an exaggerated protest, against much sickly-sentimental humanitarianism. It also appeals to an age which is only too ready to receive any ill-considered gospel of 'strenuousness'.

"The authentic concluding words of *The Antichrist*, which do not appear in the English translation, give an even stronger expression of that megalomania which is so manifest in Nietzsche's judgments, quoted above, upon the value of his own works. "Und man rechnet die Zeit nach dem *dies nefastus*, mit dem dies Verhängniss anhub,—nach dem ersten Tag des Christentums!—Warum nicht lieber nach seinem letzten?—Nach Heute?—Umwertung aller Werthe! . . ." (*Werke*, VIII, p. 314, cf. p. 440); i. e., Why not now reckon time from the date of my work, Nietzsche, the destroyer of Christianity, rather than from the date of its founder?

What I have already said also affords a partial explanation of this other fact, viz., that Nietzsche was not at first taken seriously by those best qualified to judge him, and least of all by the professed philosophers. I have called him a philosopher, and only by circumlocution avoided speaking of his system. Yet 'system' in his writings there is none, and 'philosopher' is only his title by courtesy. It is, of course, a question of definition, and I am not solicitous about the name, but only about a description of his writings. Call him '*Ein philosophischer Geist*', if you like. He was that, as were Emerson and Carlyle. But no one of these was a philosopher in the technical sense. Define philosophy as you will—as the science of first principles, or of knowledge, or of reality, or of the phenomena of mind, or as the great synthesizing, systematising discipline, the *scientia scientiarum* which gathers up the generalizations of all the special sciences and seeks to present a coherent world-view—Nietzsche was not a philosopher in any of these aspects. He was neither psychologist (fond as he is of calling himself such), epistemologist, logician, nor metaphysician. He comes nearer to being a moral philosopher; not indeed a systematic thinker even here, but rather a 'moralist' in the old sense of one who reflects and comments upon human nature and conduct. He abounds in epigrams, apothegms, *obiter dicta*. Like Emerson, he gives us insights, *aperçus*; he emits sparks; but like Emerson's they are disconnected, unrelated, without logical sequence. He reminds us in some ways of Carlyle, whom he hated. He is a thunderer, an image-breaker, a propagandist, an immoralist with a mission. He is terse, scornful, bitter, impassioned, violent, never tired of smiting the anvil and scattering fire; tiresomely repetitious, defiant, denunciatory, self-contradictory, sometimes abrupt and obscure, more often clear and incisive, but always vigorous, vital, suggestive, often brilliant. Even in point of style he is always essentially an essayist — the artistic impulse outweighing the scientific. Instead of starting somewhere and going some-

whither by the most direct route, he loiters, dances, sings, expostulates, poses, ejaculates, vilifies, moralises by the way. He ridicules scholars and scientists. He would be known as philosopher and poet. He is neither, but is more poet than philosopher. He thinks in metaphors and his poetic imagery is often beautiful. But he shows us "how to philosophise with a hammer":<sup>19</sup> which means brutal, dogmatic denial and assertion—which is not at all philosophical.

Nietzsche's philosophical defect is not that he was a conscious and successful stylist, but that the style of which he was such a master is unsuitable for philosophy and that his aphoristic mode of thinking and writing resulted in an almost total absence of systematic exposition. How far this lack of systematic and consecutive thinking is an illustration of necessity being the mother of invention, and how far it was due to deliberate perversity, we may wonder. Nietzsche says he 'mistrusts all systematizers and avoids them' and that 'the will to system is a lack of rectitude'. But when we remember that his mental and physical health made prolonged application impossible, that he was obliged to be much in the open air, that it was his habit to jot down thoughts as they occurred to him in the course of his daily wanderings and then to polish them into literary form in the evening—we have the psychological (and physiological) explanation of his statement that "sedentary application is the very *sin* against the Holy Ghost, only thoughts *won by walking* are valuable". It would be like Nietzsche thus to make a virtue of necessity. At all events it is evident that we should not expect to find much system in books composed in this occasional way of scattered ideas culled from note-books.

But the prophet of Naumburg is not only aphoristic and unsystematic in thought and expression; he is Protean in his changes. First coming under the influence of the phil-

<sup>19</sup> This is the sub-title of *The Twilight of the Idols*—cf. *Zarathustra*, p. 179. "Thou askest why? I am not of those who may be asked for their whys."

ologist F. W. R. Ritschl, then under the spell of Schopenhauer and Wagner, at length an apostate from the Schopenhauerian philosophy, an adherent of the English empiricists, of the French moralists of the school of Montaigne, of Positivism, of Darwinism, of an un-Darwinian evolutionism; and all the while delivering his *dicta*, no matter how mutually contradictory, with the same appearance of papal infallibility: is it any wonder that the philosophers refused to take him seriously when he took himself so seriously at each successive change of front? Nietzsche says he does not wish to be understood; and again he laments that he is not understood. He attributes the lack of intelligent appreciation to his own profundity and his readers' superficiality. I am not aware that he regards his shifting view-point and contradictory judgments as a serious hindrance to his luminosity.

Why, then, if the description I have attempted to give of Nietzsche's writings be just, or at all near the truth, is he now at length receiving the attention of serious students of philosophy? The answer can be given very briefly. It is, in the first place, because Nietzsche has become a power with the masses, he has become a factor in the life and thought of the reading members of the laboring classes. The intellectual horizon of many of these people is determined solely by Nietzsche. He is their prophet and apostle.<sup>20</sup> We have not time to explain how the rank and file should come to choose as their leader the most haughty, aristocratic scorner of their kind whom they could possibly discover. Nietzsche holds that the true end of life is to produce 'superior' men; that 'a whole people is the detour which nature makes in order to produce six or seven great men'; that the many exist neither for themselves nor the state nor posterity, but for the sake of the few 'noble' ones

<sup>20</sup> I understand, however, that Nietzsche's influence is now waning in Germany. If this be so, and if it be also true that history repeats itself, there is every reason to expect that the German ebb tide will be flood tide over here. Successful publishers are not fools, and they know this.



who give significance to life; that 'a healthy aristocracy should accept with a good conscience the sacrifices of a legion of individuals'. "Verily, after writing rabble, badly smelleth all yesterday and to-day". Nietzsche says in *Zarathustra*. Yet the 'rabble' follow him. Perhaps one explanation is to be found in his own statement that "it is an enjoyment for every poor devil to vilify". Nietzsche, aristocratic radical as he is, expresses in no measured language the dissatisfaction of all those who are ill at ease and disgruntled under the existing social regime. He appeals to all deniers of right, of order, of morality, of religion. All sorts of iconoclasts take him as their spokesman—not because he proves or disproves anything—but because he is hailed as a philosopher who voices the antagonism to all existing institutions and the traditional codes of social life. When a philosophy has thus touched life intimately and has strongly influenced thought and action, it can not be disregarded simply because it may be technically crude. Because Nietzsche is a living force, he cannot be ignored.

But, in the second place, Nietzsche raises several great philosophical questions. He does not solve problems, but he states them with great clearness and force. It is nothing to his discredit that like his own *Zarathustra*, and indeed like all philosophers, "he asked himself many things and did not easily know the answer". Though he scarcely attempts a systematic discussion of any problem, and though his philosophy is—to borrow the phrase which he directs against Positivism—"a bric-a-brac of ideas of the most varied origin", yet it would be a mistake to suppose that there is no coherence whatever in his thinking. His predominant interest is the problem of values—the problem which is familiar to theologians in connection with Ritschlianism, and which is just now receiving much attention in philosophy, especially in connection with Pragmatism. It is not so strange therefore that one whose writings are filled with discussion of value-judgments, and who, moreover,

attempts to introduce a new table of values, should receive more serious consideration than the intrinsic merit of his work deserves. It is just here, at this problem of values, that we strike upon Nietzsche's real significance; it is here also that we find whatever organic unity there may be among the *dissecta membra* of his various productions—the kind of unity which results from continual occupation with a single problem.

Riehl tells us that Nietzsche is the philosopher of culture; that culture is the problem which stands in the midst of his philosophy and binds together the different periods of his thinking.<sup>21</sup> Others have found this central point and common bond in the hostility to Christianity, or in his doctrine of the Superman. But while there is truth in all of these views, I prefer to state the case in my own way and to see in the *problem of values* the thought which is central to all his opinions. This is in accordance with his own statement that the problem of *décadence* is in fact that which has occupied him most profoundly,<sup>22</sup> and that Good and Evil is only a variety of that problem. His interpretation of morality, of Christianity, his interest in culture, in history, in civilization, is likewise only a variety of that problem, which is itself the problem of the value of a certain type of life. His hostile attitude towards pity is due to the fact that it is regarded as the monumental illustration of decadence. His interest in culture is not merely the historian's interest in facts, but the moralist's preference for certain types of culture and dislike for others. The Christian type is repugnant to him; the Overman is his ideal.<sup>23</sup> When he began his academic career as a philologist, Nietzsche complained of the narrowness of his specialty and expressed the intention of using philology as a tool, an instrument, in the service of the history of culture. The

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>22</sup> Preface to *The Case of Wagner*.

<sup>23</sup> There is no single recognized English equivalent for *Uebermensch*. I do not stick to uniformity, but use the words Superman, Overman, Beyond-man and Higher-man indifferently.

first fruits were his *Birth of Tragedy*; but even in this study of Greek culture his interest was not alone historical and æsthetic; there was the ethical *motif* of depicting and defending a particular type of culture, one characterized by vitality. In his early essay on *History* he discountenances the teaching of so much history—why? On the ground that living in the past and contemplating the heroic deeds of former times, will lead the present generation to look upon themselves as *Epigoni*, and thus diminish their self-confidence and make them weaker. Here at the beginning of Nietzsche's literary activity we have an anticipation of his Master-morality.

While a student at Leipsic, Nietzsche first became acquainted with Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*, which at once captivated him. One need not attempt to describe in detail Nietzsche's affinity for the great pessimist. Prof. Pringle-Pattison quotes Nietzsche's statement that "*Der Atheismus, war Das, was mich zu Schopenhauer führte*".<sup>24</sup> but I believe this is only a half-truth or quarter-truth. It is certain that his hostility to Theism and to Christianity gradually became more pronounced, and finally remained (together with the belief in the primacy of 'Will') the chief point of contact between himself and his 'great teacher'. But I think it was primarily because Schopenhauer 'had the courage to stand alone', and was a 'kicker' against all authorities, traditions, and beliefs—Theism and Christianity of course included—that Nietzsche admired him. The seriousness, the independence, the individuality, the 'free-spirit', and also the pessimism of the master, found a ready echo in the morbid, neurasthenic breast and kindred spirit of the young philologist.<sup>25</sup> However this may be,

<sup>24</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 736.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. his lines on Schopenhauer. *Werke* VIII. p. 362.

Was er lehrte ist abgethan,  
Was er lebte wird bleiben stahn;  
Seht ihm nur an!  
Niemandem war er unterthan

Cf. also *Genealogy*, p. 137, and *Werke*, IV., Zweite Hälfte, Aph. 253, 255.

the heart of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the denial of the worth of life in an irrational universe permeated by suffering. He raises the question of *value* in this concrete but broadest aspect. And while Nietzsche later reacted from Schopenhauer and rejected most of his specific doctrines, it is this question of the worth of life, of the value of a particular type of life, of culture, of institutions, of customs, of individuals, of ideas, which is always besetting him.<sup>26</sup>

During the period of the Schopenhauer-Wagner influence, the answer Nietzsche gave to the question as to the worth of life was that of the artist:<sup>27</sup> the individual was to seek salvation—i. e., cheerfulness, through self-forgetfulness in beauty and art. More particularly, music was to be the saving power of the future, and Wagner was regarded as the saving genius. This, the period of Nietzsche's aesthetic valuation of life, need not detain us. The second or transition stage is known as the intellectual and positivistic period. The natural sciences and the nature of truth now become the objects of primary interest. Nietzsche is led to reconsider his earlier views and to recoil from their logical consequences;<sup>28</sup> it is the period of self-examination and self-criticism, of the influence of the English empiricists, of epistemological inquiry and sceptical conclusions. In this period he is "working in the bowels of the earth, boring, mining, undermining". He "began to undermine our faith in morals" and also in truth. He questioned the *value* of morality and of truth.<sup>29</sup> Our religious, ethical and

<sup>26</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 137. "The Philosopher demands from himself a verdict, a Yea or Nay, not concerning science, but concerning life and the worth of life." But cf. also *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 106. "For a philosopher to see a problem in the worth of life is really an objection to him, a mark questioning his wisdom, a folly"

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, by Dr. Grace Neal Dolson, pp. 16-23.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Richter, *op. cit.* p. 133. Friedrich Nietzsche gelangte durch die absurden Konsequenzen, zu denen die Wagner-Schopenhauersche Metaphysik im Wertproblem drangte, auf dem Umwege des Positivismus zu seiner kritischen Werttheorie.

<sup>29</sup> Preface to *The Dawn of Day* Cf. also *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 7, and *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 5-6.

aesthetic ideas are not only all of them "Human, All-too Human" and lacking in objective validity, they are for the most part pernicious in their effects. The question of the relation of this period to the one preceding and to the one following it, while very important from the standpoint of Nietzsche's development, is not important for us in this connection.

I pass at once to the third period, undeterred by the statement that "Thanks to the effort of ill-informed writers, public attention has been practically restricted to the last of Nietzsche's three distinct periods, and that the one most tainted with the suspicion of incipient insanity".<sup>30</sup> I quite agree with this statement with the exception of the gratuitous implication that only ill-informed writers will regard Nietzsche's third period as the most important. Many of his admirers, as well as the majority of his critics, are agreed in thinking it a pity that he ever published *The Antichrist*. But making exception of this work, I think the public is guided by a true instinct in attaching the most importance to his later writings, not only because this is the 'ethical' period, and Nietzsche is predominantly a moralist (or immoralist), but also because it is in the writings of this third period that we find both his most iconoclastic utterances and the more positive or reconstructive aspect of his thinking. Nietzsche himself was of the opinion that during the ten years which separated *The Genealogy* from *Human, All-too-Human*, his thoughts had grown riper, clearer, stronger, more perfect.<sup>31</sup> They had at all events grown more definite; and I can see no reason why one who is concerned to know Nietzsche's fundamental philosophical message rather than the history of his mental development, should be troubled to read either his earlier works or his posthumously published writings.<sup>32</sup> Thus Spake Zarathus-

<sup>30</sup> David Morrison in *Mind*, 1904, p. 419.

<sup>31</sup> *Genealogy*, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> This opinion is not at all inconsistent with the fullest recognition of the fact that Nietzsche's philosophy is the most subjective and personal of all philosophies. (Cf. *Werke*, XV., Aph. 476.) The



*tra* (written between January, 1883, and February, 1885, but first published as a whole in 1892), is Nietzsche's most original, as well as his most popular work. *Beyond Good and Evil* (1885-6) and the *Genealogy of Morals* (1887), are his two most systematic treatises. These three, together with *The Dawn of Day* (1881) and the four essays included in the volume entitled *The Case of Wagner* (viz., "The Case of Wagner", "Nietzsche contra Wagner", "The Twilight of the Idols", and "The Antichrist", all of the year 1888) are the works now accessible to the English reader; they are also, I believe, the most popular in Germany, and they contain everything that anyone except the most curious need read.

Had Nietzsche been spared to complete his *magnum opus*, there is of course no telling how many more phases of development he would have passed through; but taking his work as we find it, we are obliged to regard this third period as the most significant. Here we find the impressionistic sketches of what might have developed into the detailed and systematic study of a single problem, viz., *Die Umwerthung aller Werthe*. It will be remembered that shortly before the outbreak of his unfortunate malady, Nietzsche completed the first part (*The Antichrist*) of a work which was to be his *magnum opus*, viz.: *The Will to Power, An Essay Towards a Transvaluation of all Values*. The first three books were intended to criticise Christianity, philosophy, and morality, respectively; the fourth was to be called *Dionysus. Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence*. Here, then, in the plan and title of Nietzsche's projected masterpiece is the clue which "once found unravels all the rest". In the writings of this final period we also find the explanation of these transvaluations in the view that biology or physiology furnishes the standard of all evaluations. That the problem of value in its various forms is the beginning and the end of posthumously published writings, especially the studies for Prefaces, uncover Nietzsche's egotism and megalomania in a more painful manner, but, I think, add little or nothing to our knowledge of his cardinal opinions.

Nietzsche's thinking, and that all values are to be interpreted physiologically—I take this to be the kernel of his philosophy. To make that clear is the primary object of this paper.

Nietzsche tells us that the *Birth of Tragedy*, his first work, was also his "first Transvaluation of all Values".<sup>32</sup> And in his last finished work, *The Antichrist*, he says: "It is primarily a question of establishing the correct evaluation, i. e. physiological evaluation." All of his judgments, in the sphere of history and culture, of art, morality, and religion, rest upon this principle. One of his unwritten works was to bear the title "*A Physiology of Art*", in which he was to show how the transformation of art into stage-playing is an expression of 'physiological degeneration'. "Aesthetics is certainly nothing but applied physiology", it is "indissolubly bound up with biological presuppositions". His objections to Wagner's music are "physiological objections". Wagner "makes people morbid"; he is the artist of *décadence*, he is 'hurtful'. Bizet, on the other hand, *improves* one. His music means a "return to nature, to health, to gaiety, to youth and to *virtue*". "In respect to artists of every kind, I now make use of this 'main distinction'; has the *hatred* of life or the *superabundance* of life become creative here?"<sup>34</sup> "It is decisive for the fortune of a people and of humanity that civilization begins at the *right place*—not at soul . . . the right place is body, demeanor, regimen, physiology."<sup>35</sup> He understands 'depravity' in the sense of *décadence*. "What is good?—All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself, in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness."<sup>36</sup> In the *Twilight of the Idols* (p. 178) he says: "Nothing is ugly, except *degenerating* man;—the domain of æsthetic judgment is thereby limited. Re-examined physiologically, all that is ugly weakens and afflicts man."

<sup>32</sup> *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 228.

<sup>33</sup> *The Case of Wagner*, pp. 24, 65, 54 5, 9, 74.

<sup>34</sup> *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 213.

<sup>35</sup> *The Antichrist*, pp. 241, 238. Cf. *The Dawn of Day*, Aph 189.

In the *Genealogy of Morals* (pp. 59, 60) Nietzsche says that the task of the philosopher "is to solve the *problem of value*, that he has to determine the *rank-sequence of values*", and that "all tables of goods . . . call first of all for *physiological* consideration and interpretation". In this work he sought to explain the origin of our 'moral prejudices', not because he was primarily interested in the genealogy of morals, but because he thought that a knowledge of the circumstances and conditions under which these moral prejudices developed, would lead to a criticism of moral values, would *put in question the value of these values*. The original meaning of Good, he maintains, is quite different from that which we impose upon it when we contrast Good and Evil (Gut und Böse). 'Good' originally meant noble, strong, self-affirming, self-asserting. The original antithesis of the 'good' man is the lowly, common, servant-class. The original antithesis was not that between Good and Evil (Böse) but between Good and Bad (Schlecht), i. e. between great and small, powerful and impotent, superior and inferior, noble and common, master and servant, aristocratic and democratic, ruling-class and subject-class. The primitive virtues were those of the dominant class; the 'noble' created values out of the qualities they possessed. How then explain the change, the transvaluation of values, the origin of the regard for the Christian and passive virtues? The masses got tired of being exploited, of being underdog; so they changed and falsified the original scale of values. In the view of the slave, it is the master who is bad because he is an oppressor; "the slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful"; hence, his qualities—his greatness, his power, his pride, his self-assertion, his injustice, violence, oppression and cruelty, in short his virtues, are called 'evil'. The 'good' comes to be regarded as just the opposite of the 'noble' traits of the oppressor; sympathy, love, uprightness, compassion, justice, equality, humility, poverty of spirit, are 'good'. Values are inverted and morality is corrupted. The Romans represent Master-

morality, Christianity expresses the morality of slaves. It was with the Jews that the *slave revolt in morality* began. They subverted the aristocratic equation of values (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God). It was by using Christianity as a means that the slaves, the inferior and decadent, got the upper hand. The old ideal of the Master-morality of the Roman Empire came to life again for a brief period at the Renaissance; but Luther and the Reformation killed it out again. The Reformation was a great calamity. The only exception to the downward tendency in modern history is in the career of Napoleon. What we need is a new transmutation of values, a return to the primitive conception of virtue, to stop this downward tendency.

The ideal is the Superman, and Nietzsche's Zarathustra is his prophet. Zarathustra bids us: "Break, break in pieces the old tables." He seeketh as companions such as will be creators with him, "those who write new values on new tables". When Zarathustra came unto men he "found them sitting on an old conceit. All of them thought they had known long what was good and evil unto man. All speech about virtue appeared unto them to be an old weary thing, and he who wished to sleep well, spoke of 'good' and 'evil' before going to bed. This sleeping Zarathustra disturbed when teaching that no one *knoweth yet* what is good and evil unless he be a creator",<sup>37</sup> i. e., unless, like Zarathustra, he denied the worth of the existing table of values, unless he taught Beyond-Man and Beyond Good and Evil, unless he wrote new values on new tables.

It is often said that the conception of the Superman is Nietzsche's central thought. It would be more correct to say that it is the central thought in *Zarathustra*. But even so, the Superman is an ideal; he is something to be created; he is both the example or personification, and the result of a new table of values. Nietzsche's conception of the *Ueber-*

<sup>37</sup> Thus Spake Zarathustra: "Introductory Speech" and "Of Old and New Tables".

*mensch* is, however, not always thoroughly consistent. In *Zarathustra* 'man is a rope connecting animal and beyond-man'; 'he is a bridge and not a goal': the goal is Beyond-Man or the Superman. The Superman is an unattained ideal. In the *Genealogy* the powerful personalities of more primitive times seem to have realized his ideal of life. In the *Antichrist* (p. 239) he holds that examples of the higher man have existed already;<sup>38</sup> only as exceptions, however, and not as *willed*. Man should *will* the breeding of a more valuable type, examples of which have hitherto existed only as happy accidents. Sometimes Nietzsche seems to regard the "blond beast", roving about in search of prey, and with the virtues and vices of barbarism, as the ideal man; sometimes he regards the intellectual genius, especially the creator of new values, who may himself lack the barbarian's efficiency, though not his 'will' to self-assertion, as the prototype of ideal humanity. But his ultimate and really consistent judgments are always in terms of body. "Body, I am, and soul—thus the child speaketh. . . . But he who is awake and knoweth saith: body I am throughout and nothing besides." 'Spirit' is a tool of body. Thy 'self' is thy body. Nietzsche despises Christians because they are 'despisers of body'<sup>39</sup> and 'are no bridges to Beyond-Man'; and he denies that the passive virtues are virtues or that they have worth, because they are both the causes and the consequences of deteriorating life.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 195, where Cesare Borgia is referred to as 'a kind of beyond-man'.

<sup>39</sup> I do not mean to imply that this is his sole complaint against Christianity. He first identifies Christianity with mediæval asceticism and then condemns the whole for the mistaken part. But another ground of his hostility to Christianity is the belief that its doctrines of sin, guilt, and punishment, rob life of its joy and make men miserable. Like Epicurus, he would free men from fear of the gods, death, and punishment. This idea runs all through the first book of *The Dawn of Day*. Nietzsche sees only the darker, not the brighter side of Christianity, and he *disliked* living, did not think life worth living, under the conditions of the Christian articles of faith. (Aph. 90.)

<sup>40</sup> *Vid.* *Zarathustra*, First Part: "Of the Despisers of Body."



It should now be evident what Nietzsche is really driving at; but the *ground* of his transmutation of all values still needs a word of explanation. Whether entirely compatible or not, the two ideas which appear together in the title of his projected masterpiece, belong together in the writings of the later period and he always falls back ultimately on the lust for power. But while I agree with Fouillée that *Der Wille zur Macht* is Nietzsche's 'fundamental idea', I do not think that this furnishes as good a rubric as the one I have chosen for the interpretation of his writings as a whole, partly because his antagonism to the traditional valuations and the anticipations of his master-morality had found expression long before the Will to Power became a definite and controlling idea,<sup>41</sup> and partly also because this phrase itself stands in need of interpretation.

Nietzsche started from Schopenhauer. He agreed with his master that 'will' is the ultimate reality. Will expresses itself in the will to live. But life on the whole is incurably bad—i. e., it is necessarily more painful than pleasurable. Hence the sensible thing to do is to negate the will to live. Life is worthless, is painful, is evil. It is a blind striving which results in increased dissatisfaction. We must curb, check, stop, this striving of the will after life. But just here Nietzsche parted company with Schopenhauer. He said: that depends; it is not all life that is bad, only some kinds of life are bad. Weak, sickly, quiescent, degenerate life is bad; but strong life, dominating life, masterful activity, is good. Don't be a pessimist, don't adopt a gospel of renunciation or despair; be strong. Don't crucify the will to live—that would be logical on Schopenhauer's premises—but it's cowardly; assert rather the Will to Power. "Willing delivereth; that is the true doctrine of will and freedom—

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Peter Gast's *Nachbericht to Werke*, VII. "Andeutungsweise erscheint die Lehre vom 'Willen zur Macht' zuerst in Zarathustra (S. 165-169); noch halb als Hypothese in 'Jenseits von Gut und Böse'. Aph. 22, 23, 36; als bestimmt formulierte Theorie in Nietzsche's Hauptwerk (Bd. XV.) Aph. 300-303."

thus ye are taught by Zarathustra". Not renunciation of life, but willing, creating the beauty of beyond-man—"that is the great salvation from suffering, and an alleviation of life".<sup>42</sup> For Schopenhauer's Will to Live, Nietzsche substituted the Will to Power. He rejected Schopenhauer's pessimism together with his hedonism.<sup>43</sup> He denied that pleasure is the good and he held that suffering 'separates', 'ennobles', 'elevates'. It is affliction that *deepens* us. He himself owes more to his long sickness than to his health. He owes to it a *higher* health which enables him to say 'yea' to life in spite of suffering. (He adds that he *owes to it also his philosophy*; and unsympathetic critics have farther added that that is only too true.) *Amor fati* is his innermost nature as well as (this will appear presently) his final word.<sup>44</sup> So much is clear. But it is not so clear why he substituted the Will to Power for the Will to Live; still less that this change was any improvement.

The Will to Power is a vague phrase and stands in need of interpretation. The hurricane and the earthquake are powerful. But knowledge is also power. It has been plausibly maintained by youthful debating societies that the pen is mightier than the sword. "The power (*Gewalt*) of the moral prejudices" is Nietzsche's own phrase.<sup>45</sup> it has been said: He that ruleth his spirit is mightier than he that taketh a city. There is a warfare of ideals as well as of arms. Conquered nations have sometimes died to live. They have imposed their language, customs and ideas upon the conquerors.

"The brooding East with awe beheld  
Her impious younger world.  
The Roman tempest swell'd and swell'd  
And on her head was hurl'd.

<sup>42</sup> Thus Spake Zarathustra, "On the Blissful Islands."

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Werke* XV. Aph. 302, 312.

<sup>44</sup> Nietzsche contra Wagner, pp. 86-88. Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 270.

<sup>45</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 23.

The East bowed low before the blast  
In patient deep disdain;  
She let the legions thunder past  
And plunged in thought again."

"And centuries came and ran their course"—and the result was that the religion of the brooding East conquered the arms and the Empire of the militant West. Power is measured by what it effects. Nietzsche eulogizes Napoleon and Cesare Borgia, and he vilifies Christ. For Nietzsche, the type of everything admirable is the Roman Empire; and he complains that Christianity broke the power of the *imperium Romanum*. That which was strong enough to break the power of the strongest, is the symbol of weakness, not of strength. Why? Because Power is defined in one way, in physiological terms. Granting that every living thing strives for Power, this Power is nevertheless of different kinds, and only some kinds of Power are good or desirable. Christianity was the religion of the *décadent*, the weak and lowly, the physically and mentally sick; it was the religion of pity, of brotherly love, not of domination and ruthless self-assertion. The religion of pity aided the sick and suffering and preserved the weak; hence it furthered the process of *décadence*. Schopenhauer was quite right on his premises, to preach a morality of sympathy, not because sympathy has any real moral worth, but because it weakens life and is therefore the best means to the goal of non-existence. But suppose enhanced vitality, more Power, is the goal?

Nietzsche uses the Will to Power as both a biological and an ethical formula; but the relation between the two points of view is not very clear, and it is difficult to say whether biologico-psychological considerations or ethical animus led him to alter the Schopenhauerian phrase. The 'Will to Live' is simply a statement of fact: all living things strive blindly and irrationally to continue their existence. Is the lust for power, then, also simply a statement of fact?

Does Nietzsche mean that individuals and species do not strive simply for survival, but for expansion of life, for more life, measured in terms of breadth, strength, power, domination? If so, this doctrine stands in need of proof. Though it is not invariably the case that all that a man hath will he give for his life, it is true that in the animal world at large, adaptation to environment as the condition of existence sometimes involves degeneration, loss of power, as the price of survival. It might be plausibly and I think truly maintained that lust for power is more characteristic of man than of other animals. But even in man the lust for power is not always the predominant instinct. Love of ease, of pleasure, of peace and quiet, are more characteristic of some nations than the imperialistic spirit. To say, as Nietzsche would say, that the will-to-be-mighty is lacking only because power is lacking, is to blind one's eyes to what might happen if some of the lethargic nations once became possessed of the lust for power.

On the other hand, if Nietzsche holds that the Will for Power is still expressed in making the best of unfavorable conditions which necessitate restricted activities, self-limitation and the curtailment of certain capacities and powers, then there is no advantage in substituting Will to Power for self-preservation as the cardinal instinct. The two phrases become practically identical in meaning, in spite of what Nietzsche says to the contrary.<sup>46</sup> "Life is precisely Will to Power." A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength—life itself is *Will to Power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results* thereof.<sup>47</sup> The truth seems to be that though Nietzsche reacted from Darwin as he did from Schopenhauer, and calls him-

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Zarathustra*, p. 161. "He who shot after the word of 'will unto existence' did not hit truth. Such a will—doth not exist. For what existeth not cannot will: but that which is in existence, how could that strive after existence." The mixture of truth and fallacy in this statement needs no comment.

<sup>47</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 259, 13.

self anti-Darwinian,<sup>48</sup> he was led to change the Schopenhauerian phrase under the influence of the Darwinian biology. He held that "life itself is *essentially* appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, . . . putting it mildest, exploitation". "Exploitation" "belongs to the *nature* of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life".<sup>49</sup> Nietzsche misunderstood Darwin<sup>50</sup> and forgot the latter's caution that the struggle for life and survival of the fittest was a metaphor which should not be too narrowly interpreted. In any case, the Darwinian formula is not a happy phrase in the sphere of ethical values. Dr. Tille, the editor of the authorized English translation of Nietzsche's works, is doubtless right in saying<sup>51</sup> that "Huxley's essay *On the Natural Inequality of Man* would have delighted him" [i. e., Nietzsche]; but he would probably have profited more by reading the Romanes Lecture on *Evolution and Ethics*. In the biological sphere, actual survival is the test of fitness; 'fitness' is proved by survival. But in the sphere of ethical values, this is not so, as Nietzsche himself would admit. The decadence which he laments just means that the 'unfit' do not perish as they should. They ignore the fact that 'much-too-many-live', and they neglect to 'die at the right time'.

In regard to Nietzsche's own formula and its application, there are a good many things that might be said at this point; but the impulse to comment must be held in leash.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *The Twilight of the Idols*, Aph. 14, and *Der Wille zur Macht*, Aph. 322-324.

<sup>49</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 226.

<sup>50</sup> He says: "Darwin forgot the intellect (that was English!)" and he calls Darwin 'respectable, but mediocre'. Nietzsche had a way of picking the brains of every author he read, and then either ignoring or disparaging almost in proportion to his indebtedness. He thus gave a shining example of that 'exploitation' which he holds to be characteristic of 'noble morality'.

<sup>51</sup> Introduction to *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. xix.



One might, for instance, question the statement that man has become smaller and weaker, either during the Christian period or the much longer historic period. It is not proven that the culture-races have degenerated physically, and if this is not the case, then Nietzsche's attacks upon the morality of the culture-races are wholly irrelevant. On the other hand, even if man had degenerated, Nietzsche holds that morality is rather the inevitable consequence than the cause of 'impoverished life', and his tiresome jeremiads are childishly at variance with that boasted nobility of soul which says 'yea' joyfully to good and bad alike.

Again, one might deny that Will to Power in the sense of ruthless self-assertion is the '*fundamental fact of all history*'. Those who seek a biological foundation for morality usually maintain that the evidence against this view is conclusive. Though Nietzsche's predominant tendency is to regard the altruistic sentiments as thinly-disguised egoism, he is more consistent in condemning the other-regarding impulses as bad, *i. e.*, as injurious or life-destroying, than he is in denying their existence.

So, also, one might maintain that the other-regarding virtues are not necessarily inconsistent with Nietzsche's Master-morality, resting upon the lust for power: that it is the strong, self-sufficient, dominant individual, who out of the superfluity of his power, is best able to succour others. Beneficent activity might be the expression and the proof of a superabundance of vitality and efficiency. The tyrant might conceivably enhance the 'pathos of distance' by his magnanimity. Nietzsche admits this when he says:<sup>52</sup> "the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power". And again: "when a man who is a *master* by nature has sympathy, *that* sympathy has value".<sup>53</sup> Sympathy and benevolent conduct therefore can have a place: they are no more intrinsically bad than they

<sup>52</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 260.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Aph. 293.

are intrinsically good. Regard for others is then entirely optional, not obligatory. One may act towards beings of a lower order just as one likes, and 'beyond good and evil'. The noble type of man regards *himself* as a determiner, a *creator of values*. He passes the judgment: "what is injurious to me is injurious in itself".<sup>54</sup> Two things, then, are evident; that Nietzsche's morality is the most out and out egoism,<sup>55</sup> and that the Will to Power is a formula which furnishes no rule for conduct; the 'noble' type of man may do as he likes, the ignoble must do as he can.

It might also be maintained that 'helping the unfortunate' is not simply the sign of a superabundance of power, but a condition of the development of power. Thus, as Spencer would say, imagine a moving tribe, beset by enemies, suffering from insufficient supply of food, and encumbered by the impedimenta of aged and infirm persons. The easiest way of preserving the tribe and extricating it from danger, would be either to abandon the aged and infirm persons or to put them to death. There is no reason why this should not be done, for the strong have a right to do as they like with the weaker. But suppose they refrain from exercising this privilege. The cunning, the strategy, the resourcefulness, the new plans and devices that would have to be invented, the alert intelligence that would be called forth under trying conditions, would develop in the tribe as a whole and in individuals an enhanced efficiency and sense of power for future emergencies.

Again, it might be denied that that "elevation of the human species" which is the goal of Nietzsche's morality is as well served by "severity, violence, slavery, . . . tempter's art and deviltry of every kind . . . by everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, Aph. 260.

<sup>55</sup> "'Not to seek *one's own* advantage': that is merely the moral fig-leaf for quite a different thing, for the physiological fact,—'one does not know any longer how to *find one's own* advantage'." *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 191.

in man",<sup>56</sup> as by the practice of the commonly recognized virtues. One might, in fact, set up question-marks all along the line of Nietzsche's 'immoralism'; but my primary purpose is to interpret and I pass on, with the parenthetical remark that since anything is 'good' which enhances the sense of power,<sup>57</sup> regard for one's neighbor may be as essential to the elevation of the species as appropriation, injury, and exploitation.

'The elevation of the species' and 'the will that Beyond-man may live'—it is in virtue of this doctrine that Nietzsche is often said to teach a 'new ethical idealism'; but his doctrines are neither new (most of them are as old as Heraclitus, Democritus and Protagoras) nor ethical nor idealistic. It is true that Nietzsche is at one with idealistic moralists in rejecting all forms of hedonism, whether egoistic or universalistic and whether coupled with the doctrine of evolution or not. His ethic is neither based upon psychological hedonism nor is it either sentimental or rational Utilitarianism. He scorns "the green-grazing happiness of the herd". It is true also that the *Uebermensch*, who is the significance of earth and the goal of humanity, is an ideal which is not supported, after the manner of the naturalistic moralist, by an appeal to the 'ways of the cosmos.' Darwin, interpreting the processes of nature, tried to show how man came to be what he is. Spencer, reading the tendencies of nature, looks to the future and tries to show what man, in view of these tendencies, will become. But Nietzsche, unlike Darwin and Spencer, does not appeal to nature to form his picture of the man of the future, the Superman. Spencer, to be sure, first got his ideal man in the ideal condition of society without the help of doctrine of evolution. In *Social Statics*, the perfect man and the perfect society are just as much the creations of pure imagination as is the 'ideal humanity' of perfectionistic moralists. Spencer

<sup>56</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 44.

<sup>57</sup> *Cf. The Dawn of Day*, Aph. 189. "When man feels the sense of power, he feels and calls himself good."

then tried later, in the *Data of Ethics*, to validate this ideal by appealing to the processes of nature to show that his conception of the perfect society was the end towards which evolution was working. But Nietzsche does not thus appeal to the cosmic process to furnish the standard of morality. He finally gave up his adherence to Darwinism because Darwin held that the whole plant and animal and human world had developed from lower to higher and that the species grows in perfection. Nietzsche, on the contrary, held that the results of the struggle for existence are prejudicial to the strong, the privileged, and that man has degenerated. He holds that Spencer is a *décadent* because Spencer sees something desirable in the triumph of altruism; and that a scientific demonstration of the morality of sympathy is futile because sympathy is a sign of *deteriorating* life.

It is equally obvious, that Nietzsche is not an ethical idealist in the ordinary sense; the sense, let us say, which is familiar to us in the writings of men like T. H. Green. The 'ideal humanity' of the ethical idealist is the antipodes of Nietzsche's 'higher man'. Of what like is this ideal humanity? Or who is the good man? He is, first of all, after Kant, the man of good will; and then, this good will is manifested in the practice of the commonly recognized virtues. The perfection of the individual is realised only in the service of humanity. This ethical doctrine is moreover intimately connected with the belief in a spiritual principle in nature and a moral order of the universe. The spiritual principle in nature, continually manifesting itself in human minds and institutions, slowly but unfalteringly perfects the conception of ideal humanity in the process of its gradual realization. The whole world-order is spiritual in its essence, and moral progress is permeated and produced by intelligence. The End is given by reason and is realized through the volitional effort of free, self-determining, intelligent agents. Nietzsche would deny every one of these positions. "There is neither spirit nor reason nor

thought nor consciousness nor soul nor will nor truth—these are all useless fictions."<sup>58</sup> This is, however, less unintelligible than it sounds. How, it may be asked, can the Will to Power be the ultimate reality, if there is no such thing as 'will'? What Nietzsche means is that 'will' = the 'natural' impulses, desires and passions. Will = self; but self — body. Mind is only the product and instrument of body. Mind is epiphenomenon, the servant, the slave, the shadow of body. Will is an effect and not a cause; it no longer *moves* or explains anything, it simply *accompanies* vital processes.<sup>59</sup>

Nietzsche's psychological or physiological dynamism is thus at variance with his ethical idealism. His psychology teaches that every individual inevitably strives for increase of power, for domination. His morality teaches that a certain kind of power and domination should be sought. The slave-classes, the decadent, reversed the original table of values, they created an inverted table for their own benefit—to curb the power of the powerful and assert their own equality or even superiority so far as possible. It was *just because* they were decadents that they invented the values of decadence—they could not do otherwise—they were still expressing the will to power in the only way they could express it. Intelligence is only the tool of the will to power and intelligence seized upon this means of power. Why then, should Nietzsche complain? Because his reason tells him that a certain type of life and power is desirable. He doesn't get his criterion of good from nature or biology or physiology. He gets it from Reason. What, then, becomes of his physiological evaluation? Body does not evaluate. It is mind that judges that physiological evaluations are the only correct evaluations. In this sense at least it is difficult to deny the primacy of reason. Reduce self to body and you *ipso facto* eliminate not only 'ethical,' but any sort of idealism.

<sup>58</sup> *Der Wille zur Macht*, Aph. 270.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *The Twilight of the Idols*, pp. 135-136, 141-143.



But what if values are *not* created by mind, but by body, as Nietzsche holds? We are thrown back again on the idea of Will to Power, and into pure naturalism. Man "calletth himself 'man', i. e., the valuing one", and "without valuing, the nut of existence would be hollow." But valuing is simply "the voice of the will unto power."<sup>60</sup> The by-product human intelligence may say: this is 'good' and that 'bad,' i. e., it furthers ascending or descending life, (Beyond Good and Evil does *not* mean Beyond Good and Bad).<sup>61</sup> but these judgments are simply statements of fact. The moral judgments which imply freedom and responsibility and praise and blame, have no place.<sup>62</sup> Every species and every individual strives for power, i. e., for superiority, for domination. Intelligence is simply an instrument of the Will to Power. In the higher species, intelligence determines the means, the way, to power. But intelligence suggests one mode of life, one table of values to the weak, and another mode of life and list of virtues to the strong, as the fit means to power. This not only means that there is "No good, no bad, but *my* taste, for which I have neither shame nor concealment"—(I shall return to that presently); it means that Nietzsche's conception of the Will to Power and his conception of the Superman as an ideal to be realised by volitional effort are incompatible. 'Man is a something to be surpassed.' The Superman is 'the goal of humanity.' The higher man must be 'created'. But he can be created only by a 'morality of *breeding*, not of *taming*'. The weak must perish and we must help them to perish. All creators are hard, they are destroyers. Sympathy, love, pity, are bad because they preserve the weak. They foster deteriorating life. But the decadents are in the majority. Impoverished life creates 'nihilistic' values,—i. e., morality

<sup>60</sup> Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 76, 78, 162.

<sup>61</sup> Genealogy, p. 59.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Zarathustra, p. 44. 'Enemy', ye shall say, but not 'wicked one'; 'diseased one', ye shall say, but not 'wretch'; 'fool', ye shall say, but not 'sinner'.

that fosters decadence. There is no help for it; we must go on step by step into deeper decadence. What, then, becomes of Nietzsche's *Uebermensch*, the higher man of the future? He becomes an impossibility. The ideal is swallowed up in the actual. "It is absurd to try to *shunt off* man's nature towards some goal . . . a goal is lacking". Humanity must go on from bad to worse; there is no escape.<sup>63</sup> This is not a new ethical idealism; it is moral pessimism, based upon an out-and-out naturalism.

I have no wish to deny or obscure the positive and re-constructive aspect of Nietzsche's teaching. The reader will be able to find whatever he seeks in this treasure-house of conflicting opinions, and it is the easiest thing in the world by confining one's attention, as Mr. Pigou does,<sup>64</sup> almost exclusively to *Zarathustra*, which is Nietzsche's most poetical, imaginative and idealistic work, to produce the impression that those who emphasize the negative aspect of his morality fail to do him justice. Zarathustra says: "But a horror for us is the degenerating mind which saith, 'All for myself!' ". His great love unto the most remote which commandeth, 'Spare not thy neighbor', bids him also to sacrifice himself as well as his neighbor unto his love for Beyond-man. One must be sure that one has a *right* to be a creator, and, 'For small folk, small virtues are requisite'. 'One shall not *wish* to enjoy one's self', and 'One must *learn* how to love one's self. (pp. 104, 80, 122, 289, 241, 290, 280). Out of the doctrine of reasonable self-love and devotion to the interests of a higher humanity, Nietzsche might have developed a 'new morality'. That he failed to do so, is not the fault of his critics but of his own philosophy. It is difficult to know how to deal with a writer who does not believe in truth and who regards it as a merit that he is not afraid of contradictions.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *The Dawn of Day*, Aph. 49, and *The Twilight of the Idols*, pp. 112, 143, 174, 206.

<sup>64</sup> "The Ethics of Nietzsche" in *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1908.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *The Dawn of Day*, p. xxvii.

Having already weakened the force of the *enfant terrible* metaphor by the attempt to treat Nietzsche seriously, I now make amends by adding that it is exceedingly difficult to do so. If, however, we are to pay him this compliment, we must really be in earnest in the matter and seek to interpret his new morality in the setting of his philosophy as a whole. When so interpreted, I have no hesitation in saying that Nietzsche is not even an immoralist; he is (to borrow a word from the French, who lack the English dis-taste for hybrids) an amoralist. In taking a negative position, he has not 'again learnt to be positive' (unless utter scepticism be itself a positive position) because he has not 'divested himself of scepticism'.<sup>66</sup> In the *Genealogy* he reproaches scientists for not being 'free spirits' but in reality in alliance with the apostles of 'the ascetic ideal', because *they still believe in truth*. He holds that 'nothing is true', that 'it is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than semblance', that 'the falseness of an opinion is not any objection to it', that 'the falsest opinions are the most indispensable to us'. All this is the outcome of the naturalism which teaches that conscious thinking is simply an instinctive function which expresses the physiological demand for the maintenance of a definite mode of life. The only question is: 'how far an opinion is life furthering'. But since that will depend upon the kind of life in question, upon the nature of the individual or class or species, it follows that there is no standard of either truth or morality. *Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt*.<sup>67</sup> This means the negation, the complete bankruptcy, of all morality.

Morality in its lowest terms involves the recognition of a rule of right which is either directly authoritative or indirectly binding as the condition of a common good. Even customary or tribal morality implies the recognition of a *rule of conduct*. In *The Dawn of Day*, Aph. 16, Nietzsche

<sup>66</sup> *The Dawn of Day*, Aph. 477.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 3, 4, and *Genealogy*, Third Essay, Aph. 24.

himself says: "any custom is better than no custom." Morality means (if you will pardon me) that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander; that what is right for me is right for all others in precisely similar circumstances. It means that what I shall do or not do is at all events not a mere matter of my private likes and dislikes. There is at least this much of objectivity about morality. Moral conduct is not wholly individual, arbitrary, and irresponsible. There is no such thing as a purely private morality. Nietzsche, however, would call this a 'higher morality'. He holds that the ripest fruit pendant from the tree of social evolution is the autonomous super-moral *sovereign individual*.<sup>68</sup> But we must not be misled by his phraseology. His 'sovereign individual' is neither autonomous nor super-moral. He is anomic and infra-moral. He is a law to himself not in the sense that the rational self imposes the law which it freely obeys, but in the sense that he places himself beyond all law and follows the natural desires and passions. He says: "This is *my* way, where is yours?" There is "no good, no bad, but *my* taste, for which I have neither shame nor concealment." "He hath discovered himself who saith: 'This is *my* good and evil' ". " 'To live as I like or to live not at all', thus I will, thus even the holiest one willeth' ".<sup>69</sup>

This is strictly in accord with Nietzsche's naturalism, which teaches that the true nature and function of life is *will to power*. "To speak of right and wrong *in itself* is altogether meaningless; *in itself* the act of injuring, violating, exploiting, destroying can, of course, not be anything "wrong", inasmuch as life *essentially*, i. e., in its fundamental functions, works injury, violation, exploitation and destruction, and can not be conceived otherwise." "That the lambs should bear a grudge to the big birds of prey, is no wise strange; but this is no reason for blaming the big birds of prey for picking up small lambs. And if the lambs

<sup>68</sup> *Genealogy*, Second Essay, Aph. 2.

<sup>69</sup> *Zarathustra*, III, "Of the Spirit of Gravity"; and IV, "The Shadow".

say among themselves: "These rapacious birds are wicked, and he who is as little as possible of a bird of prey, but rather the opposite, i. e., a lamb—should not he be good?" We cannot find fault with the establishment of such an ideal, though the birds of prey may make rather mocking eyes and say: 'We do not bear at all a grudge to them, these good lambs, we even love them. Nothing is more delicious than a tender lamb'. . . . "If the suppressed, the down-trodden and the wronged, prompted by the craft of impotence, say to themselves: 'Let us be different from the bad, let us be good! and good are all those, who wrong no one, who never violate, who never attack, who never retaliate, who entrust revenge to God . . . (who are) the patient, the humble, the just'—this means, viewed coolly and unprejudicially, no more than: 'We, the weak, are—it is a fact—weak; it is well for us not to do anything, *for which we are not strong enough*'. "Not-to-be-able-to-take-revenge is called not-to-will-revenge, perhaps even forgiveness", and the action which proceeds from the impotence of the weak one is called "a voluntary performance, a thing self-willed, self-chosen".

These quotations from the *Genealogy of Morals*<sup>10</sup> are sufficient to illustrate the fact that Nietzsche is thoroughly successful in his attempt to impugn the validity of all moral ideas by tracing their origin, provided his account of their origin and meaning be correct. With this proviso I am not now concerned. I would only remark that *Der Wille zur Macht* is surely a fruitful principle when it can account for the origin of society as due either to the forceful imposition of law upon the weaker by the 'masters', or as due to the impotence of the weaker which expresses itself in the 'herding-instinct': which can account both for the morality of 'ascetic' ideals and the morality of 'noble' ideals in the same way; which accounts for love of neighbour and injury to one's neighbour as due to the same happiness in the feeling of 'superiority'; and which, finally, explains 'bad conscience'

<sup>10</sup> Second Essay, Aph. 11, and First Essay, Aph. 13, 14.



i. e., the sense of guilt and sin, as due to the *joy* of causing pain to self after the more natural outlet of cruelty to others had become obstructed. Even if there were no real justification for the existence of 'bad conscience', it would be not the fact of bad conscience, but Nietzsche's explanation of the fact which is a 'paroxysm of nonsense'.

In his anxiety to castigate the morality of ascetic ideals by 'a bit of animal psychology', Nietzsche goes to the other extreme and in his re-habilitation of the flesh, he reduces man to the level of the beast. "The beast of prey, the splendid, *blond beast*, lawfully roving in search of spoils and victory", is the prototype of the higher-man who is beyond good and evil. Man is the animal rationalized in the sense that reason becomes a means to the gratification of the physical impulses, passions and instincts. "To be forced to fight against the instincts is the very formula of *décadence*". "To attack the passions at the root is to assail the roots of life". "All good is instinct". I need not point out that the production of the higher man by a process of breeding which involves the most stringent regulations of marriage, is an ideal which would involve the most radical attack upon instinct. It is more important to observe that the advocate of the *Uebermensch* does not merely preach 'the significance of earth' to the elimination of all beyond-earthly hopes and ascetic ideals; he preaches the supremacy and the superiority of instinct; and, since the fundamental instinct is the lust for power, the result is the very old doctrine that might makes right.

Nietzsche's conception of the Grecian gods as "the personifications of high-born and self-glorifying men, in whom the *animal* in man felt itself deified", gives us the expression we want to describe the outcome of his ethics; it is the deification of the animal in man. Zarathustra says (pp. 71, 72): "Would ye were perfect at least as animals are. But innocence is a necessary quality of animals. Do I counsel you to slay your senses? I counsel the innocence of the senses". "He unto whom chastity is hard is to be

counseled against it." Nietzsche's task is "to translate man back again into nature"; and, "Men with a still natural nature" are "barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power" who throw themselves upon the weaker. "At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste; their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power—they were more *complete* men (which at every point also implies the same as 'more complete beasts')." "The terrible original text *homo natura* must again be recognized";<sup>71</sup> and, we may add, recognized not merely as the actual but as the ideal man. No rule of conduct at all, and the *homo natura* the ideal: am I wrong in calling Nietzsche an amoralist and his morality infra-moral?

There is one other doctrine of Nietzsche's, reference to which should not be omitted—the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Whether there is any evidence that he was cognizant of the modern scientific resuscitation of this ancient Greek idea, I do not know. But he was certainly thoroughly familiar with the works of Guyau, who had expressed it poetically, and with Hölderlin's *Empedocles* in which it appears; and when in 1881 he announced the thought of Eternal Recurrence as a new revelation which changed all colours and gave a new meaning to life, he must have forgotten that in the second of the 'Inopportune Reflections' he had already shown his familiarity with the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'great year'.<sup>72</sup> At all events, while Nietzsche was composing the *Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, the idea of Eternal Recurrence took possession of him and thenceforth never left him. It appears abruptly, and concisely and tentatively expressed in that work;<sup>73</sup> again, in similar language but more positively stated in *Zarathustra*; and more at length in the posthumously published remains

<sup>71</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 230, 257.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Fouillée, *op. cit.* pp. 207 seq., and Drews, *op. cit.* pp. 323 seq.

<sup>73</sup> *Werke*, IV, Aph. 341.

of the Fröliche Wissenschaft — Zarathustra period, and in *Der Wille zur Macht*.<sup>74</sup> Let me state this doctrine in Nietzsche's own words. Zarathustra's animals thus address him: "Behold, *thou art the teacher of eternal recurrence. That is now thy fate!* Behold we know what thou teachest; that all things recur eternally, ourselves included; and that we have been there infinite times before, and all things with us. Thou teachest that there is a great year of becoming, a monstrous, great year. It must, like an hour-glass, ever turn upside down again in order to run down and run out—'Now I die and vanish', thou wouldst say, 'and in a moment I shall be nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies. But the knot of causes recurrereth in which I am twined. It will create me again! I myself belong unto the causes of eternal recurrence. I come back, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent—not for a new life, or a better life, or an eternal life. I come eternally back unto this one and the same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest things, in order to teach once more the eternal recurrence of all things'." And again Zarathustra says: "And this slow spider creeping in the moonshine, and this moonshine itself, and I and thou in the gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things, must not we all have existed once in the past? And must not we recur and run in that other lane, out there, before us, in that long haunted lane—must we not recur eternally?"<sup>75</sup>

This is Nietzsche's substitute for 'the shameless doctrine of personal immortality'. It is even less demonstrable than the latter doctrine. Is it any more desirable, is it either a nobler or a more useful ideal? To come back again and live precisely the same life over again—with the same failures, the same suffering, the same limitations, the same annihilation; with no chance for progress, for development; with no more happiness, no more power, no more perfection than we had before—this is not what we mean when we say

<sup>74</sup> *Werke*, XII, Aph. 90-132, and XV, Aph. 375-385.

<sup>75</sup> *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, pp. 320-1, 226-7.

we should like to live our lives over again. We are not surprised to learn that the loathing which overcame Zarathustra, the advocate of the circle, upon contemplation of his 'most abyss-like thought', is an accurate representation of the struggle with which Nietzsche himself faced the idea of an eternal recurrence of his sufferings. One may regard the willingness to accept an unpalatable truth as evidence of the nobility of the man, but the evidence is in this case somewhat weakened by the fact that Nietzsche's loathing diminished and his cheerfulness in promulgating this doctrine increased as he gradually became convinced it was a mere speculative idea which could not be verified by scientific evidence.

The desire for personal immortality is not proof of the truth of the doctrine of immortality. But when a substitute for this doctrine or belief or hope is put forward not primarily as a scientific theory in favor of which evidence can be adduced, but as an idea the value of which depends not at all upon its truth, but upon its workability, its efficiency as a life-preserving and species-rearing idea,<sup>76</sup> we have a perfect right to judge it in its practical bearings. If the truth of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence were definitely established, I have no doubt we should adjust ourselves to it and make the best of it as we have adjusted ourselves to so many other changes of opinion in regard to the cosmos and man's place in it. Meanwhile we may contemplate Nietzsche's 'great thought', not with Zarathustra's fluctuation between loathing and uncanny mirth, but with that philosophic calm with which so many people face the dubiety of a future life. It is quite comprehensible that those who lose faith in personal immortality should seek a substitute in the enthusiasm for humanity. The service of humanity either with the object of furthering the welfare of human beings here and now or of making possible a better type of life in the future, is an intelligible and a worthy end. When, therefore, Nietzsche says: "I do not advise

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 3, 4, and *Werke*, XII, Aph. 115-132.

you to love your neighbour, the nearest human being, I advise you rather to flee from the nearest and to love the farthest human being. Higher than love to your neighbour is love to the higher man that is to come in the future";—his vision seems to sweep a wider horizon than that of the ordinary altruist. But this wider vision, this grander prospect, is a delusion. The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence intervenes to obstruct and limit the perceiver's goal. You are to sacrifice man to higher-man, the vast majority to the very few; but the higher-man himself is a bubble that bursts in a moment, he is evanescent as a dream, a transitory phenomenon that shines as a star for an instant and is quenched in darkness, only that the whole long process may be again and again repeated and innumerable other lives sacrificed to a shadow as fleeting as yourself. Eternal Recurrence—the cosmic year, the unending cycle, matter and motion, gas and ether, life, consciousness, plant and animal and man, possibly the Superman, then back again and the whole long history over again, evolution and annihilation in unending repetition—no permanent good is accomplished or attained, nothing bad is transcended and put finally behind us. Is this a rationally to be desired End either for the individual or the race?

The idea of Eternal Recurrence is neither Nietzsche's central doctrine, nor is it a mere addendum to his system. Though scientifically unverified and ethically worthless, it fits in very well with his materialistic interpretation of the universe and serves the purpose of a religion which expresses his ultimate attitude towards life. It is an integral part of his philosophy and is his substitute alike for Positivism and for all forms of Theism.<sup>77</sup> For Theism, the Positivist substitutes the Religion of Humanity. For the *Grand Etre* of Positivism, Nietzsche substitutes the sovereign individual. "The noble soul has reverence for itself",<sup>78</sup> but certainly not for humanity. "But let me reveal

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *Werke*, XII, Aph. 105.

<sup>78</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 287.



unto you my heart entirely, my friends; *If there were Gods, how could I bear to be no God! Consequently there are no Gods*".<sup>79</sup> The sovereign individual is a worshipper of "his own great self". That is one aspect of Nietzsche's religion—not the ethical doctrine of altruism, but the unethical doctrine of extreme egoism exalted to a religion. Another, and less logical but more ethical aspect, is his worship of the beauty of Beyond-man. "Dead are all Gods; now we will that Beyond-man may live". "Once folk said 'God', now I have taught you to say: 'Beyond-man'". Willing delivereth; creating is the great salvation. But "could ye create a God? Then be silent concerning all Gods. But ye could very well create Beyond-man".<sup>80</sup> It is this religion of Super-humanity which lends an element of nobility to Nietzsche's ethico-religious philosophy. But is it true, on Nietzsche's premises, that we 'could very well create Beyond-man'?

I have said that Nietzsche's demand that man should sacrifice himself in order to produce the Super-man is inconsistent with his doctrine of the Will. We should will that Beyond-man may live; man *ought* to be so and so now in order that future man may be different: that is an ethical statement. But "when the moralist says: 'You ought to be so and so' he makes himself ridiculous."<sup>81</sup> Why? Because psychologically and physiologically everything is absolutely determined. You *can't* be other than you are or do other than you do. In the bark of physio-psychology, 'we sail right away *over* morality, we crush out, we destroy' even the remains of Nietzsche's own morality.<sup>82</sup> From the anthropological point of view Nietzsche is a psychological and physiological determinist. From the cosmical point of view he is a physical and metaphysical fatalist. "The individual, in his antecedents and in his consequents, is a piece of fate,

<sup>79</sup> *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 116.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108, 115-118.

<sup>81</sup> *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 130.

<sup>82</sup> *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 23.

an additional law, an additional necessity for all that now takes place and will take place in the future. To say to him, "Alter thyself", is to require everything to alter itself, even backward also".<sup>83</sup> But that is impossible. Everything keeps eternally recurring. The wheel keeps revolving, it can not be delayed or stopped, still less be turned back in its course. We are tied to the wheel and must revolve with it. All is bound fast in the endless chain of fate. Eternal Recurrence is Nietzsche's fantastic substitute for the doctrine of physical necessity. Zarathustra says: "On the tree of the future we build our nest"; but the leaves of the tree are not for the healing of the nations.

Is it possible, then, to make Nietzsche's philosophy homogeneous and consistent throughout? I think not. But by eliminating much that is commonly regarded as essential, we may get something like a coherent remainder. I have said that Nietzsche's conception of the Superman is not clear-cut and definite. But the conception which is most in harmony with his general philosophical theory is that the higher man is not the man of the future who is to be produced by the sacrifices of the present generation and who will possess the desirable qualities which are now lacking, but that he is the man of the present who will not only accept his fate uncomplainingly, but will even rejoice in it. He says 'yea' to life under all circumstances and whatever of joy or suffering life contains. He is not only Stoic, with the Stoic's resignation; he is an affirmer of life and shows a Dionysian exultation in it. Things may be bad and going from bad to worse—but the higher man accepts them joyfully. Nietzsche's final word is *amor fati*.<sup>84</sup> This conception of the Superman, would best harmonize with the idea of Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence. Such an optimistic materialistic-fatalism may not be unthinkable; but it must surely be a difficult state of mind for those who suffer at the hands of fate, and one does not readily see how, on

<sup>83</sup> *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 130.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, Aph. 476; *Fröh. Wiss.* Aph. 276; *The Twilight of the Idols*, pp. 216, 228; *Beyond Good and Evil*, Aph. 56.

Nietzsche's premises, the 'pessimism of sensibility' can be transcended by an act of will. One can imagine circumstances in which "*to realize in fact* the eternal delight of becoming" would be difficult. Even if this feat were accomplished, however, 'philosophical' pessimism would still remain. The higher man says 'yea' to life, but he says 'nay' to the possibility of producing a better type of life. Schopenhauer's pessimism would seem to be quite as logical as Nietzsche's 'cheerful and confident fatalism'. Joyful acceptance of the inevitable is a 'hard saying' if the inevitable is inevitably bad. Nor does one readily see why Nietzsche should condemn Wagner for seeking a redemptive theory. The whole have no need of a physician. But humanity, in Nietzsche's opinion, is sick in mind and body; and surely it is the sick who have need of a physician. It is degeneration that calls for regeneration<sup>85</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Drews, *op. cit.* p. 338.

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## PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOUL.

The appreciation of the significance of the soul was never so great as it is to-day. It—the soul—is being made the base of religion in virtue of its peculiar depth and essence—the peculiar experiences and implications of the inner life. More clearly is it perceived that the true point of departure in religion must lie within the sphere and process of life itself. The world of higher reality we are now more ready to let rise within us, rather than first convince ourselves of the existence of a real and higher order without the range of life's experiences. That is to say, we are prone to find our first and final religious evidence in the psychological sphere—in that spiritual sense wherein the soul is seen in the splendid and significant functionings of faith.

We are now to take the soul where psychologising philosophers are mainly content to leave it. We are concerned with it only in its highest reaches, where its ideal functionings are left by formal psychology undeveloped and untouched. The psychology of the soul is here taken to embrace all inner operations—not alone the cognitive powers, but all psychic processes that are volitional and emotional as well—though we are to deal only with some of the higher aspects of psychic experience. In so doing, we accept, of course, the teachings of modern psychology as to the evolution of the soul from Plato and Aristotle onwards, and proceed upon them. We are quite content to agree with Professor James that mind and world have been evolved together, and in consequence are something of "a mutual fit." Soul is the last term of an evolving series and highest synthesis of mechanism, life, and spirit. It evidences itself in complete psychic processes, in pulses of life wherein feeling, thought, and will, are all concerned.<sup>1</sup> As such, it is that

<sup>1</sup> See paper on "The Psychological Content of Religion", by Prof.

"simple and permanent spiritual being" which, as James remarks, has "combining medium" as its chief function. For man is more than a mass of states: he is these in combination: his experience is unified—one.

We may begin by accepting such a valuation of the soul as Bosanquet has given when he says "we have to remember that, after all, the soul, the contents of the soul as we know it, form an individual system full of character and personality; that it is quite as characteristically individual and belonging to itself as the body is, and certainly at a higher level; and that, while its constituent elements include of course the qualities of the body, they include also a whole world of other qualities and relations." But our primitive experience is unitary, and it is when we speak of our experience in its unitary and personal self-hood that we talk of the soul. True psychology maintains the unity of the soul, as result of countless subtle and ceaseless psycho-physical processes. It thus makes of the soul no mere mosaic, after the old "faculty psychology" conceptions, composed of so many separatist and distinctive parts. This unity of the soul, as monistic, is fundamental in modern psychology, and has led to a true sense of the interdependence of the faculties—will, thought, and emotion.<sup>2</sup> And if there be physiologists who will have none of the soul and psychic dispositions because they hold these to be metaphysical, that is no reason why we should not hold to the soul and its processes as alone explaining the facts of our deeper experience. The "qualities and relations" of psychic experience are explained by rational psychology, which, for any full and thorough carrying out of this purpose, seems to need the soul.<sup>3</sup>

The psychology of the soul is concerned with the know-

J. H. Leuba, p. 369 of Volume of *Congrès International de Psychologie*, held at Paris, 1900.

<sup>2</sup> As e. g., by Höffding in *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 25, 313.

<sup>3</sup> See *Il Concetto dell' Anima nella Psicologia Contemporanea*, by Prof. Francesco de Sarlo, Florence 1900, in which reference is made to the positions of James, Wundt, Jodl, and Höffding.



ledge of the soul's nature, the laws of its development, and its relations to its environment. A purely empirical treatment is not, and cannot be, satisfying. Psychology need not be made metaphysical, but its results may be allowed to cast light on the soul itself—on soul, not merely on a soul. The fine ideality of the soul leads it to seek nothing less than an absolute life, which clearly can never be a thing realized. For the soul is always marked by potentiality: its activity is ever that of spiritual potency on the way to actuality. But this does not lead to the Humian psychology in its vain search for an ego abstracted from all mental life, or to the Kantian psychology in its failure to find any real soul or self in experience. Kant's logical concept of unity is both transcendent and indeterminate in nature and reality, and in no way satisfactorily connected with the judging activity in experience, wherein soul or self is asserted. Man not only combines, but judges—judges his consolidated experience in the light of moral law. It is, of course, not overlooked that Kant recognized in man a power that elevates him above himself—a power which only the understanding can conceive—a power which, rightly enough, he took to be that of personality. But for our present purpose, Kant lacks in not realizing the sphere of spirituality open to us as higher than such personality.

Beyond our individual personality stretches the world of souls, which severally depend on some common ground and process. No abstract and barely logical unity is this central ground and unifying process: it is the Absolute Life, centre of all souls—Life of our life, and Soul of our souls. Bradleyan and Ritschlian thought alike have their self-appointed limitations writ large here. Emotions, no less than intellect, are subjects of inspiration, as in seer and poet. But the wise soul will keep the emotions, once duly developed, well in hand, and free from all overstrain. In what is called the Oversoul, it will find due, yet regulative, outlet for the affectional part of our nature, in the fellowship of what Prof. James is pleased to call the 'Great Companion'—

the Absolute Mind. Hence we find Maine de Biran, the 'philosopher of inner experience,' saying that "in the psychological aspect, or as regards cognition, the soul draws all from itself, or from the Ego, by reflection; but in the moral aspect, as regards the perfection to be hoped for, the good to be obtained, or the object in life to be aimed at, the soul draws all and receives all from without—not from the external world and sensations, but from the purely intellectual world above, of which God is the centre." This may, no doubt, be still too intellectual. But it is interesting to find Biran, later, saying of three kinds of temperament in the intellect or soul, that "the first, that of nearly every one, consists in living exclusively in the world of phenomena, and taking them for realities"; "the second is that of the men who reflect, and seek patiently for truth in themselves or in nature, by separating appearances from realities"; "lastly, there is a third group of those who are illumined by the unique and unchanging light which religion affords." 'Tis from the standpoint of this last class that the present paper is written.

Apropos of Biran, it is interesting to find, from some manuscripts of his, only recently edited, that this philosopher, to whom existence was known in and through the activity of the ego, expressly notes, well nigh a century ago, the tendency—so frequent in our time—to confound "the psychological origin of ideas" with the metaphysics of existence. Much interesting discussion has lately taken place as to the relations of psychology to religion, or the founding of religion upon psychology. Now, it must be plainly said that, though psychology has a large part to play in the scientific treatment of religion, it is pure lack of clear thinking which has thought a psychologic grounding of religion is all we need, and that metaphysics can be dispensed with. There are questions of transcendental, and not merely genetic, moment—of experience content, and not merely experience origin—involved, and it must be noted how truly we are metaphysicians in life and in thought. Psychology

cannot walk very far without treading upon problems of metaphysical and epistemological character, and psychology is no more without its presuppositions or hypotheses than any other science. Certainly the *what*—the nature—of the soul must be stated in terms of the *how*—its growth—but the soul is not known until its present use and function, with their teleological bearings, have been set forth. The soul's relations to reality are such that the world-problem cannot be set aside, and no more can a metaphysic be dispensed with. Psychology has plenty still left to do in the way of setting forth the individual workings of religion in the soul or human experience, and the historic developments of soul-life in all noteworthy relations and aspects. But the content of spiritual life, and its creative forces, are not to be confused with their conditioning processes.<sup>4</sup> It is precisely such creative forces Wundt seems to have had in view in formulating his law of increase of spiritual energy, which he, in fact, opposes to the law of conservation of energy. And if there be, indeed, no limit to the increase of spiritual being, there may lie therein some compensation for those disadvantages, which Lotze so finely set out, of psychological doctrine in comparison with scientific doctrines of energy.

Yet must it not be forgotten that all perceptual activity involved is, in its forward-looking and selective character, a thing of quality in the psychologic sphere, however we may seem to speak in quantitative terms. And what indeed may not be so perceptually present will, in the sphere of the soul, be furnished by the spiritual imagination—that picturing faculty which the Germans call *Einbildungskraft*—in its power to give vividness to religious realities or relations. We are, of course, as far as may be from agreeing with Münsterberg in dropping the soul from psychology, for the soul or subject is certainly no purely logical fiction, without unity or permanence. Rather is the soul for us a growing

<sup>4</sup> See some remarks of Prof. Eucken, of Jena, in his admirable brochure, *Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*, 1907.

vital unity, its unity of aim and purpose the foundation of our real personal identity. This self-unified, self-identical principle which we call the soul is one which not only springs up in experience, but gives to it unity, and not only persists in experience, but progresses with it. This is a very different result from the merely hypostatized abstractions of thought and feeling, so dear to a psychologist like Münsterberg, which have left the real worlds of instinct and impulse—both higher and lower—so far behind. But of this Münsterberg is by no means unaware, for it is just he who has said that "this is the point which even philosophers so easily overlook; as soon as we speak of psychical objects, of ideas and feelings and volitions, as contents of consciousness, we speak of an artificial transformation to which the categories of real life no longer apply". That is just the trouble, that he has carried the psychic states of psychology to so remote a distance from any "real life" that we know—a divorce of psychological truth from mental reality for which there is no scientific necessity or warrant. Is psychological theory—unlike all true scientific theory—not to find its base in the "real" world, whose facts give the theories their value?

The soul, in the high spiritual sense, may be ever so difficult to define, or may completely elude or transcend definition; but its distinctive power, place, and working, can be quite clearly realized and acted upon. For, as Stucken-berg properly remarks,<sup>5</sup> "to make a theory of the essence of the soul the principle for the explanation of its operations, is both unphilosophical and unscientific. No more in mind than in nature have we a knowledge of the substance otherwise than from its operations." Certainly the essence of mind—in the broad sense already indicated—or soul is no more inscrutable than, in the same sort of inquiry, is matter. Of course, the supposed essence of soul must remain mere postulate, and not "dominate the entire investigation." Then we may go on to inquire into the process

<sup>5</sup> *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 139.

whereby, leaving the lower levels on which formal psychology has been content to deal with the soul's ascent, the soul is seen to reach its highest centre. And the saying of Heraclitus we shall find to be as true as it is ancient, that, though you trod every path, you could not find the limits of the soul, so deep is its essence. The same thing would doubtless have been said by Emerson, who would have traced his own most illuminated thinking to the domination of the soul over the senses and the understanding. "The one thing in the world, of value," he says, "is the active soul." "The soul active sees absolute truth." "The soul is superior to its knowledge; wiser than any of its works." "The soul is the perceiver and revealer of truth."

Much of the discursive thinking of philosophical writers today is not greatly illumined, and cannot be, because it is carried on at a level to which the soul does not descend—because, while the speculative impulse must, at every cost, be maintained in full power and meridian splendour (thought, too, being a revelation of God), its work is not carried on, so to speak, in the soul's irradiating presence. Consequently, the lack of illuminated thinking is chief lack of the philosophical thought of the time. For in such thought, the lack of full experience of reality, and of the whole truth of life, is often betrayed, and that to a painful degree. 'Tis a lack for which nothing can compensate. The soul must be restored to her place and rights; she must sit as queen of the psychologic realm. Mind must obey her behests; intellect must fulfill the pleasure of her will. It is, of course, as far as may be from being suggested that reasoning processes do not mingle with the soul's functionings; they do so at every step; but the spiritual sense is, for all that, perfectly to be distinguished from all mere processes of reasoning. If the mystical consciousness be deemed as real as the consciousness that is rational, that does not keep philosophy from being of great religious help and value. Soul, in the spiritual sense, is a vast reservoir of energies locked up from us by our strangely blind con-



sent. Our dialectic may vigorously lay about in valleys or plains of sheer mentality, but that mentality would immeasurably gain in heightened vision, if it made the ascent of true union with soul. The psychologic power of the Gospel lay in its giving to men, not merely propositional truth, but Personality irradiated and shot through with the Divine. The psychology of the soul has its basal principle expressed in the word of Jesus, that "the pure in heart shall see God." It is beyond reach of psychological doubt that Jesus' own soul found its life in willing the will of the Father. The light of the soul must sit behind the reasoning and perceptive powers, to guide them with her counsel and bring them to her glory. Psychological study of the soul, as it figures in religious experience, tends to enlarge our estimate of the powers of the human mind. Philosophy has paid a heavy penalty for her disbelief in what radiant soul could do for her: blindly attached to her dialectical idols, shall we leave her alone? Why not shew her a more excellent way? Why not ask her to realise more deeply the unity and reality of the soul—as set forth in modern psychological teachings as to the self—and to learn, in more vitalised experience, that to be, that is, to grow in height and breadth and depth of soul, is of more pressing moment and more enduring value, than to know or discuss or perform? For such spiritual being cannot but illumine our thinking, and carry it to higher planes of thought and perception than those of the merely logical understanding.

But, of course, such being does not dispense the soul from effort—the effort to fulfill every new and present duty; it only gives new light for such fulfillment. The higher knowledge of God, and the super-terrestrial outlook upon man's life, are really to be sought in developed life of the soul, wherein the immediate consciousness of God and of His enveloping presence gives new elevation to thought, and deeper insight to speculative power. Both Kant and Aristotle have here been greatly overpassed. The psychology of St. Paul, with its constituent elements of *πνεῦμα*,

ψυχή, and σῶμα, has carried us, by its original and penetrating antithesis of the spiritual and the carnal, further in the psychology of the soul than ancient or modern philosophers. The presence and operation of the Eternal Spirit within us have awakened new and diviner emotions and ideals than either Kantian or Aristotelian reason knew. These higher regions of the soul's life are the most difficult for psychology, and the frequent limitations of psychological treatment here spring from the inability to seize the processes, and not merely reckon the products. The superficial aspects are, of course, easily enough abstracted and defined, but it is another matter to surprise the secret of the soul's deepest workings. The limits of the soul, it seems safe to say, are never found, and no psychological analysis can ever be really exhaustive. Ours is a perpetual becoming, and surface impressions of the soul which is our own we certainly get, but never full soundings of the sub-conscious deeps that lie behind. How much of the soul's best life is not yet existent! Man is one, and man is spirit, and it is as such a spirit that man must be raised to full spiritual endowment and the height of true soul-vision. Aristotle had no need of Paul's spirit or *pneuma*, for no function of Pauline spiritual-mindedness had been so developed in Aristotelian experience as to call for a peculiar organ of God-consciousness. To pierce to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit was therefore beyond the power of Aristotelian psychology, and spiritual psychology came to the rescue. If, therefore, we still speak of soul—soul and spirit in their union being essential to life—it must not be in forgetfulness of the fact that, to a spiritual psychology, the spirit is supreme. The soul—seat of cognitive faculty—is, no doubt, far superior to the flesh, but there is, to a spiritual psychology, a higher master within us, to which even the soul is subject.<sup>6</sup> The psychical nature in its widest reaches

<sup>6</sup> See, among many works on the subject, the late Prof. W. P. Dickson's excellent but not quite exhaustive discussion, in his volume on *St. Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, 1883.

marks the life of the soul—organ of science and philosophy; but the spirit is marked by that highest of faculties known as God-consciousness. It is in the life of the spirit or Divine *pneuma*, that we have the true presence-chamber of the God who has His tabernacle with men. For in this *pneuma*, as the principle of the new life, must be found the psychological organ for spiritual intercourse with God. But the organ is conditioned by the Divine *pneuma* immanent in man, and is no merely human *pneuma*, although, of course, the human *pneuma* is not without homogeneity to the *pneuma* that is Divine. It (the spirit or *pneuma*) is then the inner of the soul, as the soul is, so as to speak, the outer of the spirit. This—if men will still speak of the soul—is the soul that is meant, the soul in the highest, most spiritual sense.

It is the more necessary to say this because, as a matter of fact, not even in Biblical psychology can a dividing line always be drawn between soul and spirit—*ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*—so that the distinction cannot be taken as quite so definite or absolute as it seems. The *ψυχή* is made, on occasion, to include the *πνεῦμα*, whose character it must therefore bear. My spiritual capacity, as *πνεῦμα*, does not leave my conscious livingness, as *ψυχή*, unaffected in quality, for the whole man is spiritualised. Acts of the body even—the eating and drinking of the *σῶμα*—have new spiritual character or quality imparted to them. The *ψυχή* must always be thought of as, in man, spiritually capacitated. If we would see the importance of these explanations of the nature and relations of the soul, we have only to turn to the vague generalities on the soul, found in a discussion such as Haldane's *Gifford Lectures*, where the soul is represented as "merely the highest aspect in which the man appears in everyday experience."

The spirit is distinguished—or soul in the all-inclusive and most spiritual sense—from the reflective understanding in virtue of the immediateness of such spiritual life. Such life is guided and illumined by a spiritual reason different

in tone and aim from such reason as prevails at the level merely of the understanding. This, although the *πνεῦμα* is so far from being separate or indistinct from the *ψυχή*, that it really puts its own impress on the *ψυχή*, and finds expression for itself in it. The cognitive spiritual mind, as subject, is receptive of spiritual truth according to its own categories and laws. Such truth, as object, manifests itself to the spiritual perception, and in the spiritual consciousness, of the subject. The life of the spirit wears an intellectual aspect, but its spiritual intelligence is distinct from, and higher than, mere intellectual insight and process. In consequence of which, only the intellect that is spiritually illuminated will really be in a position to understand or explore the highest realities—thought, consciousness, life, truth, destiny.

The clear psychological insight of Augustine enabled him, twelve centuries before Descartes, to perceive great things of the soul.<sup>7</sup> Augustine recognized the simplicity of the soul, and its activity, as an entirety, in all actions, such activity of the soul depending upon the ceaseless action of God. Also, the self-certainty of the ego, as the point of departure of all certainty, was clearly brought out by him. But, with this whole or entire activity of the soul, Augustine recognized its limitations in knowledge due to the soul's finitude, its subjection to the law of development, and its falling within the range of the hampering noëtic consequences of moral evil. Accordingly, he early and clearly saw the need, in order to the attainment of higher knowledge and certitude, of the whole soul or self being surrendered to its quest. Omniscience was not to him, as to certain modern philosophers, the soul's foible. In this way may be recognized how the higher insight of the spiritual life discerns deeper and vaster truths than those opened by intellect alone. It still needs to be more fully realised how much shortcoming and failure lies behind present-day phil-

<sup>7</sup> See Prof. Warfield's admirable paper on Augustine in *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW* for July, 1907.

osophising about life and its higher problems, because these are dealt with as though they were exclusively intellectual, and did not really depend on added spiritual illuminativeness. And thus it often remains all unperceived how the deepest clues, or nearest solutions, of such problems will be found within the distinctively spiritual sphere — will be opened to the deep and subtle perceptions of the intellectual-spiritual thinker, and to him alone. It is precisely the intellect of the spiritual consciousness that will give to intellect, viewed apart as intellect, the strength, impulse, illumination, satisfaction, aspiration, rest and pinion, which bare intellect needs.

But the spiritual instincts, for all that, do greatly require the accentuating, confirming, and sustaining aids of philosophical thought and inquiry. These will help us pass beyond the mere subjectivity in which psychology might leave us. Psychology, like every special science, has to do with experience, and must not, if it would, get away from the facts of its selected range or point of view. The soul, as seat of living knowledge, of faith, and of belief, is more open to the scrutiny of modern psychological methods, in respect of the nature and genesis of these states of mind, than has been quite fully realised. The conscious life of man, at his more developed spiritual stages, has peculiar content of its own, which, in the essential continuity of being, is capable of fuller psychologic inquiry than it has yet received. In this realm of the soul—of free and spiritual personality—there is a world of observation and induction affecting our description of the nature and working of the soul, which psychological examination is far from having conquered. But, even more than these inquiries and aspects, we are here concerned to maintain for the soul its worth and reality—its growth, sensibility, and astonishing power, so finely set forth long ago by Socrates in his *Apology*, and by St. Augustine in his *De Animâ*. Spenser's couplet has, no doubt, its truth as well as its interest:—



"Of soul the bodie forme doth take  
For soul is forme and doth the bodie make."

This is like Aristotle's making soul the form of the body, but the psychological attitude is a too objective one, identifying mind with life. External stimuli and environing conditions have an influence which Aristotle and Spenser did not know. The soul may, no doubt, choose to be a fount of creative power, but only as living subject related to its environment, which saves from the too purely subjective psychology of Descartes, divorced as it is from concrete reality.

A nameless power and inexplicable laws attend the soul, and wait upon its silent conclusions and unspoken deliverances; and these things are not less true, although textbook psychology is ignorant of them, and formal psychology acknowledges them not. They belong to a psychology too transcendental and spiritual for the discursive treatment of the logical understanding, in the outer circles of power. The soul has no need of acknowledgments; it knows its own life, is conscious of its own power, and in its influences waits on none. The life of the spirit—the functioning of the soul—has been found to consist in founding, fighting, and triumphing spirituality. Great is the soul as we are here concerned with it—true, beautiful, deep, courageous, immortal; its greatness is unsearchable. The history of the soul has been that of the persistent and continuous working of Christ as its interior life, and of no facts are we really more aware than of the facts of this psychologic experience. What wonder if something mysterious still seems to blend with its deeper psychological laws and working! The soul is always active; in its most heroic frames and feats the soul is never passive. No wonder that, at lower levels, "this element of activity" has, as Höffding says, been, "in all intellection," the thing dwelt upon "chiefly" in modern psychology. In its upward ascents, the soul actively relates itself to every seeming calamity and misfortune. Jesus, supreme soul and unique

hero, was not passive even in Gethsemane or at Calvary, but ever actively willed the will of His Father in heaven. This activity in the highest spiritual sphere is in perfect keeping with the teachings of what is today termed functional psychology. Functional psychology tries to do justice to the immediate self and its inner self-initiated movements. So doing, it lays stress on the conative aspects of consciousness—the end-positing or teleological character of our spiritual self-activity. The categories of functional psychology are therefore dynamic rather than static, but their teleological tendencies must be stated in sufficiently spiritual terms. The activity we speak of is seen in the commerce of the finite soul with the Infinite Life—a spiritual commerce direct and immediate, in which the soul shews an indefinite capacity for receptiveness of the Divine.

This conception of a spiritual commerce of the soul may be helpful, perhaps, in respect of our relation to mystical experience, whose states have often been described as though they were void of ideational content. Many of the mystics have, no doubt, written as though their states of blessedness, peace, and love, were, psychologically viewed, void of ideational contents. But were they really so void as they themselves thought? Surely not always. For is not the idea of God so fruitful, that its presence in the mind, and its influence upon the stream of consciousness, may make our perceptions of Him, or of truths that relate to Him, more than our awareness takes full account of? Hence, do we not find that, when the soul is described as most lost in God, God is still conceived as a Being of positive qualities—love, wisdom, power, goodness—whose qualities the soul surely apprehends? We must not forget how what some psychologists have termed "relative inattention" keeps us little aware of our own states, and little able correctly to describe them. Besides, mystics are not wholly wanting—rare though they be—who have been wise enough to perceive or recognize that "emotion is valueless when it stops in itself, and becomes nothing more than merely emo-

tional experience"; and that actions or states, "without attendant perception and reflection, cannot possibly be holy". In such cases, the function of "the perceptive and judging powers" in the higher life of the soul has been explicitly acknowledged. This fact has been well-nigh universally overlooked, when mystical experience has been treated. And indeed, is it not just one of the prime monitions that come of any true mystical study that all blissful states, or rapturous feelings, or ecstatic experiences, must be jealously guarded from becoming a kind of spiritual voluptuousness, and be sedulously supported by the spiritual perceptions of truth? 'Tis a little known mystic who says that "perception depends not only upon the perceptive power, but partly upon the position in which it is placed"; hence we see the importance of having the soul's relations to God rightly adjusted.

We can learn, from mystic deliverances about the soul, the benefits accruing to our mental peace, to our sense of intellectual unity and power, and to a finely universalised regard for the will of God as law of all life and action, without lending the least countenance to indolent quietisms or the vacuities of an idle piety. The inward-mindedness of the mystics, their sabbatic resting of the soul in itself and in thought of its Divine ally, their holding of the attention upon God, and their quiet contemplative vision of the Unseen—these are things we in our measure must share, albeit we strive better to understand how often these seeming passivities are, in psychologic truth, potent forms of activity. The tendential ideas present therein are surely of great psychological importance and value. There is surely great lack of delicate perception and fine taste in comparing the influence of God's presence on the consciousness of the mystical soul with the control exercised by the hypnotiser over his subjects. We can surely welcome the unification of the soul with God—or of the human will with the Divine—without accepting an identification, in which all differences have disappeared. The soul, however sensitive to environment, or modified by antecedent, is still able to say,—"Our

wills are ours, to make them Thine", and the finite soul, though it be but a segment of being, is one and indivisible. A spiritual psychology cannot rest in racial or phylogenetic aspects of the soul, though these have their necessary value. For, as Goethe has very well said, "if during our lifetime we see that performed by others to which we ourselves felt an earlier call, but had been obliged to give up, with much besides, then the beautiful feeling enters the mind, that only mankind together is the true man, and that the individual can only be joyous and happy when he has the courage to feel himself in the whole". But, while the soul feels humanity to be thus essentially one, it yet cannot but be sensitive to that largest of aspects in which God is the spiritual environment or objective complement of the soul's unitary activity and experience, and is, in some sort, the base and support of racial developments and communal connections as well, through their grounding and growth in the immanent God. Our psychology will then be both spiritual and rational, with light of its own to shed for any empirical psychology that may be large-minded enough to receive it. And if, with James, our psychology is content to find a substantial principle of unity like the soul "superfluous", that is only because such psychology is in the unstable equilibrium of a merely natural and truncated science.

Doubtless, we do not think of the soul or spiritual personality as a substantial entity so much as a process forever resulting in self-conscious spiritual activity. For its nature is such that it grows from latency into life, and from possibility into actuality. Its principle of actuality or rational spontaneity causes it to transcend the phenomenal causal order. Its free, spiritual personality is, to newer psychology, a true union of parts—of thought, emotion, and will—whose abiding marks are unity and identity. In each and all of its activities, the whole personality is present. Our psychological experience is an experience of ourselves as knowing, in which an ultimate principle in the self knows the soul or ego to be no mere formal unity or *Bewusstsein*

*überhaupt*. The true soul or ego cannot be, as with James, a mere stream of "passing thought", but a dynamic unity or centre, which is more than any psychological continuity of fleeting thoughts. The existence of psychological data, and our psychological recognition of them, would be devoid of meaning, did we not presuppose a soul or ego which perceives the data, and reflects upon them. To make the "passing thought" the only knower must be to leave us epistemologically unsatisfied. Hyper-empirical is the soul or self in the unity of its active, conditioning aspects; in its aspect as conditioned, it is, of course, empirical. The universe is not alien to us; and there is a wider self—a social organism—of which the soul forms part, which, too, has its spiritual matrix in immanent Deity. All history and social culture are, in fact, conditioned by the hyper-empirical presuppositions of such active spiritual selves or centres. The presence, activity, and aspiring power, of the soul constitute a cosmic fact as real as any with which science has to do—a fact second to none in significant reach and inherent inspiration. In its aspirations and ideals, the soul finds a vital contact with God, and wonders not that such unexplored depths are in Deity when our own "subliminal self" remains so much of a silent land.

The creative spiritual energy works as a transcendent and judging element in our personality, raising it above itself, and leading it to judge itself in respect of attainment and of shortcoming. Thus does the soul, as determined by the Divine or creative Spirit, work out its salvation and world-destiny as a quasi-independent entity or activity, with endless power of conscious choice. It is as spiritual, and not merely psychical, that man really passes into the world of freedom. It is not on the plane of the psychic volitions of the soul, but—what is so often overlooked—above the level of merely conscious personality—at the level, namely, of the spirit or spiritual nature of man, as free, and transcendent, and open to the Creative Spirit, that true freedom is realised.



“So schaff’ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,  
Und wirke der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.”

The redemption of the soul lies just in its becoming, in its turn, creative—active sharer in those cosmic movements of the Eternal and Absolute Spirit which mean the salvation of the world. The soul would remain spiritually incomplete, did it not come into vital relation with this larger whole.

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JAMES LINDSAY.

## THE DETERMINATION OF RELIGIOUS VALUE THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

The Higher Criticism may be somewhat loosely defined to be, the science of the processes by which from internal characteristics and other circumstantial evidence we seek to determine<sup>1</sup> the Origin, Form, and Value<sup>2</sup> of the biblical writings. And yet, while doubtless sufficiently accurate for general purposes, such a definition may mislead. Indeed, it will mislead, if it leaves the impression that the problems of Origin, Form, and Value are independent and coördinate problems. Such is by no means the case. And the frequent failure to recognize the fact that such is not the case has been the source of much harmful confusion. For to this score, in part at least, must be set down the abortive attempts that have been made to substitute for the term Higher Criticism such terms as Literary Criticism, Historical Criticism, and Historico-literary Criticism.<sup>3</sup> All such substitutions put a part—and the least important part—for the whole. They absorb attention upon the means to the ignoring for the most part of the end. No doubt even Literary Criticism has for its ultimate goal the determination of value—literary value, of course. But should it stop short of its ultimate goal,—that is, should it merely deal with literary form,—it would still be within its own proper territory. And so Historical Criticism, even though the determination of historical value be its ultimate goal, may

<sup>1</sup> It is well that we should by such language pointedly remind ourselves that circumstantial evidence will not always base a rational judgment upon the points in question.

<sup>2</sup> For these, to his thinking, exceptionally felicitous terms, as for much else, the writer is indebted to Dr. A. C. Zenos' *The Elements of the Higher Criticism*.

<sup>3</sup> See Zenos' *Elements of the Higher Criticism*, pp. 7f.

stop short of this goal, and still be within its own proper domain. But the case is wholly different with the Higher Criticism. It cannot stop with the consideration of either Origin or Form without being pronounced a gratuitous and useless intruder into the field of either Literary or Historical Criticism, and as such justly liable to action for ejectment. Thus what in the case of Literary and Historical Criticism respectively are legitimate even though not necessarily ultimate ends, in the case of the Higher Criticism are not ends at all, but simply means to an end.

As another result of the failure to recognize the interrelations between the problems of Origin, Form, and Value, and the regnant position of the latter in the Higher Criticism, the distinction between the Higher Criticism and Special Introduction is in practice almost totally obliterated. And yet the two disciplines are perfectly distinct the one from the other. True, both deal with the problems of Origin and Form. But where each keeps to its own proper task they deal with these problems in very different ways, and—what is of even more importance—for totally different purposes. Special Introduction, in fact, is not called upon to deal with either Origin or Form as original problems. It is entirely at liberty to assume the solution of these problems from some other source. And certainly in any investigation it may make of them it is in no wise bound to base its findings upon internal characteristics or other circumstantial evidence. The sole interest of Special Introduction in either problem arises from its *bearing upon the interpretation* of whatever writing the former may have in hand at any given time. And it is the failure to recognize this fact in a practical way that makes most books on Special Introduction so comparatively barren for the only purpose for which they exist—that is, for the purpose of throwing light upon the *interpretation* of the books with which they deal. But in the case of the Higher Criticism all this is totally different. For it the problems of Origin and Form are no doubt real problems, albeit it is limited to some form of

circumstantial evidence in its efforts to solve them. But — and this is the point that claims special attention—while real, Origin and Form are not ultimate problems for the Higher Criticism. It is interested in them simply because of their bearing, direct or indirect, upon the problem of Value. And whatever aspect of either of these problems may at any time be immediately under investigation, the ultimate end for which the investigation is being prosecuted is the determination of Value. In a word, the determination of Value upon the basis of Origin and Form is the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism.

Unless the writer is greatly mistaken, this is a point that needs to be stressed as it has never yet been. What he has ventured to call the regnant position of the problem of value in the Higher Criticism has never received formal recognition. Even such thoroughly competent writers as Drs. Briggs and Zenos not only make no attempt to correlate the problems of Origin and Form with that of Value, but give no intimation that they are themselves aware that such correlation exists, and certainly none of being aware that in the Higher Criticism the former problems exist for the latter. And yet, as I have already shown, it is only as this fact is perceived that we can hope to vindicate for the Higher Criticism the position of an independent discipline, distinct on the one hand from Literary and Historical Criticism, and on the other from Special Introduction. Further still, it is only by assigning to the problem of Value its true importance that we get a just insight into the importance of the problems of Origin and Form, and indeed, that we can hope to redeem the discipline as a whole from the charge of being at best but a species of dilettanteism. Finally, upon the position assigned to the problem of Value will depend the coherence and unity of the science of the Higher Criticism, and upon our recognition of its position will largely depend our precision in the use of the processes of the Higher Criticism, and the worth of the conclusions reached in the use of them.

Under these circumstances the writer trusts that it will not be a work of supererogation for him to adduce the evidence for the position just laid down, namely, that the determination of Value is the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism. Just because the regnant position of the problem of Value has never been distinctly recognized, the evidence to be adduced must needs be incidental and indirect. It must from the nature of the case be gathered from what may be called the trend of thought and procedure on the part of those using the Higher Criticism, and from statements let drop by them, the bearing of which was not clearly perceived by those who made them. If examination shows that, beginning with Eichhorn himself, the labors of all, of whatever school, who have employed this discipline, have tended to converge upon the determination of Value, then we may be reasonably sure that the determination of Value, even though the unconscious, is still the legitimate and inevitable goal of the discipline itself.

It is notorious, then, that for at least half a century a great controversy has waged around the origin and form of the books of the Old Testament. That the high contestants on both sides of this controversy have written as those contending *pro aris et focis* is equally well known. Whatever phase of either problem has happened for the time to be at the front, those handling it have always assumed that it had a significance beyond itself. It has been discussed not as a question of archæology, nor even as a nicety of history, but as having important practical significance for both scholar and layman. The advocates of the new views have felt it to be a matter of conscience promptly to popularize the results of their investigations. They claim to have given the world a new Bible. And assuredly this claim is true. Now this new Bible is either a better Bible or a worse, a Bible of more value or of less than the old.

The following will serve as a specimen of the claims



made.<sup>4</sup> "If the Anglican Church is ever to renovate her theology and to become in any real sense undeniably the Church of the future, she cannot afford to be careless or intolerant of attempts to modernize our methods of criticism and exegesis."

Clearly, the ultimate justification of such language can only be found in the fact that the problems of criticism all converge upon the determination of Value. Grant this and there is a certain propriety at least in Canon Cheyne's statement. Deny it and it becomes the merest buncombe. The same conclusion is forced upon us by such a statement as the following:

"Upon the other hand, not a few, like Budde himself, who had been trained in the Ewald-Hupfeld theory, can testify that it was only after repeated and most laborious study of the positions advanced by Wellhausen that they were constrained, on grounds of conscience, to go over to his camp. Nay more, they can testify that this conception of the history of Israel has deepened their faith, that they have learned in this way better to understand the personality of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the New Testament."<sup>5</sup>

The inference is unavoidable. If the findings of Wellhausen criticism are significant for faith, and for our understanding of the personality of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the New Testament, then they are determinative of Value, for the books of the Old Testament.

But that the determination of Value is the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism is susceptible of yet more specific proof. From the days of Eichhorn to the present, those most conspicuous for the use of this discipline have never tired of emphasizing its bearing upon our estimate of the value of the books of Scripture. They have not always been consistent in their statements. They have too much ignored the fact that Value is a relative term. They have

<sup>4</sup> From Canon Cheyne's Address before the Reading Church Congress (1883), cited in his *Job and Solomon*, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> J. A. Selbie in *Expository Times*, March, 1898, p. 374.

taken no sufficient account of the relation between different kinds of Value. But they have never failed sooner or later to reveal the fact that in all their processes their eyes have been fixed upon Value as their ultimate goal. Indeed, their language might even lead one to suppose that they regarded it as the special province of the Higher Criticism to establish rather than merely to determine the value of the books of the Bible.

For Eichhorn, the reputed "father of the Higher Criticism", Value was evidently the main thing. He says:

"For this discovery of the internal condition of the first books of Moses party spirit will perhaps for a pair of decennials snort at the Higher Criticism instead of rewarding it with the full thanks due it; for (1) the credibility of the books gains by such use of more ancient documents (2) the harmony of the two narratives at the same time with their slight deviations proves their independence and mutual reliability."<sup>8</sup> Among English-speaking scholars few names are more conspicuously associated with a certain school of criticism than that of the late Dr W. Robertson Smith. In his Introduction to Wellhausen's *Prolegomena to the History of Israel* he says: "Now, to take one point only, but that the most important, it must plainly make a vast difference to our whole view of the providential course of Israel's history if it appears that instead of the whole Pentateuchal law having been given Israel before the tribes crossed the Jordan, that law really grew up little by little from its Mosaic germ, and did not attain its present form until the Israelites were captives or subjects of a foreign power. This is what the new school of Pentateuch criticism undertakes to prove, and does so in a way that should interest every one. For in the course of the argument it appears that the plain natural sense of the old history has been constantly distorted by false presuppositions with which we have been accustomed to approach it—that having a false idea of the

<sup>8</sup> *Einleitung*, cited and translated by Dr Briggs in his *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 30.

legal and religious culture of the Hebrews when they first entered Canaan, we continually miss the point of the most interesting parts of the subsequent story and above all fail to understand the great work accomplished by the prophets in destroying the Old Israel and preparing the way first for Judaism and then for the Gospel. These surely are inquiries which no conscientious student of the Bible can afford to ignore."<sup>7</sup>

According to Dr. Smith, then, in determining the origin of the Pentateuch, the Higher Criticism determines also its value both as a history, and as a source of material for a history of Israel. In other words, simply by settling the question of its origin—using that word in its larger sense—the Higher Criticism reveals the fact, so at least Dr. Smith alleges, that the Pentateuch in its present form is at once valueless as a history of Israel and invaluable as a source of material for a history of the covenant people. Hence, according to him, its practical significance and importance. Clearly, therefore, the determination of Value must be the ultimate problem of this science.

The same conclusion follows from the statements of such recent writers as Dr. Briggs and Mr. Harford-Battersby. The former, for instance, informs us that the goal of his own labors as a higher critic has been "to contribute to . . . a higher appreciation of the most ancient documents of our Holy Religion".<sup>8</sup> A "higher appreciation", of course, means a higher estimate of the value of these "most ancient documents". More definitely still he affirms that by solving the problem of the origin of the Pentateuch the Higher Criticism "vindicates its historical credibility".<sup>9</sup> If so, in so doing the Higher Criticism also vindicates the historical value of the Pentateuch. And so Mr. Harford-Battersby gives it as the result of his very elaborate literary analysis of the Book of Exodus that it "is like a grand symphony

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. vii, viii.

<sup>8</sup> *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. viii.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

which was once thought to give harmony without discord, but which is now being found, in virtue of the elements which by themselves are sharply discordant, to sound forth a yet richer harmony".<sup>10</sup> So that here again the problem of Origin is seen to terminate upon that of Value.

Discussing the question of the literary form of the Genesis record, Prof. Gunkel declares: "The evangelical churches and their representatives would do well not to dispute the fact that Genesis contains legends—as has been done too frequently—but to recognize that the knowledge of this fact is the indispensable condition to an historical understanding of Genesis."<sup>11</sup> This manifestly is but an expanded way of saying that until we have determined the question of the Form we are in no position to pass upon that of the Value of this Genesis record. In this judgment Dr. W. R. Harper evidently agrees, only he makes both the religious and the historical value of the narratives in Gen. i. to xii. to depend upon our insight into their literary form. His words are: "These stories are not history, for the times are pre-historic. They are the Hebrew version (purged and purified) of the best thoughts of humanity in that earliest period, when man stood alone with nature and with God. It is sacrilege to call them history. To apply to them the tests of history—always cold, stern and severe—is profanation. They are stories, grand, inspiring, unlifting stories."<sup>12</sup>

It is perfectly evident that neither Prof. Gunkel nor Dr. Harper is here concerned with the question of literary form for its own sake. What each of them is concerned to do is correctly to appraise the value of these Genesis records. This, however, they can not do until they have determined the question of literary form. For to settle this question is also to determine what kind of value we are entitled to expect in these narratives. Legends and stories have their

<sup>10</sup> Hastings BD. Vol. I., p. 511.

<sup>11</sup> *The Legends of Genesis*, by Hermann Gunkel, p. 12 Open Court Pub. Co.

<sup>12</sup> *Biblical World*, Feb., 1894, p. 107.

own value, but it is not of a historical kind. In dealing with the problem of Form, therefore, both Prof. Gunkel and Dr. Harper have their eyes upon the problem of Value as their real, ultimate problem.

Evidence similar in effect to that already adduced might, if it were necessary, be multiplied. One more citation, however, must suffice. It is given because of its unequivocal explicitness. It is from the pen of Dr. M'Fadyen, of Knox College, Toronto, Canada. He says: "The problems raised by the historical books of the Old Testament are of exceptional interest and difficulty. But it must never be forgotten that criticism is only a means to an end. It fails if it does not lead us to a more reverent appreciation of the ways of God with men."<sup>13</sup>

Dr. M'Fadyen fails to discriminate. Like most of those already cited, he permits himself to assume that it is the function of the Higher Criticism to vindicate or establish the value of the books of the Bible. This, however, is clearly a mistake. The sole function of the Higher Criticism is to determine Value—a totally different thing from vindicating or establishing it. Further, along with the others who have been cited, he is quite confident that the Higher Criticism as actually employed by himself has really resulted in vindicating the value of the Scripture writings, has really given them a new, stronger, juster claim upon the esteem of men. This, perhaps, is not unnatural. None the less it is simply an evidence of confusion of thought, the causes of which will come up for consideration a little later. Certain it is that the conclusions for which Dr. M'Fadyen stands are not conclusions that have commended themselves to the acceptance of the great mass of sober-minded Christian people. Not only so, but it is becoming more and more evident that these conclusions, where accepted, modify one's view of the value of the Christian religion, and indeed of the very nature of all religion. But, fortunately, the Higher Criticism itself is a larger, safer, saner thing than the conclu-

<sup>13</sup> *The Messages of the Prophetic and Priestly Historian*, p. x.



utions that have been put forth in its name by this particular school of critics. We may hold to it, even though we discard them. At any rate, these critics are unimpeachable witnesses to the fact that the determination of Value is the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism, and this is our only present concern with their statements.

The statements quoted do more than prove that the determination of Value is the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism. They show that our problem stands in need of being rendered yet more precise and definite. For they plainly reveal the fact that there are more kinds of value than one. Further, they show that the same writing may possess more kinds of value than one, and also that it may have much value of one sort, and little or none at all of another. Finally, they show that there may be much confusion and difference of opinion as to the precise kind of value to be allowed to the very same books of the Bible. Thus Dr. Briggs affirms that the Higher Criticism vindicates the historical credibility of the Pentateuch; Dr. W. Robertson Smith virtually denies to it any value as a history, but regards it as of great value as a source of material for a history of Israel; Dr. Harper denies to it the value of history, but extols its religious value; and, finally, Professor Gunkel lays most stress upon its æsthetic value. Now, all this raises some important questions. One is: Is the Higher Criticism equally concerned with the determination of all these kinds of Value? If not, which of them is it specially concerned to determine? Another question equally necessary to be asked is, What, if any, is the relation between these several kinds of value—historical and religious, for instance? Until these questions are intelligently answered the Higher Criticism will resemble nothing so much as a "go as you please" race with a "choose as you please" goal. Such indefiniteness would be fatal to its pretensions as a science. Science desiderates nothing more than precision.

Obviously the Higher Criticism takes account of more kinds of value than one. This is on the very face of the

statements already cited. It is not, however, equally concerned with each of the several kinds of Value of which, at one time or another, and in one way or another, it takes account. For just as the Higher Criticism deals with the problems of Origin and Form, not for their own sakes, but because of their bearing upon the problem of Value, so it deals with all other values, not for their own sakes, but because of their bearing, real or supposed, upon the determination of religious value. This again is a truth which, while never wholly lost sight of, can scarcely be said ever to have been distinctly perceived or firmly grasped. Occasionally, indeed, it has even been indirectly and, we may suppose, inadvertently denied. Thus, for instance, we find Dr. Briggs saying: "The question of the authorship of the Bible is whether God is its author, whether it is inspired. This can not be determined by the Higher Criticism in any way, for the Higher Criticism has only to do with human authorship and has nothing to do with divine authorship, which is determined on different principles."<sup>14</sup> Plausible as this sounds, it is hardly consistent with the most natural meaning of Dr. Briggs' words, when he declares that the crowning aim of his own labors as a higher critic has been "to contribute to . . . a higher appreciation of the most ancient documents of our Holy Religion."<sup>15</sup> This language points most naturally to religious value as the specific value in the writer's thoughts when penning these words. At any rate, religious value will be found to be the specific value upon the determination of which the efforts of all critics have, either consciously and professedly, or else unconsciously and actually converged. This is the Value explicitly stressed by Drs. Harper and M'Fadyen, and impliedly stressed by Mr. Harford-Battersby. Professor Gunkel also finds what he calls "The legends of Genesis" of more value for religious edification than would be straightforward historical narratives. Dr. Geo. A. Smith is reported recently

<sup>14</sup> *Wither?* p. 89.

<sup>15</sup> *Vide sup.*, p. 466.

to have said, "The criticism of to-day is not directed to the historical trustworthiness of the Bible so much as to its moral validity."<sup>16</sup> Moral and religious value are, of course, not identical, but Dr. Smith's remark shows the trend.

So great and disastrous has been the confusion prevailing upon this point that I feel constrained to present further and even more decisive evidence for the correctness of the doctrine just laid down. In 1892 Canon Cheyne put forth a volume of sermons and addresses under the title of *Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism*.<sup>17</sup> The purpose of the volume was to exploit the Higher Criticism, as employed by Canon Cheyne and his school, as an aid to a rational religious faith. Indeed, its contention was that the Higher Criticism is an indispensable organ for arriving at a right religious valuation of the Scripture narratives. Take, for instance, the following language: "We shall be verily guilty concerning our brother if we allow him to drift among the icebergs of doubt for want of an intelligent knowledge of the Bible. Indeed, the whole Christian family will be injured, if we do not discover some better way of preserving true reverence for the Old Testament, and more especially for its narratives. But is there any way left that might be tried in popular teaching? Yes; there is one which until lately has been neglected; it is to throw upon the Old Testament the full light of critical research. God has put it into the heart of an increasing number of Christian scholars to apply improved methods to the study of the Scriptures, and they wish now to turn their results to account in the practical service of the Church. It is but too certain that our popular religion needs simplifying, and that the defence of Christian truth against infidelity needs strengthening, and these objects can, it would seem, be best promoted by a *revival of the old religion* bringing Christian people on the one hand and the *new religion* on the other. . . . Its object

the Edinburg Sabbath Morning Fellowship Union,  
*ism and the Average Man*, p. 41.

his title as too suggestive to be really felicitous.

will be to apply modern methods of study to the Old Testament with just sufficient precision to bring out the gradualness of divine revelation, to emphasize and illustrate the essential facts and truths of the Scriptures, and to solve the difficulties and correct the misapprehensions of infidel objectors. . . . But some timid Christian may ask, Had I not better leave this study to those who have to meet infidel objectors in controversy? May I not, by being too venturesome, expose my own faith to a severe shock? Historical truth may be good, but spiritual truth is better; why should I not be content with the one thing needful? To which I would reply, with heartfelt sympathy, that vital faith in spiritual truth cannot be imperiled by historical inquiry into its records, that on the contrary there are few better aids to faith than a historical view of the progress of revelation, such as the higher study of the Bible presents to us."<sup>18</sup>

Now, all of this is very explicit. Canon Cheyne speaks here as one who, having tested to his own satisfaction a given method of attaining a specific end, is commending that method to others who wish to attain the same end. And the end, it will be observed, is nothing else than a truer insight into and a juster appreciation of the religious value of the Bible. The method commended is the Higher Criticism.

*"Principles and Ideals for Sunday School"* is the title of a recent book, a production of the joint authorship of Drs. Burton and Mathews, of Chicago University. What may be called the fundamental postulate of the book is that "The Sunday School is a religious institution". Its aim is "to secure, through teaching of the Bible as the chief means, the conversion of the pupil and his development in Christian character".<sup>19</sup> But, in order that the teaching of the Bible may become effective to the attainment of this end, "it will be needful also for the teacher, especially for the teacher of the more mature pupils, to adopt for himself and to impart

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 17, 18.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5.

to his pupils a proper method in the use of the Bible. . . ."<sup>20</sup> Now, according to Drs. Burton and Mathews, a correct conception of the Bible implies that it is not only "a collection of literature", but that "this literature is also the record and product of a historical and a developing revelation".<sup>21</sup> What they regard as involved in such a conception of the Bible they make perfectly plain. For they immediately proceed to add: "It is not difficult to help pupils to see this development. The painstaking effort of scholars, however much they may differ among themselves as to details, has placed beyond dispute this fact, that in the Bible we have the literary productions of every stage of the rise and fall of the Hebrew people. The saga, the folk-tale, the chronicle of the pre-literary period; the history and legislation, political and religious teaching of national maturity; the lamentation, the prayer and the song of praise and faith from years of national misery—all these have gone to make up the Old Testament."<sup>22</sup> If, now, the question be asked, How may one obtain this conception of the Bible? The answer which these gentlemen uniformly give is, in the use of the "historical method". But the historical method is only a one-sided, quasi-popular name for the Higher Criticism. Thus we are again brought, by a rather circuitous route, to see that the determination of religious value constitutes the ultimate and the practical problem of the Higher Criticism.

Few lectures of late days have produced quite such a profound stir as those, by Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch, of Germany, entitled *Babel and Bible*. Now, as any one who will be at the pains to read the lectures may see for himself, the object of these lectures is to appraise the religious value of the Old Testament by means of what Dr. Delitzsch calls "scientific criticism", which is only another name for the Higher Criticism. To do this, he simply sets the teachings of the Old Testament in the light of their origin as determined by their

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>22</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 40.



internal characteristics, when these are correlated with the findings of archaeology. It is true that his conclusions have been most roundly, and I must add astonishingly, denounced in quarters where he had every reason to expect only unqualified approval. With this, however, I have nothing to do. Perhaps it ought to have ceased to be surprising to find men shrinking back from the conclusions demanded by their own logic, especially when those conclusions are stated in their naked repulsiveness. In this case, for instance, the core of Dr. Delitzsch's offending lies in the fact that he finds it impossible to regard as a "revelation" what the Higher Criticism, *se judice*, shows to be a "tradition" amalgamated "out of heterogeneous sources".<sup>23</sup>

It is unnecessary for me to disavow any personal sympathy with the conclusions reached either by Dr. Delitzsch or by Drs. Burton and Mathews, or by Canon Cheyne. It is worth while, however, for me to remind the reader that the Higher Criticism, as such, is in no sense responsible for the conclusions of these scholars. In the case of all of them, their conclusions are due to the influence of certain presuppositions, and the introduction of certain material errors into their reasoning rather than to their critical processes in the abstract.

Apart, however, from express statements from any source whatever, the very nature of the case shows that if the determination of Value be the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism, the ultimate value to be determined must be the religious value of the books of Scripture. For above everything else these books are religious literature. Religious value is the specific kind of value that they arrogate to themselves. Religious value is the kind of value that above all others is claimed for them. Obviously, therefore, either to ignore this value or to subordinate it to any other would be a capital blunder. Not only so, but whatever other kinds of value the books of the Bible may possess fall to be con-

<sup>23</sup> *Babel and Bible Also Embodying the Most Important Criticisms and the Author's Replies*. Open Court Pub. Co., August, 1903, p. 165.

sidered by the Higher Criticism only because they bear upon this ultimate Value, and only as they bear upon it. The determination of other kinds of value, as such, belongs to other disciplines. Thus literary criticism has it for its special function to appraise the literary and æsthetic worth or value of the Scripture writings as truly as of any others. Historical Criticism, again, has it as its special function to determine the historical worth or value of such of the books of the Bible as present themselves to us under the guise of history, as truly as of any other books assuming that form. Hence, to deny that the ultimate Value sought to be determined by the Higher Criticism is religious value, is to leave this discipline without any special function. But that is to deny to it the character of a distinct and separate discipline at all.

Just here we must guard ourselves against a mistake. The Higher Criticism is not to be identified with the discipline known as the "Internal Evidences". Both disciplines, it is true, seek to determine the religious value of the Bible. Both likewise rely exclusively upon what is known as internal evidence. They approach their common goal, however, each in its own characteristic way. The Higher Criticism, for one thing, takes account of only certain internal characteristics of the writing with which it deals, viz., the literary, historical, psychological, and thought phenomena found in the writings. But further, it views these phenomena not as they may bear directly upon religious value, but solely as they bear upon the determination of Origin and Form. And to the light derived from these problems, i. e., the problems of Origin and Form, it restricts itself exclusively in determining the religious value of a writing. In other words, the Higher Criticism determines the value of a writing, not directly, but only through the problems of Origin and Form. This obviously is something very different from the method of procedure in the case of the Internal Evidences. The latter goes much more directly

to its goal, and goes also by a much greater variety of routes. The Higher Criticism, therefore, is, at best, but a branch, and a rather limited branch, of the Internal Evidences.

Some, no doubt, will regard the restrictions thus placed upon the Higher Criticism as too severe. They may even suppose that they strip the science of all real dignity and importance. This, however, will be the judgment of those only who either underestimate the value and importance of the literary, historical, psychological and thought phenomena of a writing for determining its Origin and Form; or of those who underestimate the value and importance of Origin and Form for the determination of religious value. Moreover, the restrictions proposed are demanded in the interest of the Higher Criticism as an independent discipline, in the interests of clearness when treating its problems and registering its conclusions, and finally by fidelity to the actual course of its history.

We are now prepared, I trust, for a more accurate definition than has previously been possible. The Higher Criticism, then, may be defined to be the science of the processes by which the religious value of a writing is determined upon the basis of its Origin and Form, these latter problems in their turn being determined on the basis of internal characteristics, such as the literary, historical, psychological, and thought phenomena found in the writing.

If the positions laid down above are correct, it is something to have gotten so far. But even now we may lose our goal in a fog. For no sooner is it declared that the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism is to determine the religious value of the books of the Bible than we are presented with a threefold difficulty. For the following questions at once emerge: (1) Who shall furnish a standard by which to estimate religious value? There are, perhaps, few important subjects upon which men's views differ more radically. In fact, a writer of some prominence has recently asserted that, "Scholars cannot agree as to the definition of

religion nor as to its classification . . . ."<sup>24</sup> (2) Again, it will be said: since, upon any view whatever, the several books of Scripture proceeded from a variety of authors, living in a variety of different places, and at widely separated periods of time, how can the determination of Origin be made to bear upon the question of religious value? And since the Bible contains a great variety of literary forms, How can the determination of Form be made to bear upon that of religious value? (3) And, finally, it will be asked, Is it possible to determine religious value by the only data which the Higher Criticism is at liberty to take account of, viz., the literary, historical, psychological and thought phenomena found in the writings themselves? These last two objections were probably what was in the mind of Dr. Briggs when he asserted that "the Higher Criticism has only to do with human authorship and has nothing to do with divine authorship, which is determined on different principles."<sup>25</sup>

A moment's consideration, however, will convince any one that the last of these objections has no independent force. I have stated it merely because it may be made to appear to less thoughtful persons to have such force. In reality the Higher Criticism does not employ literary, historical, psychological or thought phenomena for the direct determination of religious value. This may be done and is properly done in what is known as the "Internal Evidences". In the Higher Criticism, however, these phenomena are used solely for the determination of Origin and Form, and so only indirectly affect the determination of religious value. This objection, therefore, need not detain us longer.

A complete answer to the second objection would necessitate a full discussion of the problems of Origin and Form, which would be out of place at this point. Two or three general remarks ought to be sufficient to strip it of whatever

<sup>24</sup> Dr. G. W. Knox, *American Journal of Theology*, Oct., 1902. Cited in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, July, 1903, p. 497.

<sup>25</sup> *Vide sup.*, p. 464.

superficial plausibility it may possess. Perhaps the most practical answer to it is a fact patent to all who do not deliberately close their eyes — the fact, namely, that men's judgment as to the religious value of the books of the Bible has been and is to-day being modified, or rather, determined by their views as to the origin and form of these books. Of the truth of this statement, Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch is, perhaps, the most conspicuous recent illustration. Again, religious value is, or in any particular case may be, a matter of degree. But surely no one will be so rash as to say that the degree of religious value possessed by a writing will be in no wise affected by its origin or its literary form. If such be the case, where would be the propriety of cautioning readers, as is sometimes very solemnly done, that as they regard the religious value of the first chapter of Genesis, or of the Book of Jonah, they must not see in either of them a historical record? Further, there is a palpable relation between the character, qualifications, commission, claims and methods of a writer, and the literary, historical and religious value of his production. Further still, despite denials, there is a certain just and even necessary connection between historical, and even literary value on the one hand and religious value on the other. Finally, this objection—and the same remark applies also to the first objection—if valid would simply prove that there is no place for the Higher Criticism as an independent science.

We recur now to the first objection. It, in fact, is the only one of the three that has any real plausibility. It, however, is merely plausible, nothing more. If the ultimate problem of the Higher Criticism be to determine the religious value of the books of the Bible, or claimed for these books, by setting them in the light of their origin and literary form, who, it is asked, shall furnish us a standard of religious value, or even a definition of religion? This question is one fair enough in itself, but is apt to mislead. For the Higher Criticism takes account not only of Value, but also of claims as to value. Further, it takes account not



only of the claims as to value which a writing makes for itself, but equally of those made for it by others. Finally, while it may be powerless to establish the truth of these claims, it may be all-powerful to demolish them. The Quran, for instance, and the Book of Mormon, equally with the Scriptures, claim to be a revelation from God. But will any one say that the Higher Criticism cannot dispose of their respective claims by setting these writings in the light of their origin and their literary form? Why, then, may it not do the same in the case of the books of the Bible? But will it be maintained that the religious value of the Bible will remain unaffected whatever the fate of the claims as to the origin and form of its several books which it makes for itself, or that are made for it? It is hard indeed to conceive of a definition of religion under which this would be true: and yet when one considers the ideas of religion now current, he is warned to refrain from rashly fixing the limits of possibility in this direction.

But apart from all such considerations as those just ad-duced, it is to be noticed that the Bible presents its own conception of religion. This, moreover, it affirms to be the only true conception. What this Bible definition of religion is, we need not now pause to inquire. Whatever it may be, it would seem obvious that the primary function of the Higher Criticism is to test—not this Biblical conception of religion, for to do this does not fall within the province of the Higher Criticism—but to test the religious value of the books of the Bible by the conception of religion which the Bible itself furnishes. Let us suppose, for example, that the Bible idea of religion is that it consists in right thoughts of and right inner and outer relations to the living God, based upon a written revelation of His character and His will. Then the function of the Higher Criticism will be to determine whether and in what sense the several books of Scripture are a revelation, and whether and how far they tend to guide men to right views of the character and right personal relations to the living God, so far as this can be

done by setting each of these books in the light of its origin and its literary form.

But whether the above be a correct account of the Bible conception of religion or not, and whether this Bible conception of religion itself be correct or not, the important fact to fix in our minds is that there must be some definition of religion posited before any judgment upon the religious value of the books of Scripture is possible, and that the conception of religion posited, whatever it may be, will necessarily control the judgment of religious value based upon it. If this is overlooked the gravest confusion must ensue. Because this has been overlooked the most serious confusion has already ensued. Because, for example, critics who hold the most divergent and even contradictory views in regard to the origin and form of the book of Genesis agree in pronouncing it to be of unequaled religious value, many thoughtless persons have jumped to the conclusion that the differences between these critics upon the question of Origin and Form amount to little or nothing. Religious value, it is said, and truly said, is the main thing, and these critics agree as to the religious value of the books of the Bible, therefore the Bible has nothing to fear from Criticism. This is the vice of all well meant irenicons, like *Bible Criticism and the Average Man*. It is doubtless even truer than those who use this style of reasoning suppose, that the Bible has nothing to fear from Criticism. But the superficiality of their reasoning is evident, as soon as it is perceived that the opposing critics referred to above agree in their estimate of the religious value of the books of the Bible *only because* they disagree *toto caelo* in their respective conceptions of religion itself.

It should be clearly understood, however, that to maintain that the problems of Origin and Form are always of fundamental importance to the determination of Value is not to make the Higher Criticism the only or the ultimate arbiter of Value. Such is not the case. To affirm with Professor Francis Brown, for instance, that, "If questions which the

Higher Criticism seeks to answer cannot be answered by its methods, then there is no answer for them at all",<sup>20</sup> is to take a position that will not finally commend itself to sober minds. It unduly exaggerates the importance of internal evidence. It unduly magnifies our dependence upon internal characteristics for light upon the questions of Origin and Form and Value. It affects a distrust of what is called "tradition" and of "authority" that is at once unreasonable and unwarranted. "Tradition" is either a mere term of obfuscation, or else a term of scientific definition. When used, as it too often is, in the former sense, that is, as a term of abuse, it need not detain us, nor disturb us. It is a mere expletive of impotent contempt. When used as a term of definition "tradition" includes all testimony proceeding from others than contemporaries, and ought in fairness to cover all the evidence not based upon what in our courts is called "personal knowledge". To discredit all testimony from others than actual contemporaries does not, to put it mildly, show sobriety of judgment. It is not only an unreasonable, but, in the light of actual experience, it is an unwarrantable procedure. In other words, experience proves beyond dispute that testimony from others than contemporaries—i. e., "tradition" in the only tolerable sense of that word, in such a discussion as this—may be and often has been thoroughly reliable. Every thing depends upon the character and competence of the source from which the "tradition" proceeds. Indeed, even those who profess least respect for "tradition" are unwilling and unwitting witnesses to the claims that it justly has upon our consideration. The proof is, that they can never rest in their conclusions based upon internal evidence until they have impugned the character or competence, or both of all those Scripture personages whose statements either directly or indirectly impinge upon their conclusions. And in doing this, they are unquestionably wise. For no declamation against "tradition" in the abstract will avail

<sup>20</sup> *Homiletic Review*, April, 1892. Cited by Dr. Zenos, *Elements of Higher Criticism*, p. 143.

to weaken the force of the testimony say of the Chronicler to the origin of the Pentateuch. He must be impeached, or his testimony, though not that of a contemporary, and therefore falling under the head of "tradition", will with ordinary persons set aside the most confident conclusions based upon internal evidence. The reason of this is not that thoughtful persons depreciate the importance of "internal evidence". It may be admitted that "internal evidence" is of the nature of "personal testimony", direct, first hand evidence. It may be admitted that when it really speaks to a point, what it really says is final. The trouble is that there are some points to which it does not speak, and there are others upon which it does not speak unequivocally. Further, experience proves that as an unsophisticated witness in the hands of a skillful lawyer may by leading questions be brought to make statements that are utterly untrue and the farthest thing from the real intention of the witness, so the "internal evidence" may by proper manipulation be made to furnish a basis for conclusions utterly unwarranted by the facts. Indeed, "internal evidence", like all circumstantial evidence, needs in all ordinary cases to be handled with the utmost caution, candor and judicial reserve, or it may seriously mislead. It is neither wise nor necessary, therefore, to pit "internal evidence" against "tradition" in the sense in which I have defined the latter term. It is far from wise to stake our decision of the grave problems of the Higher Criticism solely upon our construction, or the construction which any particular set of scholars place upon the "internal evidence". "Tradition" has repeatedly justified itself as more trustworthy than the construction put upon the "internal evidence" by scholars of unquestionable and acknowledged ability.

Neither should we be misled by current contempt for "authority". Let us rather hope that this is merely a passing phase of intellectual bumptiousness and confused thought. To say that the problems of the Higher Criticism cannot be settled by "authority" is either to say

that there are no persons who are competent to settle them in the use of internal evidence or otherwise; or it is to say that for the great majority of mankind they cannot be settled at all. For, whatever the process employed to solve the problems of the Higher Criticism, provided it really solves them, he who is master of that process is in a position authoritatively to solve those problems for any and all others. Else why do we hear so much about the "assured results" of a certain school of critics? This label so conspicuously in evidence upon their goods would seem to have but one possible object, namely, to beget in the public the conviction that there are those who are competent to settle these vexing questions for them. But, if so, then these questions can be settled by authority. And if they can be settled by authority, who shall say that they may not be settled upon the authority of our Lord and His apostles? What if our Lord assumes the ability and the right to settle them? Shall we repudiate his authority at this point? After all, for most persons, so far as these problems are concerned, it is simply a question as to whether they will accept their solution of them from Christ and His apostles, or from certain modern scholars who, *quoad hoc*, affect to be better informed and safer guides than Christ Himself.

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W. M. MCPHEETERS.



## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

WHAT IS RELIGION. By WILHELM BOUSSET, Professor in the University of Göttingen, Author of *Life of Jesus*. Translated by F. B. Low. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907. (London: Williams & Norgate). Crown 8vo.; pp. xvi. 304.

Professor Bousset tells us that "the object of this little book is" to help us "to understand the meaning of the phenomenon which we call religion" (p. 6). It is the phenomenon which he undertakes to expound, that is to say he deals directly with the phenomenology rather than with the philosophy or the psychology of religion. In other words, his method is historical. He traces what he conceives to be the history of the development of religions from their beginning in the first vague manifestations of the religious aspirations of man to their culmination, we do not say in Christianity, but in the liberal Christianity of the twentieth century; and through this medium of history he seeks to convey to the reader a conception of what religion is.

Professor Bousset's book is, therefore, historical in form. But it is not primarily historical in purpose. As there are some novels which are written "for the novel's sake", and some which are written "for a purpose"; so there are some histories which are written for the history's sake and some histories which are written "for a purpose". And Professor Bousset's history of religions is of the latter class. He does not trace the varied forms of religion which have been prevalent among men merely that he may make these forms known to us; nor even that through them and their sequence he may make the development of religion known to us; nor even that through this development he may make what religion as religion is known to us. His real purpose, dominating his whole undertaking, is that he may make Christianity—naturally, as he conceives Christianity,—known to us. The book, therefore, very properly culminates in two long chapters on the Nature and the Future of Christianity, for which in point of fact the whole of the preceding chapters have been written and to which they lead up. In a word, Professor Bousset's little book is a study of the nature and prospects of Christianity from the point of view not so much of "comparative religion" or of the "history of the religions", as of the so-called "comparative-religion" or "history-of-religion" (*religionsgeschichtliche*) school. It is in other words an attempt

to explain Christianity, in its entirety, as a religion among religions, the product like other religions of the religious nature of man.

Professor Bousset is quite frank and quite emphatic in the expression of his point of view upon the main matter at issue—whether, to wit, Christianity is just a religion among religions, the product, like all other religions, of the religious nature of man. Nor does he wait for his exposition of the course of religious development to suggest this, or to establish it. He announces it already in his Introduction, practically as a postulate; and sets out on his exposition of the course of religious development, therefore, with his goal well in view. The distinction so often drawn between "revealed and natural religion"—as if, forsooth, "the religion of the Old and New Testaments is revealed religion", and "all others are natural religions, the product of man's thought or imagination"—is in his opinion thoroughly untenable,—"impossible" is his word (p. 8).—and, indeed, "irreligious and Godless" (p. 7). For not only is it not accordant with the principle of historical evolution, but it implies a "narrow minded and melancholy view of the history of humanity". This mode of speech is determined by the shock which it gives Prof. Bousset that anyone should suppose God to have allowed "the nations" "to go their own way" without guidance from Him, the implication being that all religion is the product in a sense of "revelation". Elsewhere his thought swings around the opposite focus of the ellipse. The thinking of men imbued with modern culture, he tells us, "rests upon the determination to try to explain everything that takes place in the world by natural causes; or—to express it in another form—it rests upon the determined assertion of universal laws to which all phenomena, natural and spiritual, are subject" (p. 283). "Historical science", accordingly, "puts before itself the object of explaining all intellectual events by reference to a universal law" (p. 288). There is, no doubt, always "the riddle of personality and individuality" which enters everywhere into the fabric of history; but this is not the same thing as—or in any way analogous to—the intrusion of a supernatural factor. The "halo of the supernatural" which has in the past clung around 'sacred history' "has been disrupted". We can now believe only in an evolution of religion shaping itself in accordance with "the universal evolution of civilization", and it is in consequence no longer possible to "believe in a Divine revelation in the old acceptance of the term, which restricted revelation to one special province" (p. 289). Thus we see the curve of the ellipse turn back on itself. When we speak of "the natural course of events" and of "the direction of divine revelation", we are speaking of one and the same thing, and the upshot of it is that Christianity is no more "revealed" than any other religion and is just as much a product of human thought and imagination as any other religion. It takes its place among other religions as just one of them,—the purest form, the highest and most perfect, religion has yet reached: but certainly not the only true religion, "but simply the most complete species of the genus" (p. 9).

It is to exhibit this of Christianity that Professor Bousset has written

his book. As was natural, he takes his start from the beginning. Religion being natural to man, there never was a time when men did not have religion, or if we, from the evolutionary standpoint, must say that "there must be some point of time when religion had its beginning", that point of time must be placed so early that "wherever human life advanced a stage religion was evolved" (p. 2). Its first beginnings were no doubt of a low character,—corresponding to the low intellectual and social development of its creators. Professor Bousset puts "animism" at the basis of all religious development; and then traces the gradual evolution of religious conceptions and practices from it, in stages running *pari passu* with the development of social organization, up through tribal and natural to universal religions. Prof. Bousset is a scholar of wide reading and an expositor of decided gifts; and much that he tells us of these several phases of religious construction is well conceived and well told. But by means of it all he is working his way steadily onward to an explanation of the religion of the Bible, or, from his point of view, we should say, of the religions of the Old and New Testament writings in their several stages—as of purely natural origin. He is careful, therefore, to insert accounts of the successive stages of religion which he thinks he finds set forth progressively in the several strata of the Biblical books in their proper places in the advancing evolution. And so he comes at last to the origin of Christianity.

Christianity, like certain other high religions of "reform" character in this, owes its origin, of course, to the impulse received from a great personality, the greatest religious personality the world has (as yet) seen. An element of inexplicability is thus introduced into it; for who can read the riddle of powerful personalities? But this does not prevent our perceiving that it grew naturally out of the soil of its own time. What Jesus did may indeed be summed up almost entirely in one word: He simplified the developed Judaism of His day. The Jewish Rabbis are quite right in saying that everything that Jesus taught may be found taught beforehand in Judaism. The proper retort is to acknowledge that the Rabbis had said all that Jesus said,—and to add that "unfortunately they said so much else too!" (p. 217). What Jesus did was not to add to their teaching but to subtract from it. The note of His teaching was simplification. He freed religion from rationalism, ceremonialism, legalism and scribism. And doing so, He gave us Christianity. For the Christianity of Jesus is just the Judaism of His day freed from these elements and thus reduced to the simple doctrine of God as Father, who forgives the sins of men, because He is good.

The Christianity of Jesus we say: but not the Christianity we know, or indeed the Christianity a modern man can accept. For the development of religion did not stop with Jesus. After Jesus came, for example, Paul. And Paul's Christianity is not the Christianity of Jesus. For one thing, the Christianity of Paul worships Jesus, and Jesus worships God alone. For another thing, the Christianity of Paul talks

of an atoning sacrifice, of which Jesus knew nothing. For yet another thing, the Christianity of Paul has incorporated into it sacramental acts, to all which that of Jesus is a stranger. Nor did the development stop with Paul. After Paul came Old Catholicism; and after Old Catholicism, Mediævalism, and after Mediævalism the Reformation; and after the Reformation has come—or at least is coming—Modernism. And it is not the Christianity of Jesus or the Christianity of Paul,—or even the Christianity of the Reformation, great as is the advance of the Christianity of the Reformation on all preceding Christianities,—which can lay claim to being the highest of religions, but the Christianity of Modernism now at last assuming firm outlines and a stable form. The old order has changed and given place to a new: "the whole structure of human life has entirely altered since the Reformation, and history and experience tell us that when this happens religion assumes other forms" (p. 271). A new Christianity conformable to the data supplied by modern culture is, therefore, now called for.

"The narrow Pauline idea of redemption, which was developed by St. Augustine and strengthened anew by Luther" (p. 275), must go. We must "no longer speak of the 'divinity' of Christ" (p. 279). And with the 'divinity' of Christ must go all its corollaries,—primarily the self-contradictory doctrine of the Trinity. The idea of an atonement and of a vicarious sacrifice, of course, goes too (p. 282). And indeed the whole conception of the supernatural which has hitherto ruled—which contradicts not only "our whole mode of thought" but also "our changed belief in God" (p. 285): and with this idea of supernaturalism must go also not only the whole notion of an inspired book, but also of a special revelation (p. 289). This is not to return to the Christianity of Jesus. The Christianity of Jesus lies at the root of Christianity; it does not appear at its apex. Jesus believed in the supernatural: we cannot (p. 286). We cannot accept His demonology or His eschatology (p. 292). Even much of Jesus' moral teaching is too onesided or ascetic to be possible to a modern man (p. 295). It is ours not slavishly to copy but to grow. "We take our stand by Jesus" only in the Parable of the Lost Son and "on the ground of the absolutely simple conviction that God is to be found in the good and that faith in the Heavenly Father includes moral deeds and moral work in the human community". Here is the creed of the Christianity into which all the religious development of all the ages meets and coalesces: "God the Father; life in accordance with His will, spent in joyful work for the service of the world; forgiveness of sins and eternal hope" (p. 298).

We must bear in mind that it is this Christianity which Prof. Bousset has in view when he tells us that Christianity is the last and best of religions and that the future of religion is bound up in it. What place does Christ take in this Christianity? None whatever. He is merely the impressive religious personality back to whose impulse is traced the development which has issued, after two thousand years, in it. If we can say of the Jewish Rabbis that they taught all that Christ taught, but the mischief of it is that they taught so very much more: so we

must say of Christ that if He taught all of this "abiding" Christianity, the mischief again is that He taught so very much more. Why call this new Christianity by His name any more than call this Christianity Judaism? He did not more "simplify" Judaism than our moderns are "simplifying" Christianity. And let us particularly note what this new "simplification" reduces us to. It is just God, Morality, Immortality "God the Father"; "life in accordance with His will, spent in joyful work for the service of the world"; "forgiveness of sins and eternal hope". Is there any religion which does not embrace these three elements of "natural religion"? No doubt the conception of God, the conception of morality, the conception of immortality which are commended to us bear the traces of Christian teaching. It is God "the Father". It is life "in the service of the world". It is "forgiveness of sins". We are thankful that it is proposed to retain this much of the contribution of Jesus and of His accredited Apostles to the religion of the world. But it is worth while to observe that when Christianity is reduced to a "natural religion" in its origin, it is reduced also to a "natural religion" in its contents. it shrinks at once to the meagre contents of the familiar trilogy, of God, morality and immortality.

The main question of course recurs, Has Prof. Bousset succeeded in reducing Christianity to a "natural religion" in its origin? He has certainly put together an account of the origin and development of religion, into which he has interspersed an account of the origin and development of the religions of the Scriptural narrative, including Christianity, in all its developments, on the assumption that it is equally with all the rest a "natural religion". But this is merely Prof. Bousset's historical argument for the naturalistic origin of Christianity. He says, in effect, "See, if this be conceived to be the way religion has come into existence and developed itself in the course of the ages, then Christianity may be conceived to be a growth of nature". The "if" here is, however, a mighty one and covers an immense assumption, or rather a whole series of immense assumptions. Behind it lies the assumption of the validity of all the results of the Graf-Wellhausen critical reconstruction of the history of the development of the Old Testament religion; and of all the results of "the history-of-religion" critical reconstruction of the history of the New Testament development. Behind it lies the assumption of the invalidity of all the evidence of the divine origin of the religion of the Bible, of the divine mission of Christ, of the revelation of truth through His Spirit to the Apostles: in a word, of the whole body of the claims of the founders of Christianity, substantiated as those claims are by a mass of the most varied evidence. In one word, behind it lies the simple assumption of the naturalistic origin of Christianity. Prof. Bousset's essay amounts, therefore, merely to this declaration: "See, if Christianity is merely a natural religion, this is the way it must be conceived to have come into existence." The argumentative value of his presentation will reduce, therefore, simply to this that a self-consistent scheme of the origin of Christianity as a natural religion can be constructed. For the



testing of the value of this presentation as an argument, we should have, therefore, to examine into the self-consistency of the presentation primarily; then into the legitimacy of the combinations that are made, the exactness of the facts which are marshalled, and the inclusiveness of the explanations which are offered.

This is not the place to enter into such a detailed examination. But it is not out of place to remark simply that in none of these items is Professor Bousset's presentation in our opinion impeccable. In addition to the primal assumptions to which we have adverted, his presentation is burdened with a mass of minor assumptions. The facts are adjusted to fit the thesis, instead of the thesis inferred from the facts. And the whole presentation takes, therefore, merely the form of a plausible effort to justify a foregone conclusion. If this is in its details at least the course of the development of religion we must assume in case Christianity be deemed a natural religion, we can only say that Christianity cannot be deemed a natural religion. It does not naturally emerge out of its environment as here presented.

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF IMMORTALITY. By JAMES J. BILLINGSLEY  
New York. Eaton & Mains. 12mo., pp. 47.

It is no reproach to Mr Billingsley's brochure that it is cast in a highly rhetorical form. The rhetoric is somewhat exuberant, especially towards the end; but he, doubtless, knows how to carry home his argument to the especial audience he has in mind. This argument is principally to the effect that science knows too many immortalities for the immortality of the soul to be held doubtful. There is the doctrine of the indestructibility of matter: and there is the doctrine of the conservation of energy: and now, since Weismann has taught it to us, there is the doctrine of the continuity of the germ plasm and of the deathlessness of the cell. Certainly "our bodies contain immortal elements", as Professor Metchnikoff says. If this is true of our bodies, what of our souls? Of course, we can say with Professor Metchnikoff that we haven't any: for consciousness is a function of the body, and, in the body of the most highly organized structures, and hence can persist only so long as they abide. Even so, it is hard to believe that the great quality of immortality belongs exclusively to the lowest things. And if we perchance have souls, can they be less immortal than their material envelopes? And just see what this self-conscious life means to nature. It is the culminating attainment of all its progress. "Having struggled through a thousand millions of years to produce a man, will Nature turn traitor in the hour of her greatest triumph and slay the superb product of all her labor and sacrifice?" "If science reveals the fact that nature preserves the material, the unmaterial, the vital, with the psychical, and as man, the climax of all that has gone before, combines these four immense results within himself, then science bids us hope." "From the indestructibility of matter, and the persist-

ence of force, from the nature of mind and its psychic constitutions, and from analogies, close, varied, startling, Science . . . announces . . . that there is another world." There is certainly food for thought here; and fuel for feeling: but are there premises for a conclusion?

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ITS MEANING AND PROOF. By J. SCOTT LIDGETT, M. A., Warden of the Bermondsey Settlement, Author of *The Spiritual Principle of The Atonement*, *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life*, etc. 8vo.: pp. xiv., 516. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1907.

This book forms the sequel to the author's preceding work, entitled *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life*. "It is an attempt to explain and verify the Christian religion by means of the fatherly-filial relationship, the supremacy and meaning of which for Christian consciousness and theology, was investigated in the former work. The purpose of this volume, therefore, is rather to establish a general point of view than to treat the subject with the exhaustiveness of a Compendium of Christian Evidences." The need of such a discussion appears in the fact that "wide-spread dissatisfaction exists at the present time with the ordinary systems of Christian Evidence." "Those who are not convinced in the matter feel that their difficulties have not been realized, still less met. Those who are convinced are disappointed, because the deepest grounds of their belief are inadequately set forth."

This general desire for the restatement of the nature and grounds of Christian belief is justified by a three-fold reason: 1. "The emphasis which modern thought lays upon the principle of continuity throughout the whole range of reality"; 2. The prominence now given to "the scientific point of view"; 3. The growing importance attached to "the personal and experimental note in religion."

The establishment of the new point of view thus demanded involves "a survey that is extremely wide." The history of Christian Evidences must be reviewed. "The meaning of Christianity must be ascertained, and this includes setting forth its relation both to religion in general and also to the great types of historic religion. Finally, its proof involves the discussion of its relation to the spiritual consciousness and to the explanation of the world, the justification of its doctrine of man and redemption, and the examination of the doctrine of God that results, in order to see that it is not involved in intellectual confusion or contradiction."

"The point of view adopted" by our author "is in agreement with the contentions of Ritschl, in so far as they insist that the first condition of the proof of Christianity is to be found in the clear indication of the contents of the Christian consciousness, and in the exhibition that those contents are necessary in order to satisfy the

human spirit, and to give a rational view of its position in the world. Apart from the pre-suppositions of Christianity, it must be shown that the position of man becomes, not only unintelligible, but contradictory." Our author agrees further with Ritschl in "protesting against the subordination of the ethical to the cosmical," the great mistake and condemnation, as he thinks, of the old apologetics. He does not, however, identify himself with Ritschl. He recognizes, that the latter falls into error "when he presses his point of view until he makes Christianity to stand in absolute opposition to all philosophical views of the world"; that Ritschl himself is "obliged fitfully to break down the absolute opposition which he has set up between religious and theoretic knowledge", and that he is "unable totally to separate between theoretic and religious judgments."

This serious defect our author would overcome, this gap between the theoretic and the practical, between nature and man, he would bridge, "by bringing into account an element which Kaftan in common with the rest of the Ritschlian school has entirely omitted, namely, the affectional aspects of religion. Neither religion in general, nor Christianity in particular, can be completely explained either by means of the speculative thought which seeks a theoretic explanation of the world, or by the practical demand for a Chief Good above the world and beyond the reach of mortal life. Even the two in combination are insufficient. An additional element has been left out—that of religion as the consciousness of certain definite relations to a present Divine Being, at once supplying material for an explanation of the world, and a ground of confidence in the reality of the necessary Chief Good. Man neither explores the universe unaided, as Paley's traveler inspected the watch on which he chanced, nor does he accept the tidings of the kingdom of God entirely because his life would be reduced to imbecility or despair if he neglected them. Beneath both these is what he believes to be the experience of immediate relationship to that Divine Other than himself, who is yet in some sense—his true self. Out of that experience he explains the constitution of the world, which for him, at least finds its unity and its climax in himself. Out of it also he draws the assurance that the good which alone can satisfy him is real because of the goodness of that God whose presence he realizes in his own inner life, and whose experienced goodness casts light both upon his own path and also upon the historic path which humanity has trod. Ritschlianism must be supplemented and corrected in all these ways before it can become a trustworthy guide to the reasons why men believe Christianity to be true." "The perfectly filial is the perfectly human, and the perfectly filial is only possible with the Christian content. This is the primary verification of the Christian religion."

Within the very narrow limits possible to us it would be out of the question to notice, much more to discuss, all or many even of the fundamental positions of Mr. Lidgett's very long and very elaborate treatise. We have to content ourselves with the following general and most inadequate remarks:

1. The argument proposed must contravene its fundamental principles if it is to be generally available. It is based on the Christian's consciousness of his filial relation to God. This it is, and this only it is, which explains the universe, the plan of redemption, and the doctrine of God; and so verifies itself by both showing its faith and facts to have a vital place in the order of Reality considered as a connected spiritual and rational system, and by revealing the meaning of this by manifesting and making good the relations in which and the ends for which the whole system exists. But the consciousness of the filial relation is the consciousness of Christians only, of none save those into whose hearts the Father hath sent the Spirit of His Son whereby they cry, "Abba, Father" (Rom. viii, 14-15). To all who have not received the Holy Spirit as their light and life the consciousness of the filial relationship to God must be as foolishness; indeed, the natural man cannot know it; for it is spiritually discerned (1 Cor. ii, 14). That is, the true evidence of Christianity is based on an experience of which those who need most to be convinced can know nothing.

Of course, it would be pertinent to reply that, though they have not had the experience themselves, they ought to be convinced by the testimony of those who have had it. This is true. In all departments of life save religion the testimony of others counts for much. Why should the sphere of Christianity be the one exception? As regards both intelligence and honesty Christians form the best class of witnesses. Moreover, their testimony is confirmed by their lives. These evidence the new and filial consciousness which they claim to have received. Because of what *they* say of the sonship which Christ has conferred on them all men ought to apply to the same Saviour for the same salvation. This, however, is not to base the argument for Christianity on the filial consciousness of the Christian, but on his testimony to that consciousness, a testimony which derives its weight, not from the content of the consciousness to which it testifies, but from the circumstances and character and life of him who testifies; and this is to fall back on that external and theoretic evidence against which our author writes to protest. Of course, it may be claimed that this evidence issues merely in the trial of Christianity, and that the only sufficient verification of it is still to be found in the filial consciousness of the Christian. If, however, this position be taken, then it must be admitted that the verification of Christianity, inasmuch as it rests, as we have just seen, on what is peculiar to the Christian, is possible for none but him.

2. The evidence arising out of the Christian's filial consciousness presupposes, even so far as he himself is concerned, external and theoretic evidence. Indeed, it itself is based on this. The evidence for which our author contends grows out of the judgment, as we have seen, that the perfectly filial is the perfectly human. But who has the right to say what the perfectly human is? There are as many ideals as there are religions, as there are sects, indeed, as there are men. In a word "the affectional aspects of religion," on which Mr. Lidgett

would rest his argument, need themselves to be discriminated and grounded; and this can be done only by theoretic and external evidence. We could not affirm even the filial consciousness of Christ to be the perfection of humanity, if we could not assert Christ to be the Son of God as well as Son of man; and we could not declare him to be either of these, had he not been borne witness to as such by "signs and wonders and mighty deeds" as clearly unique as they were necessarily supernatural. That is, the subjective may be powerful for confirmation, but by itself it is worthless for proof. The judgment of value is of great value if it rest on a judgment of truth, but alone or at the foundation it is only a broken reed. How, at any rate, can sinful creatures discriminate authoritatively between the real needs and the imaginary, if not hurtful, wants even of their religious nature save as they appeal to the objective revelation of him who is "the Truth"?

3. Beyond all this, the filial consciousness, which is the Christian consciousness, fails, at least by itself, to explain God and the universe. Yet this it must do, if it is to verify itself and thus prove Christianity. Our author admits the eternal mystery of evil, though he makes a bold effort to resolve it. The everlasting punishment of the impenitent he passes over, though he had expressed his intention of taking it up. Does not this indicate that he himself feels the inadequacy of his explanation? God is the reconciled Father of the innumerable multitude whom he has adopted in Christ Jesus. He is more benevolent than any human father to all his creatures and specially to us men whom he has made in his image and after his likeness. He yearns over even the impenitent with a compassion that no man can fathom. But is it not too much to claim that his attitude toward all is in the last analysis that of a father? A father chastises; he does not punish. It is only as we conceive of God as he has revealed himself in his Word, as judge and sovereign as well as father, that we can accept as reasonable, even when most mysterious, his relation to the universe. This relation is too complex to be expressed in the terms of any single principle.

4. The attempt to do so involves the very vice against which our author protests, the vice of excessive abstraction. It is really to abstract the emotional from the theoretic and from the practical and to argue from the first to the neglect, if not to the ignoring, of the other two. Nor is there force in the reply that this is just what the old fashioned school of Christian Evidence does: it gives the primacy to the intellect. And it should. To do this need not, and in the case in question does not, involve any slight to the other faculties. By its very nature the intellect is fitted and intended to judge of evidence. This is its characteristic and appropriate function. There is, therefore, no undue abstraction when it is given with regard to evidence the leadership which will enable it to discharge its function. The advocate is not slighted because it is the judges' decision rather than his own plea that is taken as authoritative. We have no sympathy with the Kantian tendency to regard the pure reason as a usurper when it



claims preeminence as the discoverer and the test of truth. On the contrary, to incline thus, as our author would seem to do, appears to us to go against the principle voiced by our Lord in the words, "To every man his work" (Mark xiii: 34) and by Paul in his teaching as to "spiritual gifts" in 1 Cor. xii.

5. Yet we would not be thought blind to the many and high excellencies of this large work. Though long, it is not prolix. Though giving evidence of having been prepared, as the author says was the case, "under very great difficulties, owing to the ceaseless pressure of public engagements," it is never thin and is often rich with suggestion. In its statement of the meaning of the Christian religion it is usually distinctly evangelical and its phraseology sometimes favors the Calvinistic rather than the Wesleyan position. The whole book, too, is written with Christian feeling which is not the less deep because it is always kept under dignified restraint; and the author's standpoint is ever that of unquestioning loyalty to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. To all this we are glad to call attention. We are glad, too, to point out that, though our author has not, in our view, made good his contention, he has accomplished much good. If within the sphere of Christian Evidence he has not succeeded in dethroning the intellect, he has vindicated the claim of the heart to be considered by the intellect; and if he has not justified his demand for the primacy of "the affectional aspects of religion," he has clearly pointed out the many and great evils of a one-sided intellectualism. If he has not won for the value judgment the place that he would like it to have, he has shown that it has an important place; and for this none will thank him more heartily than do we who still train with the apologists of the older school.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

**THE INWARD LIGHT.** By H. FIELDING HALL. Author of 'The Soul of A People', etc. 8vo., pp. viii, 228. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1908. Net, \$1 75.

"To explain and to illustrate really what Buddhism is" is the purpose of this book. The author is an Englishman who is evidently an ardent disciple of Darwin and also somewhat of a pragmatist. With these prepossessions, he would seem to have gone to Burmah, to have spent some time there in close touch with the people, to have become enamored of their simplicity and above all of their Buddhist faith, and to have used this latter as an illustration of Buddhism "because they alone of modern people retain its spirit as it was understood." His exposition takes the form of a narrative in which with a truly oriental exuberance of language and with glowing description of circumstances and scenery he sets forth what we conjecture are the successive steps by which, as he supposed, he penetrated to the meaning of this greatest of the religions of the East. According to him, it "is a very simple faith. It is not made of dreams nor revelations, nor founded upon the super-

natural. It is the science of the evolution of the soul within the body. It is what men have seen and feel and know. It has ideals, beautiful ideals. They are not sunset clouds hung far in space remote from us: their base is on the earth, the spires ascend from the strong and sure foundations of the things that *are*. It has a theory of this world that agrees with all that science has discovered. It has a promise of Immortality, the only beautiful and reasonable Immortality the world has known. It is a study of man, not as he impossibly ought to be, but as he is, and of what he may be judged from what he has been. It recognizes the soul because it sees it, and it knows it comes from some great Power because it feels that this is so. . . . The reasons of the error of Western writers explaining Buddhism arise, I think, mainly from two causes. The first is this: it is assumed that the only part of Buddhism which they know—the written teachings of Buddha and his followers—forms a system offered as being complete in itself." This is a mistake. "The teachings of the Buddha are no complete scheme of conduct, of faith, of immortality. They rest on Hinduism—not the corrupt Hinduism of to-day with its castes and ceremonies but the Hinduism of twenty five centuries ago. . . . With the happiness of the day, with the righteousness that was necessary and true for this world the Buddha had no quarrel. He saw it and experienced it, and he knew that it was good and true. But he knew, too, that it soon passed." "And his message was of another life, of another righteousness, another happiness beyond the grave. Therefore, Buddhism is nothing by itself. It is not, it never pretended to be, a complete truth, to be a temple in itself. It was but another story added to that great building whose feet are in the earth, whose summit rises up towards heaven." The other mistake is that the basis of the Buddhist faith is the same with the basis of ours. It is the opposite of that. Our underlying conception of the soul, of the world, of God, is such that we can not understand Buddhism. Thus to us the Buddhist heaven or Nirvana seems to be annihilation, whereas to the Buddhist it means "the realization of self in a greater, grander self than ever we have dreamed of, it means a fuller more glorious life than this world gives us now."

The question at once arises, Is this a true interpretation of Buddhism? It is at all events entirely different from the view commonly taken of it by those who have studied it longest on the ground and at first hand. They tell us that Buddhism arose as a reaction against the ritualism and the caste system of the Brahmanism which preceded it, not as an addition to that. Hence it is that Buddhism is often called "the Protestantism of the East." They tell us that, so far from having its back ground and point of departure in the happiness of this life, "in its inmost purport Buddhism is a part of the sad wail of humanity in its longing for redemption." They tell us that, instead of being the Gospel of "the only beautiful and reasonable immortality," it is the Gospel, if we may so speak, of annihilation and of despair. This is what scholars such as S. H. Kellogg, Monier-Williams, Oldenberg, not to mention many others, are giving us as the

result of lives of patient and laborious investigation. Are they all mistaken? If not, then our author is. Either the Burmese do not correctly represent Buddhism or he does not correctly represent the Burmese. Whichever it may be, the mistake is as dangerous as it is misleading.

That he has read into the religion of the Burmese what he would like to find in it instead of having read out of what is in it would seem to be probable from his unfortunate habit of misinterpreting and perverting the clearest phenomena. He sees the missionaries of Christ, but all that he observes worth recording concerning them is that "while they go to teach the heathen of another world, they spend their time trading and governing in this" (p. 155). He reads in the Old Testament that God is "Lord of the whole earth (Zech. iv: 14) and that "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth" (Dan. iv: 35), and yet he affirms that the "God of the Old Testament was not the God of all the world, but only a part of it, only of men, only of a part of man." (p. 185). "The Christianity of Christ" claims to be "the Gospel of the grace of God" (John i: 17). The message of Buddhism is that nothing can arrest or divert the operation of Karma or the law of consequence. Yet our author asserts that "there is not in the Christianity of Christ any real difference from the teachings of Buddhism. The similes, the color, the local circumstances differ, but the essentials are the same" (p. 220). Verily, if Mr. Hall sees so crookedly in the case of what he may be presumed to have been familiar with from childhood, can we put confidence in his account of his recent observations of some obscure villagers in south eastern Asia? Allowing, however, that he has reported correctly, what is there in Buddhism to admire or even to respect? It overlooks the fact and the evil of sin, and so is superficial. From the way in which our author writes he would seem never to have been conscious of it or to have seen those who were. It presents no problem either to him or to his Burmese friends. Perhaps the nearest that he gets to a recognition of it is when he says: "All the troubles that we suffer from come from the fact that ourselves, our consciousness, that which exists, is subjected to the perpetual changes of our body, over which we have little control. It is adrift upon life's tide that ebbs and flows continually. Evil is of the body" (p. 158). Again, his "only beautiful and reasonable immortality" is neither. It is not immortality at all. So far as the body is concerned, it lives in its offspring; it is merely racial. So far as the soul is concerned, it itself simply does not *live*. "When men die everything passes but the effect of that which they have done." This does not mean, our author thinks, that "when men die they disappear utterly, and that all that is left is the effect of their deeds upon the outer world." "The soul survives, and that in itself is greater or less as it has been cultivated in this life." But it has no memory why should it treasure up remembrances of the past? It has within itself the effects, and that is more than any memory" (p. 196). Just here, however, is the difficulty. As Gladstone

wrote, "Personal identity is the very core of the whole question of immortality;" and without memory there could be no *personal* identity. In a word, immortality without memory, could not be immortality for a person. It would presuppose the destruction of personality. It would be an immortality of which you could not be conscious, an immortality, therefore, the beauty and reasonableness of which would be that it could mean nothing to you yourself. Could we rightly speak of a person as having a richer and fuller life, or as even living, who existed only thus?

Once more, the Burmese or true Buddhist conception of God is self-contradictory. He is not a person. He is the world, he is the truth that it means, and all our life and soul are rays that come from his refulgence. Shall not the ray that fails call to the "sun to strengthen it; shall not the true light that dies call to the source of light for help?" (p. 187). This may be oriental poetry, but it is not sense, whether eastern or western. Neither rays nor tiny lights can call. The sun can not hear. And above all, if God is just the truth of the universe, and so if, in the last analysis, we are God, it is absurd even to speak of calling on him or of praying to him. Prayer must be simply calling on oneself.

Finally, the Burmese conception of truth is really the denial of truth. The distinction between good and evil and also that between truth and error is obliterated. We are told that "Good and evil are both from God, and there is no Devil—only another face of God" (p. 138). We are told, too, that "all truth is one," and this is interpreted to mean that whatever is is an aspect of truth (Chap. xxii). Need we pursue further such a *reductio ad absurdum*? In a word, Mr. Halls' work will hardly appeal to any who think soberly and consistently. There are, however, not a few who are dissatisfied with the Christian religion, if not with themselves, who think what is obscure must be profound, who are more attracted by brilliant word-painting than by logical argument; and it is because such are likely to be misled by our author to their utter confusion that "The Inward Light" is entitled to so much attention as we have bestowed on it.

Princeton

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. By ERNEST THOMPSON SETON. 8vo., pp. 78. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. MCMVII.

The authorship of this little volume would command for it attention even if this were not secured by the interest of the matter and the charm of the style. Whatever such a lover and observer of animals as Mr. Seton may have to say on his favorite theme must be worth serious and sympathetic consideration. Especially is this so in the case of the essay before us in which the writer illustrates the working of moral law in the animal world.

His thesis is that "The Ten Commandments are not arbitrary laws

given to man, but are fundamental laws of all highly developed animals" (p. 4). His claim is that he can trace these laws through the animal world. We can learn their existence, he says, in the penalty for breaking them; and this penalty he undertakes to show in the case of the last six, those on man's duty to man, in "the direct punishment of the individual animal by those he wronged," and also in "the slow and general visitation on the whole race of the criminal, as the working out of the law."

The illustrations that he presents of both these cases are very numerous and very striking. They impress us as usually pertinent. We do not think that Mr. Seton has "cut the facts to fit the theory." On the contrary, it seems to us to rest on an adequate basis of fact. Of course, exceptions occur to us. For example, there is not always a "deep rooted feeling against murder" among animals even in the case of their own kind. The reviewer has often seen chickens attempt to kill a companion that had been injured, and apparently just because it had been injured. Perhaps, however, our author would reply that the chicken is not in a state of nature and has been demoralized, if improved physiologically, by man; and this may break the force of this exception. Again, we are told that wolves, even when pursuing men, will stop to slay and devour a wounded comrade; and they certainly have not been degraded by domestication. Still, it is fair to remember that our author admits that he has found many exceptions, and probably his claim that they do but "prove the rule" is only just.

If so, then these studies of Mr. Seton are an additional and striking confirmation of the Christian view of the Moral Law. To regard it as "arbitrary," or as imposed on men by the mere will of God, is Islam; it is not Christianity. God did not enact the law at Sinai. He re-enacted and wrote it then, but it had been in force from the beginning; and it had been in force from the beginning because involved, as the laws against murder and impurity, in his very constitution of things; or because involved, as the law of truth, in his own eternal and immutable nature. Indeed, God, because God, could not create a universe in which truth should not be a fundamental law; and he having chosen to create such a world as he has, it could not but be that always and everywhere murder and impurity should be unnatural and therefore wrong. In a word, that physical law as far as it goes moves in the same groove with moral law is only what was to be expected from the fact that the author and upholder of the one is the author and upholder of the other.

That, however, physical law goes as far as moral law or that at any point they are to be identified may not be admitted. The instinct of the chicken to heed the cluck of its mother and the conscience of the child which binds him to honor his parents differ, not in degree only, but in kind. The result in both cases is or should be the same, but the spheres are separate and unlike. The child knows why he obeys,



but the chicken does not; and the child knows that the reason why he obeys is that he ought.

Here, then, in a sense of obligation which can not be analyzed and not be found to resolve itself into obligation to God appears the great and irreducible difference between man and all other animals. He has a religious nature; they have not. Hence, Mr. Seton says: "I could find nothing in the animal world that seemed to suggest any relation to a Supreme Being." Therefore, I reformed my theory to fit the new facts, and presented it thus: The first four commandments have a purely spiritual bearing; the last six are physical. Man is concerned with all, the animals only with the last six" (p. 6).

Nor can we agree with our author when he adds. "Maybe in this instinct of the brute in extremity"—an instinct, of which he gives some striking illustrations, to run to man for refuge and help—"that in this instinct we have revealed the foundation of something which ultimately had its highest development in man, reaching, indeed, like the Heathen Thinker's Tree, from root in the earthly darkness to its fruit in the Realm of Light" (p. 77). Rather must we see in this instinct the dim but true prophecy that, under the administration of a Being whose plan is both one and all-comprehending, a lower order might be expected to be of the higher. Rather should we learn from the lower animals in this respect the exceeding sinfulness because the utter unnaturalness of irreligion. The essential truth has been well expressed by Francis Bacon, 'Man looks up to God as naturally as the dog does to his master.'

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE APOLOGETIC OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By E. F. SCOTT, M. A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.). Author of *The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology*. 8vo.; pp. vii, 258. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Williams & Norgate. 1907.

"The design of these lectures," which were delivered at Glasgow University in accordance with the terms of the Alexander Robertson Trust, "is to examine the New Testament Apologetic. What is its nature? What value can be attributed to it? How far can we still derive guidance, in our controversies to-day, from a study of this earliest and most authoritative defence of the Christian religion?"

If we examine the New Testament in the light of these questions, we find, that, unlike the "deliberately" apologetic treatises of the subsequent age, the New Testament was addressed in the first instance to Christian converts and was intended to fortify them against the criticisms of the unbelieving world; that the attack came from four quarters, from Judaism, from Paganism, from Philosophy, and eventually from the many who, while admitting the truth, denied the finality of Christianity; that the proof relied on was, first, that from Scripture, second, that from reason, third, that from "the witness of the Spirit" in the hearts of believers, and, fourth, that from the

changed lives of the Christian disciples; that the controversy centered around the Person of Christ, the new conception of God and of his relation to the world involved in the acceptance of Jesus as Messiah, the right of the Christian church itself, and such particular tenets of its faith as the Resurrection and the Parousia; and that "this concentration on the few sovereign truths of Christianity gives a permanent interest and value to the New Testament Apology."

This interesting discussion is conducted distinctly from the standpoint of the Destructive Criticism. Thus, our author conditions the permanent apologetic value of the New Testament largely on the assumption that it presupposes the falsity of "the theory of a literal inspiration" (p. 23); he speaks of the introductory chapters of Acts as "no doubt colored with legendary elements" (p. 40); his explanation of our Lord's resurrection is that "something happened" shortly after his death which sufficed to convince His disciples that he had arisen and was still alive (p. 47); in heathenism he sees, not the corruption of a higher primitive faith, which was Paul's view, but "the first stage in a religious development" (p. 126); he thinks that we "involve ourselves in all manner of contradictions when we seek to interpret the Apostle's principles as valid for our civic life to-day" (p. 143); he speaks of the tabernacle as "half legendary" (p. 195); he denies that the Old Testament is "an ultimate divine authority" (p. 224); he holds that "the Apostles were, at best, interpreters, and their interpretation was necessarily partial and conjectural"; he teaches that "the one authority that we can accept as final is that of the enlightened conscience, the inward witness of the Spirit—that authority, in fact, to which the New Testament makes its appeal" (p. 232); his dictum, therefore, is that "Christianity is to be sought not so much in the New Testament as *behind* it" (p. 34); indeed, he thinks that the New Testament bears witness to a constant revision and enlargement of belief" (p. 248), and that thus it teaches us constantly to advance on it and beyond it; hence, he concludes that it does not follow that the Person of Christ must be construed always according to one given formula or doctrine; the New Testament itself, he asserts, "offers several doctrines, and our own age is not necessarily bound to any one of them"; "all that is required of us is to acknowledge the supreme worth of Jesus, to realize that God is seeking through Him to draw us unto himself" (p. 253); in a word, our author denies the normative character and value of the New Testament—this is the key to his whole discussion.

This is neither the time nor the place for us to criticize his standpoint. It may not be amiss, however, to raise the question, whether from such a standpoint there is any use in such a treatise as *The Apologetic of The New Testament*.

There certainly is, if the New Testament be regarded as the inspired and, consequently, infallible record of God's last and clearest supernatural revelation. Then it becomes most interesting and instructive to watch how the divine development of doctrine had reference,

not only to the fullness of truth to be revealed, but also to meeting the corresponding errors; and in this divine adaption of the form of truth to the heresy to be combatted we may see, not merely the duty of composing a wise apologetic, but also how such an apologetic should be composed. For as our author strangely overlooks, the worth of the New Testament apologetic does not lie only or chiefly in the fact that it encounters essentially the same attacks as we are called on to combat. It is rather in the fact that it is an authoritative because divine and infallible presentation of how we ought to meet them. It is just that it is normative that gives to it its supreme worth. The soldier values the commands of his general because he is his general and not because they are both fighting against the same foe.

Again, it may not be out of place to ask whether from our author's standpoint Christianity could rightly be conceived as existing? Of course, Christ was before the New Testament, and in this sense "Christianity is to be sought not so much in the New Testament as *behind it*". But is Christ revealed anywhere else than in the New Testament; and if we do not have in it an authoritative record of Christ's life and teaching, do we have such a record at all? True, the necessity of such a record may be denied, as it is by our author. "The finality of our religion," he says, "consists in nothing else than in its endless capacity of growth and self-renewal" (p. 220); and, as already noticed, "the one authority that we can accept as final is that of the enlightened conscience, the inward witness of the Spirit—that authority, in fact, to which the New Testament makes its appeal" (p. 232). But how are we to know what is an enlightened conscience, what is the witness of the Spirit, unless we have the New Testament to show us, and unless the New Testament be normative? It should go without saying that we must try the spirits if we would know which are of God—that is, unless we would enthrone mere subjectivism and even self-conceit; and how can we try the spirits, save as we have a norm with which to compare their teaching?

In a word, Mr. Scott has given us a useful book, and one that is clearly and ably written; but from his own standpoint his labor is worse than thrown away.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRISTIAN AGNOSTICISM. As Related to Christian Knowledge. The Critical Principle in Theology. By E. H. JOHNSON, D.D., LL.D., Late Professor of Systematic Theology in the Crozer Theological Seminary, and author of "An Outline of Systematic Theology", etc., etc. Edited, with a Biographical Sketch and an Appreciation, by HENRY C. VEDDER. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1907. 8vo.; pp xxxii, 302.

This posthumous publication, from the pen of one who held a high place as a distinguished theologian in the American Baptist Church, is a valuable but melancholy reminder of the great loss which the common

cause of Evangelical truth sustained in his recent death. The biographical sketch by Dr. Vedder shows Dr. Johnson's life to have been one of great activity, beautifully combining active zeal with highest intellectual interests and pursuits. Perhaps we should regard this volume rather as an insight into its author's temperamental viewpoint and theological bent, than as a systematic setting forth of his views of Christian truth. Regarded as such, we are to judge it as an epistemological treatise, bearing especially upon the subject-matter and processes of Christian Theology.

The perusal of these pages calls to mind that now almost forgotten and neglected book of a half century or so ago, "The Limits of Religious Thought", by Dean Mansel, of the Church of England. The brilliant dialectic of those Bampton lectures captivated many an admiring reader. Scarcely any book of its time impressed more profoundly a certain type of mind, which, with the opening vision and not too modest spirit, was beginning to perceive the difficulties that stand in the way of a positive acceptance of Evangelical Christianity. Those lectures, put forth in defence of the faith, were admirably suited to show the difficulties, which are incidental at the most, as seriously persistent and indeed inevitable. They laid bare the objections with a clearness and force that preoccupied the mind against a fair regard for the answers, which, however convincing and complete, were all too weakly and obscurely presented. Indeed, this volume may now be found rather on the dusty shelf of skeptical literature than in the alcove of up-to-date Christian Apologetics. The reader of Mr. Spencer's "First Principles" will easily recall how that solemn apostle of modern Agnosticism drew page after page of direct quotations from the good Churchman's dazzling but dubious dialectics.

Dr. Johnson's writings show him to have been a man of acute intellectual perceptions and powers, critical in high degree and at least partial to the dialectical method, if not indeed impatient or even intolerant of all other methods. His friend says of him in the "Sketch": "Mysticism in all its forms, received no quarter at his hands. His mental constitution was that of the rationalist, and he could find no rest for the sole of his foot but on the solid ground of rational proof" (p. xxviii). This type of mind left to itself, will lead to Rationalism, scorning faith, or to Agnosticism, failing of knowledge. No one who has read Dr. Johnson's pages will need to be told by Dr. Vedder: "Without his faith in God and his personal experience of divine grace, he might easily have become an agnostic, like Huxley or Spencer" with his faith and experience, he was the strong, well equipped fecund Christian Theologian" (p. xxviii).

We are bound to say that we seriously doubt the value of the contribution made in this book to the interests of Christian faith or theological truth. We hasten to add, however, that Dr. Johnson's death may account for the non appearance of two or three chapters at the close of the volume, striking a strong and much needed note of positive faith, based upon clear and convincing epistemological considerations.

We risk the charge of narrowness or of sentiment when we frankly say that we dislike the term "Agnosticism," even with the saving adjective "Christian." The word was coined in Huxley's mint and impressed by his disciples into the service of the enemy's realm. Scarcely can it be wholly sterilized of its malodorous suggestions, do the best we can. Dr. Johnson fain would make "A Christian Agnosticism the Critical principle of Christian Theology" (p. 3). Let us not forget that Agnosticism means a *Constitutional incapacity to know*.<sup>1</sup> The *crux* of its implications is not in the incidental fact that we do not know, but in the essential fact that we cannot know. This lack of ability to know has reference not simply to the divine and the eternal. Its scope is an absolutely exceptionless universal one. All existence, visible and invisible, natural and spiritual, temporal and eternal, is the object of the verb in the first and final article of the Agnostic's Creed "Man cannot know." We cannot know that tree outside the window, this pen with which we write, this book which we are thinking about, any more than we can know God or religious truth or divine things. We perceive the phenomenon but that is not the *Thing*, the *Ding an Sich*. What are the connections or disconnections between the *phenomenon* which we perceive and the *noumenon* which we do not and never can perceive? This is the subject of discussions and guesses time out of mind; but lying as they do behind the opaque curtain which is the background of the knowable, no man can ever know what they are. Even Mr. Spencer was happily inconsistent enough to grant that we can know some things about the "Inscrutable Power;"—at least, we can know that it is Power and that it is inscrutable. But left to the accursed consequences of an impossible self-consistency, Agnosticism denies any knowledge to man. To such a hobber-creed we prefer not to extend the ordinary courtesies of fellowship and from its pitiless doom we would withhold the christening hand. Far better to widen the scope of the faculties by which we know. The man on the street and the man in the arm chair both say "I know" when the critical canon scorns their confidence. If we must choose the lesser evil, we should hold back our adjective "Christian" for Rationalism, rather than misapply it to Agnosticism. We have far more in common with the teacher who overstates the tract of our knowledge than with him who affirms (sic) that we can know absolutely nothing.

Dr. Johnson's conceptions of Christian Agnosticism are hardly proof against the critical tests. "The Voice of Agnosticism, pure and simple, is the voice of Thomas": 'Unless I see I will not believe'; the voice of Christian Agnosticism is the voice of Paul: 'Now I know in part.' We know spiritual things with certainty but we know them imperfectly" (p. 19). Evidently, Dr. Johnson was fond of striking antitheses. Neither member of the statement just quoted is happily conceived. Poor Thomas! How he has had to suffer for the purely incidental fact that he was absent on the occasion of his Lord's former

<sup>1</sup> See Spencer's *First Principles*, pp. 68, 112-3, et al.; Flint's *Agnosticism*, p. 22.



appearance! He has been Agnostic, Materialist, Skeptic, derelict believer in turn. But if it is not too late, Thomas is entitled to his dues. He exacted no more evidence before believing than his colleagues had had before they believed. If there had been anything positively wrong in the demand he made, his Lord would hardly have acceded to it. Whatever Thomas was or was not, he certainly was not an Agnostic. The personal equation may have been important in the incident; but, in any event, the mere circumstance of his hesitating to accept a statement on the testimony of his colleagues does not warrant us in branding him as an Agnostic. Once an Agnostic, always an Agnostic; but Thomas believed. Ignorance is not Agnosticism; unbelief, based on the lack of known evidence, is not Agnosticism. Agnosticism says we can not know, and, therefore, forsooth, we do not believe. Thomas, for lack of what he regarded as sufficient evidence, did not believe. When the evidence which he exacted was forth coming, he did believe, without further parley or delay. Thomas was temporarily a skeptic. He may have been temperamentally a skeptic, but he was not constitutionally a skeptic. When he got more light he believed, but the very basis of Agnosticism is the teaching that more light cannot come. And, moreover, if we would acquit Thomas of the charge of Agnosticism, no more would we call Paul a Christian Agnostic. "Now I know in part," he said. This is the triumphant exclamation of the man who knows, not the pitiful plaint of the man who *cannot know*. Partial knowledge is knowledge just the same. If a man knows any one thing, he has smashed the philosophy of Agnosticism. That one thing may be the part of a larger whole and that larger whole may be unknown—let us say unknowable—but the unknowableness of the larger whole does not neutralize the admitted knowledge of the part. Indeed, this larger whole in turn is a part of a still larger whole, and so on *ad universum* or *ad infinitum*; so that if partial knowledge, that is, the knowledge of a part, is not of the nature of genuine knowledge, then nothing is knowledge except omniscience, and Agnosticism by begging the question has won the day. Ignorance of a million things does not undo knowledge of one thing. The child on the beach cognizes the great ocean truly but partially for there are thousands of things beneath its depths and beyond its farther shores which he does not know. All truth is one: its parts are closely interwoven. He who knows exhaustively the little flower on its cranked wall knows everything. To cognize is not to comprehend. The child that plucks the flower knows the existence of the beautiful object in its hand, but the naturalist in his wider sweep does not know all the forces that have contributed their part to the form and fibre and fragrance of that flower.

Certainly, the things of religion go beyond our power to know. "All things go out in mystery." This is true of science, too. If we cannot know God and in some sense "understand" him, then revelation is an impossibility and the night of our skepticism is forever without a dawn. Dr. Johnson says, "We must once more conclude as we began

that for those who accept Jesus as being the Son of God and Son of Man, while we *lack no assurance of the fact*, we do not at all understand the fact" (pp. 179, 180). According to this remark we may "lack no assurance" of a fact, which fact we yet do not understand. But is not the state of mind wherein we lack no assurance of a fact, just the state of mind which the common consciousness of men regards as *knowing that fact*? Did not Dr. Johnson, giving too free rein to his favorite method, make the mistake of denying the validity of all knowledge which could not stand the test of the critical dialectic? There are more ways than one of knowing. He had no place for the mystic and yet the mystic has his organ and method of knowing. Faith has in it an element of knowing but it refuses to submit its credentials to the vise of the cold critic. Dr. Johnson failed to allow for the fact that men know on other grounds than those that can be critically formulated and intellectually apprehended. To this conclusion, he himself comes in the end. Dr. Vedder says he would have been a Spencer except for his "faith and experience." And yet Dr. Johnson the critic could not accept upon "faith and experience" what was absolutely prohibited by his critical judgment. He was too strong and eminent a critic to clinch a religious faith which either in form or content, did not commend itself to his severest tests. "We may not think it pleasant or even feel it safe to pitch our tents with adventurous Ritschl in the unstable field of air, with him to take philosopher Kant for an authoritative Paul, and colleague Lotze for our brotherly John, to bow to the critical judgment of the one that we cannot really know God or any spiritual thing at all, and fall in with the value judgment of the other that is as good and know what we find is good for us; in a word, speaking for Christian folk in general, we cannot permanently reconcile ourselves to the Gospel of make-believe, to the Apostle of it, Scholarly and Sardonic as Harnack, Speculative as Kaftan, Spiritual as Herrman, or quite so determined a character as Ritschl himself. But we may claim to know the facts which our experience has attained. We think we know them at the outset with a high degree of certitude. Historically, from without inward, then, secondly and definitely, we know them experimentally, from within toward . . . Christian agnosticism, while it will not pretend to know what cannot be known, insists that we veritably know whatever is unequivocally taught by Christian experience" (pp. 292, 293).

Whatever may be said of this language in other references, it is hard to understand how Dr. Johnson could argue in defence of Christian Agnosticism and yet write these words. Agnosticism pronounces all knowledge an impossibility and yet this Christian Agnostic affirms that all facts experientially attested are certainly known. Then as experience expands, the tract of the known expands.

The author's closing words are so paradoxical as to seem forced: "A Christian Agnosticism is Christian Gnosis and a Christian Gnosis is Christian Agnosticism" (p. 299). In this paradox both terms have a definite and almost technical connotation which is entirely ignored or

violated. Adhering to the proper significations, the dictum is absurd; adopting a looser interpretation, based upon etymological suggestions, the former shot comes nearer to the target. Stripped of the aphoristic glamour we should content ourselves to say in plain plodding fashion that the knowledge which the Christian possesses, although partial, is real knowledge nevertheless; and that that knowledge, although, it is real and genuine knowledge is, nevertheless, bound always to be partial.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

NEPHILIM. By WILLIAM H. BOHANNAN. New York: Reeve A. Silk. 1908. Pp. 236.

This book has plenty of outrageous faults; yet we take it to be a much better book than it seems. Its faults are chiefly in that it consigns all the scientists, great and small, especially Newton, to perdition because they have dared to think for themselves about the world, instead of submitting first and last to the Bible. But the author does not perceive that his rule will carry himself along with us all into the same condemnation. He is as much a scientist as any of us; only after a different fashion, and his use of the Bible is mainly as a *nom de plume*. It is popular in some quarters to cry up the "Word of God," even if most of your own views are absurd, just as in other quarters it is in order to run down the Bible after the same fashion.

He is especially severe on Newton and the older physicists for their theory of the tides, and for the theory of gravitation, and inertia, and momentum, and with moderns for the nebular theory and evolution. He writes excellent English, which becomes a snare to him, when it takes the form of antitheses, especially paradoxes, in which he is strong, often grievously misrepresenting the doctrines which he criticizes. Nobody, we venture to say, ever charged the earth with having two moons, on opposite sides, or with having all its attraction caused by a heavy particle in the center. But by the "very like a whale" system of arguing he drags these absurdities into his text, and then points paradoxes on such stuff.

The solid substance of the volume is to formulate a thermo-electric theory of physics, an excellent, and seasonable effort; though we are scarcely yet in possession of enough knowledge for it, and the author who seems to be young will have much to do in the way of study and research before he is a match for the task. It is very proper and high-class scientific work, just now occupying a great many minds. And Bohannan, who bans science, has been working in a scientific way to prepare for it; following the good rule that only science is able to criticize science. He even gives us scientific experiments as a foundation of the work, which he informs us were failures; and a colleague who has examined the point for us states that the fault was on the side of the experimenter.

The substance of the work is taken up with expounding the phe-

phenomena of nature in his new style, which he asserts to be the style of the scripture, but that remains to be shown.

The name of his book suggests one of the picturesque bits of scientific speculation which he tries to tag on to the Bible. "Nephilim" were the giants who appeared before the flood, also another group of giants who frightened the spies of the Israelites as they were returning from Egypt. Now Bohannon for some unexplained reason thinks that the first of these giants were connected or identified with a ring of water surrounding the earth, just as Saturn has similar rings; and that it was the collapse of these watermen, that caused the water to escape and to deluge the world, also that the same is the "firmament" that was formed on the second day of the creation. He adds that the same once existed with Jupiter and Mars; and that some day we may expect a big flood to be thereby caused in Saturn—all a pretty dream, but he got it from his science, and not from the Bible. Now observe the use he makes of it. For some reason that I do not understand, he fancies that the length of the day was shortened, and that consequently the antediluvian longevity here finds its solution. He thinks that the men of olden time were not long lived, but the days and years by which they are measured were short; and hence we have a thousand years given, where by our measure it should be only a paltry two hundred. This would be very convenient as a key for opening one of our Bible secrets. But unfortunately it will not do. It is stolen thunder and lightning from one of a hateful family of the scientists, no less than George H. Darwin; and it bears very closely on another of the Bible puzzles, on the making of sun and moon and stars on the fourth day. This should be, geologically expressed, in the Permian Age, long-long before the existence of man. It is now believed that the moon actually was made on that day; that it was budded off from the earth; and that as a result the day was lengthened five-fold what it had been. This result appears to be reached by Geo. Darwin from a study of the actions of the moon on the tides. Bohannon repudiates it as to the moon and the tides but without sufficient reason applies it to the flood. Also something strange occurred to the sun on the same fourth day. It had been very dark, and giving little heat to the earth; in fact it did not deserve to be called a sun, was only an embryo or germ of a sun away back in the coal ages. The earth then supplied itself with tropical heat from within, and with the moderate light which was all it had. All these things are science, and just now are science in the making or rather in the guessing. The curious reader will find the subject discussed in the *Century Magazine* for February.

The juvenile writer shows some signs of conscience at the close, where he writes, "We make no issue with science in these pages." Reminding him that he is one of the scientists, we would quote a text from the Book, "Think not with thyself that thou shalt escape. . . . And who knoweth whether thou art not come to the kingdom for such a time as this?" Also by way of set-off to his quotation of "science falsely so called" we venture to cite another text where the

same word (science or knowledge), is used in the original, "Add to your faith knowledge"

Princeton University.

G. MACLOSKIE.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

FOREIGN RELIGIOUS SERIES. Edited by R. J. COOKE, D.D. First and Second Series. 12 vols. 16mo., cloth. Price 40 cents each. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1907-1908.—(1) *The Virgin Birth*. By Richard H. Grützmacher, Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock. Pp. 80.—(2) *The Resurrection of Jesus*. By Edward Riggenbach, Professor in the University of Basle. Pp. 74.—(3) *The Sinlessness of Jesus*. By Max Meyer, Lic. Theol., Gottberg. Pp. 40.—(4) *The Miracles of Jesus*. By Karl Beth, Professor in the University of Berlin. Pp. 77.—(5) *The Gospel of St. John and the Synoptic Gospels*. By Fritz Barth, Professor of Theology in the University of Berne. Pp. 87.—(6) *New Testament Parallels in Buddhist Literature*. By Karl von Hase, Professor in the University of Breslau. Pp. 62.—(7) *Do We Need Christ for Communion with God?* By Ludwig Lemne, Professor in the University of Heidelberg. Pp. 63.—(8 and 9) *St. Paul as a Theologian*. By Paul Feine, Professor in the University of Vienna. Pp. 65 and 98.—(10) *The New Message in the Teaching of Jesus*. By Philip Bachmann, Professor in the University of Erlangen. Pp. 60.—(11) *The Peculiarity of the Religion of the Bible*. By Conrad von Orelli, Professor in the University of Basle. Pp. 84.—(12) *Our Lord: Belief in the Deity of Christ*. By E. F. Karl Muller, D.D., Professor in the University of Erlangen. Pp. 103.

One of the results of the vigorous efforts which are now in progress in Germany to withstand the assaults of unbelief, has been the publication of a series of brief tracts by leading "conservative" scholars, designed to assure the people of the fundamental facts of the Gospel in the midst of the prevailing unrest. These tracts have been published under the general title of *Biblische Zeit- und Streit-fragen*, and set themselves naturally over against the similar series of tracts published by the adherents of the more "liberal" schools for the purpose of popularizing what they believe to be the results of critical study of the Christian documents and origins. Perhaps the "conservative" series is, as a whole, hardly equal in ability or in telling effect to its "liberal" rivals. This is in part due to the fact that it is, in certain parts at least, not quite "conservative" enough. The authors of the several tracts are themselves more or less affected by the modern spirit; and though they enter heartily into the defense of the fundamentals of the Christian faith, they have reserves of their own to make and are often found conceding enough greatly to weaken their argument. This is a fault of presentation which is not found in the writings of their



rials, who are certainly endowed with the courage of their convictions and manifest an unwillingness to cover fully with assertion the whole reach of the logical implications of their theories. Nevertheless, all of the "conservative" tracts, too, are able documents, and some of them much more than able, eloquent or even brilliant. We may instance, for example, Lemme's fine presentation of the necessity of Christ for communion with God—in a word, his exposition of the exclusiveness of Christianity (for that is what it comes to). Nothing could be better than this for its purpose. And others of the tracts are of the same high quality. We do not propose, however, to enter into a detailed account of the contents of these booklets. They are not absolutely new and some of them have already been reviewed in these pages. What concerns us now is the English translation of them which lies before us in the two series published by the Methodist Book Concern under the general title of the "*Foreign Religious Series*"—a much less expressive title than that under which they are published in Germany.

Doubtless, it was well that these interesting little treatises should be made known to the English speaking public. We do not doubt that under competent editorship, a better series, better adapted to our needs, could have been prepared by native writers. But it is interesting to observe how they do these things in Germany, and, as we have already remarked, although there are some things in these booklets which are regrettable, they on the whole are an admirable series of little treatises on fundamental points. We do not think the editing has been very helpful. Some things which it were well to omit, have been duly omitted. But if anything was going to be omitted on the score of insufficient "conservatism", a good deal that has been left standing might just as well have been omitted. A good deal of Lie Max Meyer's tract on the Sinlessness of Jesus has been omitted. A good deal more might well be omitted,—as, for example, the whole of his ill-balanced remarks on the limitation of Jesus' errorlessness to His religious office and His liability to errors "in the peripheral sphere" (pp. 12-13), and also his equally ill-conceived remarks on the relation of sinlessness to freedom and the consequent denial of the *non posse peccare* of Jesus (p. 14). Or, as, for example, the recurring freedom with which errors of point of view and recorded statement are imputed to the New Testament writers,—as, for instance, in Beth's and even in Barth's contributions. Not much has been done beyond these too few omissions to adjust the arguments to the differing conditions which obtain in America. The few footnotes which are added cannot be thought very valuable: and on the whole either much more should have been done or nothing. It is, however, the rendering itself which is most at fault. Happily, it is not equally bad throughout. It was our misfortune to begin reading the series with its first volume, — Grutzmacher's *The Virgin Birth*. This volume is simply wretchedly translated, and is indeed scarcely intelligible. And to make matters worse, it is also carelessly printed. It is not merely that foreign words

and proper names are mangled (Theodotion, p. 52; Manetis, p. 60), and such coinages of the translator as "tribality", p. 15, are allowed to stand; but even such blunders as "in a mistaken name" (for "manner"), p. 15, "at the first time" (for "line"), p. 58, and the numeral "sixty", p. 66,—where we are told that Mary saw no miracles wrought by her son during so many years—have passed unnoticed by the eye of the proof-reader. We are glad to say we found afterwards that this volume is exceptionally bad. None of them, however, is well translated: and the proof-reader has left us always liable to be told that John (or perhaps "Job", p. 16) was either really an eyewitness, or else "abrogated to himself in an extremely cunning manner" the part of eye witness (Barth's *The Gospel of John*, p. 15); or to be suddenly introduced to a class of miracles, entirely new to Biblical investigators, viz., "the extra ceremonial miracles" (Beth's *Miracles of Jesus*, p. 70). The volumes of the second series appear to have been more carefully done than those of the first. But we cannot say that, in any case, the German is fairly dealt by. On the whole, then, we fear that we must think that the enterprize which has put these interesting little treatises before the American public in so attractive looking a form has failed of its end. The work should have been better done or not done at all. An injustice is done to the German booklets in being so inadequately placed before their new constituency.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

**THE VIRGIN BIRTH OF CHRIST.** Being lectures delivered under the auspices of the Bible Teachers' Training School, New York, April, 1907, by JAMES ORR, M.A., D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College of Glasgow, Scotland. With Appendix giving opinions of living scholars. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1907. Pp. xiv, 301.

Those who have derived instruction from Dr. Orr's other treatises will find it not unprofitable to enter with him upon the consideration of the Virgin Birth. Certainly the subject is a suitable one, not only for more technical treatment, but also for such popular presentations as the one now before us. For the question of the Birth of Christ cannot be confined to university lecture-rooms, however desirable that might be thought to be in the interests of calmness and sobriety of treatment, but inevitably challenges the attention of every thoughtful Christian man.

In the present course of lectures, Dr. Orr seeks to show (1) that the Virgin Birth is a fact, and (2) that it is an important part of Christian doctrine.

Lecture I, "Statement of the Case—Issues and Preliminary Objections," contains much that is discussed more fully afterwards, but is important as pointing out that the author is not now attempting to prove the presence of miracle in general in the life of Jesus, but merely to resolve special difficulties connected with the particular miracle of the

Virgin Birth. "In brief," he says (p. 16), "my argument will have special respect to those who, accepting the general New Testament doctrine of Christ, are disposed to regard this as independent of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, or who think the evidence for the latter insufficient."

Lecture II is concerned chiefly with the genuineness of the birth narratives as parts of the original First and Third Gospels, and with their integrity. The importance of the positive conclusions of the author on these questions is made evident by a brief statement as to the date of the Gospels in question. The other matter discussed at the beginning of this lecture—namely, the harmony and independence of the two birth narratives—surely belongs logically to Lecture III, which is entitled, "Sources of the Narratives—Historical and Internal Credibility." Lecture IV is concerned with "The Birth Narratives and the Remaining Literature of the New Testament—Alleged Silence of the New Testament." The sensible discussion of what might be expected as to the early extent of a knowledge of the Virgin Birth, supposing our birth narratives to be historical, is worthy of special notice. Dr. Orr exhibits the sufficient motives both for Mary's early silence and for her subsequent revelation of her secret, and as a probable channel for the tradition at least of Luke's narrative he suggests "that holy circle in Jerusalem . . . to which Zacharias and Elisabeth and Simeon and Anna the prophetess belonged." Dr. Orr detects both in John and in Paul indications of a knowledge of the Virgin Birth. Paul's doctrine of Christ as the second Adam would naturally involve a miracle of some kind in His birth, and that such a miracle was actually accepted by Paul is argued from peculiarities of expression in his allusions to "Christ's entrance into our humanity." Particularly suggestive are the parallels which Dr. Orr sets up between Rom. i. 3, 4 and Luke i. 35. And even though such arguments should be pronounced ingenious rather than convincing, it must be remembered that the author himself makes them merely as more or less confident suggestions and subordinates them to the preliminary caution (p. 114): "It is first to be observed that, even were Paul's silence as great as is alleged, it would not justify the conclusion which the objectors draw from it. It is to be remembered that Paul is not in the habit of alluding to, or recalling, the incidents in Christ's life—incidents which must have been perfectly familiar to him from the common preaching. His whole interest in the Epistles centres in the great facts of Christ's death and resurrection." As to John, Dr. Orr insists that his silence, since he must in any case have had before him the birth narratives of Matthew and Luke with the rest of those Gospels, could be interpreted only as corroboraton. And then there are positive indications that John did believe in the Virgin Birth. The mode of Christ's birth, Dr. Orr believes, is in view in John i. 13, and "furnishes the type of the (spiritual) new birth of believers". Furthermore, John ii. 3, 5 shows that "Mary regarded Jesus from the beginning as endowed with supernatural powers".

Lecture V deals with "Relation to Old Testament Prophecy—Witness

of Early Church History." In the former part of the lecture, Dr. Orr seeks to prove (1) that the story of the Virgin Birth could not have been evolved out of Old Testament prophecies, but (2) that the use of prophecy in Mt. i, ii and Luke i, ii is legitimate. The second of these arguments belongs to the establishment of the trustworthiness of the narratives; the former, to the refutation of those hypotheses as to the origin of the narratives that deny their historicity. The latter part of the lecture, dealing with the "witness of early church history", seems to belong logically with the external evidence in favor of the Gospel narratives.

In Lecture VI, the author discusses "Mythical Theories of Origin of Narratives of the Virgin Birth—Alleged Heathen Analogies." Having in the preceding lectures exhibited the direct evidence for the fact of the Virgin Birth, Dr. Orr now shows "the untenableness of the rival explanations." In view of the importance of this part of the discussion, it might seem at first sight as though one lecture were a scant allowance of space, but the author succeeds well in stating the main objections (and they have never really been answered) to the various theories of mythical origin for the narratives. The objections to a Jewish origin for the narratives (supposing the narratives to be mythical) would have made themselves better felt if some of the material of Lecture V could have been combined with Lecture VI.

Lecture VII, "Doctrinal Bearings of the Virgin Birth—Personality of Christ as Involving Miracle: Sinlessness and Uniqueness," and Lecture VIII, "Doctrinal Bearings of the Virgin Birth: the Incarnation—Summary and Conclusion", are concerned with the latter of the two propositions that Dr. Orr is attempting to prove—the proposition, namely, that the Virgin Birth is an important part of Christian doctrine. The Virgin Birth is shown to be in vital connection (1) with the sinlessness of Christ, (2) with "His uniqueness as a new creative beginning in humanity," and (3) with "His Incarnation as Son of God. In this part of his subject, the author is particularly at home; the last two lectures are probably the best in the course. Dr. Orr insists judiciously upon the impossibility of maintaining a spiritual miracle in the life of Jesus while rejecting a physical one; grant anything supernatural in Jesus at all, and the *a priori* objections to the Virgin Birth vanish. Thus becomes evident the bearing which the question of the harmony of the Virgin Birth with other Christian doctrine has even upon the question of fact. The real believer in the Incarnation must be favorably disposed towards the historical evidence for the Virgin Birth. And this logical necessity has been evident from the history of criticism; for as Dr. Orr insists in his first lecture, those who have denied the Virgin Birth have with scarcely any exceptions also denied the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The only criticisms that may be ventured upon have reference not to the argument itself but to details of its presentation. As already pointed out, there are certain faults of arrangement, which may, however, have been made inevitable by the necessarily arbitrary division

into lectures. Again, the author has at times, perhaps, gone unnecessarily far in the direction of popularizing the discussion, for an audience of intelligent laymen, however little able to give reasons for its judgment, can usually appreciate the quiet dignity of scholarly exposition of which Dr. Orr has shown himself to be a master.

Such criticisms affect not the content but merely the form of the book, and the fact that the reviewer has recourse to them is really one more testimony to the value of the work. Dr. Orr has performed an important service to the dissemination of sound scholarship, and his comprehensive defence of the Virgin Birth may be expected to bring conviction to many in the wide circle to which the publication of the lectures in book form gives him access.

In the Appendix, Dr. Orr gives summaries of a number of papers on the general subject of the Virgin Birth, which were secured by Dr. W. W. White, of the Bible Teachers' Training School, New York. The writers of the papers include a considerable number of the most eminent Biblical scholars of Europe. They are as follows: Sanday, Ramsay, Box, Addis, Knowling, Garvie, H. W. Robinson, Zahn, B. Seeberg, Bavink, Doumerge, Moule, Griffith-Thomas, Cowan, Joseph Jacobs, J. J. Peritz, Hirsch, Oussani. Dr. Orr has performed the task of summarizing as well as it could be done, chiefly by quoting longer or shorter extracts, but it would have been better (supposing the space to be limited), had some of the papers been printed in full rather than extracts from all of them. Dr. Orr is fully conscious of the limitations of the appendix, and expresses the hope that the papers may be published *in extenso*. This hope we share, since it is evident from the summaries and from the eminence of the authors that many of the papers are of great value.

On p. viii, line 12, read Mark xvi, instead of Mark xiv; on p. 35, footnote, 1901, instead of 1891; on p. 70, line 6, 4 B. C., instead of 4 A. D.; on p. 173, line 14, Volter, instead of Volker; on p. 178, footnote, omit "Das"; on p. 259, the first three lines should follow the fourth

Princeton,

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DIE ABENDMAHLSFRAGE IN IHRER GESCHICHTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG. Ein Versuch ihrer Lösung. VON KARL GEROLD GOETZ, Pfarrer, Lic. Theol., Privatdozent in Basel. 8vo.; pp. ix., 311. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1904.

DIE HEUTIGE ABENDMAHLSFRAGE IN IHRER GESCHICHTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG. Ein Versuch ihrer Lösung. VON KARL GEROLD GOETZ, Pfarrer, D. Theol., Privatdozent in Basel. Zweite, durch ein dreifaches Register vermehrte Ausgabe. 8vo., pp. x., 328. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1907.

The early appearance of a second edition of this important work, advises us how little it can be neglected. To the new edition a very



complete series of indices has been added, by which its usefulness has been largely increased. These indices can be had separately by owners of the first edition. The title has also been modified in the second edition so as to correspond better to the actual contents of the book. For the book is far from being a complete history of controversies over the Lord's Supper. It is not even an account of the conflicts by means of which any given theory of the Lord's Supper—assumed to represent the truth—has won its way to a dominant position in this or that Christian communion. It is rather in its chief contents a very careful summary and criticism of recent investigation and speculation on the Lord's Supper. The concise account of Mediæval and Reformation discussion which is prefixed to this serves only as introductory background against which the thorough study of recent discussion is thrown up. Not only are two-thirds of the book in actual space occupied given to these recent discussions, but the whole value of the book lies in its clear and full survey of them. The book is properly named, then, "The Present-Day Problem of the Lord's Supper in its Historical Development". The closing words of the title have also their justification. When we speak of the historical development of the present-day problem of the Lord's Supper, we imply that the discussion has been far from fruitless; we suggest that we have gains to register to which the discussion has led. Dr. Goetz accordingly not only presents this history, but so presents it as to bring out what he conceives to be its solid results. His book is not only a history of the discussion, but an attempt through this history to commend a solution of the problem which has been discussed. In ultimate intent it is a theory of the origin, nature and significance of the Lord's Supper.

Dr. Goetz's thesis is that all earlier discussions of the Lord's Supper, whether Mediæval, Reformation, or Protestant, have necessarily been unfruitful, because proceeding on false presuppositions. The Mediæval discussions assume the authority of tradition in the mass; and the task which was undertaken by them was the impossible one of arriving at a justifiable unitary conception on the basis of very divergent materials. The Reformation discussions made a great advance by discarding all tradition except that contained in Scripture. But it did not thus transcend the false assumptions which vitiated the Mediæval discussion. For the tradition of Scripture itself is not one but manifold. Luther and Zwingli alike have a real Biblical basis. It remained, therefore, for the later nineteenth century, with its free attitude towards the Scriptural tradition and its willingness to give to Jesus what belongs to Jesus, to John what belongs to John, to Paul what belongs to Paul, to inaugurate a period of really historical investigation into the true nature and history of the Lord's Supper. As the result of this investigation, Dr. Goetz thinks we have not only been given solid answers to many questions of detail about the Lord's Supper, but have been brought well into sight of the right answer to the question of the Lord's Supper as a whole.

Jesus, then, he thinks—for so he reads the results of the recent dis-

cussions—founded no institution; he only acted a parable. It was Paul who—as he could not help doing with his understanding of his relation to Christ—transformed this simple parable into a factual representation and realization of union and communion with Christ; and under his influence the representations of the Synoptics were written. John, the *Didache* and the expressions of the earliest fathers show that the original conceptions of Jesus remained dominant in the Church until the middle of the second century, although of course in a somewhat allegorical mystical form. But the Pauline conceptions steadily won their way: and in response to real needs in the congregation a gradual change was wrought in these until step by step we have in the middle ages a full blown doctrine of the actual eating of the flesh and blood of Christ and the actual repetition of the sacrifice of Jesus on the cross.

Two or three things in this construction seem worth passing emphasis. We observe, in the first place, that Paul is made the real author of the instituted Lord's Supper. Not indeed in the sense that he himself invented it, but as the mouthpiece of a movement in which the primitive Parable was being transformed into a kind of memorial offering of food and drink. Paul, of course, himself gives a different account of his relation to the institution (*e. g.*, 1 Cor. xi. 23). We observe next that the simple-Parable view of the Lord's Supper attributed to Jesus is supposed to be reproduced in no single New Testament writing. The representation in John is spoken of as most nearly akin to it: but there it is transformed by an allegorical-mystical conception of it. And we note, lastly, that all the formal accounts of the Last Supper in the New Testament are recognized as at least colored by conceptions kindred to those of Paul. We must penetrate beneath the record as it stands to discover in the New Testament any "more primitive" conception than Paul's. It was the establishment of the New Testament Canon in a position of authority, indeed, which in Dr. Goetz's view gave its real vogue to the Pauline view. The Lord's Supper as an institution belongs, therefore, confessedly to historical Christianity from the beginning and anything "more primitive" can only be speculatively unearthed.

As a matter of special interest we subjoin Dr. Goetz's summary statement of Jesus' own relation to the Lord's Supper (p. 309):

"Jesus—so we think we may recognize—at his last meal, in the night on which he was betrayed, spoke to His disciples, apparently at the beginning of the meal, first, of His speedy separation from them and then of a new kind of future presence with them. And then, at the end of the meal, after the thanksgiving for food and drink, He once more broke bread for His disciples to eat, and once more handed them the cup to drink, and made out of this a final visible Parable for them, with the words, 'This is my flesh and blood',—that He might impress on His disciples in an unforgettable manner, before He went out of their lives and they saw Him no more in the old way, the abiding significance and importance of His human life which He had lived with them. Thus they should after His death bear ever in mind that He, Jesus, offered to their souls His human nature so well known to them, as formerly food and drink to the body, and that He is in a true

sense their nourishment and refreshment. In this way He summed up concisely for His followers, all that He had to say to them in parting. He left behind Him no Will written with paper and ink, no Institution, but He did what He always did when He wished to make a truth entirely clear to His disciples and to write it in inerasable lines on their souls,—He embodied it in the nearest best similitude. He created, simply by means of a natural, symbolical Parabolic action, a memorial of His life in flesh and blood, which would outlast His death better even than a monument of brass or stone."

It is something to have it recognized by a historian of the modern "critical" type that recent discussion establishes that Jesus had this much connection with the institution of the Lord's Supper. It is perhaps as much as we could expect to be allowed by those whose immanent thought of Jesus and the significance of His earthly life and death runs on the low plane which prevails in these circles of "critical" history. If Jesus' whole work consists in the impression made by His religious personality and the life of communion with His Father which he lived in the world, it will be hard to believe that He sought to impress more than this on the hearts of His followers when He was about to ascend to where He was before—we beg, pardon, we mean, of course, when He was about to leave them. It is only well to bear steadily in mind that the whole body of those first followers of Jesus whose writings have been preserved to us as constituent parts of the Testament He has through them left us, understood His life and death on earth to have had a much profounder significance than this, and accordingly represent Him—credibly, we think—to have wished to impress a very much deeper legacy of thought and feeling regarding Himself and His work on their minds, when, His work on earth done, He was preparing to reenter the glory which He had with His Father before the world was. Even the results to which we attain by historical research are not always unaffected by our point of view.

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

**GENERAL ACCOUNT OF MY LIFE.** By THOMAS BOSTON, A.M., Minister at Semprin, 1699-1707 and at Ettrick, 1707-1732. Printed for the first time from the original manuscript. Introduction, Notes and Bibliography, by REV. GEORGE D. LOW, M.A. Edinburgh, London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1908.

The reader interested in the ecclesiastical history of Scotland and the men who made that history will greedily read anything new that is published concerning Thomas Boston, of Ettrick, one of the most prominent figures in Scotland's religious history. Dr John Duncan, of the New College, Edinburgh, once asked one of his students what book he was reading; and on receiving the reply that it was Boston's *Fourfold State*, the learned Rabbi was for a moment silent; then he delivered himself as follows: "Boston was a commonplace genius; remember—not a commonplace man, but a commonplace genius." No happier characterization could be given of Boston than this. He has

been unkindly dealt with by such writers as Buckle and Henry G. Graham, but these writers with all their brilliancy have utterly failed to grasp the true nature of the theological school to which Boston belonged. Much has been done in recent years to make the religious public better acquainted with the saintly minister of Ettrick, but it may safely be said that alike to the student and general reader no volume recently published on Boston can compare with that edited by the Rev. George D. Low in this direction. Mr. Low has done his work thoroughly and has enriched the volume with invaluable footnotes which show remarkable care and wide research. The volume has also a finely executed portrait taken from a print in the possession of Mr. James Thin, Edinburgh. The editor's Introduction, as one would expect from a student who has so assiduously studied Boston, is an excellent account of his life. In the Appendix to the volume matters of interest in connection with Boston are dealt with; such as the Boston family, letter from Rev. Thomas Boston to Mrs. Boston, Mrs. Boston's Will and the Boston Monument at Ettrick. There is also a very useful, though not complete, bibliography of Boston's Works and of books and pamphlets written in connection with the Marrow Controversy. The volume concludes with a very full index, that gives additional value to the book. The printers have done their work well and the whole get up of the volume is fitted to create a pleasant impression on the mind of the reader. The volume which Mr. Low has edited is a MS. in Boston's handwriting entitled *A General Account of My Life*. Boston left two autobiographical MSS.; this and another entitled *Passages of My Life*. The latter he began in 1708, the year after his settlement at Ettrick; and he added to it from time to time, almost to the close of his life. The other MS., as Mr. Low informs us, was scrolled in shorthand, and thereafter extended and completed in the ten months between December 1729 and October 1730. A *Continuation* of thirty-five pages carried on the narrative to November 1731.

The *General Account*, which has been missing, came into Mr. Low's hands by purchase in May 1904. Boston expressed a wish that the MSS. should remain in the family and be in charge of one of his descendants who might "addict himself to the holy ministry." These MSS., therefore, according to the terms of his will, came into the possession of his son and namesake, who was also his successor at Ettrick. They then passed into the possession of Rev. Michael Boston (minister of the Relief Church at Falkirk) son of Rev. Thomas Boston, latterly Relief Minister at Jedburgh. Michael Boston died in 1785 and from that date Mr. Low says that he has been unable to trace the history of the MS. except that it was in the hands of Rev. John Brown, of Whitburn, editor of a once well known book *Gospel Truth* and grandfather of Dr. John Brown of *Horae Subseivae* fame. When Boston's *Memoirs* were published in 1776, an excellent edition of which appeared a few years ago edited by Rev. G. H. Morrison, Michael Boston informs us that in order to reduce two MSS. into one continuous narrative, he made the *General Account*, with its twelve periods the basis of the

*Memoirs* and selected passages from the other MS. to fill up any chronological blanks. A comparison of Mr Low's book with the better known *Memoirs* reveals the fact that Michael Boston used a pretty free hand in making changes in the MS. of the *General Account* and sometimes these were not an improvement. Mr. Low in the editor's preface informs us: "In transcribing the *General Account*, I have not adhered to Boston's arbitrary use of capital letters, or to his punctuation. His spelling of words and of proper names is often inconsistent. Where it seemed desirable I have adopted present usage in spelling. I have further indicated four or five names by the initial letter, but with these exceptions nothing has been altered or omitted." All students of the ecclesiastical literature of Scotland will feel themselves deeply indebted to Mr. Low for the carefully edited volume which he has brought before the public.

Wick, Scotland.

D. BEATON.

### SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

LES ÉTAPES DU FIDÉISME. Par EMILE DOUMERGUE, Professeur à la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban. Genève: J. H. Jeheber. [1907.] 16mo., pp. 95.

LE DERNIER MOT DU FIDÉISME. Par EMILE DOUMERGUE, Doyen de la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban. Toulouse: Chez M. le Pasteur Langereau. [1907.] 16mo., pp. 67.

Professor—or now we must say, Dean—Doumergue writes in these two booklets under the pressure of a profound sense of the importance of the questions he is discussing. "*Fidéisme*", he says, "is the question of the day; the question at the bottom of all other questions". What, then, is this *Fidéisme*? This it is the object of the former of these booklets to tell us. Formed as it is on the model of Rationalism, Individualism and the like which take up a particular position with respect to reason, the individual, and the like, the name shows that it is a particular conception of faith which *Fidéisme* exploits. What this conception of faith is Professor Doumergue wishes to make clear, and he thinks he can make it clearest by tracing its history.

Accordingly, he wishes us to observe with him three stages of *Fidéisme*. The fundamental contention of *Fidéisme* is that faith is an absolutely free movement of the soul, independent of all intellectual conceptions, whether in the sphere of science, history or philosophy. So far from identifying faith, as the classical theology of Rome does, with "the adhesion of the mind to a speculative truth enunciated in an abstract formula", it rather declares faith to be indifferent to all intellectual ideas, and announces as its program: "Faith is independent of beliefs." Now, says Prof. Doumergue, the first appearance of this proclamation as a definite platform of a party in the Protestant churches



of France, was among the so-called Liberals of fifty years ago. Religion, said this Liberalism, is not a knowledge, but a feeling, and is therefore in its essence independent of all convictions of the mind. Accordingly, the famous Manifesto of Liberal Christianity of 1859 announced the readiness of the liberal church to receive into its bosom all who desired to labor for spiritual improvement, whether in (so-called) faith they were theists, pantheists, spiritualists, materialists, or even atheists. This was historically the first stage of *Fidéisme*. The second stage is marked by the effort of this Liberalism to find for itself a theology. This is the stage represented by the so-called "Paris School", which seeks to cover up the crass indifferentism of Liberalism by a developed theory of the realism of faith, as distinguished from belief. But the hesitations and contradictions of the "Paris School" lead Prof. Doumergue to designate this second stage in the development of *Fidéisme*, "*Semi-Fidéisme*". This stage is characterized by an unwillingness to declare religious beliefs wholly without significance to faith, and yet a determination to represent faith—the faith that constitutes religion and saves—as entirely independent of intellectual conceptions. It loves to contrast itself with "orthodoxy" as standing for the faith of the heart, instead of the belief of the understanding; trust in God instead of acceptance of propositions about God; and to represent as its main purpose and effect the establishment of the religious life on a basis unassailable from the point of view whether of philosophy, science or historical criticism. What! its adherents cry, shall our faith be at the mercy of the next scientific or archæological discovery? In felicitating itself on this position of safe detachment, it has permitted itself to go very far. M. Ménégot is sure not only that true faith can exist—and save—without any knowledge of Christ; but that it can coexist with decisive rejection of Christ. God will not condemn a man for this intellectual *bizarrie*: and "in Paradise" such "an original" as can deny historically that Jesus ever existed "will see he was mistaken and cast himself at the feet of the Lord". He even feels bound to affirm that true faith may coexist with denial of the existence of the very God on whom it is said to rest! Certainly on this side of Prof. Ménégot's teaching we are already in presence of the third stage of *Fidéisme*, that of consistent *Fidéisme*, which Mr. Frommel calls "religious Agnosticism", though Prof. Doumergue does not approve the term. In this stage the affirmation is not only that faith has no content of the intellectual order and is independent of all beliefs, but that the believer stands aloof from all beliefs,—it is indifferent to him what is true or whether anything be true. "I cannot affirm that God exists, in the sense in which you understand these words", says one of its exponents. "Is God a person?" asks another. "Who knows? What I can have of religious needs can be satisfied with beliefs *ad referendum*. . . . Even the personality of God [remains a pure symbol] because before everything I remain agnostic with respect to belief in His personality—a word which continues vague."

Over against these vagaries of unbelief Prof. Doumergue sets simple

common sense. He modestly professes to have nothing to say on his own account against them, but to confine himself practically to summarizing and popularizing what has been so well said by M. Babut and Prof. Frommel in two striking articles published in 1904 and 1905. Prof. Doumergue has, however, his own contribution to make to the discussion, and that does not consist merely in casting the matter into the historical framework which we have taken note of. Above all, he has brought the matter to the level of the lay comprehension—for he is addressing laymen particularly in his brochures—and has given it all a readable and attractive form.

In the second one of his little brochures Prof. Doumergue takes his text from Prof. Ménégoz's *Une triple distinction théologique: observations sur le rapport de la foi religieuse avec la science, l'histoire et la philosophie*. The relation in which religious faith stands to science, history and philosophy according to Prof. Ménégoz is—just no relation at all: it is independent of all three. In his remarks on this thesis, Prof. Doumergue, while not confining himself to it, yet concentrates his attention on the assertion as regards history. The astonishing declaration of *Fidélisme* is that Christianity is not concerned at all with any historical fact, is independent of the determination of historical facts altogether. "The Bible", says Prof. Ménégoz, "does not contain a single narrative which we are authorized to erect into an article of faith." Not the miraculous birth; nor the resurrection of Christ; nor the crucifixion of Christ; nor even—by consequence—the existence of Christ. Professor Doumergue follows these astonishing assertions with a patient as well as a telling refutation. "We learn", says Prof. Ménégoz, "for example, from the Scriptures that Jesus Christ was crucified. I believe it just as I believe that Julius Cæsar was poisoned: but no more than the murder of the Roman emperor can the judicial assassination of Jesus be an article of faith." "What may be a matter of faith is the meaning which we attach to the death of Christ, but His death itself is a fact of the purely historical order." Will, then, Prof. Doumergue significantly asks, the meaning of the death be the same whether Jesus was crucified, or killed accidentally or committed suicide? "What do I say? Will the meaning we attach to this death be the same whether we believe that it occurred or did not occur?—that it is a fact or a legend, a myth, as would be the case, for example, if Jesus never lived?" Clearly the extremity of the *Fidélisme* assertions overreaches itself. If faith is to be independent of all historical occurrences whatever, then faith is a purely subjective thing, and all that we call Christianity as an objective religion is matter of indifference. "We are face to face with pure intuition, with pure mysticism. God reveals Himself to the heart: the heart gives itself to God: everything passes between God and the heart; between the heart and God." And what, then, shall we do with sin? *Fidélisme* may be a religion for angels, but for sinners—surely sinners cannot be trusted each to make his own religion and to make it true!

Perhaps it might have been well to make a little more clear for the

lay reader than Prof. Doumergue seems to have done the fundamental confusion of the whole development of *Fidélisme*—the confusion of the product of the religious sentiment with Christianity. The religious sentiment,—yes, it is indifferent to religious conceptions and will work and produce its product in the presence of any religious conceptions whatever. If this is what we understand by pure religion and undefiled, then it is quite true that faith cannot be inseparably connected with any particular truth or fact of the intellectual order. Man will be religious under the most untoward circumstances; for man is a religious animal, and will function as a religious animal always and everywhere. But to confound this purely subjective functioning of the religious sentiment with a specific religion like Christianity is the limit of confusion. To say it is enough, is to reduce us all to the lowest form of naturalism. Yet, since Kant, and, above all, Schleiermacher, pointed the way, this is the gulf which has swallowed up many more than that particular one of the new theologies which calls itself *Symbolo-Fidélisme*. In every land there are those to-day whose dominant thought of Christianity simply identifies it with the native movements of the religious nature, and who therefore sit loosely to everything which distinguishes Christianity from natural religion. Nobody denies that these teachers are religious. But by what right can they call themselves Christians?

Princeton

B. B. WARFIELD

CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By R. J. CAMPBELL, M.A., Minister of the City Temple, London. Author of "The New Theology", "New Theology Sermons", etc. 8vo; pp. xiii, 284. New York: The MacMillan Company. 1907.

The interest of this book does not lie in the zeal with which the writer advocates the most radical form of Socialism, though in this respect he is conspicuous even among those who would find in it the cure of every ill. Neither does the significance of the volume appear in the gradual and considerate methods by which the author would introduce the true social order, though at this point he differs widely from many of his school. Nor yet is the discussion most noteworthy for the off-hand way in which it disposes of the most obstinate questions, though in this regard Mr. Campbell, like not a few of his fellows, would seem to be blessed with convenient blindness. Nor, again, is it his attitude toward orthodoxy and even toward theology in general that is most worthy of remark. His previous volumes keep us from being surprised when we read near the close of this (p. 236) that wealth enables its possessor, "if he is utterly misguided, to endow theological seminaries." On the contrary, the real significance of the discussion is in the ground on which socialism is advocated. And here the interest is not in the fact that Mr. Campbell regards the connection between the traditional theology and the social question to be radically important. We all believe that. Our conception of God ought to determine our conception of society which he has constituted and preserves and governs,

and in the long run it will determine it. Calvinism and atheism have proved themselves to be as potent politically as religiously. Nor yet is Mr. Campbell's discussion most interesting because he would go back to primitive Christianity and specially to the teaching of Christ for the theology that should regulate his social theories. It has been common for socialists to do that, even for those not distinctively Christian socialists.

But the significance of our author's argument does lie in the fact that it exposes with unusual clearness the futility of seeking a Christian basis for socialism and especially the absurdity of any such attempt on his part.

That we may not misrepresent him, he shall speak for himself. "Modern orthodox Christianity," he says, "owing to the increase of human knowledge, has outgrown the illusions of primitive Christianity, but has adopted others in their places. It preaches an individualist salvation, to take effect after death, and obtainable by faith. It puts an entirely false emphasis on sin by representing it as a matter between man and God to be atoned for by the merits of a special Redeemer. The main emphasis in its evangel is laid upon the supposed necessity of preparing individuals for the world to come. This has led to a view of the function of the church entirely different from that with which Christianity began. Some of these modern doctrines are rooted in the New Testament, but not to the extent that is commonly supposed. The whole emphasis is different: for primitive Christianity confined its interest to the establishment of the kingdom of God in this world, whereas modern Christianity has weakened its efforts in this direction by its other-worldism. This will have to be given up, just as we have already given up the whole New Testament view as to the connection between sin and death, the structure of the universe, physical immortality, and the like. Then, and not till then, shall we be able to recover something of the intensity and enthusiasm which accompanied the early Christian preaching of the glad tidings of the Kingdom of God" (p. 146).

On the above, the author's own summary of his position, we would remark as follows:

1. Even if we allow that primitive Christianity confined its interest to the establishment of the kingdom of God in this world, that will not of itself favor socialism. Everything will depend on our Lord's conception of the kingdom of God. Did it consist 'in meat and drink,' or 'in righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost'? If the former, there may be some ground for Mr. Campbell's contention that "while primitive Christianity was not identical with the Socialism of to-day, it was far nearer to it than the official Christianity of to-day" (p. 20). The fact, however, is that our Lord's conception of his kingdom was the opposite of the materialistic one characteristic of modern socialism and, indeed, of socialism in general. His view of life as not 'consisting in the abundance of the things which one possessed' (Luke xii. 15), his warning against anxiety for temporal goods (Matt. vi. 19-34), his

referred to as a "war of double-fidelity." Luke xiii. 34, 35, he declares that the kingdom of God is "within you." Luke xxi. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

2. Though we were to grant our author's contention, that Christ did not come to save his people from their sins, that the important thing in primitive Christian preaching was "its intense object of the coming of an ideal social order in which men would no longer feel any desire to strive against or inure one another" (p. 119) and that it is "other worldism which has crushed out and replaced these glad things with which Jesus began his mission to the world,"—though we were to concede all this, it would only bring on another and a more serious difficulty. The question would at once arise as to the authority in this or in any respect of the primitive Christian preaching and of the New Testament which records it. That is, why should we accept the primitive Christian preaching of an ideal social order in this world when we unhesitatingly reject that preaching on practically every other subject? Consider for a moment how wholesale in Mr. Campbell's view this rejection must be. To begin with, he sets aside the fourth gospel for "it is not a biography at all, but a religious treatise, like the epistles, its author having adopted the literary device of employing the narrative form to set forth his ideas" (p. 49). Then he discredits the accounts of supernatural events elsewhere unless these events can be explained as other than supernatural (pp. 144, 70), even the story of the resurrection (p. 94). After this, he goes on to reject "the whole New Testament view as to the connection between sin and death, the structure of the universe, physical immortality, and the like" (p. 146). Finally, the doctrine of individualist salvation, the false emphasis on sin, vicarious atonement, other worldism, the exaltation of the church as one with the kingdom,—all these, too, "though finding some support in the New Testament, especially in the Epistles, he would throw over (Chap. v). But what has he left? Practically nothing save "the belief", according to him, "in the establishment of a perfect Commonwealth or universal brotherhood wholly of this world" (p. 141). But why does he stop here? Why does he single out and hold to this one belief? It cannot be because the New Testament teaches it, that he is concerned to show to be just a string of stupendous errors. It cannot be because Christ teaches it. It is only as we can trust the New Testament that we know what Christ taught: and then Christ himself either taught these errors, except at the very beginning of his ministry; or else



his apostles taught them subsequently, and he affirmed that they would be so under the guidance of his Spirit that whosoever should hear them would hear him. Evidently Mr. Campbell's view of our Lord and of the New Testament is such that for him to base anything on either is the act of one bereft of reason. It is as though a man were to undertake to build a great factory on what he had just labored to prove was only shifting sand.

3. Our author's attack on the authority, as we have just seen, of virtually the whole New Testament in yet another way cuts the ground from under his feet. These modern doctrines of "official Christianity" which, though "finding some support in the New Testament," he would reject, have from the first been the great forces for soul betterment. History teaches nothing more clearly. One has only to turn to such sober and careful works as Storr's *The Divine Origin of Christianity indicated by its Historical Effects* and Brace's *Gesta Christi* to be convinced that, in spite of many and serious faults and failures, the Church of Christ has been the great uplifter of society and, in the long run, has increased wealth and particularly has added to the creature comforts of the masses as nothing else has done. Now the doctrines which Mr. Campbell would reject, such as vicarious atonement, the conception of sin as an offence primarily against the law of God, etc., are the very doctrines which, unless, as our author claims erroneously, it were otherwise at the very first, have all along been characteristic of official Christianity. Indeed, Mr. Campbell's enmity for the church is based mainly on her increasing championship of these miserable perversions. They have dominated her life and she has lived for their diffusion. As he says specially of vicarious atonement, 'this has been so for ages' (p. 137). How, then, can we account for the beneficent social influence of the church as in elevating woman and alleviating poverty? Though he denies this influence, Mr. Campbell has nothing whatever to put against such facts as those which Dr. Storrs and Mr. Brace adduce. As he would claim, socialism, at least in the West, has never had a chance to show what it could do; and where in the East, as in the paternalism of Christ, it has come nearer to having had a trial, it has proved a failure. Moreover, when we examine the objectionable doctrines of Christianity, we find that they are directly adapted to produce the beneficent results which history puts to the credit of the church. It has, therefore, been by means of them and not in spite of them that the church has wrought her good work. For example, which is more likely to secure the performance of our duty to love our neighbor as ourselves, the view that sin is a matter between ourselves and our neighbor, or the view which Mr. Campbell repudiates, that when it is this and because it is this it is also and primarily a matter between ourselves and God? Can love for our brethren be put on a firmer basis than that on which John puts it when he writes: "And this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth God love his brother also"? (1 John iv: 21). It would seem, therefore, that, even from our

author's standpoint official Christianity would be the one thing that he would wish, not to reject, but to purify. When true to itself, it must tend toward the ideal brotherhood even here and now. Its distinctive doctrines are the very truth that even a materialistic conception of human brotherhood must presuppose, if it is to be realized.

4 That Mr Campbell fails to see this is due, of course, to his low sense of sin. This leads him to find the cause of the many and terrible social evils that he portrays, perhaps only too truly, in what is but their occasion. It is inevitable that one who minimizes as he does the power and sinfulness of sin, who seems to hold that selfishness with regard to our fellows exhausts its meaning, who discerns little, if any, reference in it to God and his law (p. 127 et seq.),—it is inevitable that such an one should think social environment and organization to be matters of incomparably more importance than one's attitude to God. Yet this mistake, this sin, is not the less serious because of its inevitableness. When wrong social conditions are the result rather than the cause of sin, to let the former divert our attention from the latter is as if one were to give over fighting the disease to relieve the helplessness which it had engendered.

5. The explanation of Mr. Campbell's low sense of sin and, indeed, the defect of his whole discussion, is his failure to feel the personality and, indeed, the reality of God. That this is the necessary result of the idealistic monism which, as his recent book on "The New Theology" indicates, is the philosophy, not to call it theology, which underlies his sociological speculations, we may not pause to show. We may point only to the significant fact that for this or some other cause he does not appreciate the deity of our Lord (p. 127). At least, he seems to think and to imply that the reason why Jesus had no personal sense of sin was because sin amounts to little, and not because being the Son of God he was "without sin." Indeed, it is impossible to read this volume and not feel, almost from the first, that the writer, while he concedes our Lord to be "the greatest of the sons of men" (p. 86), fails utterly to recognize in him "God manifest in the flesh." Is it strange, therefore, that his book is largely a farrago of speculation as to society, of ignorance of history, of perversion of Scripture? How can those who can not discern the truth of him who is "the truth" continue to walk in the truth?

6. This union of idealistic monism, which is only an euphemism for pantheism, with socialism should not surprise us. It is just what was to be expected. It was no other than that careful observer and still more careful thinker Prof. Henry B. Smith, who said, now some years ago: "The grand result of the socialist system is in harmony also with the pantheistic tendencies of the day; and there is progress toward the alliance of socialistic, democratic, and pantheistic tendencies, which form the grand opposing power to Christianity" (*Int. to Christian Theology*, p. 180).

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

**JESUS CHRIST AND THE CIVILIZATION OF TO-DAY.** By JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON, Professor of Philosophy, Hobart College The Macmillan Company, publishers. Pp. 242. Price, \$1.50.

A book that deals with the teachings of Jesus in their application to contemporary life will be welcomed by all who seek to interpret the Gospel to the needs of our humanity. Professor Leighton has given us a thoughtful and helpful book on this interesting problem. He defines civilization as the resultant of all past and present forces of history that go to make up our present conception of life. The modern man has a better knowledge of nature than the mediaeval man. He is less subject to nature, her forces and processes. On the other hand, he has become conscious of nature's order and systematic unity. He has learned that the struggle of existence and the survival of the strongest holds sway in human society as well as in the animal kingdom. He finds that evolution of society is conditioned by environment. He has come to see bared the roots and supports of human life resting on an economic basis and to realize what a large part economic needs and struggles play in the total activity of human life. And above all, modern man finds a new sympathy with nature, born of an intelligent and ever enlarging insight into her constitution and processes. The spiritual life must grow out of the natural. We cannot permanently rest in dualism.

Science as well as civilization insists on the mastery of mind over nature and the futility of regarding the intelligence and conscience of man as the product and equivalent of blind force. In view of this harmony of the human mind with the order of nature it has become impossible to maintain the ascetic attitude toward nature. Man on his physical side seems to be bound to physical causation. The life that centers in an individual seems to be but a transient eddy in the universal stream of life. And on the psychological side the growing insight into the hereditary factors of mental constitution, and the recognition of the great influence of social tradition and environment, seem to point to an ultimate explanation of human life and action in terms of inherited tendency and social influences, by which incipient desires and impulses of the self are transformed into actual motives of action through established custom and by the power of example.

The science of biology has cast a striking light on the evolution of human society by its emphasis on the brute struggle for existence, which goes on among all living beings and preeminently in the modern industrial organization. Then, too, the demands of the individual for life and well-being have increased with the growth of civilization. The savage has few wants. The child of the twentieth century is marked by a greater sensitiveness to environment, a keener capacity to enjoy and suffer, needs that are awakened through education and social contact. Out of these complex factors of our civilization grows with

tremendous urgency the social problem—the problem of a new social order which shall bring justice and welfare to all.

The aim of the present work, then, is two-fold. It seeks to find the fundamental ethical needs of contemporary life, to determine by what principles the spiritual nature of man and of civilization may best be preserved. And it seeks to determine the bearings of the ethical teachings of Jesus on the spiritual life of to-day. The index of a high civilization is the recognition of freedom and scope for the development and expression of the individual life. Without such free play no society can be rich in great personalities. Historical institutions can no longer claim the blind allegiance of the individual will. Such institutions must commend themselves by their readiness to adjust themselves to the spiritual progress in the individual. There seems to be no stability of life, no abiding unity, in the individual considered as a bundle of inborn impulses. Without the possession of an abiding, spiritual principle the individual has no resistive powers against the encroachments of social life. And, on the other hand, the reaction of the individual against the tyranny of the commonplace and the utilitarian standards of the contemporary social environment is in danger of mere caprice. The freedom and worth of the individual life in the individual can be realized only if self-initiated actions and private experiences have objective and universal basis. And Jesus offers this universal basis for the individual life. He points beyond the actual social life as well as the merely natural life of the individual to a supreme end. Jesus' idea of God as the source and sustainer of the spiritual life is not merely the supreme notion of the human reason, but Jesus' personal attitude and life have been the source. He has wrought in men's ideas concerning God and in their vital and active feelings and convictions concerning Him. Jesus works this change in the hearts of men by a personal appeal to deeds, new resolves and choices. He calls forth every renewed ethical endeavor in the human heart. Through His life and summons Jesus inspires man with the conviction that at the heart of the universe there exists a Life and Love in which we share. The whole earthly career of Jesus Christ was the incorporation of His teaching in life and action. He speaks with authority in matters of conduct and life, which is the authority of a perfect life, arousing an answering witness in our hearts, and winning our consent with the personal conviction that in this life our personalities are coming to their own, and ever growing in harmony and peace in the fellowship of the Divine life. Jesus' own life and personality is the ultimate source of His personal influence. The individual Personality is, in every sphere of man's activity, a great historical cause. The universal and ethical religions have all been founded by great personalities. The personal founder of a religion speaks directly under the influence of, and with reference to, local and temporal historical conditions. But the test of his abiding influence lies in his historical revelation of the universal in the spiritual aspiration of man. In His vital and continuing relation to the historical and spiritual

development of man Jesus displays ever anew the absolute and permanent religious significance of His own Personality. Jesus the Christ is for us the absolute revelation of the spiritual meaning of human existence. In the light of His Personality and deeds the ethical aspirations of mankind receive an ultimate interpretation. The teaching and work of Jesus Christ rests on the same presupposition which has underlaid the movement of European civilization toward religious industrial and social freedom, viz, that the lives of persons, realized in fellowship one with another, are the highest realities in the Cosmos and that the principle of personality governs all things. The ethics of Jesus, the ethics of social democracy, the ethics of personality, are convertible terms. Herein lies the universal standard of the ethics of Jesus that they culminate in a Divine Human Personality, who is the Perfect Revelation of God's character.

The reader is impressed with the sound metaphysics and the clear arguments of the author. We hope that it may be read by ministers and laymen, who seek a solution of our modern problems in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

*Rochester, N. Y.*

FREDERIC N. LINDSAY.

THE CHRIST THAT IS TO BE. By the author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia."  
The MacMillan Company, publishers. Pp. 373. Price, \$1.50.

This book is one of a series of efforts to think what the Gospel of Jesus really is. The author's task is to discover the truth that the early church held to be most important, viz. the personal presence of Jesus. It is this very common experience which is the stronghold of the Christian faith. By His works of might and love Jesus impressed the power of His person upon the early church. He feels that His merciful work speaks louder than His words and that the ultimate sin was the hardness of heart which rejected the proofs of such bountiful compassion and power. When He said to John's disciples, "The blind see, the lame walk," He referred to physical, not, as the modern mind is apt to suppose, to spiritual, works of healing. He bids the messengers see for themselves that the first result of His work is that sick men have restored to them the use of their bodily powers, and that the unfortunate are comforted by good news of God. It is important that we should discover what Jesus considered their essential characteristic. It is often assumed that this was their miraculous nature. But, in the commissions to the twelve and the seventy, the command to heal the sick goes to prove that in respect to those powers He did not consider Himself unique. The fact that He required certain physical conditions in which to work—faith, individual and corporate—prevents us laying emphasis on the miraculous nature of the work. How far He taught that the salvation of the world must come by suffering is a most vital question. The end He preached was perfection, but the way was joy not pain. Salvation was to begin and be accomplished in a kingdom of love. So far as this means suffering, the salvation of the world



comes by suffering—the suffering of unrequited love. Suffering is incidental and temporary, but joy is necessary to salvation and to our idea of perfection. The life the Christian must lose, the denial of his own ends that he must practice, are all included in the activities and consequences of that love for men which he must drink in with the Spirit of God. Other suffering Jesus does not enjoin or bless. Other pains exist, as sin exists. From them, as from sin, Jesus offers salvation. The book is a thoughtful and helpful discussion of a theme that has always interested religious teachers. We doubt whether his statements regarding the miraculous element of the Gospel, and claims of Jesus to save, will be accepted. His discussion of physical and moral evils will not satisfy us in view of the facts of pain and sin which all ages have recognized.

*Rochester, N. Y.*

FREDERIC N. LINDSAY

**SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEALS.** By ARTEMAS JEAN HAYNES, pastor of The United Church on the Green, New Haven, Conn. Charles Scribner's Sons, 8vo., pp. 168. 1907. Price, \$1.00

This book consists of a series of short essays on the problems of the Christian faith in the light of our present experience. The author accepts all that science and criticism have to offer and yet retains a clear and rational faith in the eternal realities of the Gospel. The book is intended to meet the growing interest in the religious and social questions of the day and to point out the way by which the Gospel of Christ answers these questions. It will be helpful to those who have thought that the modern conceptions of the world and the individual are inconsistent with the fundamental views of the New Testament. Mr. Haynes represents that large class of thinking men who see that the social ideals of the present age represent the growing consciousness of the Church in applying the message of the Gospel to all spheres of life. It is difficult, he asserts, to separate the individual and social ethics of the Gospel. In every department of human activity we are ceasing to regard man as capable of isolation. He is in sympathy with the movement of life which is finding expression in what is known as the New Theology. His appeal is not primarily to dogma but to life itself. No formal connection exists among the various essays, and for that very reason they are peculiarly adapted to busy men and women. The author finds that these reflections have been the outgrowth of his own real need and hopes that others may find them of help in their progress toward the ideal. His style is lucid and his judgment is calm.

*Rochester, N. Y.*

FREDERIC N. LINDSAY

**THROUGH MAN TO GOD.** By GEORGE A. GORDON, Minister of the Old South Church Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1906. Pp 396. \$1.50 net.

These are good sermons. They are good to read. They must have been good to hear. They are full of fine thoughts finely expressed

and forcefully put. They give abundant evidence of the wide reading and the deep thinking of their gifted author. They present old truths in new dress and the garments chosen are always attractive and often fascinating. But with all their literary qualities and their learning they are lacking in that without which all preaching is vanity, a clear cut presentation of Jesus Christ as very God of very God as well as very man of very man. It is a glorious Christ who walks these pages, but glorious rather in His humanity than in His divinity. Not that the Divine Christ is entirely absent, far from it, for He is much in evidence; but His Divinity is not here in its full orb'd splendor. It may be that the author's professed purpose as embodied in the title of the book "Through Man to God" has somewhat limited him in his forms of expression and has led him to put very great emphasis upon the humanity of Jesus. It may be that he would quite agree with us in our views of the Divinity of Jesus. If so we would suggest as a more appropriate title for this collection of what are in so many respects excellent sermons "Through Man toward God." For unless Jesus be fully Divine we can not come to God through Him either in life or in death.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

THE PRACTICE OF PRAYER By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. Pp 128

In this little volume Dr. Morgan gives an impressive exposition of the scriptural basis for the practice of prayer. We do not recall ever having read so forceful a presentation of this all-important subject in popular form. The logic of the book is irresistible. There is no escaping its conclusion that apart from the revelation of God which the world has received through Jesus Christ prayer in the scriptural sense is impossible. This Dr. Morgan strikingly proves in the chapter entitled "The Platform of Prayer," a chapter which we commend to the thoughtful consideration of all who would pray pertinently and prevailingly. No less instructive is the following chapter on "The Preparation for Prayer." This is not special or occasional. The revelation of God made by Jesus Christ makes certain demands upon the individual. And he is prepared to pray properly only to the degree in which he yields his life to these demands. The problem of the plane upon which prayer is operative, Dr. Morgan solves by an illuminating exposition of "The Lord's Prayer" which he interprets as including in its petitions all those purposes of God and all those needs of man which may properly find a place in our prayers. The book closes with a chapter on "The Practice of Prayer" in which Dr. Morgan shows sound common sense in dealing only with essentials and in leaving details to the discretion of the individual.

We welcome this book with thankfulness and wish for it the widest circulation. To many its contents will be entirely new reading and to all an inspiration.

Princeton.

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

PATHWAYS TO THE BEST. By CHARLES L. GOODELL, D.D. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1907. 12 mo. Pp. 344. \$1.20 net.

These sermons are well named. They are "Pathways to the Best" in practical Christianity. Eight sermons on "The Things of Faith"; twelve on "The Guidance of Life"; and six on "The Universal Prayer," by which the author means "The Lord's Prayer," form the contents of the volume. They are all short sermons, and are made up of short sentences and take the shortest route to the reason. No hearer could have failed to understand the preacher's purpose as he listened to them. And no hearer ought to have returned to the duties of life without an inspiration to and an impulse toward higher and more holy living. They are the utterances of a man whose heart yearns as did his Master's for the salvation and sanctification of souls and who knows how, in the fewest words and the most forceful of ways to stimulate faith and strangle doubt. It is a satisfaction to read such simple, sane and scriptural sermons. No wonder this preacher is prominent as a soul winner. May these pages carry his message to an ever increasing audience.

*Princeton.*

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

DREW SERMONS ON THE GOLDEN TEXTS FOR 1908. Edited by EZRA SQUIER TIPPLE, D.D., Professor of Practical Theology. Drew Theological Seminary. New York: Eaton & Mains. 8vo., pp. 312. Cloth. Price, \$1.25 net.

These brief sermons, prepared by some of the professors and graduates of Drew Theological Seminary, form a valuable help to the study of the Sabbath School Lessons for the current year.

The "Golden Texts" are usually selected with the view of summarizing the essential truth of each lesson; an exposition of such a text is therefore an explanation of the chief message of the passage assigned for study. These sermons are all clear and concise in statement; and those are to be specially commended which have interpreted the text assigned with most definite reference to the lesson for the day. The volume is of the greater value in that it is not a mere miscellaneous collection of sermons on scattered texts, but is characterized by a certain homogeneity, due to the fact that the International Lessons, for the first half of the year, were taken from successive portions of the Gospel of John, and during the latter half of the year from the history of Saul, David and Solomon.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE FASCINATION OF THE BOOK. By EDGAR WHITAKER WORE, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 253. Price, \$1.25.

The personal experience of the author as a pastor and also as a

Bible teacher, enables him to speak with a certain authority when he insists not only that the Bible is a book of surpassing interest, but that it is possible to make that interest apparent to the average congregation or individual student.

After stating the wide-spread need of such a demonstration, the writer points out the deep human interest of the Bible, due to its appeal to the imagination, the charm of its literary perfection, its continual application to life, its four-fold portrait of Jesus, its adaptation to the needs of childhood. These and its similar features are adduced to prove the contention that the Bible is a fascinating book. The discussion will be of interest to all readers, but it makes a special appeal, almost a challenge, to the ordained ministers of the Word, showing the possibilities of widest usefulness and power which await those who, by careful study and by skilful exposition, seek to make known from the pulpit the spiritual power, and "the fascination of the Book."

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

**THAT BLESSED HOPE, THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST.** By DAVID HEAGLE, Ph.D., D.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth, 8vo., pp. 176. Price, 75c.

The spirit of the writer is quite as irenic as his purpose in this endeavor to mediate between the Post-millennial and the Pre-millennial views. The solution suggested is that of "eliminating the millenium" as a factor in the discussion, and regarding it as "an insolvable mystery". The mistake of the author seems to be in supposing that, excepting in the twentieth chapter of Revelation, there is no mention in Scripture of an age of peace and glory, when the "kingdom of the world will be the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ". That the latter is taught by abundant scripture is the contention of most teachers in both schools of thought. It is, therefore, to be doubted whether either school will readily accept the solution suggested, or the contention of the author that the pope, or the papal system, is the anti-Christ, or his "conclusion that both the church, and the apostles with the evangelists were mistaken" (p. 141). The main position, and practical import of the discussion, however, is that the second coming of our Lord is literal, personal, visible, glorious, immanent.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

**GLORIA CHRISTI. AN OUTLINE STUDY OF MISSIONS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.** By ANNA R. B. LINDSAY. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1907. Cloth. Pp. 302. Price 50 cents net.

This seventh volume brings to a close the series of studies issued by the Central Committee on the United Study of Missions, during the seven years following the great Ecumenical Conference of 1900. It is most appropriate that the series should conclude with this study, which first of all reviews the history of Modern Evangelistic Missions, and

then presents the results accomplished by other forms of missionary enterprise, dependant upon or related to the distinctly evangelistic efforts. Among the interesting chapters are included the discussions of Educational Missions, Philanthropic Missions, and lastly, certain other forms of social progress which Christian Missions have produced. These brief studies could hardly fail to awaken faith and interest in missionary work in the minds of even the most skeptical. The author acknowledges special indebtedness to the invaluable books of Doctor James S. Dennis; "Christian Missions and Social Progress," and "A Centennial Survey of Foreign Missions"; and this smaller volume will stimulate many to enjoy these larger works, which form the special reading library arranged to accompany "Gloria Christi."

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

CHRIST'S REDEMPTOR. AN OUTLINE STUDY OF THE ISLAND WORLD OF THE PACIFIC. By Helen Barrett Montgomery. New York: The MacMillan Company. Pp. 282. Cloth. 50 cents net.

The Church at large owes a debt to "The Committee on the United Study of Missions" for the series of helpful hand-books of which this volume is the sixth in number. More than a quarter of a million of these publications have been furnished to missionary societies, and classes for mission study. It is enough to say that this book well merits its place in the series. It opens to many an entirely new world. Names like John Calvert, John G. Paton, and Robert Louis Stevenson, are familiar to most readers, as are the main facts concerning the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands; but the number and extent of the Pacific Islands, and the marvelous transformation of their inhabitants by missionary effort, will be, to most readers, a novel story, full of romantic interest, and suggesting the divine power of the Gospel of Christ.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE CREED OF CREEDS. By THE REV F. B. MEYER, B.A. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 16 mo. Cloth. Pp. 220. \$1.00 net.

We are here given a devotional commentary on The Apostles' Creed. The successive words and phrases are dwelt upon and illuminated in a series of brief chapters, forming fifty two in all, and affording a message for each week of the year. The fundamental truths of Christianity are set forth in language peculiarly clear and striking, and the reader is impressed anew with the breadth, and beauty and power of this ancient symbol of Christian faith.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.



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# The Princeton Theological Review

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# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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HERMAN BAVINCK.

The Free Churches of Holland possess at the present moment in Dr. Abraham Kuyper and Dr. Herman Bavinck theologians of genius and of erudition worthy of the best traditions of the Reformed theology. In the autumn of 1898 Dr. Kuyper delivered at Princeton Seminary the L. P. Stone Lectures, and thus for the first time made his voice heard by an English-speaking audience. During the present month Dr. Bavinck is to deliver these Lectures. The circumstance seems worthy of notice; and the occasion seems to call for some introduction of Professor Bavinck to his American audience. The following account of the position he occupies and the work he has done in the churches and for the people of the Netherlands has been derived from an authentic source.—EDITORS.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands underwent a great change in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Rationalism had already penetrated into the church and caused a tremendous upheaval; but it now made itself master of almost the whole of the church in the form of a moderate supranaturalism. Everywhere the old truths of atonement and regeneration were set aside in favor of new dogmas of the example of Jesus and of moral improvement. The hope was cherished that an end could be put to the old faith by means of official preaching, elementary education

and university instruction. Moderation should reign, all extremes should be avoided and the people should lead a peaceful and happy life in mutual tolerance. The confession of the church was put into the background, and the presbyterial form of government shared the same fate. French dominion, which was greeted as the dawn of freedom by the deluded people, had produced a hopeless confusion in state and church. The old organization of the Reformed Church with its presbyteries (classes) and provincial synods no doubt still existed, but it was no longer used; the state enacted various capricious laws affecting the church and finally subjected the church entirely to itself by an imperial decree of the 10th of October, 1810. From the end of November, 1810, the stipends of the pastors ceased to be paid, so that their need became continually greater and confusion increased. But a change came in November, 1813. The Prince of Orange returned to the country and began to reign, not as "Stadhouder", but as King. He soon tried to re-establish order in the church. Although animated by good intentions, nevertheless he strove to introduce into the church of the Netherlands the episcopal and territorial ideas which he had learned in a foreign land, and compelled it to accept a new, synodical, caesaro-papistic government, which was at variance with the old presbyterial organization.

These two important changes, in confession and church-government, were the cause of a conflict which, beginning slowly, steadily increased in force, and has gone on till the present day. For although the new tendency seemed to have conquered the whole field, the old Reformed faith still lived in the hearts of the people. Here and there pastors still preached the old truths and attracted many hearers. From Switzerland the so-called "Revival" penetrated into the Netherlands and awoke, especially in certain aristocratic circles, new spiritual life, which was fed and strengthened by the immutable truths of the Reformation. The opposition to the new doctrine and church-

government eventually led to the "Separation" of 1834, from which sprang the later so-called "Christian Reformed Church". At first this "Separation" had to pass through difficult times. It was opposed with violence by the government, looked upon by the established "Hervormde Kerk" with jealous eyes, scorned by the people, disapproved of by those who, while agreeing with it in confession, yet considered it an untimely and arbitrary movement, torn to pieces by internal strife. But slowly conditions improved. A period of growth and prosperity ensued, especially after the foundation of the Theological School at Kampen in 1854. The movement was strengthened in 1869 by union with another small church, which owed its existence also to separation from the "Hervormde Kerk". It was extended still further in 1892 by union with a group of local congregations, which in 1886 and the following years had refused obedience to the synodical régime of the "Hervormde Kerk" under the leadership of Kuyper, Rutgers and Lohman. The united churches then took the name of "De Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland".

This spiritual revival in the Netherlands exercised a great influence also in the provinces of East-Friesland and Bentheim, which from of old had been allied in many ways with the Dutch people. Under the leadership of an enthusiastic preacher, who had to suffer much scorn and persecution for his faith, a young man, by name Jan Bavinck, was brought to a knowledge of the truth in a remarkable way, and later was led to enter the service of the Gospel. After having worked a short time as a preacher in his own country, he entered the ministry in the congregation of Hoogeveen in the Netherlands. There a son was born to him on the 13th of December, 1854, eight days after the establishment of the Theological School at Kampen, who received the name of Herman Bavinck. Birth and education in a pious, Reformed family were of great significance in the life of this son. In it he received a deep and ineffaceable impression of the truth of the Reformed confession, and there were



imprinted on his mind those fundamental convictions which formed the starting point of his thought and activity, and which still remain with him in his later years, his life thus confirming the truth of Fichte's word, that the philosophy which a man upholds depends on what he is. Life precedes science and the conviction of the heart the direction of the thoughts.

But although young Bavinck adhered, by virtue of home training, with heart and soul to the Reformed confession, nevertheless, as he entered upon maturer years, he did not feel quite at ease in the small circle of the "Separation". The church in which he was born and brought up was too far from the world, and the truth in which he was educated was too much separated from the scientific thought of the time. There was no connection and no coöperation between them, but only separation and antagonism. This condition was not unnatural under the circumstances. In the eyes of pious men, who had experienced nothing but scorn and persecution from the government and society, from the established Church and the official science, it seemed as if the whole country was given over to unbelief and lost to Christian truth. There were even some who thought the time had come to expatriate themselves and to seek refuge in foreign countries. This desire was certainly not unnatural and is easily explained, but its point of view was very one-sided. Even in his youth Herman Bavinck understood that such a total separation between the church and the world could not be right, because on the one side it violated the truth of the church and religion, which is catholic by nature, and on the other side it was itself at fault in not appreciating the good elements which are contained under God's guidance in the culture of to-day. So he persuaded his parents to allow him to receive his scientific education first at the gymnasium at Zwolle and later at the University of Leiden. The Theological School at Kampen, although it had many advantages for the training of ministers, was not well enough equipped scientifically to

give him what his heart and mind desired. So, with the consent of his parents, he went in 1874 to Leiden, at that time the center of the "Modern Theology".

Scholten and Kuenen were then the most able and most renowned professors in the faculty of theology there. Scholten had this peculiarity; in contradistinction from the supranaturalistic school, which had an unhistorical bent, he went back to the old Reformed theology and sought in it a foundation for his own system. Old dogmatic works, esteemed totally worthless and sold as waste-paper, were drawn by him from obscurity, zealously studied and eagerly used for his chief work on *De Leer van de Hervormde Kerk*. He did in the Netherlands what a short time before Alexander Schweizer had done in Germany. But still he was far from accepting the old Reformed theology. In the beginning of his career he maintained and zealously defended the chief truths of the Christian faith, such as the trinity, the incarnation and the resurrection. But in proportion as his philosophy came under the influence of Hegel, it became evident that he was striving to put the new wine of his monistic system into the old bottles of Reformed terminology.

For a long time the Netherlands stood astonished at this flag of truce. Faith and science seemed to be reconciled. The old Reformed theologians, in at least their principles and purest thoughts, were made the preachers of the new wisdom; and Scholten came forward as the 19th century successor and interpreter of Paul, Augustine and Calvin. "Modern Theology", of which Scholten was the spiritual father, soon took the place of honour; it felt itself strong and set itself against all other theological and philosophical schools in an aggressive and polemic manner. Genuinely Reformed and genuinely scientific seemed to be one and the same thing.

When Herman Bavinck entered the University of Leiden in 1874 and came under the teaching of Scholten, the high-tide of "Modern Theology" had already passed. Not

only had its negative and destructive tendency become more and more evident in the struggle with other schools, but there had appeared from within its own circle various men who regarded this reconciliation of the old Reformed confession and Hegel's pantheism as an illusion and who were no longer able to accept the monistic determinism which Scholten preached. They thus felt themselves obliged, for conscience sake, to abandon the ministry of the church. "Modern Theology" had thus already passed from the aggressive and polemical period to the apologetic; it could no longer attack; it had enough to do to maintain its position and to defend itself. Scholten did this during these years with zeal and force; he remained true to the end to the banner he had himself unfolded, but the younger men left him and went their own way. Those who came from Reformed families conceived that the wine which Scholten poured out was not what it purported to be; the terms sounded Reformed, to be sure, but the system itself was little more than a Dutch edition of Hegel's monism.

The strongest influence at Leiden was now exerted no longer by Scholten, but by his younger colleague, Abraham Kuenen, a profound and accurate student of the Old Testament. Scholten had built up his system without inquiring into the solidity of its foundations. Neither the critics of reason nor the critics of Scripture had the sympathy of his heart. He never understood or valued Kant, and though in his later period he was obliged to form a judgment about the origin and meaning of the New Testament books, he was too dogmatically inclined to make impartial inquiry into these matters or to wield here a permanent influence. Kuenen, on the contrary, was a strong, accurate and earnest critic. He asserted nothing without previously considering it from all sides, and thus he inspired confidence among his disciples. He was not a philosopher. He laid more stress on the ethical than on the religious life. As to morals, he took his standpoint with Kant in the ethical nature of man. Conscience was to him an original

datum, which could not be explained by evolution; and this he esteemed the bulwark of an ethical view of the world. But those who attended his ethical lectures could not understand how Kuenen, according to his principles, maintained this position. He did not show how the originality of ethical consciousness, the greatest wonder in itself, could find a place in his anti-supranaturalistic view of the world; and he did not explain how the independence of ethical life could be harmonized with the deterministic monism which he had embraced, not so much, perhaps, from personal conviction, as under the influence of his colleague, Scholten.

This defect in Kuenen's ethical teaching had its parallel in his criticism of the Old Testament. His accurate analysis, his endeavour after impartiality, his prudence in conclusions, commanded admiration, but, after all his critical investigations, the mystery of the religion of Israel remained unexplained. For although this religion is certainly not sufficiently described by the name "ethical monotheism", yet its ethical monotheism is a fact which needs explanation. By taking his position in the prophetism of the 8th century B. C., Kuenen enveloped himself in an unresolvable antinomy. For, if this ethical monotheism is a product of the prophets of the 8th century, it not only becomes necessary to assign a later date to all the sources in which it is mentioned, but the ethical monotheism itself also appears quite suddenly without historical preparation. If, however, the evolutionary principle does not admit of a sudden and unprepared appearance of ethical monotheism, then this ethical monotheism cannot be used as a canon or norm in the criticism of the sources. Some of Kuenen's students perceived this more or less clearly when they were attending his lectures, but the development of Old Testament criticism has since brought it to light even more convincingly. Criticism is a means, not an end; yet even if the dates which Kuenen assigned to the books of the Old Testament could be justified, the chief questions still remain un-

answered, viz., from what source did Israel's religion come, what development did it undergo, and how did it reach its fulfilment in Christianity. More and more the conviction has forced itself on careful investigators, that just as the person of Christ cannot be eliminated from the explanation of the origin of the Christian Church, so the figure of Moses with the lawgiving and the covenant is the necessary basis of the religion of Israel.

Herman Bavinck accordingly left the University of Leiden with the idea that "Modern Theology" raises earnest problems, which in itself it is least of all capable of solving. For some time he pondered the question whether the so-called "ethical" theology could not provide for these needs. It had an excellent representative in Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, who after a richly blessed pastoral life became a professor at Groningen in 1872, but died two years afterward, at the age of fifty-five. This "ethical" theology set itself in opposition to Scholten's principles, but it did not manifest much sympathy for the Reformed confession. It was neither historical nor national, but was fed chiefly by ideas which the theology of Schleiermacher and Vinet had developed in foreign lands. Although it had a deep conviction that its vocation was to reconcile the Christian religion and modern thought, it lacked a decisive principle and a consistent method of procedure. In a special study on *De Theologie van Prof. Dr. Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye*, Leiden, 1884, 2<sup>e</sup> druk, 1903, Bavinck has given a circumstantial account of it.

Other factors and circumstances strengthened the influence which the Reformed confession had exercised upon him in his youth. The teaching of Scholten, although it did not satisfy him in its theological content, yet it awoke his historical sense and opened his eyes to the treasures of truth which were hidden in the old Reformed theology. The subject that he treated in his dissertation, *De Ethiek van H. Zwingli*, 1880, offered him the opportunity of penetrating into the origin of the Reformation and of making



a study of its motives and inspirations. The short but blessed period which he spent in the ministry at Franeker, and the acquaintance he made there with the religious life, as Reformed truth translated into practice, were foremost among the influences which led him back with stronger convictions than before in the direction which his home-training had already given to his spiritual life. All these influences made clear to him that Christianity is a history, a unity of idea and fact, an inmost connection of word and deed; that the separation which Hegel and Scholten tried to bring about between these two elements would have as a consequence nothing less than the loss of the Christian religion, and that accordingly this religion is realized in history both by word and deed, by illumination and regeneration. There may be no infallible guidance in the history of the church and of her confession, but the promise is not thereby annulled that the Holy Ghost is poured out upon the church, leads believers into all truth and, on account of the catholicity of the truth, gives to every people and to every century a special vocation and a special task. Among the various types of confession in which Christianity has unfolded itself, the Reformed church and theology takes a special place, and that a place of honour. For in this confession the Christian religion is most purely represented as *religion*, and therefore also as most catholic; for while it teaches that there is nothing in man that gives him a claim on the fellowship of God, it teaches also that there is nothing that could anywhere or ever preclude him from it. Religion and grace are one. Christian theology, which in the last century made itself continually dependent on philosophy and science, needs nothing more to-day than to regain its independence, to return to its own principle and to go to work in its own way.

This was the fundamental idea which Herman Bavinck developed in an address on *De Wetenschap der Heilige Godgeleerdheid*, delivered on the 10th of January, 1883, on the occasion of his inauguration as Professor in the

Theological School at Kampen. In opposition to the modern demand that theology must be more and more secularized, he advocated the duty of maintaining its holy and independent character and of allowing no science nor philosophy to put a yoke of bondage upon it. Christian theology has its own principle, object and aim: it has its principle in the peculiar revelation that comes to it through the Holy Scriptures; it has its object in the knowledge which emanates from God in the person of Christ; and it has its aim in the building up of the church and in the glorification of God's name. If theology does not distinguish itself by means of these special characteristics from all other sciences, it has no right to exist; but if it has these special characteristics, then it has its own life, it takes an independent place in the circle of the sciences, and it has a claim upon the sympathy and support of the church. Both science and the church have need of theology, in the same way as it in its turn profits by both and makes use of both. In proportion as theology has regained its independence, it seeks according to its nature alliance with all that is around it, with all sciences and with the entirety of culture. Christianity is the only true, and, therefore, also the highest and the complete religion, assimilating all that is true, good and beautiful in the world, and opposing only all that is sinful and impure. Thus Professor Bavinck expressed himself in the rectoral addresses on *De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk*, 1888, and on *De Algemeene Genade*, 1894. If the independence of religion and theology is upheld, one cannot lay too much stress on its duty to think on whatsoever things are true and honest and just and pure and lovely. For the world as an organic whole is the object of God's love. Christ came not into the world to judge the world, but to save it. The Gospel is a glad tidings for all creatures. The Roman Church misinterpreted this catholicity by its dualistic supranaturalism; Luther and Zwingli partly re-established it; but it is principally contained and unfolded in the Reformed theology,

which received its stamp from Calvin. In this theology, religion is purely conceived and the whole life of man in society, or state, or church, is represented as a service of God, a standing and walking always in the light of His presence.

It goes without saying that a writer with such sympathies would look around and endeavor, according to the measure of his strength, to work for the solution of the problems of the day. The founding of the Free University at Amsterdam in 1880, for the purpose of reëstablishing the encyclopedic alliance between theology and the other sciences, Professor Bavinck hailed with much joy; and the second exodus out of the "Hervormde Kerk" in 1886 and the following years received his warm and cordial sympathy, being, as he was, a son of the "Separation" of 1834. In the union of both groups of congregations, which took place in 1892, he took an active part; and labored with others for the combination of the Theological School at Kampen and the Free University at Amsterdam. When these endeavours again proved unsuccessful at the synod of Arnhem in 1903, he left the Theological School at Kampen with his colleague Biesterveld and accepted the nomination to a professorship in the Free University. He worked also in behalf of the elementary schools and the education of Christian teachers through the publication of his *Beginnelsen der Psychologie*, 1897, and his *Pædagogische Beginnelsen*, 1904. In his *Christelijke Wetenschap*, 1904, and his *Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing*, he maintained that science and philosophy, denying revelation and religion, could not fulfil their own vocation. At the 150th anniversary of Bilderdijk's birth he described the philosophical view of the world which this thinker and poet had set forth. Convinced of the power of the Word and of the high and holy vocation which preachers in these days have to fulfill, he wrote a treatise on *De Welsprekendheid*, 1901. For the practice of the religious and moral life he gave, under the title *De Offerande des Lofs*, 1901, 5<sup>e</sup> druk 1907, a series of meditations intended

for those who were to be admitted to the holy Sacrament.<sup>1</sup> In *De Zekerheid des Geloofs*, 1901, 2<sup>d</sup> druk 1903, he sought to show the way in which the Christian may be assured of his life in the fellowship of God; and in his *Hedendaagsche Moraal*, 1902, he drew up a sketch of the tendencies which are prevalent at the present day in moral science.<sup>2</sup>

The chief subject which Professor Bavinck has taught at the Theological School at Kampen and later at the Free University of Amsterdam has been Dogmatics. His principal published work is therefore naturally devoted to this science, and appeared under the title, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* from 1895 to 1900 in four volumes, of which the first and the second have since appeared in a revised and augmented edition. This work embraces the following characteristics:

(1) After an introduction, which treats of the name, idea, place, method, division and history of dogmatics, an exposition is given of the principles on which this dogmatic theology is built up in distinction from other works. In doing this the author goes back to the principles of science in general and then advances to the principles of religion in general and of Christian theology in particular. The principles of Christianity are described as two. The first, viz., the special revelation in the Holy Scriptures, has an objective, and the second, viz., the illumination by the Holy Ghost, has a subjective character. The special revelation is the completion and at the same time the measure of all revelation in nature and history, and faith, as a gift of

<sup>1</sup> Also translated into English. *The Sacrifice of Praise. Meditations before and after receiving access to the table of the Lord.* Translated by the Rev. John Dolfin. 1908.

<sup>2</sup> Among other writings of Prof. Bavinck may be mentioned *Schepping of Ontwikkeling*, 1902. *Roeping en Wedergeboorte*, 1903. *Godsdienst en Gedeeleerdheid* 1902. *Het Wezen des Christendoms*, 1906. *Evolutie*, 1907. *Christelyke Beantwoelen en Maatschappelyke Verhoudingen*, 1908. Also the two articles: "Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands", in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, April, 1892, and "The Future of Calvinism", *ibid.*, January, 1894.

God's spirit, is the highest development of human consciousness.

(2) In the exposition of the material part of dogmatic theology, the author first sums up the Scriptural data of each dogma; then shows in broad lines the direction along which the development of the dogma has taken place; and finally gives the theoretical explanation and defense. Against this treatment objections may no doubt be made from a systematical point of view, for dogmatics is, strictly speaking, nothing else than exposition of dogma. But the intention of the author is in no sense to take out of the hands of the history of revelation, the history of dogma, and apologetics, what is properly their work. He has adopted the above mentioned order in the present circumstances, first, because he obtained in this way an opportunity of making his readers acquainted in some degree with the problems which dogmatics has to meet in our days and of awakening in them the desire for research; and secondly, because he could in this way show from the facts themselves that dogma is not an arbitrary opinion, but organically grows out of the Scriptures and receives in the Reformed theology its purest and highest unfolding. Dogmatics bears a Christian-historical and therefore a catholic character.

(3) In the thetical exposition of dogma the author strives to bring it into connection and to compare it with the doctrines which other religions, scientific inquiries and philosophic systems have brought forward. For it is idle to imagine that theology, and especially dogmatics, has to do with matters which have significance only for the schools or for a small circle of learned men. Dogmatics always treats of questions of life which have the deepest interest for every man, so that, although one can do away with the answers which Christian dogmatics gives to these questions, he cannot escape from the questions themselves. On the contrary, these questions remain and we must seek an answer to them. And if one compares the answers which are



given from other points of view with those which Christianity gives, the divine wisdom will appear in its superiority to human folly. Dogma does not arise from reason, but it is reasonable in the highest sense of the word.

(4) Finally although the author has planned this dogmatic broadly, he always takes care not to lose himself in subtle, scholastic speculations. Dogmatics everywhere has to do with matters of life, and the author is convinced that Reformed theology has grasped and explained the thoughts of revelation in the purest way. But he tries always to keep in touch with the whole of the Christian church, both in its past and in its present development, and not only with the confession, but also with the spiritual life of the church. No single church or system of theology has the right to consider itself as the one church or as the one theology. Dogma strikes its roots deeply into the past, but it also spreads its branches widely and broadly on all sides. And it is the more necessary, in these times, to lay stress on the catholicity of dogma, because the crisis through which religion and Christianity are passing to-day concerns not one church, but all churches, and not only the doctrine, but also the life of religion itself.<sup>2</sup>

By the scientific labor in which Professor Bavinck has been engaged for more than twenty-five years, he has taken an honourable place in the church and the theology of his country. His work has been recognized in different ways and on different occasions. Not only is he a member of various scientific societies, *e. g.*, of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Amsterdam, but he has also been decorated by Her Majesty the Queen with the order of the Dutch Lion. On the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his professorship, his pupils, present and past, gave him an ovation. One of his first disciples, now for some years his colleague, Prof. Biesterveld, acted as their

<sup>2</sup>Under the title: *Magnalia Dei. Onderwijzing in de Christelijke religie naar Gereformeerde belijdenis*, Prof. Bavinck is now writing a popular dogmatic hand book, which will be complete in twenty-seven parts, each of twenty-four pages; twelve parts have already appeared.

spokesman. In the first place, he thanked his former teacher for the scientific instruction which they had received in his courses; next, for the many works which had appeared from his hand, and concluded with the following words: "Finally, we thank you also for the holy inspiration which has come from you to us and which has set on fire the hearts of your disciples. This was not the least among the virtues that characterized your instruction; on the one side, the high earnestness, which spoke to us in every part of dogmatics: 'take thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground'; on the other side, so much tenderness and sincerity, that your hearers and readers felt themselves nearer to God, the knowledge of whom you taught. You were all this for us, and sought to implant in us scientific method, thorough-going knowledge, and a holy enthusiasm for the truth which is from God. As you were educating us also for the ministry of the Word of God, which of us did not hang on your lips when you unfolded that Word to us in the church; and whose heart of those standing around did not exclaim: 'Oh, may a portion of my master's spirit fall on me!' If there are among your old disciples those who are engaged in scientific labour or those who preach the Word with fervor, in fitting language, with enthusiastic conviction,—and there are such—their impulse and inspiration for work is in no small measure due to your teaching and to your example."

## PRAGMATISM, HUMANISM AND RELIGION.

If the search for truth, as Lessing believed, is to be chosen in preference to its complete possession, philosophers should now be happy, for never before has the answer to Pilate's question, What is truth? been more eagerly sought, and never certainly has the true answer appeared to be more doubtful. The responsibility for this state of things lies mainly at the doors of Prof. William James, who, with the assistance of Prof. Dewey, of Chicago—now of Columbia University,—and Mr. Schuller, of Oxford, has advocated with striking success a new theory of truth, of its origin, nature and criterion. The new school appeals especially to the interest and pride of Americans as being the first notable philosophical movement to have its origin on American soil. While the name and in part the doctrine of Pragmatism were first suggested by Mr. C. S. Pierce<sup>1</sup> as long as thirty years ago, it remained for Prof. James to become the recognized champion of the new method, and his adoption of Pragmatism as the name for his own views, in an address in California ten years ago, may be taken as the birthday of the new way of thinking. For the past ten years the new movement has constantly gained in popularity, and the discussion it has awakened has so overshadowed other topics that the word "pragmatism" literally "spots" the pages of the philosophical journals. The controversy has overflowed into the pages of the literary monthlies and the popular weeklies, and has even attracted the attention of the professional humorists, one of whom hits off the new views with the remark, "Th' truth is somethin' that wurruks. If it don't wurruk, it ain't th' truth. . . . Whin th' truth

<sup>1</sup> "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1878.

stops wurrakin' it's a lie, an' whin a lie starts goin', it's th' truth."<sup>2</sup>

The rise of a new philosophy can never be a matter of indifference to religion. So closely are philosophy and religion allied that a new philosophy is likely to have its origin in a religious interest and is quite sure in turn to exert a strong influence upon religious thought. This influence in classical instances has not been exactly what the founder of the new system intended. Everyone knows how Berkeley, in order to refute materialism, did away with material substance, while his own principles were used by Hume to dispense with spiritual substance; and how Kant's destruction of the knowledge of God and immortality to make room for faith has given to agnosticism its strongest weapon. It is not surprising that theology has grown a little shy in accepting the proffered aid of philosophy, and is inclined to cry, "Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts!" In the case of Pragmatism, however, as presented in the recent lectures of Prof. James,<sup>3</sup> suspicion is disarmed. Prof. James comes with the conscious mission of mediator between the scientific temper and the religious temper, offering an empiricism which accepts cordially and enthusiastically the facts and theories of modern science and yet gives full recognition to the needs of the spirit. He offers to science a cure for easily besetting materialism and to religion a cure for its remoteness and alleged aversion from facts. For this office of conciliator Prof. James is eminently qualified. His professional standing as a psychologist is of the highest, and no writer of our time has done more to make the study of psychology popular. He has been a pioneer in the application of psychological methods to the analysis of religious experience, and he has spoken and written often and impressively upon the deepest questions of morals and religion.

<sup>2</sup> "Mr. Dooley on Philosophers." *American Magazine*, Mar., 1908.

<sup>3</sup> *Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking: Popular Lectures on Philosophy* by William James, 1907.

... can trace the roots of ... *Psychology*, with its ... consciousness, but more ... Readers of this vol- ... received from its ... enthusiasm and of relig- ... naturalism and radical ... against a "block" uni- ... of truth or reality calling ... we imagine, were ... who, with marvelous ... the moral foundations ... upon its supreme ... the book was a boon to the ... the author's chapters on ... the second essay, "Is Life ... the pathos of existence ... who shrink from life's ... like a tract to kindle the ... The religious philosopher could find ... a new argument for ... statement of the older ... and just would wel- come the original ... the vital element in ...

"The end of all things is death, when all's done and said,  
And the last judgment is made;  
To be or not to be, that is the question,  
That is the end of all things."

In his *Lectures on Religious Experience* (1902), Prof. James explicitly avows the pragmatic method. It is true that the apprehension of the good was aroused by hints of a "sort of polytheism" (pluralism) to be developed later by the author, but the weight of his whole investigation was thrown behind the argument, "God is real, since He produces real effects".

What then, we are ready to ask, is Pragmatism? It is



worth while to set down for reference the primary definitions before tracing the development of the doctrine. Pragmatism, says Mr. C. S. Pierce, is the application to metaphysics of the following maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."<sup>4</sup> This maxim, he says, was suggested by reflection upon Kant's *Critic of the Pure Reason*. Prof. James, adopting this principle, pushes it, Mr. Pierce thinks, "to such extremes as must tend to give us pause", but his definition is not essentially different. Pragmatism is, "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name."<sup>5</sup>

Thus defined, Pragmatism appears as a purely logical doctrine. It is primarily a method of determining the meaning of propositions or conceptions by their assumed consequences. It easily passes, however, into a method of testing by their consequences the truth of propositions already determined to be meaningful.<sup>6</sup> Opposing theories, when the practical consequences flowing from each are drawn out, may be shown to be only verbally different. If there is not difference enough to make any real difference, the question, it is held, is not worth discussing. A pragmatist in theology, for example, might minimize the differ-

<sup>4</sup> Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 321

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Prof. A. O. Lovejoy complains that these two meanings of Pragmatism are not kept distinct. *Am. Journal of Theology*, Jan., 1908, p. 118.

ence between Calvinist and Arminian, by insisting that both parties would act the same toward a brother taken in a fault; or might contend, with Mr. Pierce, that there is no real difference between the Catholic and Protestant view of the Sacrament if the effects attributed to it are in both cases essentially the same. Where the derived consequences are plainly different, this difference may furnish the means of deciding that one theory is true and its rival false. That theory is true which will "work" the best in practical life, that is, which promises most in the way of the fulfilment of our desires and the accomplishment of our purposes. Doubt will of course remain as to whether even in metaphysics the practical test of truth, the test by consequences, is the only one which needs to be applied. Prof. James in fact suggests this doubt when, in testing the rival theories of materialism and theism by the difference each would make for the future, he remarks, in brackets, "I am supposing, of course, that the theories *have* been equally successful in their explanations of what is" (p. 97).

We may notice in passing that if Pragmatism is no more than a method of fixing the meaning or testing the truth of various theories, its application to religious problems will be distinctly favorable to the theistic view of the world. If an appeal to consequences is the only means of deciding between conflicting theories—the only test of truth—religion may lose indeed the theoretic supports upon which in the past it has been supposed to depend, but this will be in part at least counterbalanced by the removal of the purely theoretical objections. It is doubtful if Prof. James has done any greater service to religion than by pointing out, in several classical passages of great force, the superiority from the practical and emotional standpoint of the religious over the materialistic view of the world. "Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living

*thou*, with whom the whole man may have dealings."<sup>7</sup> "Our attitude toward concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith. For this reason the strenuous type of character will on the battle-field of human history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion will drive irreligion to the wall."

It will be seen that the state of mind out of which Pragmatism was born is more than hospitable to the foundation doctrines of ethics and religion. But it will be noticed that the theistic argument so finely expressed in the passages just quoted is really two-fold. Belief in God fits in with and stimulates all the powers of our nature, but further we ought to believe in God because, as the "infinite demander", He demands our faith and service. Take away the "ought" or the authority of an infinite demand, and substitute the ethics of expediency for the "ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high",<sup>8</sup> and the argument loses its pungent appeal. To many readers Prof. James will appear to speak from a lower level, and thus to weaken his theistic position, when he says in his *Lectures*, "'The true' . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving" (p. 222). Utilitarianism in epistemology and in ethics naturally go together, but both must face the objections to subordinating one of the great ideals of our conscious life to another. We are ready enough to admit the usefulness of truth and the beauty of truth, to say in poetry, "*Was fruchtbar ist, das allein ist wahr*", or "Beauty is truth, truth beauty", or to declare in prose that knowledge is power: but

<sup>7</sup> *Will to Believe*, p. 127. *Ibid.*, p. 213

<sup>8</sup> "All through history . . . we see the antagonism of the strenuous and genial moods, and the contrast between the ethics of infinite and mysterious obligation from on high, and those of prudence and the satisfaction of merely finite need," *Will to Believe*, p. 213.

this does not mean that we are prepared forthwith to reduce any one of these ideals, truth, beauty or utility, to another. No one has resisted more strongly than has Prof. James himself the attempt of hedonistic ethics to make pleasure the sole object of desire merely because the attainment of desired ends is accompanied by pleasureable feelings.<sup>9</sup> So we must remember that the end of thought is not necessarily something outside of itself, such as the satisfaction of emotion, simply because the operation of thought is attended by emotional interest. We may explore the world for the sake of knowing. There may perhaps be a paradox of Pragmatism, similar to the "paradox of hedonism" familiar to students of ethics. If the aim of scientist and philosopher had always been utility, if thought had been content to remain merely instrumental to feeling and action, and there had been no enthusiasm for knowledge for its own sake, no search for truth and no propaganda keyed to the motto, "The truth at any cost", the progress of invention itself would have been retarded. This, at least, is intimated by M. Poincaré, when he says in his *Value of Science*: "I do not say: Science is useful, because it teaches us to construct machines. I say: Machines are useful, because in working for us, they will some day leave us more time to make science. But finally it is worth remarking that between the two points of view there is no antagonism, and that man having pursued a disinterested aim, all else has been added unto him" (p. 88f.).

Pragmatism, as we have already hinted, has not been content with its humble rôle as a method of clarifying our ideas or testing the truth of our theories. The Pragmatism whose significance for religion is in question is the Pragmatism of the early definitions reinforced by biology, functional psychology, empirical philosophy and humanistic metaphysics. Hence its interest, and the greater weight of its appeal. It is Pragmatism defined by Prof. James as "first, a method; and second, a genetic theory of what is

<sup>9</sup> *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 550

meant by truth" (p. 66), with distinct metaphysical implications, as we shall see. It is Pragmatism described by Mr. Schiller as "a conscious application to epistemology (or logic) of a teleological psychology, which implies, ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic".<sup>10</sup> Pragmatism, in fact, in order to defend its own territory, has naturally been led to wage an offensive warfare. A utilitarian test of truth will obviously be greatly strengthened by a demonstration of the practical or instrumental origin of truth. If truth originates as a means for the control of experience, as an instrument to guide to useful action, then the obvious test of truth will be its success in the accomplishment of its practical purpose. Theories will not only be proved true because they work, but will become true when they work. "Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events" (p. 201). In other words, the true can be construed entirely in terms of the expedient. The true, as already noticed, "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222), and truth therefore, being subordinate to expediency, will look to expediency as its sufficient criterion. It follows also that truth becomes a teleological conception. It is to be defined primarily not as a static relation of our ideas to an already existent reality, but in terms of a purpose yet to be accomplished. So far as the notion of correspondence or agreement is retained, it is to be interpreted, we are told, in a "large loose way" (p. 215).

To establish this position Pragmatism has extended its conquests in two directions, seeking to bring under its sway (1) the realm of facts and (2) the realm of principles. "Wedged tightly" (as we are told the mind is) "between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order" (p. 211), between given facts and necessary principles, Pragmatism has tried to show that neither of these coercions is as rigid as it seems. The facts may be very different when seen from a different viewpoint and for a different purpose, and the "necessary" principles may be

<sup>10</sup> *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, p. 12



primitive guesses or postulates so constantly verified as to have hardened into principles by thought. If over and above the world of finite selves there exists an Absolute being, or independent of our perception or our purpose there exists an ordered cosmos or external world, the relation of knowledge to such a being or such a world will be primarily static rather than dynamic, and the "correspondence theory" of truth will by the very weight of attraction be apt to draw away our allegiance from any subjective test of truth. The great need of man if he is to make his way amid such an environment is to know "things as they are", and theories will be useful in proportion as they are true. It is plainly to the advantage of a doctrine that makes truth consist in utility to do away with the sphere of independent existence or to make it as small as possible. Again the realm of principles will prove refractory to a practical theory of truth if there are self-evident and necessary truths, not of empirical origin, and neither needing nor admitting of confirmation by experience. Some form of empiricism will therefore be more congenial to Pragmatism than an *a priori* view of the principles of knowledge.

In the pragmatic invasion of the two-fold realms of fact and theory, Mr. Schiller and Prof. Dewey have proved able lieutenants to Prof. James. Mr. Schiller's most striking contribution was his brilliant essay on "Axioms as Postulates" in *Personal Idealism* (1902), in which he argued that axioms of thought were as empirical in origin and as much in need of verification as any of the postulates of science or of ordinary life. While avowing his allegiance to the Pragmatism of James, Mr. Schiller gave to his own views the name of Humanism. Humanism may perhaps be regarded as a more genial and glorified Pragmatism, and in spite of the objection to borrowing a name already attached to a great historic movement, it is admirably adapted to describe a doctrine which adopts Protagoras' motto, "Man is the measure of all things", emphasizes the emotional and practical basis of all theorizing, and teaches that human expe-

rience is the most important part, if not the whole, of reality. Mr. Schiller thinks that the older empiricism's account of the origin of axioms is inadequate because it represents the mind as passive—as a mere sheet of paper. Rationalism, on the other hand, cannot be accepted because it ignores the biological and psychological setting of knowledge. The element of truth in the two theories is united in the statement that necessary truths are "prior to experience as postulates". Axioms and postulates differ in age rather than in origin. Some postulates were made so early, worked so admirably, and were so generally accepted, that, in the course of time, they have acquired the supposed marks of *à priori* truth: necessity and universality.

Mr. Schiller recognizes the difficulty of getting the mind started upon its career. There cannot be mind without mental equipment, nor can there be postulation without something to postulate about. He assumes an "actively inquiring mind",<sup>11</sup> and a sort of *ὕλη* or matter which cannot be wholly idealized. The principle of identity is used as his first illustration of the application of his theory. The mind starts, he says, with a "concrete given identity of self-consciousness",<sup>12</sup> but this "proves unequal to the requirements of a social life, and needs on this account to be sublimated and idealized into a concept that transcends the given". In a sort of Platonic myth, he describes the second meeting of Edwin with Angelina, in which, for the first time apparently, Edwin makes the postulate of identity; but before Edwin could assume that a given object was the same he must have had a mind already categorizing objects as the same or different. Without such a capacity to start with it is hard to see how there could be any "actively inquiring mind", distinguishing, comparing and inferring, or in fact any mind at all. The extremes of empiricism and rationalism have this in common that, given the sensational elements of knowledge, the mind, whether a *tabula rasa*

<sup>11</sup> *Humanism*, 1903, p. 357.

<sup>12</sup> *Personal Idealism*, p. 99.

or fully furnished with innate ideas, inevitably construes these elements within the framework of certain principles. These principles belong to the very structure of the mind, or are inevitable and universal ways of grouping sensational elements. In Pragmatism, however, there is something accidental in the growth of these principles of common knowledge. A postulate is something, we are told, growing out of a specific situation and made by an individual. If the same postulate should be made inevitably and by everybody at the very beginning of experience, the postulate would differ only in name from an *a priori* principle. In the accounts of Schiller and James, at any rate, the fundamental postulates which have hardened into axioms of thought were made originally each by some individual and then gained social currency by spreading from mouth to mouth, from mind to mind. James' thesis is that "our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors" (p. 170). More at length he says: "When we look back, and speculate as to how the common-sense categories<sup>13</sup> may have achieved their wonderful supremacy, no reason appears why it may not have been by a process just like that by which the conception due to Democritus, Berkeley or Darwin, achieved their similar triumphs in more recent times. In other words, they may have been successfully *discovered* by prehistoric geniuses whose names the night of antiquity has covered up; they may have been verified by the immediate facts of experience which they first fitted; and then from fact to fact and from man to man they may have *spread*, until all language rested on them and we are now incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms" (p. 182f.).

By analogy we might expect to find some men or races who did not use these principles of common sense, just as there are still some logicians in the pre-darwinian stage of

<sup>13</sup> A list of these is given on p. 173: "Thing; The same or different; Kinds; Minds; Bodies; One Time; One Space; Subjects and attributes; Casual influences; The fancied; The real."

thought and some people even who insist that "the sun do move", but we strongly suspect that such people never existed. The prehistoric genius who discovered the distinction between the same and different, and imposed this distinction upon the thinking of all men for all time, was at any rate greater than Berkeley, Darwin or Democritus. His happy guess was the most important event in the history of thought, but our difficulty is in conceiving how our ancestors who lived before his time did any thinking at all.

Prof. Dewey and his co-laborers of the Chicago school<sup>14</sup> start out from a patient and instructive criticism of current logical theories (Lotze, Bosanquet and Bradley), and find that these assume at the outset a chasm between thought and its object which thought is afterward unable to bridge. The traditional logic of idealism placed empty thought forms over against a sensational matter essentially foreign and forever inaccessible to thought. The result is thus happily expressed elsewhere by Prof. Dewey: "The ancient myth of Tantalus and his efforts to drink the water before him seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern epistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth is the human mind, . . . the more surely the living waters of truth recede."<sup>15</sup> To escape this situation it is insisted that thought and its object are not absolute distinctions, but that each has meaning only as a function within a wider experience; and that the function of thought in its characteristic exercise of judgment is to readjust or transform experience so that a condition of tension or unrest is followed by one of satisfaction or harmony. A concise statement of the more ultimate philosophical bearings of the *Studies* is to be found in the preface. There, after emphasis upon the close connection between the act of knowing and affection, appreciation and practice,—“hence the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology”—Prof. Dewey states as the conviction of himself and his colleagues, “that since Reality must

<sup>14</sup> *Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903.

<sup>15</sup> “Beliefs and Realities”, *Phil Rev.*, March, 1906, p. 113.

be defined in terms of experience, judgment appears accordingly as the medium of thought through which the consciously effected evolution of Reality goes on: that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, etc." (p. x). In common life he shows that the exercise of reflection is to meet some specific difficulty, to bring about some desired end, and he adds that this point of view "knows no fixed gulf between the highest flights of theory and control of the details of practical construction and behavior" (p. 9). This instrumental theory of knowledge or truth is strengthened by an appeal to evolution. "The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its meaning, its character, its value, is known when, and only when, it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation" (p. 15).

Enough has been said to show that Prof. Dewey has presented his theory in an instructive and highly persuasive way. Two points may be singled out for remark, his appeal to science, especially evolutionary science, and his humanistic metaphysics of reality as experience. At first sight, indeed, there is a lack of harmony between the two sides of his theory. If reality is experience, what becomes of the pre-human and pre-organic ages with which geology, for instance, deals? This is a question which Prof. Dewey finds it a little difficult to answer. If reality "must be defined in terms of experience", and judgment is "the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of experience goes on", Prof. Dewey's theory of evolution appears to be not so much one of the evolution of knowledge as of evolution through knowledge. If to be is to be experienced, and reality is transformed through knowledge



there seems to be no place left for the pre-human and pre-experiential evolution of which science treats. While the emergency is met<sup>16</sup> by assuming for the "non-contemporaneously experienced" scientific facts another or secondary kind of reality, "an earlier reality", "the earlier portion, historically speaking, of what later is experience", some doubt of the entire compatability of Prof. Dewey's theory of reality with "reigning biological conceptions" may remain and the consignment forthwith of all rival logical theories to a "pre-evolutionary" stage of thought may appear unwarranted.<sup>17</sup>

It should be noticed that Prof. Dewey's view of reality as experience has been as influential in the development of Pragmatism as his instrumental theory of judgment. It may be said to have become a cardinal doctrine of Pragmatism on its metaphysical or religious side. If reality is experience, and judgment transforms reality, we are ready to believe with Prof. James that "the world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers violence willingly. Man engenders truths upon it" (p. 257). Pragmatism, which was at first "completely genial" (p. 79), entertaining any hypothesis, has now become metaphysical, and therefore interesting. It "concerns the structure of the universe itself", and the universe is said "to be growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work" (p. 259). "All 'homes' are in finite experience: finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope for salvation only from its own intrinsic promises and potencies" (p. 260).

<sup>16</sup> "Reality as Experience": *Journal of Phil.*, etc., May 10, 1906.

<sup>17</sup> In an appreciation of the work of Spencer (*Phil. Rev.*, March, 1904, p. 175), Prof. Dewey says: "A thoroughgoing evolution must by the nature of the case abolish all fixed limits, beginnings, origin, forces, laws, goals. If there be evolution, then all these also evolve, and are what they are as points of origin and of destination relative to some special portion of evolution."

We see how easily Dewey's theory of reality as experience passes into the Humanism of Schiller and the "pluralistic pragmatism" of James. Humanism, with its homeless flux of finite experiences, would seem to set a bar to religion, which asserts a reality over and above the flux; it would seem to defeat the purpose of the *Lectures* to mediate between the scientific or "tough-minded" and the religious or "tender-minded" temperaments. All three of our authorities, however, whether or not with perfect consistency, are ready to defend the legitimacy of religious faith. Prof. James, without coming to terms with the avowed Humanism of his preceding chapter, boldly declares, "I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe" (p. 299). But while Humanism does not exclude religion, as perhaps it might if strictly construed, it determines its form. In a world growing at various points, with finite experiences assuming a semi-creative role; in a world left to work out its own salvation, God may be properly viewed (as Prof. James says that professed monotheism really regards him) "as but one helper, *primus inter pares*, in the midst of all the shapers of the great world's fate" (p. 298). The center of gravity in religion is changed. Instead of human dependence, which cries, "Lord, on thee our souls depend", the emphasis is now on divine dependence. The power, perhaps, as is elsewhere suggested, the purpose of God to achieve the victory of the good needs reinforcement by the faithfulness of man.<sup>18</sup>

These finite experiences, so highly exalted by Pragmatism, may possibly prove a source of embarrassment when their relation to one another is considered. Reality is experience; but whose experience? Doubtless that of A, B, C and all finite selves. But how can B with his experience

<sup>18</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 519. "Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectually faithful to his own greater task?"

become a reality to A? Unless the pragmatist becomes frankly a solipsist, as many of his critics insist that he ought to be, this question may become troublesome for both the metaphysical and the logical sides of his theory. The experience of A cannot enter except as a transcendent factor into the experience of B. Without this factor B can have no knowledge of A's experience, but only perhaps a vague "feelin' for you". In a community of finite selves known to each other, knowledge has already started on the road to transcendence, and for each finite knower reality transcends experience.

For the instrumental logic these other selves also may prove embarrassing. A candidate for office, through his up-to-date campaign manager, makes a thorough canvass of the intention of voters in doubtful states or districts. The aim of the canvass is distinctly practical, but the canvass will be useful only if a true report be rendered. The truth of the canvasser's report will be independent of its usefulness. It will be just as true whether it leads to a dangerous "overconfidence" or to an unwarranted despondency, or whether it leads to the vigorous measures needed to secure victory. The intention of the voters at a given time simply is a fact, whether the manager knows it or whether he likes it or not. It is not changed in one way or another merely by being known,—it is not transformed. The relation, then, of the voters' state of mind and the manager's knowledge is static. The truth of the report will not consist in its utility or lack of it, but simply in its correspondence with the voters' intention. It is not true because useful, but will be useful only in case it is true. Pragmatists are ready to admit that the existence of other selves is a convenient hypothesis; but it would appear that a world of other experiences, existing independently of a given knower, will require a place in logical theory for a purely correspondence view of truth, as much as would a real external world or a real Absolute.

The notion of an external world causes Mr. Schiller some

trouble. The assumption of ordinary experience of an "external world" "works splendidly" (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 459), but since the whole is an "intra-experiential affair" (James), our terms must be interpreted "pragmatically", i. e., "not too literally" (p. 461). Elsewhere, in speaking of determinism, the author says that a postulate "may continue to be serviceable even after it has been discovered to be false" (p. 397). What then becomes of serviceability as a criterion of truth? Plainly, it must not be pushed too far: its edge must not be turned against a humanistic metaphysic which says "Reality is experience" (p. 463). In an earlier chapter he says that "to recognize the pragmatic reality of an unpleasant fact means nothing metaphysical, and entails no serious consequences" (p. 189). One is in doubt whether to infer that there is a realm of truth sacred from profanation by the pragmatic test, or whether, if this test is the only one, there is no reliable means of distinguishing between the doctrines that are serviceable and true and those that are serviceable and false. Mr. Schiller suggests that the reality of our present world may finally vanish like that of the dream world when we wake. He also says that "'pragmatic' recognition of the external world may not be final, because it does not serve our ultimate purposes" (p. 203). But if all the theories which work splendidly now can be appealed to the august but rather shadowy tribunal of final or ultimate utility, we are left for the present with no very workable test of truth.

Pragmatism, full-grown and fully armed, is not as we have seen, a single or simple doctrine. Among elements entering into the making of it may be mentioned the dominating influence of the evolution theory, the rise of a functional psychology, the alleged inadequacy of the older logics, the failure of the current philosophies to satisfy personal needs and aspirations, the extraordinary progress of modern science as contrasted with an apparent deadlock in philosophy, the development of a non-euclidean geometry, the discovery of chemical elements which seemed to throw

doubt upon accepted generalizations, the theological influence of Kant especially as mediated through Ritschl, the practical spirit of the age, and possibly the tendency of human nature to disparage metaphysics as so much barren logomachy, but not to be quite content without a metaphysic of one's own. But while these elements were in solution and ready to crystalize into a new philosophy, it would be unjust and ungracious in dealing with a doctrine of Humanism to deny full recognition to the personal influences through which the crystallization has taken place—the brilliant dialectics of Schiller, the literary grace of Dewey, and, above all, the moral earnestness and picturesque persuasiveness of James. Whether the three stars in this galaxy will long remain in conjunction; whether the influence of Pragmatism upon religious thought will be superficial or profound; whether in its attitude toward religion it will go through the familiar process of developing a left and a right wing; these are questions which the future must decide. In the meantime, we may, in closing this paper, set down in a rather summary and dogmatic fashion what seems to us to be its value and significance for religion.

1. It has done a service to religious thought by vitalizing philosophy and bringing up in a new form and with fresh interest the recurrent problems of human thought, the problems of the one and the many, of being and becoming, of intellectualism and voluntarism, of faith and reason, of empiricism and rationalism, of a utilitarian and an intuitive morality, of a moral monism or dualism of pluralism in the constitution of the universe, of idealism, realism and skepticism, of predestination and free-will.

2. It is the outgrowth and expression of a protest, coming from philosophy itself, of emotional and practical interests against the alleged tyranny of the reason. It champions the rights of personality against the depersonalizing tendency of an empiricism on the one side, which construes it under mechanical categories, and an absolutism on the other, which pretends to transcend it.



3. Its attitude toward religious faith is distinctly friendly, and it has given to faith a new philosophic standing. Against agnosticism, which declares that belief without evidence of a scientific sort is the unpardonable sin, it has asserted the right to believe, at one's risk, in the central affirmations of religion. Faith cannot be the foe of reason because faith is involved in the exercise of reason itself. Interests and emotions, instead of being always sources of error, are in fact the sources of all truth. Both science and religion begin with postulates of faith, and transmute them through the verifications of experience into axioms of reason. "The identity of method in Science and Religion is far more fundamental than their difference" (*Humanism*, p. xv).

4. It should be of service to religion so far as it protests against verbal quibbles and against a one-sided intellectualism; so far as it decries, like the practical St. James of Scripture, a dead orthodoxy, a faith that makes no difference to conduct or any doctrine which is not alike "the child of faith and the mother of duty", and so far as it insists that religious truths are truths to live by. While discarding all authority, all absolute truth, it claims a close kinship with Christianity.

Over against these aspects of Pragmatism which are favorable to religion may be mentioned some points of apparent weakness or inadequacy to meet religious needs.

1. Its religious appeal is to a rather narrow circle of minds, to those so buoyant and self-reliant that in a "vulnerable" universe, a universe with only a "fighting chance", they feel that they can fight its battles not so much with Divine assistance as by giving aid to the Divine. Since its appeal is to a moral aristocracy of the strong and the robustious, and it comes not to call sinners but the righteous, and confesses that it "has no saving message for incurably sick souls"<sup>19</sup> it can hardly be that "finally victorious way of

<sup>19</sup> *Journal of Phil.*, etc., IV, p. 20.

looking at things" which James says "will be the most completely *impressive* way to the normal run of minds" (p. 38).

2. With this very problem of "sick souls" its dealing is inadequate. It is indeed a distinction of Pragmatism that its leading advocate has grappled with the problem of pain and suffering, with the "tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed" (p. 21) facts of experience. Every reader must admire Prof. James' sympathetic touch as he deals with these facts, and must applaud his protest against an easy-going optimism which overlooks them, and a callous indifference which is unmoved by them. It may still, however, be suggested that a still more radical empiricism might face the facts of sin and moral disorder even more boldly, and that a religious doctrine which is to be true because in the highest degree useful, must call sinners as well as the righteous, and must offer some remedy for sick souls. The facts of pain and suffering, as construed by a writer quoted on page 22, "invincibly prove religion a nullity". Prof. James, facing these same facts, makes the venture of faith and believes in a religion of meliorism; that the world, though now in a state of flux, without elephant or tortoise to rest on, can yet be made better if the power (and purpose?) of God are reinforced by the moral energy of man. Why may not a still stronger faith, facing steadily the same facts, so "tangled, muddy and perplexed", make the great venture and cry, "Who shall separate us from the love of God?" and assert a universe built on "rocks all the way down?"

3. The central convictions of the religious and moral life are man's dependence on God and man's responsibility to God. For neither of these does "pluralistic pragmatism" provide an adequate basis. If an *ad hominem* argument may be admissible, it cannot be denied that coincident with the growth of Prof. James's Pragmatism there has been a modification, if not a decline, in the quality of his theism. In place of the doctrine of God as the "Great Companion" (*Psychology*), or as the "Infinite demander" (*Will to Believe*), in place of the ethics of "infinite and mysterious obli-

gation from on high", we have vague hints of polytheism, suggested limitations upon Deity, expediency exalted as the highest category in morals, and a world where there is no guarantee of the final victory of the Good. The motive in all this has doubtless been to vindicate the value and significance of the finite moral struggle, as against forms of Absolutism which reduce finite experience to illusion or deprive the moral life of its meaning. But surely it must not be necessary to destroy or weaken obligation in order to vindicate freedom. Freedom, in fact, in its moral aspects, is but the corollary of obligation. "If the (moral) foundations are destroyed, what shall the righteous do?"

The religious limitations of Pragmatism are best expressed in Prof. James' own words. Here, as we have found elsewhere, he is his own most searching critic. With a deep moral insight and with admirable frankness, he declares, in contrasting theism with materialism, that the notion of God "guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it, to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. . . . Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope" (pp. 106, 107). The ontologic thirst of religion is just this need of an immortal love, of a power that can save and can assure the victory of the good, of an eternal moral order, and this need, it must be admitted, neither a flexible truth, nor an evolution without laws or goal, nor a universe ultimately dependent on man, can adequately supply.

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## THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE WESTMINSTER "SHORTER CATECHISM".

No catechism begins on a higher plane than the Westminster "Shorter Catechism". Its opening question, "What is the chief end of man?" with its answer, "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever",—the profound meaning of which Carlyle said grew to him ever fuller and richer with the years—sets the learner at once in his right relation to God. Withdrawing his eyes from himself, even from his own salvation, as the chief object of concern, it fixes them on God and His glory, and bids him seek his highest blessedness in Him.

The Shorter Catechism owes this elevated standpoint, of course, to the purity of its reflection of the Reformed consciousness. To others, the question of questions might be, What shall I do to be saved? and it is on this plane that many, or rather most, of the Catechisms even of the Reformation begin. There is a sort of spiritual utilitarianism, a divine euthumia, at work in this, which determines the whole point of view. Even the Heidelberg Catechism is not wholly free from this leaven. Taking its starting point from the longing for comfort, even though it be the highest comfort for life and death, it claims the attention of the pupil from the beginning for his own state, his own present unhappiness, his own possibilities of bliss. There may be some danger that the pupil should acquire the impression that God exists for his benefit. The Westminster Catechism cuts itself free at once from this entanglement with lower things and begins, as it centers and ends, under the illumination of the vision of God in His glory, to subserve which it finds to be the proper end of human as of all other existence, of salvation as of all other achievements. To it all things exist for God, unto whom as well

as from whom all things are; and the great question for each of us accordingly is, How can I glorify God and enjoy Him forever?

When we ask after the source of this question and answer, therefore, it is an adequate response to point simply to the Reformed consciousness. It is not merely in this place that this consciousness comes to peculiarly clear expression in the Westminster formularies, which the time and circumstances of their composition combined to make the most complete and perfect exposition of the Reformed mode of conception as yet given confessional expression. It is interesting, however, to go behind this general response and seek to trace the influences by which the literary form of this expression of the Reformed consciousness has been determined. If we ask after its source, in this sense, it is quite evident that we must say that its proximate source is the corresponding question and answer in the Larger Catechism, the preparation of which immediately preceded that of the Shorter Catechism, and a simple—and often most felicitous—condensation of which the Shorter Catechism, in its general structure and specific statements, is largely found to be. The question in the Larger Catechism takes the form, "What is the chief and highest end of man?" and the answer, correspondingly, "Man's chief and highest end is to glorify God, and fully to enjoy Him forever." This differs from the statement of the Shorter Catechism only by an expansion of the simple idea by means of phrases which, while meant to strengthen and enrich, perhaps rather weaken the effect—illustrating aptly Emerson's dictum concerning the fat and the sinew of speech.

The ultimate source of the declaration is almost as easily identified as its proximate source. This must undoubtedly be found in John Calvin, who, in his *Institutes* and in his *Catechisms* alike, placed this identical idea in the forefront of his instruction. One of the first duties to which Calvin addressed himself on coming to Geneva was to provide the Church there with a brief compend of religious truth, drawn



up on the basis of his *Institutes*, which had been published the year before. This compend was already in 1537 made public in its French form,<sup>1</sup> and it was rendered into Latin in the spring of the following year.<sup>2</sup> Its first section bears the heading: "That all men are born to know God";<sup>3</sup> and its first paragraph runs as follows: "Since there is no one of men to be found, no matter how barbarous and altogether savage, who is not touched by some religious notion,<sup>4</sup> it is clear that *we are all created to this end, that we should know the majesty of our Creator; and knowing Him, should hold Him in esteem, and honor Him with all fear, love and reverence.*"<sup>5</sup> And its last paragraph runs as follows: "It is necessary, then, that *the principal care and solicitude of our life should be to seek God and to aspire to Him with all affection of heart and not to rest anywhere save in Him.*"<sup>6</sup> However catechetical in intention, this document, it will be perceived, was not at all what we know as a catechism in form. It requires mention here, however, as the foundation-stone in the edifice of Reformed catechetics; although it was soon supplanted in Geneva itself by the document which has for three hundred and fifty years been known affectionately throughout the whole Reformed world as "Calvin's Catechism". This new formulary was published in French and Latin in 1545 and entered at once upon a world-wide mission. Translated

<sup>1</sup> *Instruction et Confession de Foy, dont on use en Leglise de Geneve.* (Opp. xxii, pp. 4 sq.)

<sup>2</sup> *Catechismus, sive Christianae Religionis Institutio ecclesiae Genevensis, etc.* (Opp. v, 313 sq.)

<sup>3</sup> In the Latin: "born for religion."

<sup>4</sup> Latin, "sense".

<sup>5</sup> We have rendered the French; the Latin—which was more broadly known—runs as follows: "Quum nemo hominum reperiatur, quamlibet barbarus sit ac toto pectore efferatus, qui non aliquo afficiatur religionis sensu: nos in hunc finem creatos omnes esse constat, ut majestatem agnoscamus creatoris nostri, agnitam suspiciamus, omniique et timore, et amore, et reverentia colamus."

<sup>6</sup> The Latin runs: Haec igitur praecipua vitae nostrae cura et sollicitudo sit oportet, Deum quaerere et ad eum omni animi studio adspirare, nec alibi nisi in ipso acquiescere

into Italian, Spanish, English, German, Dacian-Roumanian, Hungarian, and even Greek and Hebrew (including German-Hebrew), it rapidly penetrated every corner of the Reformed world. At least thirteen editions of it in English had been printed before the Westminster Assembly convened. This is the way its opening questions stand in the old-English translation: "What is the principall and chief end of man's life? To know God. What moveth thee to say so? *Because He hath created us and placed us in this world to set foorth his glorie in us;* And it is good reason that we employ our whole life to his glorie, seeing he is the beginning and fountaine thereof. What is, then, *the chief felicitie of man?* *Even the self-same:* I meane to know God and to have his glorie shewed foorth in us. Why dostest thou call this man's chief felicitie? Because that without it, our condition or state were more miserable than the state of brute beastes. Hereby then we may evidently see that there can no such miserie come unto man, as not to live in the knowledge of God? That is most certaine. But what is the true and right knowledge of God? When a man so knoweth God, that he giveth him due honour (*sic*). Which is the way to honor (*sic*) God aright? It is to put our whole trust and confidence in him; to studie to serve him in obeying his wil; to call upon him in our necessities, seeking our salvation and all good thinges at his hand; and finally to acknowledge both with hearte and mouth that he is the lively fountaine of all goodnesse."<sup>7</sup> Here the knowledge of God is presented as the chief end and highest good of man;<sup>8</sup> and this knowledge of God is resolved into the glorification of God in us,<sup>9</sup> which again is

<sup>7</sup> We have quoted from Dunlop's *Collection*, vol. II, 1722, pp. 141-2. The Catechism is printed also in Bonar's *Catechisms of the Scottish Reformation*, 1866. The French and Latin texts may be consulted in Calvin's *Opp.* vi, pp. 9 sq.

<sup>8</sup> Latin: *praecipuus finis*, and *summum bonum*. French: *la principale fin de la vie humaine*, and *le souverain bien des hommes*.

<sup>9</sup> Latin: *quo glorificetur in nobis*. French: *pour estre glorifié en nous*.

resolved into our trusting Him, appealing to Him, seeking salvation in Him and finding all good things in Him. That is as much as to say that we exist but to glorify and enjoy Him. What is common to both forms of Calvin's catechetical instruction is, thus, that they alike open with the declaration that men have been created for the very end of knowing God, and in knowing Him of glorifying Him, and in glorifying Him of finding their happiness in Him. Here is the root which has borne the fruit of the opening question of the Westminster Catechism.

The late Dr. A. F. Mitchell has, indeed, suggested that we may go behind even Calvin. "The first question or interrogation," he says,<sup>10</sup> "which does not seem to have appeared in the former draft of the committee, is taken from the old English translation of Calvin's Catechism, 'What is the principal and chief end of man's life?' " But the source of the answer to this question he does not consider so simple. "The answer to this question," he suggests, "may be said to combine the answers to Question 3rd in the Catechisms of Calvin and Ames, 'To have His glory showed forth in us', and 'in the enjoying of God', and it may have been taken from them; or the first part may have been taken from Rogers, Ball, or Palmer, and the second from one of the earliest catechisms of the Swiss Reformation, viz., that of Leo Judae, published at Zürich before 1530". If this answer goes back to a period before 1530, it goes, of course, behind Calvin, the earliest of whose Catechisms was not published before 1537, and the first edition of whose *Institutes* itself not before 1536.

It is quite tempting indeed to refer it to Leo Judae's Latin Catechism, the citation from which given by Dr. Mitchell is strikingly like the Shorter Catechism definition. It runs as follows and Dr. Mitchell is fully justified in speaking of it as important in this connection: "Q. Tell me, please, for what end was man created? A. That we may recog-

<sup>10</sup> *The Westminster Assembly, etc.* (Baird Lecture for 1882), ed. 2, Philadelphia, 1897, p. 432.

nize the majesty and goodness of God, the Creator, all good, all great, all wise; and finally enjoy Him forever."<sup>11</sup> But quite apart from the reference of the Shorter Catechism definition to this response as its source, Dr. Mitchell's dating is at fault. We do indeed owe to Leo Judae the first important Catechism produced by Reformed Switzerland. This was not, however, his Latin Catechism from which Dr. Mitchell quotes, but his Larger German Catechism,<sup>12</sup> which does not contain anything corresponding to these words. Nor was even it published "before 1530", but not before January, 1534,<sup>13</sup> while the Shorter German Catechism (1541)<sup>14</sup> followed upon the Latin Catechism and derives from it. The Latin Catechism<sup>15</sup> was prepared for the use

<sup>11</sup> Q. Dic, sodes, ad quem finem homo creatus est? R. Ut optimi, maximi ac sapientissimi Dei Creatoris maiestatem ac bonitatem agnoscamus, tandemque illo aeternum fruamur.

<sup>12</sup> *Catechismus. Christliche klare und einfalte zñleitung in den Willenn vñnd in die Gnad Gottes, darinn nit nur die Jugend sunder auch die Eltern vñnderricht, wie sy ire kind in den gebotten Gottes, inn Christlichem glauben, zñnd rechtem gebätt vñnderweysen mögend. Geschriben durch Leonem Jude, diener des worts des Kilchen Zürich.*

<sup>13</sup> It contains a preface by Bullinger, dated January 3, 1534. On Leo Judae's Catechisms see C. Pestalozzi (1860), in ix. 1 of Hagenbach's *Leben und ausgewählte Schriften der Väter und Begründer der reformirten Kirche*, 10, pp. 56 sq., with the relevant notes on pp. 101 sq.; M. A. Gooszen, *De Heidelbergsche Catechismus. Textus Receptus met toelichtende Texten* (1890), pp. 35 sq.; A. Lang, *Der Heidelberger Katechismus und vier verwandte Katechismen u. s. w.* (1907), pp. xx sq.

<sup>14</sup> *Der kurtzer Catechismus. Ein kurtze Christliche underweysung der jugend in erkanntnuß vñnd gebotten Gottes, im glauben, im gebätt, und anderen notwendigen dingen, von den Dieneren des worts zu Zürich gestellt in fragens wysz.—Getruckt zu Zürich by Augustin Friesz, im Jar als man salt M. D. XLI.* It was prepared in accordance with a request from the Zurich Synod of October, 1534 (Pestalozzi, pp. 60 and 102), and although a long, is yet in comparison with the earlier Catechism, a brief document. A. Lang (pp. xxxii sq.) argues that it must have been published as early as 1535 and thus predates the Latin Catechism. But his reasons are not convincing and the phenomena appear to be best accounted for by assuming that both documents were in course of preparation simultaneously and influenced each other. The earliest known issue is from 1541.

<sup>15</sup> *Catechismus. Brevissima Christianae formula, instituendae juventutis Tigurinae catechizandisque rudibus aptata, adeoque in communem*

of the youth in the Latin School at Zurich, and Leo Judæ quite frankly explains, in a dedication prefixed to it addressed to Johannes Fries, the rector of that school, that he has freely used in compiling it, "certain *Institutes* of the Christian religion lately (*nuper*) composed by John Calvin", that is to say, Calvin's earlier Catechism, which was published under this title. On the strength of the word "lately" in this dedication, it has been usual to assign this Latin Catechism to 1538, or at latest 1539.<sup>16</sup> There can be no question, therefore, that Leo Judæ derives the sentence which Dr. Mitchell quotes from him from Calvin's first Catechism, which he here reduces to catechetical form<sup>17</sup> and redacts to suit his purpose. What interests us most is to observe how, in doing so, he falls upon a form of words which was almost exactly repeated by the Westminster Divines a century later. For the rest, it is also interesting to observe how the same ideas appear in the Shorter German Catechism which was in preparation simultaneously with this Latin Catechism, although it seems not to have been published until a couple of years later. Here they are very much expanded, but preserve the same tone. The Catechism opens with the question, "Since thou art a rational creature, that is to say, a human being, tell me who made thee?" to which the answer is returned: "God made me." Then follows: "How and whereto?" "When I had no existence, He made me, out of goodness and grace, moved thereto by nothing but His unspeakable goodness, that I might be partaker of His great riches and all His goods."<sup>18</sup>

*omnium piorum utilitatem excusa. Tiguri apud Christophorum Frobenium.*

<sup>16</sup> Pestalozzi, p. 103; Gooszen, p. 43; Lang, p. xxxii.

<sup>17</sup> Leo Judæ put it into the form of question and answer, which, it will be remembered, Calvin had not done (cf. Pestalozzi, p. 63). It will be borne in mind that the two German Catechisms appeared in German only: there was no Latin version of them (cf. Pestalozzi, p. 101).

<sup>18</sup> Leermeister: Diewyl du ein vernünfftige creatur vnd geschopft, nämlich ein mensh bist, so sag mir wär hat dich geschaffen? Kind: God hat mich geschaffen. (2) L.: Wie, und warzu? K.: Do ich nut vun nienen was, hat er mich vsz siner gute vnd gnad erschaffen darzu



And after a lengthy and very beautiful exposition of what it is to be made in God's image, the question is returned to (Q. 7): "To what end did God make thee?—that thou shouldst be always here in this world?" and the answer is given: "The end for which man was created is God,—that he should learn to know Him, love Him alone above all things, and, after this time, enjoy Him forever, in eternal life. Wherefore I should with my heart rise above all creatures, and cling alone to God my Creator."<sup>19</sup> Certainly, if Leo Judae rests on Calvin, he knows how to give the richest expression to the thoughts derived from Calvin, and quite justifies his own description of himself as a bee which, going from flower to flower, gathers the honey for himself. By this beautiful description of the destination of man we are prepared to arrive shortly (Q. 18) at this equally beautiful definition of God, which also has its roots in Calvin: Q. 18. "Tell me what is God?" A. "God is an inexpressible, inexhaustible fountain of all that is good. What we lack we should seek in Him alone; of what afflicts us we should complain to Him alone; to Him alone should we flee in all times of need, in Him alone should we seek help, comfort, shelter and defence. As He has promised to be our God, that is that He will give us all that is good and save us from all that is evil, we should hold and recognize Him as such and trust Him for it."<sup>20</sup>

jn nut bewegt hat dann sin vnuszsprächliche gute, dasz ich siner grossen rychtigen vnd aller siner guten teilhaft wurde.

<sup>19</sup> L.: Zu was end hat dich Gott geschaffen? solt du allweg hie syn in diser walt? K.: Das end darzu der mensch geschaffen ist, ist Gott, den sol er lernen erkennen, jn ob allen dingen allein lieben vnd jn nach diesem zyt in ewigem leben ewigklich niessen. Darum sol ich alle creaturen mit dem hertzen überstygen, vnn Gott minem schöpffer allein anhangen.

<sup>20</sup> Gott ist ein vnuszsprächlicher vnerschöpflicher brunn alles guten. Was vns mangelt söllend wir by jm allein suchen: was vns truckt söllend wir jm allein klagen, zu jm allein söllend wir in allen noten louffen, by jm allein söllend wir hilff, trost, schutz, vnn schirm suchen. Wie er uns verhetzt er wolle vnser Gott syn, das ist, er wolle vns alles guts geben, und alles ubels ledig machen, also sollern wir jn darfur haben vnn erkennen, vnd söllend jm des vertruwen, Psal lxxxi. xci.

It is not to be imagined, of course, that these ideas were the invention of Calvin. They were the property of every Christian heart and especially of all who had learned in the school of Augustine—which is as much as to say of all the leaders of the Reformation movement, whether of high or of low degree. It could not be but that they should find some expression, therefore, apart from Calvin, and even before Calvin, in the numerous catechetical manuals which the new teachers prepared for the instruction of the people. We find, therefore, among the large number of catechisms which begin with questions bringing out what it is to be a Christian, now and then one which carries back the thought to creation itself and begins with making an effort to explain to the people what it is to be a creature of God. "A little book in questions and answers" was printed, for example, somewhere in the middle of the 'twenties (1522-1526), by a certain Petrus Schultz, possibly for the people of Lemgo—but we really know nothing of the man or his flock—which opens as follows: "What art thou? I am a creature. What is a creature? What is made out of nothing. Who made thee? He who is almighty and eternal. For what did He make thee? For His kingdom and to do His will."<sup>21</sup> About the same time—or a little later—a schoolmaster of Rothenburg, Valentin Ickelsamer by name, was printing beautiful dialogues for the instruction of children in the great art of knowing themselves and living worthily. One of these, a dialogue between Margaret and Anna, opens thus:<sup>22</sup> "Margaret: What art thou? Anna: A rational creature of God, a human being. M.: How

<sup>21</sup> F. Cohrs, *Die evangelischen Katechismusversuche vor Luthers Enchiridion* (in the *Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica*, edited by Karl Kehrbach, vols. XX-XXIV), vol. II (XXI), 1900, p. 211. Cohrs says (p. 209): "Of no catechism do we know so little as of that of Petrus Schultz. We neither know anything certain of the life of the author . . . nor do we know anything of either when it was printed or where it was used."

<sup>22</sup> Cohrs, as cited, I (xx), pp. 138-9. Ickelsamer holds an honorable place in the history of German paedagogy. See Vogel, *Leben und Verdienste V. Ickelsamers*, Leipzig, 1894.

didst thou become a human being and come into existence?  
 A.: God made me and placed a living soul in my flesh, that in this house of exile,<sup>23</sup> born on the earth, it might long after God its creator and apprehend Him".<sup>24</sup> Sometimes the two lines of thought are united, with more or less felicity. Thus no less a man than Johannes Brenz, in no less a book than that which has sometimes (though, of course, with only relative accuracy) been called "the first Protestant Catechism" — the *Fragestück des Christlichen Glaubens* of 1528, designed for young children, and hence called the *Catechismus Minor*—begins thus: "What art thou? According to the first birth, I am a rational creature or human being, made by God;<sup>25</sup> but according to the new birth, I am a Christian."<sup>26</sup> And this opening is almost exactly repeated in a later Catechism of Kaspar Grater's (1537): "What art thou, my dear child? According to the first birth I am a rational creature or human being, made by God, but according to the new birth, I am a Christian";<sup>27</sup> as also, in a still later one by Johann Meckhart (*circa*. 1553 +): "What art thou, my child? According to the first birth, I am a rational creature, a human being, made by God, but according to the second<sup>28</sup> and new birth, I am a Christian."<sup>29</sup> In Bartholomeus Rosinus' *Short Questions and Answers*, printed in Regensburg in 1581, this double answer still stands, but is diverted from its original purpose and conformed in both elements to the current soteriological motive: "Dear child, what art thou? By reason of<sup>30</sup> the bodily birth, I am a condemned sinner, but

<sup>23</sup> Elends, 'exile' or 'misery'. Is there some Origenism here?

<sup>24</sup> sich nach Gott jrem schöpffer sehnen vnd in erkennen solte

<sup>25</sup> The close resemblance of this to the opening of Valentin Ikel-samer's dialogue should not pass unobserved.

<sup>26</sup> Cohrs, III, 146

<sup>27</sup> Reu, *Quellen zur Geschichte der Katechismus-unterrichts*. Vol. I, 1904, p. 315. On Brenz and Grater and the relation of their catechisms see also Cohrs, III, 130, II, 313, 316.

<sup>28</sup> Andern.

<sup>29</sup> Reu, p. 820.

<sup>30</sup> Halben.

by reason of the spiritual re-birth. I am a saved Christian."<sup>81</sup> We may perhaps look upon this as a reminiscence of the old Brentzian formula, rephrased under the influence of the prevalent method of catechizing. Other examples of the mixture of the two motives may be found in the Catechisms of Kaspar Loener (1529) and Jacob Othor (1532), in both of which the idea of the likeness of God is emphasized. The former of these begins as follows: "What art thou? I am a Christian man and a child of God. Whence is man? God made man out of the earth, after His image. How is man God's image? When he is righteous. What man, however, is righteous? He who does righteousness and avoids unrighteousness."<sup>82</sup> The latter begins as follows: "What art thou? I am a human being. How dost thou know this? Thus, that I am unrighteous, a sinner and nothing worth. Who made thee? God the Almighty who made the heavens and earth and all things. How did He make thee? After His image. What is the image of God? It is righteousness, holiness, truth, eternal joy and blessedness."<sup>83</sup> Instances such as these of the utilization of the conception which dominates Calvin's Catechisms are clearly more interesting than significant. It may possibly be that Leo Judae knew some of these earlier efforts to prepare spiritual food for the babes of the flock. He was a very busy bee and ranged far for his honey: Bullinger, in the preface he prefixed to Leo Judae's earliest Catechism, tells us that "he did not despise the work of other true and learned servants in the Gospel of Christ"; and "made no shame of transcribing and adopting from them into his own what he found most suitable, as indeed not only the most learned of the ancient doctors did, but also the holy prophets". One would like to think he may have known the dialogues of Valentin Ickelsamer, and one can scarcely doubt that he knew the Smaller Catechism

<sup>81</sup> Reu, p. 743.

<sup>82</sup> Cohrs, III. 471.

<sup>83</sup> Reu, I. 362.

of Brenz: and if he knew them he may well have more or less drawn from them. But it is clear that his main source for these questions, not only in his Latin, but also in his Shorter German Catechism, was Calvin. And we can scarcely suppose Calvin, who obviously is going his own way, was influenced by these earlier manuals.

Calvin, then, it is evident, is the ultimate source of the opening question and answer of the Westminster Shorter Catechism. If Leo Judae is to come into consideration at all, it is only as an intermediary between Calvin and the Westminster formularies. Leo Judae is not, however, the only intermediary which must come into consideration when we begin to ask whether the language of the Westminster Catechisms may not be modified by some of Calvin's successors. There are, for example, the series of Catechisms which were published by John à Lasco in London, and which present very interesting modifications of Calvin's treatment of this topic. Three of these are of interest to us. The first was prepared by Laski for the Friesian Church as early as 1546, but was first printed, in Dutch, by Jan Utenhove, an elder of the Foreign Church of London, in 1551. The second—a much briefer one—was the production on Laski's model of another of Laski's London helpers, Marten Microen (Micronius), and was first printed, in Dutch, at London in 1552. The third, which was in effect an abridgment of the Catechism of 1551, was prepared for the Church at Embden and was first printed in the autumn of 1554, continuing in use until our own day.<sup>34</sup> The opening words of the first of these Catechisms,<sup>35</sup> which we may call the Friesian Catechism, run as follows: "Why has God created man and endowed him with such great gifts of understanding above all other

<sup>34</sup> For à Lasco's catechisms see Lang, pp. xxxix sq.; Goosgen, pp. 55 sq.

<sup>35</sup> *De Catechismus, oft Kinder leere, diemen te Londen, inde Duytsche ghemeente, is ghebruyckende . . . Ghedruct tot Londen, by Steven Myerdmā. An. 1551. Printed by A. Kuyper Joannis à Lasco Opera, etc., vol. II, 1866, pp. 340 sq.*



creatures? That he might learn to know aright his God and creator, love, fear, laud and praise Him and so become sharer in all His goods."<sup>36</sup> In the second, Micronius', or, as we may perhaps call it distinctively, the London Catechism,<sup>37</sup> they run: "Whereto hast thou been created by God and placed in the world? In order that my life long I may know and serve God according to the right teaching, and finally may live with Him in heaven forever."<sup>38</sup> And in the third, or, as we may call it, the Embden Catechism,<sup>39</sup> they run: "Whereto hast thou been created a man? That I should be an image of God, and should know, praise and serve my God and Creator."<sup>40</sup> What is most striking in these Catechisms is that in both of the forms which were issued in London for the use of the Dutch Church there—as in Leo Judae's Latin Catechism—the two items of glorifying and enjoying God are brought together: man is on earth primarily to know and serve God, but also to become partaker in His glory and to live with Him forever. It is clear that already by the middle of the sixteenth century there was a tradition growing up in the Catechetical manuals deriving from Calvin's fundamental statement to emphasize these two items: as indeed faithfulness to Calvin's statement required should be done. We need not feel surprise, then, that Dr. A. F. Mitchell<sup>41</sup> is able to quote

<sup>36</sup> Kuyper, p. 355: Dat hi sijnen God ende Shepper recht soude leeren bekennen, beminnen, vreessen, louen, ende prijsen, ende alder sijnder goeden deelachtich wesen soude.

<sup>37</sup> *De Kleyne Catechismus, oft Kinder-leere der Duytscher Ghemeynste, van Londen, de welke nu hier ende daer verstroyt is—Gemaect door Marten Micron.* . . . Ghedruckt by Gellium Ctematium, Anno 1559. Printed by A. Lang, pp 117 sq.

<sup>38</sup> Op dat ick God mijn leuen lanck, ten rechten leere kennen ende dienen: enn eyndelick met hem indem hemel leue in der ewicheyt.

<sup>39</sup> *Catechismus efte Kinderlehre, tho nütze der Jögel in Ostfrieslant dorch de Deners des hilligen Godtlicken Wordes tho Embden. Appel korteste vernalet. Ghedruckt te Embden by? Anno MDLIV. Octob. 10.* It is printed by Kuyper, II, 495 sq.

<sup>40</sup> Kuyper, p. 501: Dat ick ein Bildt Godes scholde syn, unde mynen Godt unde Schepper scholde erkennen lauen ennde denen.

<sup>41</sup> *Catechisms of the Second Reformation, etc., 1886, p. 3.*

Italian and Spanish examples the language of which comes very close indeed to that of the Westminster Catechisms. "To what end was man created?" is asked in the Italian one, and the answer is "To know and love God and enjoy Him forever",<sup>43</sup> and the Spanish answer is almost as striking.<sup>44</sup>

We are naturally more interested, however, in the tradition as it manifested itself in England and Scotland, where, as we have seen, Calvin's Catechism was much used, and indeed in Scotland formed part of the recognized formularies of the Church. This tradition is very rich, and takes many variations upon itself in the hands of the several teachers who attempted to draw up manuals for the instruction of youth. In Scotland, from the Reformation down there was in use in the grammar schools a *Summula Catechismi*, designed for the training in piety of the youths gathered there, which is supposed to have been the work of Andrew Simpson, master of the grammar school of Perth both before and after the Reformation and first Protestant minister of Dunbar.<sup>45</sup> Its opening questions run: "Who created man? God. How did He create him? Holy and sound and with dominion over the world. For what end was he created? To serve God."<sup>46</sup> Less richly the shorter form of John Craig's Catechism begins by asking: "What are we by nature?" and after answering: "The children of God's wrath", proceeds: "Were we thus created?" to respond: "No, for He made us in His own image."<sup>46</sup> The

<sup>43</sup> "A che fine é creato l'huomo? Per conoscer, amar, et goder eternamente Deo—Gagliardi" (p. 3). Gagliardi's Catechism dates from the 16th century (Mitchell, *Catechisms*, p. xx).

<sup>44</sup> "Para servir a Dios en esta vida e despues della gozarle en la otra eternamente.—Spanish."

<sup>45</sup> It will be found perhaps in its best form in Dr. Bonar's *Catechisms of the Scottish Reformation*, 1866; and also in Dunlop's *Collection*, II, p. 378, cf. p. 14.

<sup>46</sup> "Quis hominem creavit? Deus. Qualem creavit eum? Sanctum et sanum, mundique dominum. In quem usus creatus est? Ut Deo inaserviret."

<sup>47</sup> Bonar, p. 275; Dunlop, II, p. 368.

essence of the matter, however, is still preserved there. The tradition of Andrew Simpson's manual, however, appears to dominate Scottish Catechetics: his method of putting things at least reasserts itself in the Westminster period in a couple of documents issued almost or quite with authority in the Scottish Church. "The A, B, C, or A Catechisme for yong children appoynted by act of the church and councell of Scotland To be learned in all families and Lector Schooles in the said Kingdome" seems to have first appeared in 1641. It opens thus: "Who made man? God. To what estate made he him? Perfectly holy in body and soul."<sup>47</sup> The "New Catechisme according to the Forme of the Kirk of Scotland"—which, as Dr. Mitchell says,<sup>48</sup> "was published in England just before the Assembly entered on this part of its labors"—that is, in 1644—"and ( I can hardly doubt) in the hope that it might tend to facilitate them"—begins thus: "Who made the Heavins and the Earth, and all things contained in them? God. Whereof was man created? Of the earth. To what end was he made? To serve God."<sup>49</sup>

The English tradition takes a slightly different form and keeps closer, on the whole, to Calvin's example. In most of the manuals which begin, after the fashion of Calvin's Catechisms and the best Reformed tradition, with the end of man's existence, the stress is laid on the glorifying of God: and when there is an addition to this it ordinarily takes the form of reference to the securing of salvation. Occasionally the soteriological motive seems to absorb all interest. Thus, for example, in Dr. William Whittaker's *Short Sum of Christianity delivered by way of Catechism* (London, 1630) we read: "What is the only thing whereto all our endeavors ought to be directed? To seek everlasting felicity or salvation in this life, that we may fully enjoy it in the life to come. What is salvation? Perfect happi-

<sup>47</sup> Mitchell, *Catechisms*, pp. 267 sq.

<sup>48</sup> P. xxxiv.

<sup>49</sup> Mitchell, pp. 277 sq.



chisms of this type was undoubtedly the Short Catechism of John Ball, which was published in his early ministry and had reached its nineteenth impression in 1642. Its opening question and answer are: "What ought to be the chiefe and continuall care of every man in this life? To glorifie God and save his soul."<sup>54</sup> Similarly we read in William Syme's *Sweet Milk of Christian Doctrine* (1617): "What is the chief and principal end of our being, etc.? That we may glorify God, and work out our own salvation."<sup>55</sup> And again, in *A Short Catechism for Householders*, published in London, 1624: "What should be the chief desire and endeavor of every Christian in this life? To seek the glory

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<sup>54</sup> Mitchell, p. 65. It is, no doubt, requisite to distinguish between Ball's *A Short Catechism containing the Principles of Religion*, and his larger manual, called *A Short Treatise, containing all the Principal Grounds of Christian Religion*. It is the latter which is perhaps commonly meant when "Ball's Catechism" is spoken of, but it is the former and briefer compend which is quoted here. The larger treatise, however, is simply the smaller one expanded. Incorporating the whole of the smaller one, it follows up each question with additional ones designed to develop more fully its contents. It therefore begins with the same question and answer: "What ought to be the chief and continual care of every man in this life? To glorifie God and save his soul." Then, after developing what is meant by God's glory, it is asked (in the seventh question), "What is it then to glorifie God?" and answered: "To glorifie God is inwardly in heart and outwardly in word and action to acknowledge God to be such an one as he hath revealed himself." Afterward (in the ninth question) it is asked: "What is it to take care of our salvation?" and answered: "To take care of our salvation is so to live here, that we may live with the Lord hereafter." In the next question the reasons why we should take care of our salvation are adduced, among which stand: "(6) The soul came from God, and is after a restlesse manner carried to seek and desire communion with God (7) A desire to be happy is naturally planted in the heart of all men by God himself," and especially "(8) God is infinite in goodness, the highest of all things that are to be desired. Therefore we should earnestly set our affections upon things that are above and infinitely desire the enjoying of God's presence in heaven." It may be questioned whether we need to look beyond this larger form of Ball's Catechism to explain the language of the opening question of the Westminster Catechism and its answer. It is all here in substance. The tenth edition of this Catechism was published in 1635, the fifteenth in 1656.

<sup>55</sup> Mitchell, p. 3.



of God and to obtain happiness and salvation of his own soul."<sup>66</sup> No two Catechisms, probably, are of more significance for the preparation of the Westminster Catechisms than those of Herbert Palmer (ed. 1, 1640; ed. 4, 1644) and of Ezekiel Rogers (1642). The former of these was not only the work of that member of the Westminster Assembly who had most to do with its catechetical labors, but obviously supplied a starting point for them. And the latter, Dr. Mitchell thinks, is on the whole, in its general structure, most like the Westminster Shorter Catechism of all earlier manuals. Both belong to the class we have now under view. Palmer's begins: "What is a man's greatest businesse in this world? A man's greatest businesse in this world is to glorifie God and save his owne soul. How shall a man come to glorifie God and save his owne soul? They that will glorifie God and save their own souls must needs learn to know God and believe in him and serve him."<sup>67</sup> Here is again the very flavor of the Westminster Catechisms. Rogers' begins: "Wherefore hath God given to man a reasonable and an immortall soul? That he above all other creatures should seek God's glory and his own salvation. Where is he taught how this is to be done? In the Scriptures or Word of God."<sup>68</sup>

There was tradition enough, then, beneath the Westminster divines as they sat down to frame the first question and answer of their Catechisms: and we cannot fail to see that they were floating on the bosom of this tradition. The tradition does not, however, quite account for their first question and answer. They must themselves be taken into consideration for that. The third question and answer of Calvin's Catechism was undoubtedly in their minds, and from it they no doubt directly derived the question. It would seem that they got the first half of the answer directly from Palmer. But the second half of his answer

<sup>66</sup> Mitchell, p. lxxxiv.

<sup>67</sup> Mitchell, p. 99.

<sup>68</sup> Mitchell, p. 55.

they improve on. Whence did they draw their improvement? From the third question of William Ames' Catechism: "in the enjoying of God",—as Dr. Mitchell thinks possible?<sup>69</sup> Or "from an Italian Catechism of the sixteenth century", as Dr. Mitchell thought worth suggesting in 1886?<sup>70</sup> Or from Leo Judae, as he thought more likely in 1897?<sup>71</sup> Of the three suggestions the most plausible seems to us to be William Ames, whose work was certainly in the hands of the Divines, and may have suggested this heightening and broadening of the current: "and to save his soul." But, in any event, this heightening and broadening conception was already present in Calvin's Catechism, and it may very well be that there was no conscious dependence here on any intermediary, but the Westminster Divines simply did what Leo Judae, Gagliardi and Ames had done before them—found a felicitous brief expression for Calvin's thought. Or, if we must seek some intermediary between Calvin and the Westminster divines, it would seem enough to bear in mind that Ball's *A Short Treatise* was in the hands of all the members of the Assembly, and provided them with language which asserted it to be the chief duty of man "to glorify God" and "infinitely to desire the enjoyment of God's presence in heaven".

The peculiarity of this first question and answer of the Westminster Catechisms, it will be seen, is the felicity with which it brings to concise expression the whole Reformed conception of the significance of human life. We say the whole Reformed conception. For justice is not done that conception if we say merely that man's chief end is to glorify God. That certainly: and certainly that first. But according to the Reformed conception man exists not merely that God may be glorified in him, but that he may delight in this glorious God. It does justice to the subjective as well as to the objective side of the case. The Reformed con-

<sup>69</sup> *Baird Lecture*, ed. 2, p. 432: *Catechisms*, p. xx.

<sup>70</sup> *Catechisms*, p. xx, meaning Gagliardi: see above.

<sup>71</sup> *Baird Lecture*, ed. 2, p. 632.

ception is not fully or fairly stated if it be so stated that it may seem to be satisfied with conceiving man merely as the object on which God manifests His glory—possibly even the passive object in and through which the Divine glory is secured. It conceives man also as the subject in which the gloriousness of God is perceived and delighted in. No man is truly Reformed in his thought, then, unless he conceives of man not merely as destined to be the instrument of the Divine glory, but also as destined to reflect the glory of God in his own consciousness, to exult in God: nay, unless he himself delights in God as the all-glorious One.

Read the great Reformed divines. The note of their work is exultation in God. How Calvin, for example, gloried and delighted in God! Every page rings with this note, the note of personal joy in the Almighty, known to be, not the all-wise merely, but the all-loving too. Take, for example, such a passage as the exposition of what true and undefiled religion is, which closes the second chapter of the First Book of the *Institutes*. He who comes really and truly to know God, we are here told, rejoices that God is the governor of all things, and flees to Him as his guardian and protector, putting his whole trust in Him. "Because he knows Him to be the author of all good things, whenever he is in distress or want, he flees at once to His protection, sure of His aid; because he is persuaded that He is good and merciful, he relies on Him with assured confidence, doubting not that in His clemency there is prepared a remedy for all his ills; because he recognizes Him as his Lord and Father, he is determined to acknowledge His government in everything, to revere His majesty, to promote His glory, to obey His mandates; because he perceives Him to be a just judge whose severity is armed for the punishment of iniquities, he keeps His tribunal always in view and in fear restrains himself from provoking His wrath. But he is not so terrified by the sense of His justice as to wish to withdraw from it, even were escape possible: he rather loves Him not less as the punisher of the wicked

than as the benefactor of the good, since he understands that it belongs to His glory not less that punishment should be visited upon the impious and abandoned than that the reward of eternal life should be conferred on the righteous. And moreover, it is not alone from dread of punishment that he restrains himself from sinning, but because he loves and reverences God as his Father, and honors and worships Him as his Lord, and even though there were no such thing as hell would abhor offending Him."

It is not, however, Calvin who first strikes this note, and there is another in whose thought God is even more constantly present—Calvin's master, Augustine. This is the burden, for example, of Augustine's *Confessions*, and its classical expression is to be found in that great sentence which sums up the whole of the *Confessions'* teaching: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord: and our heart is restless till it finds its rest in Thee." For there is nothing the soul can need which it cannot find in God. "Let God," he exhorts in another of those great sentences which stud his pages—"Let God be all in all to thee, for in Him is the entirety of all that thou lovest." And then, elaborating the idea, he proceeds: "God is all in all to thee: if thou dost hunger He is thy bread; if thou dost thirst He is thy drink; if thou art in darkness, He is thy light; . . . if thou art naked, He is thy garment of immortality, when this corruption shall put on incorruption and this mortal shall put on immortality."<sup>62</sup> Delight in God, enjoyment of God—this<sup>63</sup> is the recurrent refrain of all Augustine's

<sup>62</sup> *Tract. 13 in Ev. Johan. 5*: Totum sit tibi Deus, quia horum quae diligis totum tibi est.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. J. Martin, *St. Augustine*, p. 238: "To enjoy God, *frui Deo*, is an expression which Augustine adopted from the very beginning of his teaching. He employed it continually: he said 'The soul organizes its life in such a fashion as to be able to enjoy God: for it is thus that it is happy' (*De diversis Quest. lxxxiii* [388-395]. Q xxx: Migne, vi 20)." "The sense of *frui* is clear in itself: Augustine defines it thus: *Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus frui, nisi praesto habere quod diliges* (*De lib. arbitr. I. iii. 4*, Migne, I. 1312)." In the treatise *De Beata Vita*, II. 10, Migne, I. 964, he says that "the really happy man

spirit of God—delight in God here, enjoyment of God hereafter." Would he know the way of life—it would which the good man was to expect after death he tells us we must come to know God and ourselves. God is his love that we may not despair, ourselves is our weakness, that we may not be proud." And would we know what the goal is—what is that but the eternal enjoyment of this God of love? "What he who is good and faithful in these exercises will have passed from this life to the blessed life, then will truly come to pass what is now wholly impossible—that a man may live as he will. For he will not will to live cruelly in the midst of that felicity, nor will he will anything that

enjoys God. The perfect satisfaction of man, that is to say the happy life, consists in knowing perfectly and devoutly by what we are led to the truth, what good we should enjoy, and by what means we are joined to the sovereign good." Cf. *Recurit, Augustinus Solutus* (1867, 22, 226), where also some criticisms are offered. In Augustine's view, however, truth as God is the transcendent value not only for knowledge, but for all action. His common appellation was *Dei in Deo* (X, 114). As the "summum bonum" he is the sole "res" to be enjoyed, all else is to be used. "The things of the world have no end of their own, their end is realized through the overcoming of (independent) existence by means of man, standing between God and the world, to whom is given as his end the enjoyment of the 'Res' which God is."

"Cf. E. Portalié (*Vacant-Mangenot's Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, I, 2454). "The other fathers have exalted the majesty of the power of the Creator. Augustine is the first to be ravished by the beauty of God, *sapientior ad Te decore Tuo* (*Confess.* VII. xvn. 23). No man has ever written on this subject pages so inflamed. This beauty, 'always old and always new', inspires the enraptured flights of the *Soliloquies*, and the passionate cries of the *Confessions*. 'Then saw I in spirit, O my God, Thy invisible beauties in the visible things Thou has summoned from nothing'. And after contemplating them his soul preserves through life a glowing memory of love, '*reddatur solitudo non meum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam*', etc. (*Confess.*, *ibid*). To other minds the spectacle of the world reveals the existence of God; but for him, in this sublime appeal to all created things, it is on the beauty of God that he interrogates them. Their response is an invitation to love God: 'but the heaven and the earth and all that in them is, lo! from every quarter they bid me love Thee' (*Confess.*, X. xv. 8). And he adds that to interrogate them he has only to look upon them: their own beauty is their response."

<sup>20</sup> *De Trinitate*, IV, 1, 2.



shall be lacking, nor shall there be anything lacking which he shall have willed. Whatever shall be loved will be present; and nothing will be longed for which shall not be there. Everything which will be there will be good, and the Supreme God will be the supreme good, and will be present for those to enjoy who love Him; and what is the most blessed thing of all is that it will be certain that it will be so forever."<sup>66</sup>

The distinction of the opening question and answer of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is that it moves on this high plane and says all this in the compressed compass of a dozen felicitous words: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever." Not to enjoy God, certainly, without glorifying Him, for how can He to whom glory inherently belongs be enjoyed without being glorified? But just as certainly not to glorify God without enjoying Him—for how can He whose glory is His perfections be glorified if He be not also enjoyed?

<sup>66</sup> *De Trinitate*, XIII. vii. 10.

*Princeton.*

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## THE FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY IN LIFE AND ITS RELATION TO LEGALISM IN ETHICS AND RELIGION

### METAPHYSICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ASPECT.

My aim is to bring out the problem which urges itself more and more upon the thoughtful mind of to-day: the problem of how to reconcile the strictly personal, individual life-elements with the claims to authority of those universal elements incorporated in tradition, in social institutions, in written and unwritten law.<sup>1</sup> This inquiry is in order in an age of individual assertions and claims, of disruption of systems, of cries of "No dogmas", of subjectivity, of pragmatism, of "Umwertung aller Werte", of the disintegration of all things which claim binding authority save that of the ego; in an age which, disregarding the old New England consideration of all things "with reference to eternity", has come to subject, at least professedly, all things to the final judgment of the self-important ego; in an age of individual pretensions which clamor loudly against the impotent, worn-out, false, mystical, hundredfold-cursed superstitions of former days that cumber the ground over which progress is to march on to higher and better things. In such an age it must be worth our while to reflect on the situation, to find out whether individual sovereignty, personal integrity, cannot be maintained together with the authority of incorporate

<sup>1</sup> The discussion has special reference to the present trend of theological opinion. Quotations are therefore numerous, though they are used as illustrations rather than as authority. Still, the weight of expert opinion, of course, may be used as corroborative evidence in argument. If the essay does not convince, it may at least clarify some notions regarding the subject; or, better still, it may occasion abler scholars to give it deserved attention. For one thing is certain: Authority must become the most vital question for an age which—rightly or wrongly—tends to challenge its established forms.

law.<sup>2</sup> On either side, strong claims are made in behalf of legal authority as well as for individual rights, though the temper and tenor of our age favor the individualistic interpretation of life.<sup>3</sup> Especially is this true in our Republic, founded under the spirit of revolutionary ideas, through sudden break of historic relations practically without tradition, with much of that "assertive democracy" which will recognize no superiors, where the citizen is possessed of a spirit

"That bids him flout the law he makes,

That bids him make the law he flouts".

Morality and religion are of all things asserted to be primarily personal, individual concerns, "Privatsache". And yet, it is exactly in this sphere that legalism is most often complained of as enlisted in the suppression of the individual life by the majority-rule. Legalism, with its outward dictates, has at all times encroached upon the domain of ethical and religious life, though—as Maurice remarks—the conscience is intimately bound up with the "I". If codified standards become rules for individual life, appearances come to play a large part in life. Legalism has a bad

<sup>2</sup> This would bring, if not a solution, at least a reconciliation in the sense of Montesquieu's definition of liberty as "the freedom to do what the law permits" (*Esprit des Lois*, Bk. II, ch. 3). This view is indicated also in the title of Sterrett's recent book *The Freedom of Authority*, in Dr. Oman's *Faith and Freedom*; all these are attempts at reconciliation rather than at solution. Laveleye inclines to the side of authority when he thus defines liberty: "La liberté est le pouvoir de faire tout de qui n'est pas contraire au droit, en pratique tant ce qui n'est pas contraire aux lois." *Le Gouvernement dans la Démocratie*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> In a valuable article in the *Yale Review* of February, 1907, by Professor Garner, of Illinois University, it is stated that the legislative guarantee for individual liberty is a comparatively late appearance. Along with this attention to the individual goes, however, "the tendency since the middle of the nineteenth century, among the states of the civilized world, to push the lines of government farther into the field which the individual under former conditions would have a right to claim as belonging to liberty". This theme is ably treated in a recent inaugural address by Professor H. Krabbe, of Leyden University: *De idee der persoonlijkheid in de staatsleer*.

have especially because of these constant law-a-likes, *nomos* and *religion*, the phrase: "On the one hand, the preservation of the state independence of the individual is his freedom from all restraint is nothing more than a fiction." Nietzsche, the gifted destroyer of all gods and laws, has certainly given a shocking picture of the unlimited individual pretension of his "Herrenmoral".<sup>5</sup> The movement for a return to nature and the individualism of the "Sturm und Drang" period ran its course without much approval. Rousseau's prize essay on the question: *Have the Sciences Contributed to Purify or to Corrupt the Morality of Mankind?* aimed to establish the latter point with more passion and eloquence than calm reasoning. After the appearance of many treatises on the limitation of the authority of the law and of the state, have come discussions as to the "limits of individual liberty".<sup>6</sup> Schiller, in a distich on the Werther-like sceptic of passion, who aims at the realization of unlimited autonomy of the inborn "I", without any outward restraints whatever, characterized fitly its prototype: "For every character has the right of existence; only inconsistency is not allowed."<sup>7</sup> Rousseau, declaring the individual a sovereign law unto himself, does not allow any supposed submission of personal interest to the general welfare of mankind. His motto is: "The individual above society." The regulations of society are to be burst asunder, and an abrupt return to nature is proclaimed as the cure for all evils. Such a naive conception of individualism makes him ignore the historic develop-

<sup>5</sup> The remarkable development of this legalistic religion is finely portrayed in Schürer's *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*. (See chapter, "Life under the Law".)

<sup>6</sup> *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*. Nietzsche's Werke. Band VII.

<sup>7</sup> Montague's *Limits of Individual Liberty*, Lacy's *Liberty and Law*, and Ritchie's *Principles of State Interference* are fruitful discussions in this field. J. S. Mill, in his famous treatise, feels that individual liberty must be limited to actions of a "self regarding class", however difficult they are to define.

<sup>8</sup> "Denn Recht hat jeder Character

Es giebt kein Unrecht als der Widerspruch."

ment of society and raise the cry to repeal the "social contract". This anarchistic self-rule, however, has likewise been turned to ridicule and held up for opprobrium. "Anarchy is the permanent liberty of change, it is the elevation of change into law as need or caprice will have it", is the definition given in an anarchistic periodical. Or, as some one has said, "Anarchism is the acute outbreak of individualism".

In learning to understand both view-points, the one desiring to regulate the life of the individual by an expressed, outward authority or law, the other claiming for the individual autonomy on the ground of individual sovereignty, we may find a common ground on which to meet the problems involved in the conflict. For where conflicts rage, problems are involved. Instead of arguing, therefore, one case at the cost of the other, we shall attempt a solution of the difficulty by a close interpretation of each view, endeavoring to find a universal element in the individual and an individual element in the universal. If legalism be the expression in society of a multiple individual experience, made regulative for the individual, we shall need to inquire into the organic relation between the two elements, viz., the personal equation and the larger experience of racial wisdom, which assumes the right of regulative law over the single life in its moral and religious functions. In the analysis of this question, light may be thrown on the nature of legalism. Legalism functions instrumentally in the moral life of man. Accumulated, congealed morality, objectified deposits from most variegated single sources, it is the historic object-lesson by which man learns to discern the Authority of all authority. In the recognition of the forms of authority the exercise of faith is involved. However reasonable, however natural, however inevitable, therefore, the recognition of the forms of authority may be, reason can never render an exhaustive account of life's "grammar of assent". Sabatier in his able discussion, *Religions of Authority*, assumes that this can be done. But he can do this



only because his final authority is humanity, the last sanction of morality and religion being found in humanity, the source from which it springs, and its final aim. This view is characteristic of France. It is Comte's cult of humanity revived in a disguised form. And this is the fatal fault under which this valuable treatise labors. For Sabatier is right in not recognizing on such a presupposition any final or absolute authority. There is no absolute and final authority when we do not touch somehow in its forms the Absolute from which all authority is derived. When the ontological implications of the moral and religious life are discarded, the rejection of the metaphysical aspect of religion necessarily follows. This position undermines religion by disowning the real, objective authority lying back of all faith. Sabatier therefore always remains in the sphere of human or derived authority. He expresses himself in his Introduction as follows: "Authority is a necessary function of the species, and for very self-preservation it watches over that offspring in whom its life is prolonged." "Social authority and individual autonomy are not more hostile, and can no more legitimately be opposed to one another, than the final destiny of man and of humanity. And yet authority is never other than a power of fact. This is to say that it cannot be the philosophic explanation nor the ultimate reason of anything." "Whether willingly or unwillingly, authority must own the control of reason." "An established authority, however great its antiquity or its power, never carries its justification in itself."<sup>8</sup> "Being essentially progressive, and far removed from the state of perfection, neither authority nor autonomy may be posited as absolute." "Authority, in its true conception, is and can be no other than relative." Now, as Sabatier goes on to say, "This theory of the national genesis and social

<sup>8</sup> This is exactly where Sabatier's and all rationalistic explanations of faith are at fault. They rest on a false psychology of faith. Authority is power of fact, and never owns the control of reason. Though reason functions in the giving of assent, authority carries its own justification for the person who recognizes it.

function of authority will easily be granted for the ordinary course of human things in general". "But when the question is of religion, men stop and protest." Sabatier fails to understand this protest, because all objects of faith must needs become for him merely mediating forms, designed as method. Intrinsic, real authority does not obtain in this sublunary world. He will not abide in the absolute authority which faith proclaims. Truly, the question is not whether the pope is infallible, but whether he must be infallible. But the latter proposition does not get a hearing from Sabatier. Behind and beyond all sovereignty of fact, rises for him a sovereignty of right; and on the strength of this he protests against the exercise of faith, disallowing authority to any and all forms of authority. Yet, strangely inconsistent, this, his last appeal and final authority to deny any and all its forms, is proclaimed relative. He does not discern in the manifestations of truth, the Truth itself. For Sabatier, the immanent does not involve the transcendent. Metaphysics is professedly disowned. He fails to realize the import of a passage like Hebrews xi. 3, "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear"; or of Romans i. 20, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead". On Scripture authority, therefore, it would appear that though truth is neither of man, nor by man, it is yet for man, here and everywhere, and at all times. This argument, of course, applies only to those who admit the authority of the Bible. Yet, let me quote in this connection the admirable words of Professor Andrew Seth. "Rightly agnostic though we are regarding the nature of the Absolute as such, no shadow of doubt need fall on the truth of our experience as a true revelation of the Absolute for us. Hegel was right in seeking the Absolute within experience and finding it, too; for certainly we can neither seek it nor find it anywhere

else. The truth is hardly likely to be the final truth; it may be taken up and superseded in a wider or fuller truth. And in this way we might pass, in successive cycles of finite existence, from sphere to sphere of experience, from orb to orb of truth; and even the highest would still remain a finite truth, and fall infinitely short of the truth of God. But such a doctrine of relativity in no way invalidates the truth of revelation at any given stage. The fact that the truth I reach is the truth for me, does not make it on that account less true. It is true, so far as it goes, and if my experience can carry me no further, I am justified in treating it as ultimate until it is superseded. Should it ever be superseded, I shall then see both how it is modified by being comprehended in a higher truth, and also how it, and no other statement of the truth, could have been true at my former standpoint. But before that higher standpoint is reached, to seek to discredit our present insight by the general reflection that its truth is partial and requires correction, is a perfectly empty truth, which in its bearing upon human life, must almost certainly have the effect of an untruth." In the same essay Professor Seth emphatically declares: "God is revealed to us alike in the face of nature and in our own self-conscious life,—in the common reason which binds mankind together and in the ideals which light us on our upward path. God is not far from any one of us. Within us and around us, here or nowhere, God is to be found." This, indeed, deserves special emphasis. On the one hand, knowledge is discounted and rendered unreliable, because it is treated as relative, inadequate in scope and in nature, whilst even truth itself is considered a fluctuating total of which subjective experiences render inadequate account inasmuch as they play a formative part in it. The extreme tendency in this direction leaves us in subjectivism. On the other hand, the Absolute is lifted out of the reach of the finite, following out Kant's view that thoughts stand between us and things, so that we are shut off from the knowledge of "things in themselves". The "negative theol-

ogies" represent this line of thought, so ably expounded in Bradley's work *Appearance and Reality*. The Truth, the Absolute, the Infinite, Reality, is conceived of as necessarily unrelated and undifferentiated substance. It is the pure Being of the Eleatic school. It is strongly insisted upon by Dean Mansel in his Bampton lectures and gave rise to the well-known controversy with Maurice. But it amounts practically to the same thing, whether the Absolute be elevated into such pure Being that it is essentially unrelated and undifferentiated, or whether it is held to have no independent objective existence. In either case, or even in Hegelian panlogism or Spinozan materialism, the Absolute is so pure an abstraction that truth becomes a fiction. Maurice is right when he says of this view in *Sequel to What is Revelation* (p. 10): "No real knowledge of the Eternal is possible; our conceptions are bounded by the finite and the visible. My answer is: If that is the reason, no knowledge of the temporal is possible. Slavery to our conceptions, as the teacher of experimental science has shown us, is the hindrance to any real, solid acquaintance with the mysteries of Nature. When we try to bind her with the forms of our intellect, she will give us no faithful answers; she will only return an echo to our voices. Here is another proof of the analogy between the things sensible and spiritual. The same enemy blocks the entrance into both regions. The determination to measure all things by ourselves, to bring everything under the conditions of our intellect, makes us exiles from the Kingdom of Heaven and the Kingdom of earth."

Hegel's system may teach both these errors. For, inasmuch as it equates the Absolute with human experience, it leaves no room for the independence, the transcendent objectivity of the Absolute,—unless it be at the expense of individual personality, in which case that which figures as such, is only the Absolute as subject of thought. Yet, it teaches also that we can only determine the Absolute by predicates drawn from experience, attributes which expe-

rience indeed furnishes in its ever-increasing rich and various forms. These characteristics and determinations are legitimately "thrown out to a vast Reality" as Matthew Arnold terms it:—legitimately thrown out, because found and recognized in the forms of life, as appearing in the things that are seen.

We should, however, accept the fact that objective existence is known in our experience, not only from epistemological considerations, but also from the admission of the necessary function of authority, unreservedly made by those who yet disclaim the meaning of fact. For is not objective authority the mediating agency for the individual, because it constitutes direct, first-hand witness to independent facts, which we are not able to verify ourselves? The whole function of authority falls to the ground, unless it implies this witness to objective, independent fact. Of course, this functional authority in its most varied forms, to which conscience and reason make their appeal in justification of belief, relates to the objective source of authority, without which these individual witnesses would not constitute authority.

In this connection we may call attention to the essentially unscientific procedure of the present Bible-critics in employing the narratives of the original, direct witnesses to Christ, in order to "reconstruct" a Christ and a Gospel as they conceive of them, but independent of the authority of the Bible-stories. One can readily understand the resulting diversity in the reconstruction and appreciate Kalthoff's remark that every school in modern times has its University-Christ. At the bottom of this procedure lurks Feuerbach's bald assertion, contrasted with the affirmation of Christian faith: "God did not create man in His image, but man created God (or Gods) in his image." This theory, especially regarding Christianity, is historically false, because it reverses the true causal relation.

Professor G. T. Ladd takes up this view in his *Philosophy of Religion* in a somewhat concessive mood. Accept-



ing the statement that "man made God in his own image", he finds the other statement that "God first made man in His image to be only a religious interpretation of the first (Vol. I, Ch. xiv). "God himself", he says in another place (p. 146), "as at first the Ideal of power and majesty and afterwards of justice, truth and spiritual perfection, is the construct of the quenchless desire and growing aptitude for the realization of the Ideal." I am aware that Professor Ladd's ontological consciousness strenuously safeguards at least the reality of the truth that appears in historic religions, but his explanation seems rather arbitrary.

Professor Schmiedel furnishes another typical illustration of this view in his article on the "Resurrection" in the *Encyclopedia Biblica*. After arguing with much elaborateness and ability in favor of the vision theory he says: "The disciples believed they saw Jesus, because they were already persuaded He was alive."

Examples might be multiplied in which the decision whether Christ made Christianity or Christianity made Christ has been made from theory, rather than in accordance with the results of a strictly historical method of investigation. But in the scientific study of history, as in strict legal procedure, original witnesses are not easily displaced by the most ingenious theory. The question is not what might have been the case, but what are the facts. Truth is our first concern,—truth in the Old-English meaning of the word "*trcaw*", which is "faithfulness", or "appeal to facts" (cf. the German *Treue*, Dutch *trouw*). We must be faithful to facts. Theories and explanations are subservient and secondary to fact. They are mere attempts to explain them. But facts require recognition, whether we are able to explain them or not. The irreversible facts are themselves explanations as passive witnesses to truth. *Magna est veritas et praevalabit*

The nature and importance of original authorities is maintained by all historians. Professor E. A. Freeman, in

his *Methods of Historical Study* (Lectures IV and V). says:

"The kernel of all sound teaching in historical matters is the doctrine that no historical study is of any value which does not take in a knowledge of original authorities. Let no one mistake this saying, as if I were laying down a rule that no knowledge of any historical matter can be of any value which does not come straight from an original authority.

"The fact is that Livy, Plutarch, and a crowd of others, though they are not original authorities in themselves, are original authorities to us. That is to say, we can for the most part get no further than what they tell us. We know that they copied earlier writers; we often know what earlier writers they copied. But those earlier writers are for the most part lost; to us Livy and Plutarch are their representatives. For a large part of their story we have no appeal from them except either to internal evidence or to any fragmentary authorities of other kinds that may be left to us. There is no counter-narrative.

"If then we are to define original authorities, we might perhaps define them as those writers from whom we have no appeal, except to other writers of the same class.

"We must remember that even the best contemporary writer is commonly a primary authority for a part only of his subject. Though living at the time of which he writes, though often an actor in the scenes of which he writes, still he cannot always write from personal knowledge; he cannot have seen everything with his own eyes; he must constantly write only what he has been told by others; only he is able to judge of what is told him by others in a way that a later writer cannot do. And besides his narrative, there is often other contemporary evidence which for some purposes may be of higher authority than his narrative. The text of a proclamation or a treaty is, within its own range, of higher authority than the very best contemporary narrative. I say within its own range, because the official document, while it

always proves a great deal, does not always prove everything.

"The later writers are by no means to be cast aside; it is often very important to see how they looked at the events of earlier times. The point to be understood is that they are not authorities, that they are not witnesses, that a statement made by a contemporary gains nothing in inherent value because it is copied over and over again by a hundred writers who are not contemporaries. Whenever a man at any date has special means of knowledge, he becomes so far an authority; a local writer or a man who has specially studied some particular class of subjects may be in this sense an authority, that is the nearest approach to an authority that we can get, even for times long before his own."

In literature the same rule applies. Authorities are the standards by which to regulate, but which, after the testing of the times, cannot themselves be subjected to other standards in their authoritative element. Sainte-Beuve, in his *Causeries du Lundi*, gives certain definitions which may be adduced here by way of illustration:

"A classic is, according to the ordinary definition, an author who is already established in the admiration of the people and who figures as authority in his field. The word 'classic' appears first in this sense with the Romans. With them not all the citizens of the different classes were called 'classic', but only those of the first class who possessed at least a certain fixed income.

"All those who possessed an income below that were designated as 'infra classem', below the class par excellence. Figuratively the word 'classicus' is found used by Aulus Gellius, and applied to authors; an author of value and distinction, 'classicus assiduusque scriptor', an author who counts, who possesses something and is not to be confounded with the mass of proletarians. Such an expression, therefore, presupposes an age sufficient to have given opportunity for criticism and classification in literature.

"The idea 'classic' implies something of a regular consis-

tent character which forms a whole and has tradition. It grows, spreads, yet endures.

"The first Dictionary of the Academy (1694) defined a classic author simply as an ancient author very much approved, one who is authority in the subject-matter with which he deals. The Dictionary of the Academy of 1835 presses this definition further and renders it more precise and specific. It defines 'classic authors' as those who have become models in any language. In the articles which follow recur continually expressions such as: models, established rules for composition and style, strict rules for art to which one must conform."

Subjectivism, pragmatism, and pluralism, as much as agnosticism, logically rule authority out of court. The current attempts to save a kind of authority for the Bible by those who refuse to admit its objective authority are interesting. At the best they simply vest Scripture with their own endorsement, holding that the Bible is not the Word of God, but that the word of God is in the Bible. The authentication of the Word of God, however, is left to the individual. Dr. Forsyth in an able article in the *Contemporary Review*, advocates the view that the Bible as such is not the word of God, but derives its authority from the Word of God, of which it is part. This conception is not unlike the view of the authority of the Bible held by the Roman Catholic Church, in which the Church is set over the Bible, but the Roman view retains at least some objective norm. As Cardinal Gibbons says in *The Faith of our Fathers*, "The canonicity of the Holy Scriptures rests solely on the authority of the Catholic Church, which proclaimed them inspired." Dr. Forsyth, on the other hand, derives the authority of the Bible from its function in the service of the Gospel. If Dr. Forsyth means to leave any intrinsic authority to the Bible in its necessary relation to the functioning of the Gospel among men, then his conception of authority is at fault. For authority is not a derived power, behind which those to whom its appeal is made, may go.

It has also been suggested that, though one might concede the whole of the Bible to be true and therefore authoritative, this need not bind us now, inasmuch as some parts were true and needed at one time, but are no longer applicable or even desirable as norms. These parts are, indeed, rightfully in the Bible, because they were required in the development of Christianity. This view, however, needs little consideration, as it resolves truth and authority into a merely functional fitness of the organ. The authority of truth is incompatible with the notion of expediency. The serious-minded theologian is concerned with truth and adheres to the *semper ubique ab omnibus*. He is therefore disinclined to dismiss or discount any truth, so far as ascertained, because of its incompleteness, nor will he entertain the idea of truth—if it be truth at all—ever becoming obsolete. The term "new truth" which is so much in the air is a misnomer as opposed to "old truth", for all truth is one. The term may be freely admitted in the sense of additional truth. Fortunately, however, it seems usually to mean alleged truths that are destined to remain essentially new, inasmuch as they have not enough authority in them ever to grow old, not being authorized by the Truth they ignore, *i. e.*, the transcendent, everlasting source of all truth and authority. For the theologian, as for every truth-seeker, the word of Clough expresses a deep conviction:

"It fortifies my soul to know  
That, though I perish, Truth is so."

Authority means recognized, established power, witness, statement, command, etc., accepted and obeyed without any questioning.<sup>9</sup> It is experienced, felt, and taken with the sense of objective validity. It exists (*ex-sistere*), it stands out before us, independent of us, or of our conception. Though its efficacy for us be largely determined by our

<sup>9</sup> It implies the sentiment of Don Diègue in *Le Cid* of Corneille:

"On doit ce respect au pouvoir absolu  
De n'examiner rien quand un roi a voulu."



relation to it, the authority as generally received is only its subjective aspect, its recognition by men. A source of information, or a duly accredited fact, is considered sufficient to give authority to a statement, as, viz., an authoritative witness. But it must be borne in mind that this acceptance of authority, the power derived from opinion, respect or esteem, is the resulting influence of authority itself. Dr. Forsyth in conceding to the Bible only this kind of authority is reasoning in a circle when he tries to authorize the Gospel conception by the Bible. Authority, as objectively residing in the forms of life, and in historic development, refers to the inherent truth of these forms; it has self-evident justification. It is the same, when in daily intercourse the utterance is heard: Who or what is your authority? This is a characteristic inquiry inasmuch as it asks for a guarantee to establish the reliability of that to which assent is given. This authorization is not always exhaustively established for those who thus question, nor do they require this. It is sufficient when subjective needs and required guarantees are met in such a way so as to produce acknowledgment of the truth. The question calls forth an authority beyond the first alleged authority. The subsequent endeavor aims to have this authority acknowledged as objective fact, thus affecting the personal witness by meeting and subduing the individual authority residing in the verdicts of conscience and reason. It would seem that this is putting objective authority out of court by bringing it before the bar of individual approval. Yet, in leaving the defendant to establish his claim, recourse must needs be taken to authority of some sort in the procedure to establish the recognition of some form of authority before the critical mind.

This yielding to final authority seldom requires exhaustive verification on the ground of implicit reliance on self-evident truth—the authority of authority. In the exercise of faith, we accept as a final authority those facts and forms which function creditably in accordance with individual requirements in regard to truth. Thus a scholar, who pre-

sents his subject exhaustively, is considered an authority on his subject. He gives first hand evidences which are recognized as such. Consequently his statements made from original, direct, personal contact with facts, as first hand evidence, are received and recognized as authoritative by others. This is strikingly illustrated in the concluding remark of the Gospel of Matthew, which at the end of the Sermon on the Mount, observes in regard to Christ's teaching: "And after Jesus had ended these sayings the people were astonished at his doctrine for he taught as one having authority and not as the scribes."<sup>10</sup> Indeed, very few things, even in our daily life, though of trivial importance, are verifiable by each individual. So we constantly believe, speak and act on authority. This being the case in the daily intercourse of our common life in which we depend upon the detailed and penetrating study of experts, it is from the nature of the case much more so in questions relating to ultimate causes beyond which we cannot go, as, viz., God's Revelation in His Word. Wherever its verification is excluded, assent is required by the exercise of faith, which accepts its affirmation at face value, that is, on authority.<sup>11</sup> Even if, in the ordinary departments of social, civil, and religious life, the impossible proposition that we go back for authorization to those primordial truths without which the argumentation in justification of any specific form of authoritative truth would be impossible, should be insisted upon; or if the critical disposition should take for granted only a few propositions as established and immune from critical investigation; in either case, the acceptance of some

<sup>10</sup> The word used is *ἐξουσία* = out of (His) being, i. e., as direct first hand witness to truth. He, the law in living figure, the Way, the Truth and the Life Himself came to bear witness to the truth in a unique way as contrasted with scribal book-lore about the law.

<sup>11</sup> Reason recognizes its own limits. It simply accepts, but does not establish the trustworthiness of our senses, that the world has objective existence, that the laws of thought yield truth, that there is correspondence between thought and being, between subject and object, spirit and matter.

*prima facie* evidence must enter in. It is therefore an amazingly superficial assumption that modern writers make when they say, "We want truth for authority, not authority for truth." The first is what we are in search of; we cannot claim to have it already; and it is safe to say that we shall not get it, if we follow the method proposed in the latter part of this motto. We feel, therefore, constrained to repeat the greater wisdom of old "*credo ut intelligam*." As a matter of fact, authority is in full force in all departments of life.

Professor James touches upon this subject in his essay, *The Will to Believe*. He says: "We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary, or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let the truth take its chance." I suppose—as Prof. James himself suggests—that of these two alternatives we have only a Hobson's choice. Giving the 'first and great commandment to would-be knowers': We must know the truth; and we must avoid error, he insists that these "are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separate laws". And again: "Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever happens that by merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into believing other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anything at all, not even A." It is strange that this statement should occur in the essay which so ably sets forth the influence of 'temperamental atmosphere' and character upon our intellectual beliefs. It simply shows how the views of a candid, empiric philosopher are vitiated by his pluralistic belief. It appears sufficiently evident that a suspense of belief—whatever its possibility in specific cases—, as a rule of conduct at least, is impossible. There is, then, really only one rule: We must know the truth, which incidentally implies that we are to avoid error. It is the sense of the latter

injunction that raises the query, 'What is your authority'? It is the negative safeguard to give assent only to duly accredited facts, to yield to the right authority, to truth. Now, it would seem that Prof. James, in speaking so forcibly about Clifford's adverse disposition towards Christianity, should have seen that there is no danger of his choosing any form of it. The specific forms, the cases presented to us, appeal to us, or fail to do so, according as we have fashioned and moulded our character. It is not, therefore, a question at all of putting the choice. We start out with the positive injunction, implying the negative aspect of rejecting that which does not stand on the rightful authority of truth. Nor is this 'enfant terrible', Clifford, urging suspense of judgment because of choice, but rather on account of 'insufficient evidence', on the plea that every assent is unwarranted until the evidence is complete. Just as James himself assures us, "Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions". "As a rule we disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use." For Clifford Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start (consequently *excluded* from the choice which Prof. James proposes). So truth may become a dead issue by constantly running into error, and error lose its insidious temptations for him whose candor sincerely makes for truth.<sup>12</sup> Our

<sup>12</sup> It should be noticed that Prof. James strongly inclines to identify the subjective attitude towards reality with its metaphysical implications. The psychologist gets the better of the metaphysician. Since this was written, his *Pragmatism* has appeared, in which the whole of metaphysics is let down practically into the sphere of psychology. The great physicist, Du Bois-Reymond, also makes an unwarranted inference in his famous address: *Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens* with the same subjectivistic bias. He says: "Dass es in Wirklichkeit keine Qualitäten giebt, folgt aus der Zergliederung unserer Sinneswahrnehmungen. . . . Eigenschaftlos, wie sie aus der subjectiven Zergliederung hervorgeht, ist die Welt auch für die durch objective Betrachtung gewonnene mechanische Anschauung, welche statt Schall und Licht nur Schwingungen eines eigenschaftslosen, dort als wägbare, hier als scheinbar unwägbare Materie sich darbietenden Urstoffes kennt." From the fact that sensations are conditioned in their recep-

belief in truth, that there is a truth, and that our senses are made for it, would stand even if our social system did not confirm it. Our hearts respond to the authoritative announcement that we were created in the image of God, as it says in Gen. 1:27, "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." This belief is not the result of desire and instinct, but is anterior and loyal to them.

God has left his witness in the heart, and if we are walking in rectitude of will, the Spirit of truth will lead us into all truth. We find corroboration of this everywhere. For truth is indeed one, as God is one. But Prof. James disowns this, until demonstrably verified to the intellect. Yet Prof. James, in another brilliant essay on *The Sentiment of Rationality*, says: "The necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is strongly insisted on by the scientific philosophers of the present day; but by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that it is only legitimate when used in the interests of one particular proposition,—the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is uniform. That nature will follow to-morrow the same laws that it follows to-day is, they all admit, a truth which no man can know; but in the interest of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it. As Helmholtz says: "Hier gilt nur der eine Rath: vertraue und handle." And Professor Bain urges: "Our only error is in proposing to give any reason or justification of the postulate, or to treat it as otherwise than begged at the very outset." "Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause

tion, it does not follow that the differentiation is wholly an affair of the receiving agent in response to the activity of a property-less substratum of undifferentiated substance. As there is no metaphysic, we must leave sensations their representative meaning.



the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance." In *Reflex Action and Theism* the same writer says: "I will only remind you that each one of us is entitled either to doubt or to believe in the harmony between his faculties and the truth; and that, whether he doubt or believe, he does alike on his personal responsibility and risk." He quotes with approval the lines:

Believe you must, and risk.  
For Gods ne'er lent a pledge.  
A miracle alone can bear you  
Into the beauty of that wondrous land.<sup>18</sup>

But, in spite of this, Prof. James ought to be reminded that there is no metapsychic, and that we find the home of truth within. And whether we can demonstrate their objective validity or not, we must take the primordial verdicts of conscience and reason on authority and as having objective reference. Prof. James has himself made much of the subjective aspect. In *The Will to Believe* he wrote: "The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth's existence," and so is it in innumerable other cases. "Faith in a fact can help create a fact." "There are cases where faith creates its own verification," etc. This subjective aspect is not to be overlooked, and selective thinking, the personal equation in the grouping and viewing of facts needs to be taken in account. Yet, not with disregard to objective truth. In fact, what does it matter if all knowledge is subjective? One may then well ask with Pilate in indifferent scorn that greatest of questions: "What is truth?"

Since, then, Prof. James has espoused more pronouncedly the pragmatic attitude in disregard of objective reference

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<sup>18</sup> "Du musst glauben, du musst wagen  
Denn die Götter leih'n kein Pfand,  
Nur ein Wunder kann dich tragen  
In das schöne Wunderland."

of truth, he is left not only with things unrelated, but with a world of pure experience, which is unrelated.<sup>14</sup> In another essay ("Humanism and Truth", *Mind*, U. S. 52, p. 463), Prof. James says: "Whether experience itself is due to something independent of all possible experience is a question which pragmatism declines to answer." In making satisfaction the criterion of truth, in conceiving of "the true as that which gives the maximal combination of satisfactions", Prof. James wrongs our inherent sense of the authority of truth. Especially does he ignore the sense of the moral implications of truth as revealed in our hearts.

"This pragmatism does make successful practice the very essence of truth, and substitutes for the view of truth as 'accordance of our ideas with reality', a valuation by the individual. This individual valuation is emphasized in the pragmatic school in proportion as the acceptance of truth at face value, *i. e.*, as true representation of reality is discredited. This shifting of emphasis from what constitutes truth (treow = faithfulness to fact) to the always inadequate attempt at its verification is a hopeless and harmful confusion. Indeed, Prof. Macbride Sterrett well says of this school: 'What now is the fundamental principle of this extravagantly vaunted new theory that is styled pragmatism? As one reads most of these volumes, he becomes dazed and bewildered and ends with very vague ideas of what the thing really means. First these pragmatists give us to understand that truth as an objective system—truth, the search for which has been the object of all science and philosophy, is a mere cob-web of the intellect. Second, that all our judgments of reality are worth- or value-judgments. What is called truth and reality consists in bare practical effects. In science, for instance, if it serves our practical purposes better to use the Ptolemaic instead of the Copernican theory in astronomy, then it is the true and real for us. In morals, if honesty is the best policy, then honesty is the truth. In philosophy, if we can get more out of our moral and religious life by believing in polytheism instead of monotheism, then polytheism is the truth, which is practically the view of Professor Howison and Professor James and Professor Schiller. The *cut bone* scales are to give us the validity of judgments in all spheres. Reasonableness of truth is not a good in itself. It is an abstraction. There is no truth, no absolute system of truth independent of the needs of men. Love of such supposed truth, which has always been the inspiration of thinkers, is rudely taken from us as the worship of a false God. Such truth is useless, and the useless is false. We can say that what is true in pragmatism is not new, and what is new in it—the attempt to substitute value judgments in all cognition for judgments of truth and reality—is not true." *The Freedom of Authority*, p. 311ff.

Would that the gifted scientist could say in a deeper sense than he meant to express when quoting Pascal: 'Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas!' or exclaim with Paul: "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness."

This pragmatic attitude, whose bugbear is to give things real objective reference so that our knowledge fits the scheme of things, finds its 'enfant terrible' in Mr. E. W. Lyman, who says, in an article "The Influence of Pragmatism upon the Status of Theology", published in *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, a commemorative volume by pupils of Prof. Garland: "Meanwhile the actual absoluteness of Christianity, so far as it can be grounded in religious psychology and religious history, is undiminished by discrediting any artificial supplement that might be constructed through the aid of some supposed metaphysical necessity. The recognition of the mere possibility that new values may arise, which may even be discontinuous with the old, does not mean the recognition that there have already arisen needs calling for such values; it merely asserts the sovereignty of this additional practical need that, when new needs do arise, they should be satisfied by their appropriate values. It is true that the maintenance of a right proportion in values may require the subordination of the new needs, but at all events they must not be suppressed in advance by *a priori* reasoning. This priority of need to values is already an element in the standard value of Christianity." Mr. Lyman, in other words, is so pragmatic that he feels warranted in discrediting the authority of truth on the basis of his need of possible needs. Yet, he seems to allow an ordering of our needs, which of course involves a rational procedure to maintain a right proportion of values. Strangely enough, the essay concludes with a tribute to faith. Now Faith is the recognition of authority, on as reasonable grounds as the person exercising faith has at his disposal. Mr. Lyman, however, objects to authority on the strength of need and instinct. Indeed, the manward side of truth is all there is of truth. And this subjective aspect of

truth which has come to displace its philosophy, is dominated by the physical functions which made the world of sense loom up large. This world-view is practical with reference to the instant need of things; it keeps a steady eye on the wants of the moment. It constitutes the utilitarian expendency of our worldly-wise age which discards philosophy. As Schiller says:<sup>15</sup>

"Meanwhile, till philosophy shall hold together the structure of the world, nature maintains itself by hunger and by love."

The prevailing mode of determining religious and moral life from the sense of need rather than from its content, the attempt to confine all our outlook, our whole *Weltanschauung*, within the compass of humanity demands investigation.

Maurice remarks at the conclusion of his work, *The Religions of the World and their Relations to Christianity* (p. 245): "In compliance with the directions of Boyle, I sought for that which seemed to be the most prevailing form of unbelief in our day; and I found it in the tendency to look upon all theology as having its origin in the spiritual nature and faculties of man. This was assumed to be the explanation of other systems, why not apply it to Christianity? The questions we have asked are, 'Is it the adequate explanation of any system?' 'Do not all demand another ground than the human one?' 'Is not Christianity the consistent assertor of that higher ground?' 'Does it not distinctly and consistently refer every human feeling and consciousness to that ground?' 'Is it not for this reason able to interpret and reconcile the other religions of the earth?' 'Does it not in this way prove itself to be not a human system, but the

<sup>15</sup> *Die Weltweisen.*

"Einstweilen, bis den Bau der Welt  
Philosophie zusammenhalt  
Erhalt sich das Getriebe  
Durch Hunger und durch Liebe."

The original has in the third line, "Erhält sie (i. e., die Natur).

Revelation, which human beings require?' " The question, then, is: Can we reasonably proceed on this presupposition which makes need the criterion of objective, normative truth? It is generally admitted that what is true for me, is not therefore true in itself. Or, as we may put it, our subjective apprehension of truth is not the same as the objective truth. Now, philosophic inquiries are made in search of principles by which reason may obtain a true knowledge of things. It is therefore essential that we lay special emphasis upon the presuppositions with which we begin any and all disquisitions. We must have some philosophic principles to begin with in order to give an orderly account and explanation of the facts as we see them. And both we and our theories must be judged in the light of our philosophy. It is therefore a wise custom, followed in many treatises, to devote first of all some discussion to the presuppositions with which we approach the subject; for as Bettex well said, "Die ganze Theorie von der Voraussetzungslosigkeit der Wissenschaft beruht auf der grossen, falschen Voraussetzung, dass der Mensch voraussetzungslos sein könne".

We hold that philosophy proceeds on the supposition that there are no phenomena without some reality, which is their ground, and which appears in them. These phenomena, being *forms* or *expressions* of this objective reality, are as such of course not that reality itself. Metaphysics inquires into the nature of this objective reality which lies behind phenomena as their ground, and which in them enters into human experience. It thus endeavors to know phenomena in their deepest ground, to see their inner being and truth. This view, however, is wholly discarded by many contemporaries. Yet without first settling these points, discussions between representatives of different metaphysical convictions will prove fruitless. We may, however, fruitfully compare and contrast systems. Such reasoning, of course, does not create conviction, but rather corroborates and establishes views already held. As the recognition of authority is an act of faith, we must not therefore consider



faith to be the ground of truth, or the source of the knowledge of truth, but rather as a faculty of the soul to perceive and recognize objective truth.

Dr. H. Bavinck observes in *De Zekerheid des Geloofs* (p. 21ff.): "Certitude is something different from truth, though closely related to it. Truth is agreement between thought and reality and expresses the relation between the content of our consciousness and the object of our knowledge (i. e., fidelity to reality). The assurance of faith, however, does not express a relation, but a quality, a characteristic, a condition of a knowing subject. Assurance of faith obtains when the soul reposes perfectly in the object of knowledge. Truth carries this certitude, but not every certitude is proof of truth." Elsewhere—in *Godsdienst en Godgeleerheid*—he remarks in this connection: "Troeltsch recognized rightly that comparative historic studies at best can only demonstrate that Christianity is the highest of the present religions relatively, that there is at present no higher religion than Christianity. Yet it is not susceptible of proof that Christianity is the final (endgültige) revelation of God, that Christ is the Only begotten of the Father,—that is simply a matter of faith. Nature and history as such do not yield an absolute standard. It is the same in the sphere of right, of morals, or æsthetics, and also in the sphere of religion. The absolute standards which sciences use are derived from faith. This is more and more perceived and recognized in theology. Just as formerly the value of historic-apologetic arguments was overrated, they are now in danger of being slighted, and the proof from experience is likely to be considered by many the only argument for the truth of Christianity. This is running to another extreme of one-sidedness and exaggeration. Experience is not conviction, and can never be the ground, standard, and vindication of revelation. But it is nevertheless the way in which the Christian religion is known and recognized by us in its absolute character. Rather, the Christian religion as the revelation of God in Christ Jesus His Only

Son becomes an absolute certainty for us only by the way of saving faith. If the Christian religion be the absolute one, there can be no other way. And on the other hand, if it had to be demonstrated, it would *ipso facto* cease to be the absolute religion. From this standpoint, it will not appear strange, but rather quite natural, that the Gospel of Christ does not endeavor to justify itself before the human reason. It witnesses, but does not argue. It claims authority, demands recognition, but renounces all attempts to secure approval on the strength of scientific arguments. Yea, it freely acknowledges that the cross of Christ must seem foolishness to the prudential wisdom of the world."

This, as Bible students will readily admit, is a prominent note in the Scriptures. This sovereignty of faith, of the recognition of authority before the claims of reason in its demand for rational explanation, has ever been and still is the great divide in religious controversies. Rationalism violates faith in the interest of reason, whereas the traditional Christian views have always emphasized faith as supreme over reason. M. Scherer says in *Revue de Strasbourg*, p. 66: "I believe in authority whenever I admit a fact simply on my faith in a witness." And yet liberal tendencies of to-day manifest an increasing disposition to oppose authority in moral matters and to discard the miracles in intellectual matters. The resort to subjectivism, Ritschlianism and pragmatism have not improved matters. Faith and authority are too closely allied. And it is evident that in subjectivism real faith and authority are rendered impossible. Religion is a metaphysico-psychological fact. Its sphere is the human personality, but this is not its ground, and therefore cannot be its sole explanation, as some writers think.<sup>10</sup> It must not be forgotten that revela-

<sup>10</sup> Professors Coe, Starbuck, and James have paid almost exclusive attention to experience, without letting objective truth come to its right. They have subsumed metaphysics under psychology. Men, little interested in metaphysical study, labor in experimental psychology to reduce religion to its lowest terms, to biological ethics explained by

tion and religious experience are correlative, each implying the other. When the unseen is measured by the seen, the ideal brought within the compass of the actual, and the unseen identified with what is religious, ethical and spiritual interests lose their ultimate ground.

In the materialism of France this method is predominant. Standing firmly on the facts seen, the facts of greater moment are scoffed at as fiction. Professor Gustave Le Bon utters a wail of sensational alarm over this state of affairs. Writing under the title, "Will Civilization Fade and Die Out", in the *New York American* of February 24, 1907, he says: "Science has renewed our ideas and deprived our religious and social conceptions of all authority. Visible decadence seriously threatens the vitality of the majority of the great white nations, and especially of those known as the Latin nations,—and really Latin nations if not as regards their blood, at least as regards their traditions and education. Every day they are losing their initiative, their energy, their will and their capacity to act. The satisfaction of perpetually growing material wants tends to become their sole ideal. The family is breaking up; the social springs are strained. Discontent and unrest are spreading in all classes, from the richest to the poorest.

"Like the ship that has lost its compass and strays at chance and winds direct, the modern man wanders haphazard through the spaces formerly peopled by the gods and rendered a desert by science. He has lost his faith, and with it his hopes. The individual is coming to be solely preoccupied with himself. Consciences are capitulating and morality is deteriorating and dying out."<sup>17</sup>

physiological functioning of the organism. Dr. Stanley Hall's endeavor in this direction has been without much success.

"The McAll Mission describes the situation in France as follows. 'Religiously, at the present moment, France is in a condition of 'eclipse of faith'. Of her 38,000,000 not over 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 at the outside remain, in any practical way, attached to the Roman Catholic Church. Clericalism, discredited at the polls, and capitalism, trembling for its property rights, in the presence of socialism, seek, in unnatural

The French psychologist portrays in dark colors the condition of his people. What we are concerned with here is to call to mind the "esprit gaulois", the peculiar trait of the French nation, its lack of reverence,—that negative, critical attitude which mocks, jests and makes cynical sneers at spiritual things. It is this "esprit gaulois", opposing submission to all authority, which dominates the national life of France. It will recognize no restraint, and revolts boldly against an authority which makes appeal to God. Well did La Fontaine express a French sentiment: "Notre ennemi c'est notre maitre, Je vous le dis en bon francais."

Unbelief thus raises the ultimate question of the supernatural. The issues are clear. On neither side is demonstration or proof possible. The eternal cannot be comprehended within time-limits or fully expressed in temporal forms. To speak in evolutionary fashion of an eternal becoming, is to ignore the fruitless attempts of the Greeks and to show little appreciation of the real problem.<sup>18</sup> After all, change is in the hand that knows no change. We may say that this world alone allows of the application of the time-conception inasmuch as with the world's existence time became in the world's process. Time is unthinkable without the world, and it is contradictory therefore to imagine a time in which God was without the world. But to say that there is no time thinkable in which the world was not is simply to state that the world had been as long as it has been.<sup>19</sup> Without

alliance, to perpetuate exhausted superstition, while socialism counts its recruits. Among the working classes, licentiousness, alcoholism, and home-life devoid of moral training, are rapidly disintegrating the family. Absinthe numbers its victims by the hundred thousands, annually."

"The kenotic theories of Thomasius, Gess, Ebrard and Martensen endeavored to solve this problem by settling it at the outset. Cf. an able and scholarly discussion by H. C. Powell: "Principle of the Incarnation with especial Reference to the Relation between our Lord's Divine Omniscience and His Human Consciousness." It contains an interesting discussion of Kant's view of time and space as the postulates of the inner and outer perception.

"Professor Bolland's Inaugural, *Verandering en tijd*, contains an interesting discussion on this subject.

the Eternal Spirit there would not be any time. Time and change issue forth from eternity and return to it for judgment. Eternity holds absolute sway over time and change, and "stands at the heart of all time". This eternity is the source of each mysterious variation, and it is also the unseen providence which controls and directs all the variations to their collective end. When Ritschl says: "What is eternity but the power of the spirit over time?" he simply gave expression to the idea that change rises from the changeless. Reality is timeless. What really is does not admit of a beginning or an end. It is therefore begging the question to endeavor to explain eternity in terms of time;—it is a contradiction in terms. Equally contradictory is the effort to explain reality by its appearance in time. The "tertium quid", the undefined and undefinable, does not arise from, else it could not give rise to, the temporal world.

Hegel assumed the knowing of this coming into existence of this world-order and plan, but rendered the task consequent upon his bold assumption easy by the identifying thought and matter,—which may mean metaphysical idealism or materialistic pantheism, but in either case strict monism. A world is treated in each instance as a negligible quantity.

Although of late "Christian Science" has had a large following, and although idealistic philosophy has found favor with many, yet it is but natural that in an age of material achievements the slighted factor should be the spiritual world. Characteristic in this regard are the titles of the writings of Romanes. *A Candid Examination of Theism*, by Physicus, in which descriptive science holds him in a hard, grinding, causal mechanism without outlook upon a spiritual power behind, in, and beyond it. *A Candid Examination of Religion*, by Metaphysicus, in which the facts of the inner life are given full recognition, and in which he feels himself again in possession of a Christian *Weltanschauung*. These books and the history of Romanes are well known and need no comment. It is also a matter



of general knowledge that the consistent atheist Nietzsche did away with "das Seelending" and reduced the inner life to a "Begleiterscheinung". Yet the most prevalent mode of thought reserves for the spiritual a place only in subjectivism. It is indeed a saddening result when modern scholarship is compelled to repeat as Christian what Goethe made Faust exclaim with unspeakable heartache: "The message indeed I hear, but I lack the faith. A miracle is the favorite child of faith."<sup>20</sup>

Loisy, as well as Harnack, distinguishes between the Easter-message and the Easter-faith. The message is the objective, historic fact, an empty tomb: "He is not here", and faith merely concludes, or creates the conviction "He is risen". The risen Christ is an object of faith (*objet de foi*, in the sense of faith-product, not as lying at the basis of it, and perceived by faith), not a factual reality (*réalité de fait*). The whole believing atmosphere of the early Church, this faith-state as fact appeals again to the faith of others. It is from faith to faith, but without objective ground in historic fact.<sup>21</sup>

Exact science will not allow an objective fact which it cannot explain, and the method of exact science has been carried over into historical study. If, after all sidelights have been utilized and all circumstances bared, history does not explain the Christ as portrayed by the records and by the effects which He produced, then, instead of concluding that mere historic facts cannot explain Him, the explanation of the cause of the world's greatest event is sought in a pious fiction. Christ is the explanation of Christianity,

<sup>20</sup> "Die Botschaft hör' ich wohl, allein mir fehlt der Glaube  
Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind"

<sup>21</sup> Loisy's polemic books *Autour d'un petit Livre*, and *L'Evangile et l'Eglise*, are able presentations of the current subjective views which attempt to explain away the supernatural basis of Christianity. Neither Loisy nor Harnack is an approved representative of Catholic or Protestant Christianity. Yet, the excommunicated Abbot retains more ground for authority than the able church historian, whose views lead to individualism.

and admittedly cannot be explained by circumstance and earthly surroundings. The very attempt to explain His world-transforming power from faith-elements witnesses to the inadequacy of the historic method to explain Him. He is all encompassing and future-regarding. No record of the past therefore will contain anything else than an earthly Christ. What a tremendous exercise of faith in the mystery of personality is it for Harnack, on the strength of that mystery, to ascribe to Christ the miracle of sinlessness. This is the pious fiction of the "Zeitgeschichtliche Methode". Calvin's word deserves repeating here: "*Totus Christus sed non totum quod in eo est.*" The earthly Christ was not the all of Christ. And even the earthly Christ in sinlessness defies classification or explanation according to these faithless methods.

A record of beginnings does not change the nature of the product, the successive phases of which are described in history, any more than life is explained by the development and functioning of a living organism. In biological science, life itself is not subsumed under the rubric of development, circumstance, or functioning. The elementary cell has its 'Eigengestaltsamkeit' which descriptive science simply takes as a fact. No more should Christianity with Christ as its centre be identified with its development, the circumstances under which it took rise or its subsequent history. If it is out of time, it will go in time, and will deserve the mephistophelian sneer at earthly things:

"Alles was entsteht  
Ist werth dass es zu Grunde geht."

It could not inspire faith, it would lack its commanding authority, it would require verification from the things of this world, instead of ruling at their heart and centre. Christ is in history what *a priori* elements are in individual experience. When an un-Christian temper through lack of faith in this spiritual principle imperiously demands demonstra-

tion of the world's spiritual events in terms of the seen, we reply effectively, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" (Heb. xi. 1). This fact has made some historians retire into subjectivism; which leads to an individualistic interpretation of Christianity and threatens to destroy both tradition and authority.

The Ritschlian school has not been able to stem the tide of subjectivism, but has rather furthered it. In spite of Harnack's tribute to Ritschl as the one who saved Protestantism from this disintegrating tendency, the process is still going on alarmingly. The popular mind comes to think of the Christian religion as a pious sentiment, an experience of ethical enthusiasm and moral endeavor, as consecrated good-will in the service of mankind, as faith in the eternal right as the condition for self-realization in discipleship of the Christ, in the following of our innate religious instincts. The application of a normative standard to a matter so purely private and individualistic is considered difficult and needless. Should no objective reality correspond to our deep-rooted religious experiences, we are nevertheless none the worse for indulging in these pious sentiments. They relax the tension of life's struggle and relieve its grim reality. Metaphysics having been denied its place in religion, psychology tries to comfort us with a last apologetic word in behalf of retaining Christianity.

These ideas easily gain access to the minds of modern preachers. In a recent book, *The Dynamic of Christianity*, by E. M. Chapman, the following remark is made: "The ultimate source of authority is not an objective thing. It has never been fixed, codified, or finished!" Strange confusion of ideas in popular theology! A thing is not objective because it is not fixed, codified, or finished! From the nature of the case it cannot be finished in time, although it requires at least some form in which to express itself in time. The New England pastor, however, fortunately holds to what he calls "that chief practical charisma of the Spirit known as common sense", and believes "the conscience of

Christendom, educated by the Bible, by the experience of the Church, by the partial light issuing from the ethnic faiths and applied to specific cases of conduct by human reason acting with a full consciousness of its limitations, cannot go far wrong".

More harmful are the reasonings which would have us discount and repudiate the agencies and manifestations of Christ, *i. e.*, historic Christianity, on the ground that they are not Christ Himself. This is very much like saying that the study of language, in any and all its forms, may be discarded because language is only the expression of thought, not thought itself. And yet, without language thought would not be possible. Such a confusing opposition of Christ to Christianity and Bible may be seen in the following:

"It is upon Jesus himself that the authority of life and all its religion rests to-day. There are those who say the authority of religion rests with the church, and that all we can hope to do as workers and teachers in religious things is to represent the church. But there are those who push this matter further back and say the authority of the church rests in the creeds, and that all we need to do is to keep the creeds intelligible to men. But there are still others who go further back and say the authority of the creeds rests with the Bible, and all that we have to do is to keep the Bible taught and preached to men. But you see this simply presses the question back one further step for its final answers, because, when we ask where rests the authority of the Bible, the only answer to this question is, it rests with Jesus Christ whom it contains."

In this typical instance of popular fallacy the church, the creeds, and the Bible are the articulate members of Christianity which the lecturer desires to push back and out of sight, to get to Christ as the final authority. As if Christ did not buttress Christianity! Why labor to find Him different from, and elsewhere than where He admittedly and professedly is to be found? The Christian Church

is Christ operating in history, as reflected in the mind of men, "the collective Christ". Christian experience as a witness is formulated in the creeds. Both may be tested by the perfect rule of faith and practice, the Bible, professedly God's book, the only perfect book as Christ is professedly the God-man, the only perfect man. The abuse of that judicial authority, of which every individual is a repository, in refusing to exercise it in agreement with the Church to which one owes allegiance, on the paltry plea that the experience of Christ is first, only serves to call in question the reality of one's share in such an experience. The vagueness of this position certainly makes Christian experience itself an undefined and meaningless term.

It is the object of faith that deserves attention rather than the subject of experience, for the object is basal to the experience which it calls forth. The message of the Church should consist in proclaiming its belief rather than in telling of its experience. The Church has in trust the preaching of the Gospel as the objective truth. Indeed, guardian of the truth as once delivered unto the saints, its message, the truth, is the matter of most importance. And this is guaranteed neither by subjective experience nor by *cui bono* considerations.

No *Weltanschauung* is complete, no philosophy entirely satisfactory in every detail. The plumb-line of the finite intellect cannot measure the Infinitude in which it finds itself. In the end, therefore, we shall be brought before alternatives, and we may well face them at the start. Ballard makes prominent the alternatives involved in Christian or non-Christian systems, and urges a choice of them in his able apologetic work, *The Miracles of Unbelief*.

There is, in fact, no more lamentable disposition than the one which is content to hold by implication at least that there may be any number of truths; which is not merely content to hold that there are different aspects of truth, truth differently apprehended; but which holds opposing views true under the claim that everybody is entitled to his



own opinion. Though this be conceded in the abstract, to act upon it betrays an indifference to truth as such that kills all search for it and shows lack of confidence in it. The liberalism which proclaims "*laisser aller*", "*laissez faire*", as profound wisdom, reveals not only an intellectual but a moral indifference to opinion.

This temper, of course, does not obtain among trained, academic minds. Among these the prevailing lines of thought are different. Truth is held to be beyond our reach (in negative theologies); or incomplete and inadequate (evolutionary views); or again the limitations (not impossibility) of our knowledge is emphasized. Some dwell upon our inability to obtain objective certitude (subjectivism), and others hold that there are different kinds of truth (pluralism). The most insidious and subtle mode of thought, however, is that which enthrones need as the ultimate criterion of truth before which inquiry should be silent. We shall, therefore, treat of this at some length, since it involves the subjective standpoint of the other views, although the values determined by the satisfaction of need are held to correspond to objective reality.

The very nomenclature of this mode of thought is suggestive in that it speaks of truth as 'corresponding to objective reality', instead of 'resulting from objective, disclosed reality'. It is evident that such disclosure is always an affair of individual apprehension. If faith is the recognition of authority, exercised reasonably, not instinctively as led by feeling, then the question concerning the forms of authority to which we shall give assent must be settled by reason. Much more intricate, however, does the question become, when we put the analogous inquiry concerning the relation of the sense of need to the true, real need of man as man. Orthodox Christianity has always dwelt upon the fact that religion, as a result of the soul's relation to God, is an individual affair, and therefore it has laid stress upon inner experiences and has exalted conscience and reason. But it has never gone so far as to make these

human experiences the final authority, because if religious knowledge requires content occasioned by some object, much more does the religious sentiment. Feeling is not creative; it is merely the capacity to receive impressions. There is, therefore, no guarantee for the religious life, except on the basis of an acknowledged objective norm, in the recognition of God's truth. Apart from the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of things without, at least as perfectly as the reality of the psychical representations, an objective norm is required to set in order our experience as rational beings. History has shown human judgment to be, as it is individually felt to be, inadequate, faulty and unreliable. Prof. James acknowledges this in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, but only to invite return to it, as residing in, or guided by utility, as this is apprehended by men. He says: "Origin in immediate intuition; origin in pontifical authority, origin in supernatural revelation, as by vision, hearing or unaccountable impression; origin in direct possession by a higher spirit, expressing itself in prophecy and warning; origin in automatic utterance generally,—these origins have been stock warrants for the truth of one opinion after another which we find represented in religious history. The medical materialists are therefore only so many belated dogmatists neatly turning the tables on their predecessors by using the criterion of origin in a destructive instead of an accreditive way." And again: "Not its origin, but the way in which it works on the whole, is Dr. Maudsley's final test of belief. This is our own empiricist criterion, and this criterion the stoutest insists on supernatural origin have also been forced to use in the end (H. Maudsley, *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings*). This is exactly what we do not understand by the final authority, an assent to which is faith. Faith is not born of things seen, authority not recognized after we have seen how expedient its commands are."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Those who insist on supernatural origin, are forced to use for verification in apologetic argument the same world-field in time and to

The suggestive, plain title of Dr Maudsley's essay reduces the supernatural to seemings, and proclaims the natural only as cause. It goes without saying that on this presupposition no other guarantee is left. But—as we have observed—the existence of the natural world is no more proved than is the reality of the representations of our psychic life. As Prof. Rudolf Eucken observes in *Das Wesen der Religion* (p. 5): "To religion surely belongs the reality of another world, above the one we know through sensuous experience. For an immanent religion, that vague and inadequate notion which defies this world, is a pitiful contradiction." The logical application of this both to the sphere of inner experiences and the world of outer experiences is not only analogical, but true to the experiences themselves. Dr. H. Vischer, in urging this in an inaugural address, "*De oorsprong der Religie*", before the University of Utrecht, 1904, quotes his colleague Ziehen as follows: "Shall we indeed speak soon, not of a tree, but of a tree-sensation, or even some specific part of the tree-sensation? Not at all. Our words denote not things, but sensations and ideas and these complexes of experiences are to be taken as real."

But we wish further to call attention in Prof. James' statement to the view concerning the relation of origin to authority. Prof. James takes little account of the origin of that which claims authority. Simply because he does not recognize its truly *a priori dictum*, he inclines toward the seeming causes which discount supernatural causes, and discards, in much the same way as medical materialists, the

abide by the criterion "the way in which it works on the whole". But the convictions were not derived from the survey, not brought about by argument. It is a contradiction in terms to establish one's own authority. After assent has been given, we cannot further accredit the authority upon which it rests. All we can do is to find corroboration for the reasonableness of our act of faith. Cf. "Is Proverbs Utilitarian?" in the January number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1907.

question of origin.<sup>23</sup> But on such presuppositions, it is difficult to come to any true appreciation of faith, which requires independent or final authority to be acknowledged, not proved. After all the facts are in, from a *posteriori* reflection upon the thought, act, or experience, we cannot determine the faith required before the issues. Authority always requires as a *priori*, what James will recognize only as a *posteriori* and estimates with a bias on the basis of its results upon things without us. In his *Will to Believe* Prof. James remarks: "No concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon. Some make the criterion external to the moment of perception, putting it either in revelation, the *consensus gentium*, the instincts of the heart, or the systematized experience of the race. Others make the perceptive moment its own test,—Descartes, for instance, with his clear and distinct ideas guaranteed by the veracity of God; Reid with his 'common-sense'; and Kant with his forms of synthetic judgment, *a priori*. The inconceivability of the opposite; the capacity to be verified by sense; the possession of complete organic unity or self-relation, realized when a thing is its own other,—are standards which, in turn, have been used." Instead of interpreting these facts as accreditive to the circumstance that these are attempts to explain and justify the striking certitude wherewith first truth was apprehended and authority recognized, James insists that "the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or no". Here is the point at which the discussion has always halted, or—shall we say—really begun. Those whose faith leans upon the verdicts of reason and conscience, treating them as essentially veracious, demand the infallibility of Absolute truth to back them.

We believe that truth announces itself as such in the forms of life we find, or rather as it finds us in the forms of

<sup>23</sup> "Origin" is employed here in the sense of source, not as meaning the procedure of genetic appearance.

life. Truth is dogmatic; it has authority and inspires faith. This is truth as we see it, of course. Specific forms which represent truth to us, may not do so from another angle, and certainly not to another individual. Yet truth recognized as such carries its own verification. We have already anticipated the objection that our metaphysical bias runs into theoretic abstraction. But we believe that we are free from the charge, inasmuch as we do not identify truth with the specific forms in which it manifests itself to different individuals at different times, knowing that it is larger than any temporal form. Yet, in these forms we must find the truth as we can experience it. On strictly psychological grounds, we know that unmediated faith is a chimera.

Prof. Rudolf Eucken, in his *Hauptprobleme der Religions-philosophie der Gegenwart*, remarks concerning this point: "The mental life is simply incomprehensible and could never exercise power with us, if it had not independent reality apart from man, if the life which appears in it did not have reality and were not truly related. Only a real life-whole is capable of evoking the activities of our inner life" (p. 16). "We may understand quite different things by the true and the good, but none of us would ever strive for them, did we not think of them as superior to human conditions and opinions, as representative of another timeless order of things. The more we comprehend the mental life as a whole and understand it as another phase of reality, the clearer it becomes that in it we see an independent world of eternal truth appear which gives foundation to the change of temporal happenings and human life" (p. 54). "That its metaphysical elements prove to be ethical and the ethical metaphysical, is the characteristic greatness and lasting dynamic of Christianity; former times often made it onesidedly metaphysical; we of the modern age should avoid turning it into a mere ethics" (p. 89).

An illustration of the use of authority in the sense of witness to objective fact may be seen in a clause of the last



will and testament of the late Rev. John Bampton, specifying the purpose of the now famous Bampton lectures: "Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the following Subjects—to confirm and establish the Christian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics—upon the Divine authority of holy Scriptures—upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church—upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ—upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds."

From this will it clearly appears that authority is lifted above questionings and inquiries; but justification is sought for it in order to guarantee the rational exercise of faith. The objective witnesses are called upon to justify the authority which is acknowledged. So those in whom especially resides the objective witness to facts, are to render service by bringing about intellectual verification of faith. It is the recognition in Anselm's profound maxim: "*Credo ut intelligam*",—of the *ut intelligam* as well as of the *credo*,—expressed in that other famous saying of his: "*fides quacrit intellectum*." In faith, in the recognition of authority, the will is involved; yet, not the bare will of abstraction according to the former rigid division of our tripartite nature. It is an intelligent will which is to operate under proper and proportionate sentiment. As Dr. W. Brenton Greene, Jr., well said in an address delivered before a conference at Princeton: "There is no knowledge of the heart. Feeling can give knowledge no more than can excitement. Professor Bowen said, 'Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of some idea'. Again the head and the heart are not in opposition. They are not, as often represented, rival faculties. Man is not a bunch of separate activities. He is an indivisible unit."

We cannot fruitfully consider will, intellect, or feeling separately, neither should we leave them too much to ab-

stract consideration, but their bearings should be found, as they function, in the concreteness of human life. In life we find man exercising conjointly his volitional, emotional, and intellectual nature. His whole personality comes to play on the scenes of his life under specific forms to which he responds and upon which he reacts in his own, personal way, thus forming a character with its corresponding *Weltanschauung*. Fichte was right in saying that a man may be known from his philosophy, as was also the author of Proverbs when he said (iv. 23): "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life."

Are then the forms of authoritative truth on which faith is exercised, such as to warrant the act, are they to be considered final? We must answer, No, unless they carry in themselves the intrinsic power of the truth, unless they are manifestations of God; no derived authority will endure. This, however, is exactly what religion is built on and upon which it rests, as Prof. T. Gannegieter has said.<sup>24</sup> "Through our indivisible, spiritual nature, we are in personal, direct relation with God. He gives us—He only knows how—the impression of His Presence and relation to us. But it follows from this, that, when the question is raised as to the reality of these experiences, it never devolves upon the science of religion to prove the existence of God. For the religious man these experiences are real. For him God is the deepest reality. Out of this blossoms forth his religion. The first point in all religion is God, who is known, because He revealed Himself. Whoever tries to explain religion without this presupposition destroys it. In this one *primum* all is contained. For, when God reveals Himself to the soul, then He is known in His absoluteness as the Infinite, who is the ground of all finite things. And everything finite is considered as belonging to Him only. God revealing Himself is the primordial source of all religion. When did this revelation begin? It coincides with creation, it began when man commenced his psychic life

<sup>24</sup> *De taak en methode der wijsbegeerte van den Godsdienst*, p. 129.

equipped for the reception of this revelation. As the eye is teleologically fitted for the reception of light, so is the soul of man fitted for the perception of God."<sup>25</sup>

When Leopold Monod observes in *Le problème de l'autorité*: "I insist that no such regime is of divine origin," he practically predetermines not to recognize any final authority, and thus his conception of the revelation of truth must needs be one that is not only incomplete, but also mixed with error, for it means consistently that there is no revealed truth at all. Yet he presumes to discuss seriously just this point: "We do not dispute the fact of authority in human life, nor its relative right, but the absolute right of authority. Are there authorities, or is there an authority, which commands us in absolute fashion, so that to withhold from it our thought and action would be to fail in our first duty? Where is this authority? Where specifically for the Christian is the authority which he may not deny without ceasing by the very act to be a Christian?"

This method necessarily keeps M. Monod in the sphere of relativity, for he has precluded the serious admission of any final authority or absolute truth. The question concerns the recognition of authority, the receiving of the documentation of God's revelation, not the establishment of it. To argue authority into being, would require a regress *ad infinitum*. And whenever, or in whatever field, such an attempt is made, it is evident that the recognition of authority has already been refused, that the exercise of faith has been shut out. The confusion of these two totally different procedures is in the air and is widespread. It seems to be thought a reasonable procedure to-day in many quarters to hold that established authority, in the exercise of its function, be it religious or civil, must give an account of itself even to those over whom it rightfully holds claim. This, however, is a hopelessly confusing principle, and is never acted upon in practice, neither indeed

<sup>25</sup> See also his interesting sketch: *De samenhang van het objectieve en het subjectieve in de dogmatiek*.

could it be. It would require a judge in office to ask for jurisdiction, an officiating priest to request his parishioners to grant him authority for his ministry. It would require approval by the people of the law that is in force over them, and vindication of the Bible while appeal is made to it. There is a normative, objective standard of truth. All the varied forms of truth, however differently perceived, admit of being brought into comparison, inasmuch as all these forms go back to one source, i. e., to human nature, which is always essentially the same.

Dr. Charles Tyler Olmstead, Bishop of the diocese of Central New York, commending an article of the Rev. Burnett T. Stafford in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1907, remarks truly: "It is certain as anything can be that there is an immovable substratum of truth underlying every Divine manifestation, which the human mind may elucidate and view from different points, but can never change. And it is so that the Christian life and civilization are built up on the unchangeable facts of the Incarnate Life of the Son of God. We may meditate on those facts and see more and more of their wondrous significance, now emphasizing one feature and now another; but to deny their reality and call that 'spiritual interpretation' is to put our vain fancies in the place of God's revelation, and to trick out our unbelief with a deceptive appearance of faith. It will not do. It destroys the foundations, and leaves us a mere human philosophy in the place of a divine religion. No such philosophy ever has been, or ever will be, able to withstand the active resistance and antagonism of human selfishness."

Subjectivism tends to discredit the normative element in authority, because its objective aspect, its metaphysical implication, recedes before the claims of subjective interpretation. This finds illustration in a recent volume by Dr. D. W. Forrest entitled, *The Authority of Christ*. The author endeavors to enforce Christ's authority by enlarging upon the importance of the work of the Holy Spirit. It is a peculiar mode of treatment to affirm at the start: "It

appears to me that those who maintain a genuine historical Incarnation of the Son of God have not always sufficiently recognized the limitations inherent in an Incarnate life, nor how vital is the illumination of the Spirit, operating through the best activities of men's minds and hearts, for the discovery of what Christ's authoritative message really is." Dr. Forrest certainly chooses a rather illogical way when he seeks to persuade us of the authority of Christ by declaring His limitations according to the kenotic theory to which he adheres, and then subsequently endeavors to establish Christ's authority by appealing to the activity of the Holy Spirit. He thus comes into line with the current subjective interpretations of Christianity, leaving us without guarantee that the "Zeitgeist" will not assert itself as "Heiliger Geist", when he discards "an objective standard of divine commands, unbounded by any fluctuations or vicissitudes of human thought and life". He says again: "What security is there that mankind will not some day universally renounce the Gospel of Christ? Is it merely that the Church claims to have a commission to declare, 'This is the revealed truth'? Certainly not. A claim is nothing unless it can justify itself to the best judgment of men; and the higher it is the more eagerly will its credentials be scrutinized. Therefore in the end the one guarantee for the perpetuity of Christianity in the world is its adaptation to human nature" (p. 429).

If the impossible, hypothetical event suggested by Dr. Forrest should happen, and mankind should universally renounce the Gospel of Christ, the Gospel none the less would still be true. Truth does not derive its intrinsic, objective authority either from the needs of human nature or from its appreciation by human nature. Its reception by mankind depends on this sense of need, but to elevate this manward aspect of truth into its criterion is pure pragmatism. The question in point Dr. Forrest dismisses abruptly. The Church does claim to be commissioned to declare a revealed truth. For Dr. Forrest to deny these claims because they do



not meet the criterion which he proposes (though we need hardly mention that in this revealed truth the deepest needs of the human heart are met)—is to refuse assent to objective truth, because it does not find its way to the minds which he sets up as judges. With some exaggeration of this statement we might say: Truth which is not popular is a contradiction in terms. Such a saying, however, would be a most painful mockery of the world's heroic martyrs who have fallen as witnesses to truth, and even of Him who said: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth," and who added: "Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice" (John xviii. 38), although there were many who did not hear.

This contention that the claims of Christianity must justify themselves to the individuals who sit in judgment upon them, involves the moral question of beliefs as expressed in Christ's significant addition. This subjective attitude as prerequisite for the reception of truth, Dr. Forrest makes practically the whole of Christianity and then elaborates the activity of the Holy Spirit by identifying His work essentially with the best judgment of men,—a procedure which runs either into humanitarianism or into pantheism. He who discusses the authority of Christ should remember that, if mankind derives its final authority from its own nature, it acts on its own authority, and further, that though the admission of truth to the hearts of men is subjectively conditioned, this circumstance does not decide the question concerning the nature of truth itself. "God is His own interpreter and He will make it plain."

But again Dr. Forrest says (p. 428): "We repudiate the attempt to impose upon us the ecclesiastical order of patristic or mediæval times, and claim the right in Christ's service to be true to ourselves and to our appointed place." The question, however, is not whether systems should be imposed upon those who do not find themselves satisfied in the traditional creed of Christianity. This would make

hypocrites, not Christians. Those of "the ecclesiastical order of patristic or mediæval times" were the first to affirm that human agencies cannot make Christians.

The issue is one which Dr. Forrest either evades or does not perceive, namely, whether simply being true to ourselves constitutes being a Christian, or do specific and unique characteristics belong to Christianity and the Christian Church. We must first determine the nature of Christianity and then answer the question, What constitutes a Christian? Scholars professedly still turn to the Christ as the source and center of Christianity, though the ethnic faiths have occasionally been called upon for elucidation, because of a widely current emphasis on human nature. In discussing Loisy's books, *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* and *Autour d'un petit livre*, Dr. Forrest quite naturally inclines towards Abbé Loisy's subjectivism, but objects to what critics consider Loisy's strongest point, the defense of historic Christianity as the natural and therefore legitimate form by means of which the Church perpetuates itself, declaring that "History knows no instance of religion without a cult".

Christianity interpreted as a mere historic fact cannot be reduced to a series of events, the signal success of which had its origin in an unimportant cause. When Harnack in his *Die Ausbreitung des Christentums* seeks to explain the spread of Christianity by arguing that it won the world to itself by absorbing all the foreign elements with which it came in contact, he is consistent with his subjective standpoint. But it may readily be seen that this explanation is made at the cost of Christianity itself. It amounts practically to saying that Christianity's conquest of the world is a mere appearance. Real Christianity never ran a historic course. Historic Christianity is merely a mixture of different pagan elements on which the cross of the early Christians was set. How this became possible is difficult to understand on Harnack's supposition. One is reminded of Nietzsche's bitter sneer: "In Wirklichkeit gab es nur ein Christ und der starb am Kreuz"; and on the other hand of

Prof. Freeman's remark: "You say, Am I still a believer? Certainly. That is, I believe the Christian religion to be from God, in a sense beyond that in which all things are from God. One cannot study history without seeing this. As I said in one of my published lectures: 'For Caesar Augustus to be led to worship a crucified Jew was a greater miracle than the cleaving of rocks or the raising of the dead'."

Dr. Geerhardus Vos, discussing the causes which have been operative in spreading the opinion that Christian faith is in its essence independent of historical facts, says: "The aim of modern historical research is to view developments from the inside, to catch the subjective tone and color of the period, to study it preëminently from its human point of view. Applying this to Sacred History and the Scriptures leads almost inevitably to a wrong distribution of emphasis. In redemption and revelation naturally not the human, subjective side, not the religious views and sentiments of men, stand in the foreground, but the great objective acts and interpositions of God, the history as it is in itself, not as it reflected itself in the mind of man. Facts, rather than the spirit of times or the consciousness of periods, should be here the primary object of investigation." Indeed, though we admit the human factor as determining the forms of Christianity in its historic course, it ought to be clear that unless objective reality is recognized as its ground, yea, Christ as its cause and center, Christian theology will be cast adrift on the eddying tides of human opinion.

Dr. Forsyth argues eloquently for "the Cross as the Final Seat of Authority".<sup>28</sup> He elaborates the idea that the cross is what God has done, does, and will do in an eternal act of grace for this sin-stricken world. The source and seat of man's final authority is, therefore, God at the heart of man (common grace), especially where man responds by faith to His gracious revelation (special grace).

<sup>28</sup> *Contemporary Review*, October, 1899.

and in thus ethicizing Christianity with vigor, ability and rare charm, Dr. Forsyth stands forth as one of the great spiritual champions of England. It should be remembered, however, that his inferences are not always safe, for he is inclined to slight the valuation of specific authority functioning in behalf of this central authority which he so ably champions. In closing this discussion we may fittingly quote his words:

"We must have for these days an authority which is in its nature emancipatory and not repressive, empowering and not enfeebling. That authority is the Redeemer's. The object of human faith must be the source of human freedom, individual or social. Society can only be saved by what saves the soul. The evangelical contention is that that object of faith is the Redeemer, directly and alone. It is the straitness of the Cross, that is the condition of critical, speculative, and social freedom for the world.

"The real and final seat of authority is Evangelical. It is the cross of Jesus Christ. Neither soul nor society knows anything as a final authority but Him crucified. The sovereign and the cement of society is the Saviour of the soul. That rules man which rules the conscience; and that rules the conscience which forgives it and redeems. The conscience is not the ruler, but only the ruler's throne. The center of authority is the world's central moral personality and order. It is the act of redemption. It is not the ideal but the Redeemer of the conscience that is its King. The cross is the seat of moral empire and human unity. There is more unanimity among the saved about the Cross than there is among the enlightened about truth. The believer has an authority for society that the thinker has not.

"The absolute is the only final authority, and we touch that by the moral of personal faith alone. Man is a free creature even more than the rational; the lower animals are more rational than free. And it must be in the region of his distinctive freedom that his King resides; it is there he needs and finds his authority. It exists for free will rather

than for free thought. For knowledge and thought there may be order and limit, but there is no authority which the real, absolute, and final sense, exists for man as more than as intellectual."

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A. V. C. P. HUIZINGA.



## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. 8vo: pp. xiii, 409.

A new book from the pen of Professor Royce is always a distinct event in philosophical circles. He has taught his readers to expect in every case a substantial contribution to the serious thought of the time and they are never disappointed. His standpoint does not change and his general view is the same in all his books, but there is a rich development of his thought in the way of the amplification of its elements and of the application of it to the problems of duty and the relations of life. This monograph has in it a freshness of conception which lends a peculiar attractiveness to the profound philosophy which it presupposes. Professor Royce attempts to gather up his whole doctrine of life under the one category of "Loyalty". To be sure, this conception must be stripped of its narrow and false associations; the elements involved in it must be explicated far beyond the thought of most of those who are familiar with the term: but the position taken and maintained in these lectures is that when truly analyzed, correctly developed and properly related, this idea of loyalty is the key to a complete and comprehensive ethical theory. The book begins with a sort of preliminary and tentative definition of loyalty; namely, "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" (pp. 16, 17). Involved in this definition are, first, a cause; secondly, a thorough devotion. The discussion of these factors is very interesting, but is that of a notion which is a purely formal one. The choice of a cause that is worthy of such devotion, is, of course, of the first importance and often fails. Many false highest goods bid for tribute, such as power, happiness, the mandates of social convention and the like; but these are all found wanting. The concrete objects of a true loyalty are to be found in the circles of friendship, of the family and of the state; but for the building of our philosophy nothing concrete is broad enough to serve as foundation. Accordingly, we are carried on to the point where the abstract principle is set forth that "loyalty to loyalty" is fundamental. "The principle is now obvious. I

may state it thus: In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less. And, in fact, so choose and so serve your individual cause as to secure thereby the greatest possible increase of loyalty amongst men. More briefly: *In choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty*" (p. 121; italics his). Herein, rightly interpreted, is set forth "the whole duty of man" (p. 140). Our author is able to reduce the dictates of conscience to this principle, and, reduced to its lowest terms, the moral sense has no broader or more imperative injunction than just to be loyal to loyalty.

Two lectures, on "Some American Problems in their Relation to Loyalty" and "Training for Loyalty", respectively, present some timely and suggestive considerations in relating this principle to present day problems; but, while they may have served as a concession to the exigencies of a lecture course, they are somewhat in the nature of *obiter dicta* in the close and consecutive development of the author's thesis and thought. We are told that loyalty to any object involves leadership to be followed, a cause to be idealized, and labor and sacrifice in the interest of that object. And here we begin to be aware that we are already in the current of Royce's philosophy. The social will is a concrete and real entity; the world of truth is a conscious world, a world of experience, a world of rational and spiritual unity; and, accordingly, when the loyal man believes his cause to be real, which (although at the same time it must be "idealized", too) he must do or he could not have chosen it as worthy of his willing and thorough devotion, he is, *ipso facto*, believing in the reality of this world of truth. But this world of truth is just this social will. The acceptance of the truth has a purposive, a volitional aspect. Differing as the lecturer does so widely from Professor James, he yet consents that to believe means, in a certain real sense, to "will to believe". But the world of truth is a world of conscious experience and the willing to believe anything in the world of truth is, so far, a surrender of our will to the will of that whose conscious experience all truth is. Accordingly, all search for truth is in effect but praying "Not my will but Thine be done". The individual will gives itself up to the universal will, of which, indeed, the individual will is a part. Thus our concept of Loyalty is brought forth as a certain relationship of harmony, of surrender, of "willing and thorough devotion" to the Eternal. In the light of what we have learned by the way, we are now at length prepared to abandon the tentative definition of loyalty with which we began and to receive the fully developed one: "Loyalty is the will to believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being" (p. 357). To any one who is in the least familiar with Professor Royce's writings, it will be seen, almost without reading it, how the last lecture on "Loyalty and Religion" falls as an easy corollary from these considerations.

It is not unfair to say that, although there is some reason for herald-

ing this book as an original contribution, in that the whole superstructure is based upon the one idea of loyalty, yet it is also true that, with a slight change in the text, it is the same old sermon still. Professor Royce's philosophy has, of course, like every other, its theological valuation. It has its own franchise and framework for a religion, and any religion must combine abstract truth with historical fact. The philosophy which is all-comprehending must construe all the elements of religion under its primal categories. This philosophy of Loyalty believes itself able to do this. It defines religion as "the interpretation both of the eternal and of the spirit of loyalty through emotion, and through a fitting activity of the imagination" (p. 377). The Eternal, the Over-soul, the *ego* whose conscious experience all truth is, is God. The same difficulty which is encountered elsewhere in following Royce is found here in being able to conceive of the God that conforms to the conditions of his philosophy as being a Person at all, and, whatever may be the essential elements of our conception of Personality, of being able to so round it up as in the end to come to any other than a pantheistic conception of the Eternal. But, whatever may be the theist's criticism of Professor Royce, no one can fail to see that these lectures are exceedingly rich and suggestive, stimulating to new lines of thought and throwing a fresh and healthy light upon some of the foremost problems of the present time.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

ON THE WITNESS STAND. Essays on Psychology and Crime. By HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. New York: The McClure Company. MCMVIII. Pp. 269.

This interesting book proceeds upon the assumption that the experimental stage of the experimental psychology has been safely passed and that the time has now fully come for the application of its practical results to Education, Medicine, Art, Economics and Law. If this be true, we may certainly add the discipline of theology to the list. The present task contemplates the Law in only one department of its administration; namely, the witness in court. It leaves entirely out of account the judge, the jury and the attorney, though it is easy enough to see that the principles of the Wundt psychology have their interesting application to each of these as well. In short, we have here a consideration of the personal equation on the witness stand, viewed from the standpoint of the most advanced type of the new psychology. The position of the author is that the truth is not obtainable unless this personal equation is taken into account in a perfectly scientific way. Compliment is made that, while it is assumed that there has been a great advance in the chemical analysis of the blood to the end that blood-spots may be identified, say, in a murder trial, no notice has been given to the equal advance in psychological science which may have just as much to do with the accurate ascertainment of evidence in locating crime. It is safe to say that much that is here brought out is well

worthy of careful consideration. There are many subtle and hardly detected factors that, unconsciously to the witness, affect his best attempts to tell the truth. It is psychologically scientific to declare that children, fools and tipsy people are most likely to out with the plain truth. Taking an oath may itself have the effect of an inhibition upon truth-telling. If only one man in every thirty or forty can distinguish at a distance between a red and a green lantern, it is little wonder that the sworn testimony of honest men differs so widely. If it be true that there is nothing in the material itself which enables the knower to know whether he came upon it by perceiving it as a fact or by recalling it as a memory or by imagining it as a fancy, then to the man who imagines very vividly it may be a pretty mixed question sometimes whether he gets his facts from the field of reality, from the range of past experience or from the airy realms of fancy.

The functions of the hypnotist are represented as being very important in the practical administration of criminal jurisprudence. The Harvard professor impresses the lay mind as being too cock sure. We are soon led to allow for the personal equation in our author. We are hardly able to accept the psychological judgment of Professor Munsterberg in Cambridge against the formal verdict of a court and jury in Chicago as to the guilt or innocence of a murderer in Chicago. We would be surer of the new psychology if the new psychology were not quite so sure of itself. The agnostic must not be too certain that nobody can be certain of anything; neither must the psychologist forget that the furtive and fugitive factors of the personal equation enter into his own judgment upon the thoughts of other men. This book should be exceedingly suggestive to the preacher of the Gospel. If some Munsterberg in the ministry should write such a book, applying the results of the new psychology not only to the dogmas and dogmatists of scholastic theology, but also to the preaching and hearing of the pulpit-message, it might bring out, among other things of doubtful value, some helpful lessons for both the pulpit and the pew. Some one has said that theology is nine-tenths temperament, and there is an element of truth in the remark; but it is nearer the truth to say that in the close and vital touch of the preacher with his hearers, his work is in very large measure psychologically conditioned. For suggestive light reading, we commend this by-product of the new psychology to any who are interested in the great work of imparting impressions and conveying truth to others.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

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## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

**DARWINISM TO-DAY.** A discussion of present-day scientific criticism of the Darwinian Selection Theories, together with a brief account of the principal and other proposed auxiliary and alternative Theories

of Species-forming. By VERNON L. KELLOGG, Professor in Leland Stanford, Jr., University. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xii, 403. With good analytical Table of Contents and an (insufficient) Index.

A book like this has long been greatly needed, and this ever increasing need is admirably met by this volume. Of course, Professor Kellogg writes from his own point of view, and he would not be human if he did not leave some things to be desired. Readers of his book should supplement it by reading also some such book as Rudolph Otto's *Naturalism and Religion*; as readers of Otto's book should certainly supplement it by reading Professor Kellogg's. If what Otto has to say, for example, upon teleology, and the relation of teleology to mechanical explanations of phenomena, will help the reader to correct Professor Kellogg's unreasonable objection to all that he calls "mystical" in our world-view, Professor Kellogg will on the other hand give him a far richer knowledge of, if not a deeper insight into, the great debate which has been going on of late upon the factors and processes of the development of organized forms. No one can have been unaware of this debate or of the gradual modifications it has been working in the attitude of the scientific world to the traditional Darwinian conceptions. But the general reader has lacked adequate guidance to an exact estimate of the drift of the discussion, and has been liable to be left in a state of mental confusion or to be unduly swayed by the latest advocate of a special line of theory he may have chanced to read. A comprehensive survey of the whole field of the debate from the hand of a competent guide is what he has needed. And this is what Professor Kellogg has given us in this volume.

Professor Kellogg wisely begins at the beginning—with a lucid account of what Evolution means, in general, and what that particular theory of Evolution known as Darwinism really is. And he rightly finds the differentiation of Darwinism, specifically so called, in the Selection Theories,—or, let us say, that we may keep our eyes fixed on the real pivot of it all, in the theory of Natural Selection. Keeping this central point well in sight, he next gives his readers a careful and clear account, in no way glozing its extent or its seriousness, of the widespread revolt of biological investigators during the last few decades against the principle of Natural Selection,—against ascribing to it the whole work of species-forming, and even at times against ascribing to it any effectiveness or capacity for species-forming. Having thus exhibited the attack on Darwinism in its full reach and force, he next, with equal care and fulness, recounts the defense which has been made of it—a defense sometimes very strong, but always involving certain concessions which go to modify or even to transform the rôle which is ascribed to Natural Selection in the moulding of forms. This leads naturally to a survey of the new theories of species-forming which have been suggested, whether as auxiliary to the theory of Natural Selection, designed to supply its deficiencies, or as alternative to it, designed to



supplant it. This survey has not been carried through without betraying Professor Kellogg's own predilections; the volume naturally closes therefore, with a chapter on Darwinism's Present Standing, in which the results of the debate are summed up and Professor Kellogg's own conclusions outlined. These conclusions may be briefly stated in the two sentences: "Darwinism, as the all sufficient, or even most important, causo-mechanical factor in species forming, and hence as the sufficient explanation of descent, is discredited and cast down." "Darwinism, the natural selection of the fit, the final arbiter in descent controversy stands unscathed, clear and high above the obscuring cloud of battle. That is to say, Professor Kellogg recognizes in Natural Selection the true cause, actually working in nature, to the control of which the stream of descent is subjected, so that when we look at the whole course of development, we see it moving on under its guidance. But he recognizes also that Natural Selection rather works on the stream of descent than produces it, and accounts rather for the general channels in which it flows, than for itself, whether in its main character or many of its minor characteristics. He evidently conceives himself as standing midway between the contending extremes, allowing to Natural Selection a most important function in species-forming, but denying to it the omnipotence which the Neo-Darwinians are prone to ascribe to it.

The place of Darwin in the history of the evolutionary theories is determined by the fact that he first pointed to a *vera causa*, actually working in the world, to which could be plausibly ascribed the production of the various forms which occur in the animated universe. The essence of his suggestion consisted in the very simple proposition that if multitudes more beings are born into the world than can possibly live in it, it will be inevitable that those which are least fitted to live in it will be crowded out, which will result naturally in the survival of the fittest in each generation. Thus there will come about the gradual moulding of organized beings to fit their environment. The strength of the theory lies in its simplicity, and its apparent appeal to nothing but recognized facts. We all know that over-production is the law of life. We all know that no two individuals are precisely alike. We are all prepared to allow that in the struggle for existence which seems inevitable in these circumstances it will be the fittest among these unlike individuals which survive. We are equally prepared to admit that, a "like begets like", the fittest will reproduce in their offspring their fitnesses. Who, then, can deny that in the course of innumerable generations going on thus, very considerable modifications from the original stock might be produced? Is there not given here, then, an adequate account of the whole course of development of animate forms?

Certainly the theory looks very simple and convincing. But so soon as we transfer it from the region of imaginary construction to that of fact, difficulties arise. Many of the objections which have been urged against it seem to us, to be sure, to be little justified. These are largely directed against its consistency or completeness as a logical construction.

tion. From this point of view, however, as it seems to us, the theory is unassailable. When, for example, it is objected—as it has been persistently objected—that it provides only for the survival of the fittest, not for the production of the fittest; that it leaves unexplained the whole matter of the cause of variation and particularly of the causes of the actual variations which occur; that it has no account to give of the opportune appearance of the variations needed, or of the repeated consecution of variations in the same direction in the line of actual descent—and the like: the mark seems to us to be completely missed. The Darwinian theory does not need to concern itself with the origin of the fittest, the cause of variation, the causes of the specific variations which occur, or their opportuneness or consecution. It is logically complete in the simple postulates of variation, struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest. If we admit, as all must admit, that no two individuals are ever exactly alike, then we must admit that some of these individuals are more fit to exist than others: that is given in the very fact of difference. We need not concern ourselves with how the "fitness" arises; relative fitness is inherent in the mere fact of difference. Neither need we concern ourselves with the objection that relative fitness in some particulars in a given individual may be offset by relative unfitness in other particulars. To estimate in these circumstances which organism is on the whole most fit to survive might puzzle us: it cannot puzzle Nature, which acts simply along the line of the resultant. Wherever two individuals exist it is inevitable that one will be "fitter" than the other: wherever thousands or millions of individuals, generically alike, come into being, there necessarily exist among them some, few or many, who will be "fitter" than the rest. And if these thousands or millions of individuals come into being in such circumstances that the great majority of them must needs be crowded out, the survival of the "fittest" seems certain; and as this process goes on through generation after generation, the line of descent must follow the line of relative fitness.

Logically unassailable as the theory is, however, so soon as we presume that this process has actually gone on, we find ourselves faced with many difficulties. The difficulties are important—or let us frankly say, as it seems to us, are destructive of the theory. But they do not lie against the logical completeness (and therefore the plausibility) of the theory, but rather against its actual working power. It may be suspected that it is often an underlying sense of these factual difficulties, subtly modifying the objector's point of view as to the conditions of the problem to be solved, which accounts for the pressing of the (really ineffective) logical difficulties. These real difficulties raise such questions as these. What reason is there to believe that the struggle for existence in animate nature is severe enough rigorously to eliminate in each generation all but the fittest to survive? What reason is there to suppose that the differences by which (as we all must agree) individuals are discriminated from one another, are great enough to form telling factors in the struggle for existence, even supposing it to exist

in the right which the theory postulates? What reason is there to suppose, even if the variations are great enough to furnish a handle for selection and the struggle for existence is severe enough to weed out all but the fittest in each generation, that this process, continued from generation to generation, will result in any great modification of type, and the successive generations will not rather fluctuate around a center, as variation itself fluctuates around this center, and thus on the whole the type remain stationary? Or if there is marked on the whole an increasing divergence from the original type as the line of descent advances through the fittest of each generation—a general divergence on the whole amid much fluctuation (which seems the most that, on the theory, can be possibly postulated)—what reason is there to suppose that this divergence could advance very far in the time at disposal? And above all, what reason is there to suppose that this slowly increasing divergence produced by the survival in each generation of only the "fittest"—through the many fluctuations to this side and that which, on the hypothesis, must occur—could in the time at disposal produce the infinite variety of animate forms which has actually come into being? Or, to put the question in its sharpest form, could not only bridge the gulf which separates the amoeba from man, but bridge it by a steady upward advance—upward, that is, not merely in the sense of ever more and more perfect adjustment to the environment, nor even in the sense of progress "from homogeneity to heterogeneity", to ever greater complexity of structure but measured by an absolute standard of value? For this is what has really happened if the palaeontological record has anything at all to tell us; and it has happened, if any trust at all can be placed in the calculations of the physicists, with a rapidity which confounds thought. The formal completeness of the logical theory of Darwinism is fairly matched, therefore, by its almost ludicrous actual incompetence for the work asked of it.

Of course, this has become ever more and more apparent as time has passed, and workers in the relevant fields of research have escaped somewhat from the obsession of the specious plausibility of the Selection Theory and looked more squarely in the face of the problems to be solved. Here and there, no doubt, as was inevitable, there has been a disposition exhibited to glaze its inefficiency, and to "cure" its defects by ineffective remedies. A recent instance of this is noted by Prof Kellogg, when he records (p. 55) Prof Ray Lankester's appeal to the properties of radium as offsetting the physicists' calculations as to the time available for the possible existence of life on the earth. If, Prof Lankester argues, the sun contained a fraction of one per cent of radium, that would offset its estimated loss of heat and, "upsetting all the calculations of the physicists", give us the thousands of millions of years which are needed (on the Darwinian hypothesis) "to allow time for the evolution of living things". When men catch at straws like this to buttress their theories with, it becomes clear what a strawy foundation they are building on. Nor would the concession of the

thousands of millions of years needed (but not obtained) relieve the difficulties of the case, which have led biologist after biologist to suggest supplementary theories designed to meet the failure of the main theory in this or that aspect of it, or, in ever increasing numbers as time has gone on, to propose alternative theories, and in extreme instances to assume an attitude of opposition to the doctrine of descent altogether. Thus De Vries' theory of "mutations" may be supposed to be ultimately due to the feeling that "natural selection" must have marked variations to work on; Eimer's theory of "orthogenesis" to the feeling that some account must be given of the advance of development along a straight line; Nageli's theory of a "principle of perfection" in organisms to the recognition of the steady advance of the line of evolution towards something that looks very much like a goal.

The result of it all is that Darwinism, specifically so called,—that is, as a particular theory accounting for the differentiation of organic forms,—stands to-day not merely as Prof. Kellogg somewhat too gently puts it (p. 5), "seriously discredited in the biological world", but practically out of the running. Even the most extreme Neo-Darwinians (like Weismann) have been compelled to supplement it by auxiliary theories which altogether change its complexion. It is quite true also, on the other hand, however, that nothing has come to take its place; as Prof. Kellogg truly puts it (p. 375): "these bitter antagonists of selection are especially unconvincing when they come to offer a replacing theory, an alternative explanation of transformation and descent". The real state of the case seems to be that the deficiencies of the Darwinian hypothesis have come to be widely recognized and numerous suggestions have been made, which severally provide for, or seek to provide for, this or the other of these deficiencies. But no one of these will serve any better than Darwinism itself serves—possibly not even so well as Darwinism serves—as a complete "causomechanical" explanation of the differentiation of organic forms. Each severally—all in combination (so far as they can be combined)—still leave something, and something essential, to be desired. The problem still presses on us; a great variety of suggestions are being made to solve it; it remains as yet unsolved.

What most impresses the layman as he surveys the whole body of these evolutionary theories in the mass, is their highly speculative character. If what is called "science" means careful observation and collection of facts and strict induction from them of the principles governing them, none of these theories have much obvious claim to be "scientific". They are speculative hypotheses set forth as possible or conceivable explanations of the facts. This is fully recognized by Prof. Kellogg. "What may for the moment detain us, however", he says, (p. 18, cf. p. 382), "is a reference to the curiously nearly completely subjective character of the evidence for both the theory of descent and natural selection. . . . Speaking by and large we only tell the general truth when we declare that no indubitable cases of species-forming by transforming, that is, of descent, have been observed; and that no rec

ognized case of natural selection really selecting has been observed. . . . The evidence for descent is of satisfying but purely logical character, the descent hypothesis explains completely all the phenomena of homology of palaeontological succession, of ontogeny, and of geographical distribution, that is, it explains all the observed facts touching the appearance in time and place on this earth of organisms and the facts of their likenesses and unlikenesses to each other. . . . The evidence for the selection theory . . . also chiefly rests on the logical conclusion that under the observed fact of over-production, struggle is bound to occur, that under the observed fact of miscellaneous variation, those individuals most fortunate in their variations will win in the struggle; and finally, that under the observed fact of heredity, the winners will transmit to their posterity their advantageous variations, all of which inter-acting facts and logically derived processes will be repeated over and over again, with the result of slow but constant modification of types, that is, formation of new species" (cf. p. 92, 394). What is thus true of the theory of descent in general and the specific theory of selection put forward to account for this descent, is equally—often far more—true of the auxiliary and substitutionary theories which have been suggested to fill out the deficiencies of the latter or to supplant it (cf. pp. 382, 391). These are often hyper-speculative theories, which have only this to recommend them to our consideration,—that if they be conceived to represent fact they may supply an explanation of the facts of observation. Thus far, there is no other reason than this for supposing them to represent fact. And it is obvious that a vivid imagination may supply many competing theories of this hypothetical sort and all of them prove subsequently to have no basis whatever in reality. The lay reader may be excused if, reading over the outlines of these several theories, he is oppressed with a sense of their speculative character; in a word, of their unreality. For ourselves we confess frankly that the whole body of evolutionary constructions prevalent to-day impresses us simply as a vast mass of speculation, which may or may not prove to have a kernel of truth in it. All that seems to us to be able to lay claim to be assured knowledge in the whole mass is that the facts of homology and of the palaeontological record suggest that the relation of animate forms to one another may be a genetic one. So soon as we come to attempt to work out for ourselves a theory of the factors and process of the differentiation of these forms, we are in the region of pure speculation and can claim for our constructions nothing more than that the facts leave them tenable. Whether they ought to be held as well as are capable of being held, we seem to lack all direct evidence.

The next thing that most strongly impresses the lay reader is the amazing zeal which is exhibited by our biological workers for these speculative theories. It is not merely that every man has his theory and sets great store by it, however speculative it may be. It almost seems at times that facts cannot be accepted unless a "causo-mechanical" theory be ready to account for them: which looks amazingly like



basing facts on theory rather than theory on facts. Professor Kellogg himself is no stranger to this state of mind. He is at least repeatedly telling us of this or the other contention that it is unacceptable because no "causo-mechanical" theory explaining its operation is forthcoming. It almost seems at times as if it were "causo-mechanical" theories rather than facts that our biological investigators are on the lookout for. And let us note well, that it is a "causo-mechanical" theory alone that satisfies them. There must be no "mysticism" involved; we had almost said no "mysteries". They seem to say to us that nature is as plain as a book and has no secrets which are intrinsically secrets, but only secrets in the sense that they are not yet found out. But above all, they not only seem to say—but, if we are to take Prof. Kellogg for an example, do say—that there must be no loophole left in our explanations for the intrusion of even directive forces from without. It is enough for Prof. Kellogg to condemn a theory out of hand, if it involves the recognition—or the suspicion—of the working in animate nature of forces deeper—or higher—than physico-chemical ones. Accordingly the Neo-Vitalism which is playing its part in the biological circles of Germany is set aside with a bare word. "Butschli has well pointed out", we read, "that Neo-Vitalism is really only a return to the old 'vital principle' belief, and that we are now, and have been ever since our practical giving up of the vital principle notion, making steady progress in the explanation of life-forms and life-functions on strictly mechanical and physico-chemical grounds" (pp. 226-7). Even when it is introduced "under a pseudo-scientific guise", therefore—as, no doubt, for instance by Driesch, who in positing "an extra-physico-chemical factor" (which he calls "psychoïd"), yet is careful to represent it as "an attribute of, or essential kind of potentiality pertaining to, organized living substance"—the assumption of the interworking into the phenomena of organic life of anything above "psycho-chemical" forces is treated as out of the question. The whole animate universe is to be explained on the basis of these forces alone, and no theory of it is even to be taken into serious consideration which is not ready with a causo-mechanical explanation on these grounds. Here is a chance sentence, for example, which seems to indicate in a word the settled point of view of Professor Kellogg himself certainly and apparently of those whom he naturally represents: "Nageli's automatic perfecting principle is an impossibility to the thorough going evolutionist seeking for a causo-mechanical explanation of change" (p. 387).

This amounts, it will be seen, to a definitely polemic attitude—of a rather extreme kind—towards teleology. It is true that teleological language is sometimes employed. In the immediate context of the sentence just quoted, Professor Kellogg speaks of the occurrence of "determinate or purposive change". But this is only an instance of that "personifying language" which is the bane of naturalistic writers. What he means is that "the simple physical or mechanical impossibility of perfect identity between process and environment in the case of one individual and process and environment in the case of any other" will

automatically produce such a variety in individuals as will result in "the change needed as the indispensable basis for the upbuilding of the great fabric of species diversity and descent". That is to say, he is here only saying that the simple fact of unlikeness between individuals—so that no two individuals are precisely alike—provides materials for selection to work on and precludes the necessity—on Darwinian ground—of inquiring into the causes of variation or seeking out a principle of orthogenesis. There will always be "a fittest" at hand. We have already pointed out the sense and limits in which this contention is valid. What is here interesting us is that this is all that Dr Kellogg means by "determinate or purposive change". His polemic attitude towards all real teleology in the evolutionary process—to the intrusion into it of the guidance of purpose, properly and not abusively so called—we will not say is betrayed, it is expressed, over and over again in this volume. In criticizing the type of theory represented by Nageli and Korschinsky which assumes "a special tendency towards progress" in the organism—"an inner directive force", an "inner law of development"—for instance, Professor Kellogg writes (p. 278): "It is needless to say that but few biologists confess to such a belief. However much in the dark we may be regarding the whole great secret of bionomics, however partial and fragmentary our knowledge of the processes and mechanism of evolution, such an assumption of a mystic, essentially teleological force wholly independent of and dominating all the physico-chemical forces and influences that we do know and the reactions and behaviour of living matter to these influences which we are beginning to recognize and understand with some clearness and fulness—such a surrender of all our hardly won actual scientific knowledge in favour of an unknown, unproved, mystic vital force we are not prepared to make. As Plate well says, such a theory of orthogenesis is opposed, in sharpest contrast, to the very spirit of science." Again (p. 376): "Modification and development may have been proved to occur along determinate lines without the aid of natural selection. I believe they have. But such development cannot have an aim, it cannot be assumed to be directed towards advance, there is no independent progress upward, *i. e.*, towards higher specialization. At least, there is no scientific proof of any such capacity in organisms. Natural selection remains the one cause-mechanical explanation of the large and general progress towards fitness; the movement towards specialization; that is, descent as we know it." Still again, criticizing von Kolliker (p. 350): "He included in his general theory of heterogenesis, a basic plan of progressive evolution. Such a conception has in it too much ontogenic orthogenesis; it is too redolent of teleology for present day biology." Teleology itself is seen then to be the *bête noire* of biology as represented by Professor Kellogg. "Certainly", we are told (p. 375), "no present-day biologist is ready to fall back on the long deserted standpoint of teleology and ascribe to heterogenesis or orthogenesis an auto-determination towards adaptiveness and fitness." "Definitely directed variation" he may with Weismann allow to exist (p. 199); "but not

predestined variation running on independently of the life conditions of the organism as Nageli . . . has assumed" (cf. 381). As he expresses it with the polemic edge well turned out, in another place (p. 377): "Nor can any Nagelian automatic perfecting principle hold our suffrage for a moment unless we stand with the theologists on the insecure basis of teleology." That is to say, the ultimate objection to Nageli's "principle of perfection" is—just that it is too much like teleology—the "teleology of the theologists". In other words, the scandalon is precisely teleology, in any form.

Now all this is very depressing. The anti-teleological zeal of Mr. Darwin is well known: the vigor with which—as, for instance, in his correspondence with Asa Grey—he repelled the intrusion of teleology into his system betrays his fundamental thought. The anti-teleological implication of Darwinism, taken in its strictness—when it becomes a system of pure accidentalism—is obvious. But it could have been hoped that we had got by now well beyond all that. Some lack of general philosophical acumen must be suspected when it is not fully understood that teleology is in no way inconsistent with—is rather necessarily involved in—a complete system of natural causation. Every teleological system implies a complete "causo-mechanical" explanation as its instrument. Why, then, should the investigators of the "causo-mechanical" explanation array themselves in polemic opposition to the very conception of governing purpose? Above all, why should they make the test of the acceptability of theories, the recognition or non-recognition by them of teleological factors? This gives the disagreeable appearance to the trend of biological speculation—we do not say of biological investigation—that it is less interested in science for science's sake, that is, in the increase of knowledge, than it is in the validation of a naturalistic world-view: that it is dominated, in a word, by philosophical conceptions, not derived from science but imposed on science from without. Of course, there are many workers in the biological, as in other scientific fields, to which this will not apply. And it may well be contended that the drift of thought among investigators in these fields is precisely towards the recognition of the mystery of life and life processes, of their inexplicability on purely physico-chemical grounds, of the necessity of the assumption of the working of some higher directive force in the advance of organic development—in a word, towards just that vitalism and teleology which Professor Kellogg scouts, not as excluded by observed fact or by proved theory, but as inconsistent with "the scientific spirit"—which seems as much as to say with an *a priori* philosophical attitude. In the meanwhile, however, it seems clear that much of our scientific thought is still under the control of a very definite anti-teleological (which is as much as to say an a-theistic, for teleology and theism are equipollent terms) prejudice.

We should be sorry to close even so desultory a notice of a book so competent and so informing on a note of blame. After all, the book is not an anti-teleological treatise; and though its allusions to the hypothesis of teleology in organic nature are disturbing, they are only

allusions. What the book undertakes to do is to "present simply and concisely the present-day standing of Darwinism in biological science", and to outline the various auxiliary and alternative theories of species-forming which have been proposed to aid or to replace the selection theories". And this it does well, with thorough knowledge, with sufficient fulness, and with adequate exactness. Professor Kellogg exhibits here great skill in expounding and much penetration in criticizing the several views which have been advanced, and commends his own views to us by their moderation and balance. He impresses us as a safe guide to the history both of evolutionary speculation and of biological research. Readers desiring to know the present state, whether of knowledge or of opinion, in this sphere of research, cannot do better than to resort to his comprehensive and readable volume.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

NO STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE: NO NATURAL SELECTION. A Critical Examination of the Fundamental Principles of the Darwinian Theory. By GEORGE PAULIN. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo.; pp. xx, 261. Price, \$1.75 net.

We have not had the fortune to meet with other writings by Mr George Paulin and are entirely ignorant of his personality. He speaks of himself as of one advanced in years; and his manner of writing seems to accord with this description, characterized as it is at once by a certain ripeness of tone and by a certain diffuseness of expression. The matter of his book is highly speculative in character and divides itself into two extended arguments—the one in refutation of the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection, the other in rebuttal of the central contention of Malthus' Essay on Population. Unity is secured by the identity of the governing principle in the two theories which are examined.

Mr. Paulin appears to ascribe a venturesome novelty to his assault on the core of the Darwinian hypothesis which somewhat astonishes us. He seems almost to imagine that he is the first, or among the first, to arraign the conceptions of the "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest". Readers who are unaware of the widespread revolt from these conceptions among recent scientific investigators should at least read the three chapters on "Darwinism Attacked" in Professor Vernon L. Kellogg's *Darwinism To-day*. Meanwhile, Mr Paulin's apparent lack of acquaintance with these labors of his fellow-workers gives to his strictures on the Darwinian hypothesis the value of an independent criticism. The hundred and twelve pages which he devotes to this criticism, diffuse and speculative as they are, and now and then somewhat heated, are nevertheless quite effective,—chiefly because they lay stress on certain broad considerations, which, apart from all details, appear to be fatal to the Darwinian construction.

Neither the palaeontological record nor the present state of the

animate universe is such as it must have been were the Darwinian hypothesis true. If the Darwinian hypothesis were correct, there would necessarily have existed, in the slow formation of types through infinitesimal changes, innumerable intermediate stages and the several types would inevitably melt insensibly into one another. Vastly more of the unfit would have died than of the fit. How is it that the record is free from these intermediate types? How have the rocks selected out only the few fit for preservation in their remains for our inspection, and destroyed all trace of the immensely more numerous unfit? If the Darwinian hypothesis were correct, again, all nature, in the terrible struggle for existence which is its nerve, would hang ever at the starving point. It does not. The average animal is a well-to-do animal. Why do not the starving multitudes who are unfit swarm around the surviving few who are fit? They do not. On the Darwinian theory, nature should be one vast charnel house. It is not. It is a happy hunting ground. "We behold only the survivors,—vigorous, healthy and happy survivors. But where is the struggle for existence? Where are the dying and the dead?" (p. 17). Starvation is not the normal plane of animal existence. On the contrary, in a district stocked from immemorial time, the numbers of animals inhabiting it will be constant at just the point at which they can be comfortably supplied with their proper food (p. 53). This is what we call the balance of nature, and it seems to maintain itself indefinitely without visible struggle. An internecine struggle such as Darwin pictured as the inevitable state of animal nature—and on the inevitableness of which he built his whole theory—simply never exists, as is open to the observation of everybody. And what survives from generation to generation is obviously not a few hard-pressed "fittest", but the normal somewhat pampered "average".

The examination of the Malthusian theory, which occupies the second half of the volume, is somewhat more labored, but scarcely so effective as the criticism of the Darwinian theory which precedes it. Mr. Paulin's argument here, too, is that the struggle for existence, which is the nerve of Malthusianism also, is not in point of fact a characteristic of human existence, and never can become its characteristic. Population, in his view, is automatically governed by the labor-market, and follows inevitably, therefore, the fluctuations in the means of sustenance. In times of plenty, men marry early and the birth-rate is large: in times of stringency, men marry correspondingly late and the birth-rate is small. Thus the population is regulated by the means of sustenance and the struggle for existence never comes off. These views he supports by elaborate statistical tables designed to show that the birth-rate follows closely the fluctuations of the labor-market, so that the population abides steadily at the mark at which sustenance is provided according to the standard of living in vogue. A curious corollary is that large emigration, acting as a new demand for men, stimulates productivity and does not deplete a nation, and the same is true of the maintenance of a large standing army. The rule is,



...the ... ..

一、政治的に於ては、國家の統一と獨立を維持し、國民の幸福を増進することを目的とし、法律を制定し、行政を執行し、司法を掌ることである。  
 二、経済的に於ては、生産力を増進し、消費生活を豊かにすることを目的とし、産業政策を実施し、貿易を振興し、金融を統制することである。  
 三、文化的に於ては、國民の知識を普及し、道徳心を涵養することを目的とし、教育制度を整備し、文藝活動を奨励し、宗教を尊重することである。  
 四、社会的に於ては、社会秩序を維持し、貧富の差を縮小することを目的とし、労働法を制定し、社会保障制度を整備し、慈善事業を推進することである。  
 五、環境的に於ては、自然環境を保護し、生活環境を改善することを目的とし、公害防止法を制定し、緑地帯を確保し、資源を節約することである。

final word to us and it seems to us far from an unsatisfactory word.  
*Princeton.* B. B. WARFIELD

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSPIRATION; An Attempt to Distinguish Religious Truth from Scientific Truth and to Harmonize Christianity with Modern Thought. By GEORGE LANSING RAYMOND. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1908. 8vo.; pp. xix, 340.

This book promises great things, and it would be a greater book than it is if it performed them. The author, who is, we believe, connected with the George Washington University, comes to his task with what seems to be a distinct bias in his thought. He draws the line sharply, though not too accurately, between science and theology, the one "trains the mind to be candid and logical", while the other "is inclined to be neither" (p. vi). The shortcomings of theology, accordingly, are not only intellectual, they are also moral. Religious men must be prepared, "without prevaricating or hedging, to satisfy all the requirements of the rational nature". The author tells us that some time ago he attended a meeting of scientists, and, as he looked about him, he reflected that not one of those present was considered by himself or by others as being what is conventionally termed religious, yet, everybody was in a fine frame of devotion, conscientiousness, and charity. About the same time, he had his attention called to an ecclesiastical gathering (we are left to infer that he was not present): those present regarded themselves "as religious in an exceptional degree": "yet no reported speech of any of them happened to be devoid of a certain selfish, intolerant, and unmagnanimous disregard of the feelings and thoughts of others"; neither was there any noticeable display of "distinctively Christ-like traits". We submit that the author had in this most interesting psychological observation the suggestion of a theme which in itself is worthy the consideration of many wise men without as yet widening the scope of their endeavor so greatly as to accomplish the rather ambitious task indicated in the somewhat glowing but adequately general terms in the sub-title of the comely volume which his publishers have produced. It occurs to the reader that it must have been a picked group of scientists not one of whom could be fairly regarded, even in the conventional sense, as religious. Certainly it would not be hard to select a group of scientific men of the first magnitude who are so regarded. Moreover, the ecclesiastical mien is hardly so degraded, nor is the *odium theologicum* so ferocious, in these degenerate days, as to render either absurd or superfluous a mild shock of surprise at being told that any Conference or Convocation or Synod has been in solemn session for several days without some brother, less active, less prominent, less useful forsooth than his colleagues, displaying in some incidental way or in some felicitous moment when he was off his guard, just a little degree of tolerance, unselfishness or magnanimous regard for the thoughts and feelings of others.

The scandalized may be entitled to some comfort from the fact that the author refrains from declaring that he was himself present at this meeting, and that his hear-say evidence is confessedly based upon what had been "reported".

The body of the book gives some evidence that the author never wholly succeeded in ridding his mind of the effect upon it of this unfortunate observation or, apparently, of the feeling that he himself occupied a sort of judicial position, in which he was immune against these deflecting and distracting influences. The task of harmonization is essayed by means of the psychological method. The Coleridgean conception of the principle that truth is not in the letter, but in the spirit, is vigorously employed. Truth is, essentially, conformity to method. This is less profound than it seems, seeing that so long as truth is conformity to anything it is not itself essentially anything. It is only formally what it is and the essential elements inhere rather in that something to which the truth must conform in order to be truth. Absolute truth is simply conformity to one changeless, absolute method. This conception of the relativity of truth gives us the first distinctive part of the book and the second, and only other, is like unto it, namely, the reduction of inspiration to the general category of hypnotism. Inspiration is merely suggestive; that is to say, it is "suggestion". Many and varied are the services of the new psychology. We are not prepared to deny that there is much yet to be explored in this *terra incognita*; neither are we dismayed at the prospect that in the advance of psychological learning and in the much-heralded leveling of the heights of the supernatural to the low plains of the natural, it should come to pass that some of the phenomena of canonical inspiration should be explained as hypnotism or suggestion or what-not. Our failure to be dismayed is based upon two grounds: first, in that we are aware of little evidence that any very satisfactory advance is being made in this particular direction; and, secondly, that as at present psychologically informed, we believe that most intelligent people would regard the transformation of inspiration into hypnotic suggestion as but the changing of an  $x$  into a  $y$ , of one unknown quantity into another, and that whereas the  $x$  may be held to be beyond the complete explanation of science, the  $y$  is as yet uncertain, variable, and uncanny. It certainly is not clearly enough defined to serve as the satisfactory solution of a problem to be solved.

The work is not without evidences of ability and thoughtful research. It speaks rather for the advocate than for the judge. Its breadth of view is not too great for the task attempted. It harmonizes Science and Christianity, only in such a beneficent and epochal performance the waiting world will want to be sure that it is, on the one hand, Science that is truly scientific, and, on the other, Christianity that is truly Christian, which have been harmonized.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A DICTIONARY OF CHRIST AND THE GOSPELS. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, D.D., with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, D.D., and (in the reading of proofs) of JOHN C. LAMBERT, D.D. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Vol. I. 1906. Pp. xii, 936. Vol. II. 1908. Pp. xiv, 912. Each, \$5 net.

Of Dr. Hastings' large encyclopædic programme, embracing no less than four voluminous dictionaries, this is the second work to reach publication, the *Dictionary of the Bible* having preceded it, and the *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics* and the smaller *Bible Dictionary* (in one volume) still being in course of preparation. The present work professes to be something different from an enlargement of that portion of the *Bible Dictionary* which relates to Christ and the Gospels. Instead of being occupied mainly with things biographical, historical, geographical or antiquarian, it seeks to meet "the need of the preacher, to whom Christ is everything". The preface states that "it seeks to cover all that relates to Christ throughout the Bible and in the life and literature of the world", and promises "articles on the Patristic estimate of Jesus, the Mediæval estimate, the Reformation and Modern estimates"; further, "articles on Christ in the Jewish writings and in the Muslim literature", and goes on to say that "every aspect of modern life, in so far as it touches or is touched by Christ, is described under its proper title". We are told that, to suit the practical, homiletical purpose of the Dictionary, the writers of the articles have been carefully chosen from among those scholars who are, or have been, themselves preachers. In regard to the other half of the title, the Gospels, the scope of the work is not limited to what these writings tell about themselves; the extra biblical testimony to their origin and their history is likewise dealt with, as articles like those on Aristion, Ebionism, Papias and others indicate. It is obvious that, unless the whole history of Gospel-criticism were included, a line had to be drawn somewhere. But the same necessity of limitation existed in regard to the Christological part. Satisfactorily to exhibit the significance of Christ as a factor in history would overtax the powers of the most encyclopædic mind. Even the editorial mapping out of a scheme for attempting this would appear a herculean task, at least to the theologian who conceives of Christ in accordance with Col. i. 15-80. The question may be raised whether the thing can be properly done at all under the alphabetical plan, and whether some systematic treatment under broad religious and theological headings by a limited number of writers would not be preferable. In point of fact, the editor resorts to such a method in the Appendix, where a series of articles on "Christ in the Early Church", "Christ in the Middle Ages", "Christ in the Reformation Theology", "Christ in Modern Thought", "Christ in Jewish Literature", "Christ in Mohammedan Literature", and (strange to say) on "Paul" is added.

The juxtaposition of Christ and the Gospels in the title would seem

to indicate that the Dictionary means to deal chiefly with the Gospel-Christ or the so-called historical Christ as in some sense distinguishable from the Christ of the Old Testament, the Apostolic Christ, the Christ of the Creeds, the Christ of Theology. But, while this to some extent is kept in view, more space being devoted to it than to any thing else, it is by no means rigidly adhered to as a matter of principle. We learn something about Christ in all these other aspects, only not enough to satisfy us or to give us a proper sense of proportion. Nor is the manner in which the Christ of the Gospels is presented here purely objectively determined by the view points which the Gospels themselves furnish, but to no small degree by the subjective appreciation and preference of the present age for certain sides and elements in the character of Christ. What we get is not always the historical, but sometimes the modern, Christ. Perhaps the homiletical purpose of the Dictionary made it difficult to avoid this. Still, we cannot help feeling that, like all theology, so a theological dictionary should set before itself as its ideal not so much the voicing, but rather the correction and perfecting, of the spirit of the times. There is not a little within the covers of these two volumes that savors less of the dictionary than of the contemporary pulpit. We find a sermon where we might expect an exposition, and sometimes the sermon, as modern sermons are apt to do, one-sidedly exploits, if it does not outright distort, the biblical facts for its own specific purpose. This free play of subjectivity on the part of the several writers has also accentuated a feature that can never be entirely eliminated where many minds work together, viz., the cropping out of divergence of opinion on important subjects. Denno, who puts the sufferings of Christ and their necessity on a line with the sufferings of all God's servants in the establishment of the Kingdom of God (II, 268), is contradicted by Denney, who characterizes such a view as "less than the whole truth" (II, 398). Such differences even appear where the same topic is treated from two points of view by two writers in succession, as, e. g., the Lord's Supper by Falconer (sacrament — mere symbol) and Darwell Stone ("the consecrated elements are the spiritual body and blood of the risen and ascended Christ"). But, even where the contradiction is not so conspicuous by reason of proximity, it is none the less real in many cases where certain articles in their advocacy of liberalizing theological positions run contrary to the traditional faith of the Church as reflected, we are glad to say, in the majority of contributions. It seems to us, the editorial supervision might to advantage have been exercised somewhat more strictly. Also, apart from conflicting views, the cross-references might have been profitably multiplied. E. g., under the article Holy Spirit, where the phrase "Spirit of glory and of God" (1 Pet. iv. 14) is commented upon, a cross reference to the article "Shekinah", whose author proposes to understand Glory as a proper name of Christ, ought not to be wanting.

Special interest attaches to these conflicts of opinion where they touch the fundamentals of faith, such issues as supernaturalism, inspi-



ration, the authority of Christ, the vicariousness of the atonement, the monergism of divine grace. As to supernaturalism, it is gratifying to note that the bulk of the articles reflect an unqualified acceptance of the church's historic position on this question, and is in so far faithful to the spirit of the Gospels themselves. Still, statements of a different complexion are not entirely absent. The article on Miracles, under the head of modern conceptions of the order of nature, tells us that—

"The ancient antagonism between the natural and the supernatural has broken down, and the two spheres are seen to be one, regarded from opposite poles. Grave objections lie against the term 'supernatural', which is entirely unscriptural, and many modern thinkers prefer the term 'spiritual' to express the animating and sustaining power which pervades all things."

To the same effect we read in the article on Revelation that the manifestation of the Eternal in the world

"may be either ordinary or extraordinary; by which it is not intended here to suggest any distinction between what is natural and what is supernatural. That distinction may not be tenable, for we do not know all the possibilities of nature, and so do not know what may be above it".

In fact, the trend of this whole article is to explain revelation, while upholding its necessity and reality, in terms of immanence.

More frequent are statements implying scepticism with regard to the strict historicity of the biblical records in general and of the Gospels in particular. The Gospel according to Matthew fares worst in this respect. Its reliability as a historic witness to the sayings of Jesus is called in question on account of its principle of selection and artificial grouping, resulting in overemphasis of statement. The Jewish Christians stood too near the life of Christ to form any adequate conception of the true meaning of His person and work. They labored under a mistake as to His teaching on the permanence of the law. This Gospel also distorts Jesus' eschatological teaching by selecting and producing sayings which emphasize the nearness of the parousia. It makes out that the preaching to the Gentiles is but "for a testimony", and ranks the Gentile converts as proselytes merely in the Jewish church. They were to be made "disciples" in the specific sense; the wedding-garment of the parable is the Jewish righteousness. (Article on Matthew's Gospel.) In another article we learn, to the discredit of the same Evangelist, that he gives a fantastic and allegorical interpretation of the sign of Jonah and that Chap. xxiii. 2 shows traces of influence of later ideas, in that it represents Jesus as countenancing obedience to the legal teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees (article *Old Testament*). Over against this must be placed the ample recognition and able defense which the historicity of the Gospel-narrative, at least that of the Synoptics, receives in by far the greater number of articles which have occasion to touch on this question. This is the case even where the stress of recent criticism might have tempted to a less certain note, *e. g.*, in connection with the gospel of the nativity in Matthew and Luke. The virgin-birth is admirably treated by Box in

the article bearing that title. The only exception here that has come under our notice concerns the narrative of the visit of the magi, the positive evidence for the truth of which, we are told, is slender, so that we must content ourselves with the concession that there may possibly be a substratum of historical fact. (Article Magi)

In a dictionary especially adapted for preachers "to whom Christ is everything" it might fairly be expected that the authority of Christ as a teacher would be recognized as absolute without reserve in any respect. To our regret, we have not found this to be so. While respected by the majority of the writers, in some instances it is called in question, restricted, or even denied. So conservative a man as Denney excludes from its field of application all science, on the ground that science constitutes a sphere in which there can be no authority, only facts. This seems a specious solution of an old and vexed problem. In the article on Plan we learn that our Lord made no definite provision for the establishment of an outward church, and its world-wide extension. He delivered His message to His own people and formed no clear design of a work that should embrace all people. This is in direct contradiction to the view so ably unfolded in the article on Foresight. Denney, in his articles on Authority of Christ and Preaching Christ, reveals a quite perceptible shrinking from the acceptance at its face-value of our Lord's eschatological teaching. In the latter of these articles he says:

"Account has been taken in art. 'Authority of Christ' of any considerations which go to qualify the certainty with which we ascribe to Jesus Himself the eschatological conception of the consummation of God's kingdom; but if we do connect it with Him, and regard it as part of what is meant when He represents Himself as the Christ, clearly history requires us to recognize the inadequacy of that conception to be the vehicle of the truth. . . . We may say that the spectacular representations of the judgment are a form which we may recognize to have only a relative value, while yet we do not dispute in the least the absolute truth that the standard of reality and of worth in the spiritual world is Jesus."

Here Jesus the judge becomes Jesus the standard, although in the Gospel-teaching the two are never identified. The same point of view emerges a little later in the statement:

"It may be possible to strip from the gospel of St Peter without detriment to its essence some of that vesture of eschatological Messianism which it necessarily wore at the time."

Farthest in this direction, although it only carries to a logical conclusion the views already stated, goes the article on Accommodation, which represents our Lord as necessarily thinking and teaching in the forms of thought and belief of His time, not, however, in the sense of conscious adjustment, but in harmony with the kenosis-hypothesis. Here the inference, whether the church ought not perhaps to practice a conscious accommodation in teaching, is seriously considered.

Coming to the doctrinal positions represented in the Dictionary, we find an even greater degree of divergence. The anti-dogmatic and anti-metaphysical spirit with which Ritschlianism has inoculated the present-

day theological mind is in evidence here and there. We read much of the "impression" made by Christ (c. *g.*, I, 470). The most outspoken Ritschlianism is found in the article "Back to Christ", which contains a formal indictment of the metaphysical Christology and soteriology of the early creeds. To be sure, the author of this article ostensibly simply relates after an objective fashion what the Ritschlian movement stands for, but he does it with such evident sympathy and with such entire abstinence from criticism, that one can scarcely help putting him down as an advocate rather than a disinterested historian. For, while Ritschlianism is not criticized with so much as a word, the Christocentric theology of Fairbairn is charged with half heartedness because it continues to place the essence of the character of Christ in the miraculous elements of the Gospel-narrative, such as "His moral perfection and consciousness of sinlessness, His assertion of a unique knowledge of God and of a sonship different in kind from that possible to His disciples, His assertion of His Messiahship and preexistence, His demand for absolute devotion to His Person, His claim to a superhuman authority in forgiving sins and in dealing with Old Testament institutions and laws, His claim to be the Saviour of the world, the arbiter of human destiny, the final judge. Similarly, His outer life receives its character from the virgin birth, the miracles (interpreted in the strict sense), and, above all, from the bodily resurrection." Fairbairn is criticized because the historical Christ is to him "the transcendent and miraculous Christ, the Christ who was conscious of superhuman dignity and who was declared by the resurrection from the dead to be the Son of God with power". And not only this, the Ritschlian assertion is here repeated that in the synoptical version of Jesus' gospel-preaching there is no place for Jesus Himself as an object of religious faith. The Christ to whom we are called back is the Christ teaching the forgiveness of sins without the need of propitiation. Unfortunately, there is no assurance given that, having once retraced our steps to this "historical Jesus", we shall be permitted to rest there permanently. The summons "Back to Christ" is only preparatory to the further demand: Back from the peripheral to the central Christ, for we are told by this same writer that "we must distinguish between central and peripheral elements, and between the enduring spirit and the passing form of manifestation. We cannot, for example, revive the primitive expectation of the world's speedy end or the ideas about angels, Satan, unclean spirits as the agents in disease, which Jesus shared with His contemporaries. The gospel must be translated into the language of to-day, and its spirit applied to the relations of our modern life" (I, 165).

The two doctrines which constitute the heart of evangelical religion, that of the atonement and of justification by faith, come in for their share of criticism. The first volume, it is true, contains a good article on Atonement from the pen of Principal Simpson. But whatever good it might accomplish is largely undone by the two articles on Sacrifice and Vicarious Sacrifice in Vol. II. In that on Sacrifice: Mt. xx. 28, the well known ransom-passages is interpreted as follows:

"The idea clearly is that men are enslaved and that Christ gives His life to set them free; but the question still remains as to the nature of the bondage. 'From death, from the guilt of sin and its punishment', says the old theology, or, as it is sometimes expressed, 'from the wrath of God.' But there is not a single word upon the lips of Christ to justify this interpretation, and, as we shall see later, wherever in the N. T. the death of Christ is called a deliverance or a ransom, it is always a being purchased for God, a being delivered from the bondage of sin to serve God that is thought of."

As if being purchased for the service of God excluded a being purchased from the curse of God, and as if not the latter, rather than bondage of sin, constituted for Paul the *terminus a quo* in the movement of redemption. A little later we read:

"To imagine that Christ in those words represents the Father as requiring a ransom at His hands before He can forgive mankind is to render His revelation of the Heavenly Father wholly inconsistent, is to give the lie to all His earlier words regarding the mercy and compassion of God. The parable of the Prodigal Son in the light of this later presentation becomes an impossibility." . . . "Christ called His blood about to be shed the blood of the new covenant in the sense that His death of course would inspire His followers with new life, would be to them in the first place a means of breaking the power of sin in their lives."

The hackneyed and, among reputable exegetes, thoroughly discredited arguments are here pressed into service again, such as that the Pauline formula is not "Christ reconciled God", but "God reconciled us in Christ", and that therefore the obstacle must have been in man, not in God, or that *thánatos* is not used by Scripture in the pagan sense of "appeasing God", but has sin for its object, whence the unwarranted inference is straightway drawn, that therefore the whole transaction must lie in the subjective sphere. The article on "Mediator", although on the whole more sound, does not entirely steer clear of this same fault of subjectivizing the atonement when it states: "Christ is our propitiation, because He gives us inwardly that power, that communication of His own life, which cleanses us from sin." Translated into the language of justification, the principle embodied in such statements amounts to the downright denial of the common Protestant position, of which the article on Righteousness furnishes a sad illustration. A more absolute travesty of the Pauline doctrine can scarcely be conceived than finds expression in these words: "The salvation of his life had come to him in the conviction that God takes the will for the deed, and that, in union with the risen Christ, the human will is kept constantly true." But the climax of this sort of exegetical perverseness is reached in the article on Vicarious Sacrifice, the whole of which is nothing else but a deliberate attack on the substitutionary penal interpretation of the atonement, and a special plea for putting the moral-influence theory in its place.

Where even common evangelicalism is not safe, it is not to be wondered at that specific Calvinism fares badly. In fact, it is scarcely deemed worthy of attack, the writers largely ignore it. And yet even a critic as Johannes Weiss has assured us that there is a predestinarian

element in the Synoptical Gospels. Under the head of Necessity it is first conceded that the advocates of theological determinism as taught by Calvin "can appeal plausibly to a considerable number of N. T. passages". Next it is observed that these passages of deterministic tendency are balanced by others of opposite import. Then the following statement is offered by way of synthesis: "Since some reject God's benevolent purposes and refuse to be saved, it follows that the human will is free, and that the apparently deterministic passages of Scripture must be so interpreted as to leave room for human freedom. We are led, therefore, to some such view as this, that only the main events of human history are absolutely determined beforehand. The persons by whom and the times when the Divine purposes are to be realized are not predetermined absolutely, but only conditionally." According to the writer on Universalism, the Calvinistic limitation of the intent of salvation "is little heard of now in Great Britain, except among some of the Evangelicals in the Church of England and some of the Baptists. . . . The controversy has gone to sleep, or judgment in the cause goes by default". It is entirely in accord with this that no attempt is made to show the Calvinistic position exegetically untenable. We can only be thankful that the author of this article, notwithstanding a strong leaning in that direction, does not go the full length of advocating Universalism in the sense of universal ultimate salvation, but candidly confesses that there is "no ground for challenging the old doctrine on exegetical lines". The article on "Elect. Election" well-nigh entirely ignores the sovereign character of the divine choice, and that on the following basis: "By and in the incarnation the human race and the separate individuals of the race have received those capacities and endowments which fit them for their work and for their divinely appointed destiny".

The bibliographies appended to the several articles are, on the whole, discriminating, reasonably full and correct. Still, here and there important references have been omitted. As such we notice the following: art. Messiah, Wrede's *Messiasgeheimnis*; art. Missions, Harnack's *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*; art. Name, Heilmüller's *Im Namen*; art. Propitiation, Deissmann's various contributions on *ἰλαστήριον*; art. Sabbath, Zahn's essay on the subject in his *Skizzen*, etc.

A serious error occurs in the article Resurrection, II, 508, where a sentence from Wellhausen's commentary on Matthew is translated so as to make him say something quite different from the original. The statement accurately rendered should read: "It is assumed (viz., by the Evangelist) that with the resurrection the body of Jesus also had vanished from the grave, and it is regarded as impossible (viz., by the Evangelist) that this could be accounted for on natural grounds." Instead of this the translation reads: "It is *admitted* that with the resurrection the body of Jesus also had vanished from the grave, and it *will* be impossible to account for this on natural grounds."

In conclusion, we remark that, with few exceptions, the contributors



to the Dictionary are British and American. Of continental scholars there occur in the first volume the names of Gautier, Nestle and Johannes Weiss only, in the second volume, besides the last mentioned, that of Kattenbusch.

The proof-reading of the work has been unusually good. In our extensive reading of the volumes, we have hardly discovered half a dozen typographical errors.

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

**LIGHT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT FROM BABEL.** By ALBERT T. CLAY, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Semitic Philology and Archæology, and Assistant Curator of the Babylonian Section, Department of Archæology, University of Pennsylvania. (Second edition.) Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1907. Pp.; xvi, 437, with map and over 100 illustrations. Price, \$2.00 net.

Prof. Clay is well known to Assyriologists as a scholar of merit by his work in connection with the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, and the articles which appear from his pen in the various scientific magazines. The work before us is, however, of a different nature. It has grown, as he tells us, partly out of lectures delivered at Winona Bible Conference, Mt. Gretna, Chautauqua, Pocono Pines Assembly, and other institutions and churches. As such it is necessarily a popular work and must be reviewed with that in mind.

It is a difficult thing for a scholar to address a popular audience on his specialty and then publish the lectures; for in the first instance he must accommodate himself to the limitations of his audience, and in the second he is liable to be criticized for making statements and not proving them, or for asserting as facts things that are not generally agreed upon by his fellow workers in the same field. Especially is this so in the science of Assyriology, for it is so new, and the workers so few, and the opinions on disputed points so variant. Moreover, new discoveries are so frequent, and new texts are published from the museums of the world so rapidly, that what is said to-day may have to be modified to-morrow. This volume was hardly out of the press before we had evidence that our views regarding the date of Hammurabi may require considerable modification. In the translation of disputed passages Prof. Clay, apparently with intention, omits the question mark that is usual in such places in scientific works. To introduce discussions of such passages in a popular volume would be only bewildering to the layman. And yet we cannot help feeling that it was unwise at times. For instance, on page 375 we read "the son of the king was killed". But the sign translated "son" is not clearly legible, and, as the passage is so important for the criticism of the Book of Daniel, we think it would have been well to say so.

Except in the Introductory Remarks, and the chapter on the name Jahweh, Prof. Clay has hardly touched on the subject of Babylonian religion and its relation to that of the Hebrews. This, too, is doubtless

done purposely, for, as he intimates, the problems involved are still very much disputed and hardly in form to be popularly presented—and yet again we think that a translation of some of the hymns, prayers, incantations and ritual tablets would have added to the interest of the volume. His general position on the question of the Hebrew dependence on Babylonia in religious and cultural matters is to be found on page 21: "But beyond that which belongs to common Oriental culture which has been handed down from time immemorial, little direct borrowing, it seems to me, will be found to have been done. In other words, such direct and wholesale dependence upon the Babylonians as has been claimed by some will not be proved."

The greater part of the book is taken up, therefore, with the historical records of the Babylonians and Assyrians and their relation to the history of the Hebrews. The general conclusion is to be found in his own words: "And it must be a source of gratification to many to know that the ruin-hills of the past have yielded so many things to prove that much which the skeptic and the negative critic have declared to be fiction is veritable history. Archaeology must ever be given the greatest credit for having come to the rescue. When we reflect that wherever in the Old Testament reference is made to contact with foreign powers, and we have been able to delve among the contemporaneous records of those powers, in nearly every instance . . . reference to such contact with Israel had been found, truly every lover of the old Book must rejoice," (p. 214). But he is quite frank in confessing that many difficulties still remain unsolved and that some new ones have been added by our new knowledge—for instance, the relation of Belshazzar to Nebuchadnezzar or Sennacherib's invasion of Judea.

The greater part of the book deals with the historical records of Babylonia and Assyria on the one hand, and those of the Hebrews on the other. It is not written from the standpoint of apologetics, but it is nevertheless apologetic. The author does not relate the results of archaeology to theories about the Bible, but, as an increasing number of archaeologists are doing, to the Bible itself; and as we noted before, the two very frequently are in striking agreement.

The arrangement of the matter is chronological. It begins with a discussion of the great antiquity of man as revealed by diggings, literature, art and comparative philology, and gives in concise form the reasons why we may no longer hold to Archbishop Ussher's chronology. It next treats of the Babylonian story of creation, giving translations of part of it. Prof. Clay follows Gunkel in believing that the Hebrews knew of some combat between Jehovah and a dragon, corresponding to that between Marduk and Tiamat; but he refuses to decide between the theory that the Hebrews took the story from Babylonia (if they did, it was probably at the time of Abraham or earlier that it came to Palestine, p. 74) and the theory that the two are separate developments of a common source. The same may be said of the relation of the Hebrew to the Babylonian account of the flood. In the chapter on the Tower of Babel, which he identifies with the tower Etemenanki

("the house of the foundation of heaven and earth"), he tells interestingly of the structure of Babylonian temples. Regarding the intention of the builders of the Tower of Babel to erect a building whose top should reach to the heavens (Gen. xi. 4), he objects to Driver's statement that the expression is to be taken literally (in the modern sense), and would interpret it rather in the light of the Babylonians' account of their temples, which were said to reach the heavens, or be the "link of heaven and earth" (DUR-AN-KI, p. 121ff.). Prof. Clay thinks that the Hebrews derived the word Babel from a root *balal*, "to confuse" (Gen. xi. 9, probably by misprint the text twice has *babul*), whereas the cuneiform tablets both Sumerian and Babylonian make it mean "gate of god". The view is at least worthy of consideration that *balal* is used in the Hebrew verse referred to, only on account of its similarity in sound to Babel; and that the name "gate of God" is eminently appropriate for a place where such a terrible judgment was pronounced.

In his treatment of Genesis xiv. Prof. Clay justly criticizes those scholars who formerly declared this narrative to be demonstrably unhistorical, and argues strongly for its historicity. We are inclined to think, however, that he finds rather more than is warrantable in the tablets. It must be remembered that the identification of Hammurabi and Amraphel is not yet assured, and that of Arioch with Warad-Sin (for we must now probably distinguish between Warad-Sin and Rim-Sin), and Tidal with Tudkhulu still less so. As to Chedorlaomer, we do not see how Prof. Clay can say he was doubtless the "father or brother" of Kudur-Mabug when it has just been rightly asserted that the father of Kudur-Mabug was Shimti-Shulkhak (p. 133f.).

We cannot, however, take time to speak of the whole volume in detail. Prof. Clay writes interestingly and informingly of the culture of the days of Abraham, the code of laws of Hammurabi and its relation to the Mosaic code, the Amarna Letters, the different kinds of literature found among the temple records, the Assyrian historical records and their relation to the Biblical account of the fall of Babylon, the rise of Persia, and of the Hebrew exiles in Babylonia, of whom there are many traces in the later Babylonian literature.

We cannot close this review, however, without noticing more particularly Prof. Clay's chapter on the name Jahweh in cuneiform literature, in which he goes rather minutely into the argument and introduces some new evidence from tablets which he has himself edited.

There are four kinds of proper names in which it is claimed the divine name Jahweh is a component part. Of these the first comprises those transliterated names of Hebrews known to us in the Old Testament. The divine element in these is represented by *Jau* or *Jaw*. The second class comprises names of individuals living before the time of Moses. They are few and may be reduced to the two forms *Ja'au-ilum* (other readings of the first part being possible) and *Ja'um ilum*. In the first of these Prof. Clay refuses to recognize the divine name, on the grounds that it is never found in the Old Testament in its unabbreviated form in proper names, nor in their transliteration into Babylonian

and Assyrian. Of the second (*Jaûm ilum*) he says: "It is difficult to explain if it is not conceded that the name Jahweh existed as early as the Hammurabi period" (p. 239), because "it is exactly the form in which the abbreviated element of the Hebrew names appears in the cuneiform inscription." In this connection he cites a *third* class of names, namely, those with *Jau* as a component part, but belonging to the second or third century after Moses. The *fourth* class, to our mind, is very important to the argument. Prof. Clay gives us twenty-five names of Jews living in exile whose names as found on the tablets can be paralleled in the Old Testament. In these the last element is *Jâma*, which corresponds to the *Jah* in the Hebrew names,—an abbreviation of *Jahweh*. The problem is how to explain the form *Jâma*. Prof. Clay correctly points out that the later Babylonians frequently represented spoken *w* with written *m*, so that *Jama* may have been pronounced *Jawa*. But how is the final vowel *a* to be explained? He suggests two ways. Either the final *a* was not pronounced at all, in which case the form becomes *Jaw*, which is all but identical with the form *Jau* found elsewhere; or the form *Jâwa* "represents the exact and full pronunciation of the divine name as it was heard by the Babylonians". The reason for the name being written in full, he says, is that the Babylonians were scholars, analyzed every name before writing it, and wrote it etymologically rather than according to its popular pronunciation. This seems a very good suggestion, but we think Prof. Clay might have carried his analysis of the form *Jâma* a step farther. As is well known, the vowel sounds *a* and *e* are closely related in Semitic languages. The Babylonian Hebrew vowel system makes no distinction between them, and Babylonian scribes in reproducing the Hebrew *e* frequently wrote *a*. For proof of this we need go no farther than the list of names Prof. Clay gives us. The Biblical Berechiah is reproduced in Babylonian as *Ba-rik-ki-ja-a-ma*. The final vowel of *Jâma*, therefore, may quite well have been pronounced *e*—that is, the written *Jama* could be pronounced *Jâwe*, the exact phonetic equivalent of *Jahweh*.

This being so, we are bound to ask another question. If the divine name occurs in its unabbreviated form in the later Babylonian literature, why may it not so occur in the literature of the first dynasty? If accuracy in such matters can be claimed for the scribes at the time of the language's decay, much more may it be asserted of those whose work is known to us in the code of Hammurabi. Hence Prof. Clay's objection to the form *Ja'wî* (which can quite as well be read *Ja'wê*), as containing the divine name *Jahweh*, falls to the ground. In other words, we feel that Prof. Clay's argument at the end of this chapter rather nullifies the conclusions reached in its earlier part.

To us the matter seems to stand thus: The form *Ja'wî* in *Ja'wî-ilum* (assuming this to be the correct reading) may be the exact philological equivalent of the Hebrew word *Jahweh*, but whether used as noun or verb is as yet uncertain. The form *Jaûm* in *Jaûm ilum* is exactly what we should expect if the originally verbal form *Ja'wî* were nominalized,

but whether there be any real relation between the two is as yet uncertain. And finally, the form *Jāma* in later times is to be pronounced *Jāwe* and regarded as the Babylonian reproduction of the Hebrew divine name.

The book deserves its wide popularity. It is free from the extremism that characterizes many works on Babylon and the Bible just now. It is written in a popular style, and coming from a scholar of Prof. Clay's rank, may be depended upon to introduce the reader not only to those problems which have already received their final answer, but also to those which are still engaging our attention. It remains to be said that the book is nicely printed and bound and well illustrated with judiciously chosen pictures of tablets, works of art, and scenes from Babylonian diggings. At the end is added an index of subjects and one of Biblical texts—but surely such names as Daniel, Darius, Gobryas, Jerusalem, should not have been omitted from the former.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

STUDIES IN THE INNER LIFE OF JESUS. By ALFRED E. GARVIE, M.A. (Oxon), D.D. (Glas.), Principal of New College, London. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1907. Pp. xii, 543. \$2.25 net.

The Studies embodied in this volume have grown out of a series of talks begun some twenty years ago and originally prepared for slum work in Glasgow. This series was followed by a minute comparative study of the Gospels and ten years of preaching on texts from the Gospels bearing on the subject. In 1902 Principal Garvie published ten of the studies in *The Expositor* and subsequently ten others appeared in the same journal. The first of the series has now been replaced by the "Critical Introduction" and the "Constructive Conclusion"; the others have been revised and five new studies have been added.

"The title indicates the purpose and the method of the book. It is the mind, heart, and will of Jesus as revealed in His words and works that the writer seeks to understand; enough is being written about the scenery, the upholstery and drapery of the life of Jesus; an exaggerated importance is attached to a knowledge of contemporary custom and costume; even the ideas and ideals of His environment, important as a knowledge of these is, do not explain Jesus. We can know Him as He reveals Himself. There is an opinion current that it is irreverent for us to try and penetrate the mystery of the 'inner life' of Jesus. This the writer does not share. Jesus is the revelation of God, and that revelation in its most essential features—this inner life—we are intended to know and understand. Theology cannot construct a doctrine of the Person of Christ without this insight, and piety needs this discernment for closest and tenderest communion. What is here written is written in profoundest reverence, and nothing should offend the most reverent reader" (pp. vi-vii).

In the "Critical Introduction" two subjects are treated: "The Lit-



erary Sources of the Life of Jesus" and "The Historical Value of the Gospels". Principal Garvie accepts the two-document hypothesis in its broad features as furnishing the most probable solution of the literary relation of the Synoptic Gospels and, in agreement with many advocates of this view, rejects the Matthaean authorship of our Greek Matthew (p. 17). In regard to the Fourth Gospel Principal Garvie writes: "What the internal evidence of the Fourth Gospel leads to is authorship by an eye-witness, not equally familiar with all parts of our Lord's ministry, and accordingly reporting some incidents at second-hand as well as others at first hand, an eye-witness whose memory retained vividly outward events, but, owing to a meditative mind, transformed inward experiences. John the son of Zebedee does not satisfy the conditions for two reasons: (1) he was a Galilaean and not a Jerusalemite, as the Fourth Evangelist evidently is; (2) the character of the Evangelist does not correspond with the impression of the son of Zebedee which the Synoptic narratives leave upon us. Can the old tradition of two Johns in Ephesus suggest a solution?" (p. 29). And again: "The conclusion of the present writer is that we are warranted, at least tentatively, in assigning the Gospel to the presbyter, who was himself an eye witness" (p. 32). The conclusion of Principal Garvie's discussion of the literary sources of the life of Jesus is summed up on pages 33f. "These are three (at least) in number. The notes of Peter's preaching by Mark are given with little (if any) alteration and addition in the Gospel bearing his name. The collection of sayings and speeches of Jesus, the *Logia* ascribed to Matthew has been utilized as well as the first source, by the *First Evangelist*, about whom we can say no more than that he was a Jew of Palestine, specially interested in the fulfilment of prophecy by Jesus as the Christ, and the *Third*, who may be confidently identified with Luke the physician, the companion of Paul in travel, and the author of Acts, and who seems also to have had access to a third source, the 'travel document'. By a careful comparison of these two Gospels we can, with a high degree of probability, recover the *Logia*. Even if the Gospels in their present form should be later than the fall of Jerusalem, yet these two sources carry us back to a much earlier period. A third source, embodying a trustworthy independent tradition of parts of the ministry of Jesus unrecorded in these two sources, is preserved in the Fourth Gospel, although its original form has been more modified by subsequent developments of thought and life in the Christian Church. We may, and we must, use our judgment in dealing with these documents: but the result of our criticism we may expect to be the conviction that we can know enough about the words and works of Jesus, to warrant fully the faith we put in Him as the Christ, the Son of God, and the Saviour of men."

The section on the "Historical Value of the Gospels" treats of recent critical theories and in particular of the religious-historical method. The elements of this method are: (1) the criticism of the documents (literary), (2) historical construction (evolutionary), (3) scientific comparison (religio-psychological). In connection with the first,

Schmiedel's criticism of the Gospels and Wrede's *Das Messiasgeheimnis* are reviewed; under the second Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums* and the question of the miraculous in history; under the third Pfleiderer's *The Early Christian Conception of Christ*. The religious historical method is, of course, distinguished by the third principle. Principal Garvie insists that in applying it due regard should be had to difference as well as to agreement; that where there is resemblance there need not be dependence; that historicism has its value, because, for those who believe in the living God, the search for His revelation in the records of the past need not involve the loss of the power of finding it in the present: that Pfleiderer's assertion that the ideal cannot be realized in any individual (an assertion which sounds very much like Strauss, cf. *Leben Jesu*, 4te A. II, S. 709) and has not therefore been realized in Jesus must be rejected as an *a priori* assumption of philosophy and not an *a posteriori* conclusion from history; and that there are formal points of resemblance in primitive Christian faith with the thought of the time. "What, however, vitiates attempts like these of Pfleiderer is the assumption that a Jesus who cannot be expressed in merely human terms is necessarily unhistorical" (p. 65). In applying this method Principal Garvie urges the following limitations of its principles (pp. 66f.): "(1) While the tenacity of religious tradition, custom, and belief needs to be very much more fully recognized than it generally has been by critics, in the case of Jesus especially it is reasonable to assume that He left an indelible impression and an imperishable memory in the Christian community. Extreme caution must be exercised in declaring this or that feature of the evangelical testimony unhistorical merely on the ground that present beliefs affect past memories. (2) If human personality is not evolutionary (as Dr. Gardner concedes), and if, as Troeltsch maintains, religion involves an immediate contact of man with God, the principle of causality or evolution cannot be too rigorously applied to the religious consciousness; in it the temporal is lifted up to the eternal, and therefore we cannot say confidently what is or is not possible beyond ordinary human capacity. (3) The comparative method of religion does not necessarily prove that all beliefs are alike false, or true; but rather it may be used to demonstrate that imperfect ideas and ideals are prophetic of perfect reality, that the religions of the world are various stages in a development which has a consummation in Christ."

The subjects of the twenty-four Studies which follow the "Critical Introduction" are "The Eternal Word", "The Virgin Birth", "The Growth in Wisdom and Grace", "The Vocation Accepted", "The Temptation", "The Early Self-Disclosure", "The Surrender of Home", "The Judgment of Religious Rulers and Teachers", "The Scope of the Ministry", "The Characteristics of the Teaching", "The Function of the Miracles", "The Companionship of the Twelve", "The Causes of Offence", "The Limitation of Knowledge", "The Perfection of Character", "The Consciousness of the Son", "The Foreshadowings of the Cross", "The Foregleams of the Glory", "The Upper Room", "The Foretaste of

Death", "The Hour and the Power of Darkness", "The Desolation of the Cross", "The Risen Lord", "The Living Christ". The Studies are concluded by a chapter entitled "Constructive Conclusion" dealing with the "Evidence for the Person of Jesus" and the "Doctrine of the Person of Jesus".

From this statement of the contents of Principal Garvie's book it will be seen that the treatment of the life and teaching of Jesus is both topical and broadly historical. The title of the book indicates a psychological interest or point of view, but the book itself shows that the author is not content to rest until he has advanced to the theological implications of his interpretation.

There are many fine traits in Principal Garvie's treatment of his subject. The result of long meditation and careful investigation, these Studies present conclusions and reasons in simple and direct form. They are characterized by sincerity of conviction, sanity of judgment, and reverence of spirit. The author is open minded toward the question of the supernatural, and defends the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. His attitude toward and use of the Gospels is, in the main, positive, although in his critical principles he has introduced an element of subjectivity in judging the content of the Gospels which might yield a more or less—usually less—positive result in the hands of others.

Mention can be made of only two points which seem to be of fundamental significance in Principal Garvie's discussion. With the first I find myself in agreement. Principal Garvie holds that Jesus' conception of His Messianic work was influenced by the conception of the suffering Servant of Jehovah of Isaiah liii. Both the necessity of His suffering and its vicarious character were elements in Jesus' Messianic consciousness at the time of His baptism, so that, in receiving the baptism of John, Jesus consciously undertook the work of fulfilling all righteousness, "Jesus' conception of righteousness was most probably that of Isa. liii. 11. The righteous Servant shall justify many because He shall bear their iniquities. It is in His vicarious consciousness and the sacrifice which this would involve that Jesus fulfilled all righteousness" (p. 125). The psychological grounding of the vicarious element in Jesus' consciousness (p. 123, cf. pp. 380, 388, 420) in His love and compassion for mankind needs supplementing, as Principal Garvie himself points out: "For the full explanation of the psychology of Jesus, His vicarious consciousness, we need the metaphysics of the Word of God, His universal relations" (p. 124). But this leads to the second point, Principal Garvie's metaphysical grounding of his conception of the Person of Jesus.

The first Study, on the "Eternal Word" (pp. 68-87), and the fourteenth, on the "Limitation of Knowledge" (pp. 269-283), together with the general psychological point of view, but especially the twentieth Study, on the "Foretaste of Death" (pp. 374-388), and the twenty-second, on the "Desolation of the Cross" (pp. 405-425), prepare for and lead up to the statement of the doctrine of the Person of Jesus in the "Constructive Conclusion". Principal Garvie is convinced that this

doctrine requires a metaphysical basis, and, therefore, he is convinced also that "we cannot rest in the Ritschlian position that Jesus has for us the religious value of God" (p. 520). But Principal Garvie is also persuaded "that the older metaphysics cannot afford adequate and satisfactory intellectual forms for a constructive doctrine; but there is a newer metaphysics possible, sufficient for this task. The principles of the newer metaphysics must be such as these. (1) The perfect moral ideal (God) is the absolute metaphysical reality; (2) the metaphysical relations of the universe must be expressed not in terms of physics (nature), but in terms of ethics (personality). (3) the highest ethical term is personality, which is eternally realized in God, but only being progressively realized in an ethical process in man; (4) accordingly the metaphysical reality of the union of God and man in Christ is most adequately and satisfactorily expressed as a personal union realized progressively in an ethical process" (p. 520). After affirming his belief in an essential Trinity and guarding the conception of Divine immanence from pantheism by insisting on God's transcendence of the universe "both metaphysically in His essential attributes and ethically in His purpose, which in the world is only partially fulfilled", Principal Garvie states his doctrine of the Person of Jesus in terms of a principle inherent in the nature of God Himself. This principle is self limitation or *kenosis*, and manifests itself in creation, in the Incarnation and in the sacrifice of Calvary. "If God is expressed in the process of the world, which is subject to limitation, then creation is self limitation of God. The Infinite in creating, as it were, reduces Himself to the measure of the finite. Creation itself is *Kenosis*, self-emptying. . . . The universe is God's humiliation, the finite is the *Kenosis* of the Infinite" (p. 524). But this principle explains not only God's relation to the universe; it explains also the inner Trinitarian relations of God Himself and is thus the ultimate explanation of the Person of Jesus. "God's self-limitation in His self-expression and self-communication in the universe implies a principle of *Kenosis* in the nature of God Himself, a principle of dependent, limited and subordinate existence, as well as of sustaining, unlimited, and sovereign existence. Intellectually this principle is described in the Divine Logos or Word, ethically in the Divine Son" (pp. 524f). This principle is in reality a person, for "reality is ultimately and must necessarily be personal. . . . this principle of *kenosis* is personal as God Himself, God self-limiting for self-revealing and self-communicating. In so far as we can distinguish God in His infinite and eternal essence from this *kenosis* in God we contrast Father and Son in the Godhead; but we must not oppose the Father and the Son as separate individuals; for this is not Christian monotheism, but pagan polytheism" (p. 526).

As the *kenosis* of God in the universe is progressive, subject to the law of evolution, and God's action is both habitual and original, the divine immanence does not exclude but allows for new departures in nature and history. But these departures are in an upward direction, the highest being reached in Jesus, for "Jesus can be interpreted only

as the creative act of God, in which this kenosis principle in God, Word or Son we may call Him, in His perfect reality entered as man into the world" (p. 529). "Instead of God and man—Creator and Creature, Infinite and Finite—being conceptions so opposed that the Person of Christ must be conceived as composed of two distinct natures, man seeks to become what God is as personal, and so the human in Christ can be regarded as having fulfilment in the divine. The perfect moral character, the absolute religious consciousness, the consequent mediatorial function are the goal towards which the movement of mankind is tending, although it is far from reaching. It is the ideal humanity which is realized in the Divine sonship; for the actual humanity apart from its sin and all that its sin brings with it is the divine kenosis as a lower stage of its revelation and communication" (p. 530). But as Jesus, taught by the Scriptures, accepted the vocation of vicarious suffering and fulfilled it in His death, "the divine principle of kenosis was expressed and exercised completely in His cross: that in God, in His metaphysical capacity as in His ethical character, which is the source of created, finite existence, was revealed and communicated in the self sacrifice by which man is saved from sin" (p. 531).

I have attempted to reproduce Principal Garvie's theory largely in his own language. While it seeks to ground the essential deity of Jesus in the nature of God, it connects this with a self-limiting principle and so relates this principle to the universe, mankind, and the work of redemption that the historical Jesus appears to be a man who differed from others in that His origin was due to a creative act of God and in the more complete communication to Him by God of those qualities of His own nature by which through an ethical process man is lifted up into communion with Himself. In other words, Principal Garvie's theory does not seem to me adequately to ground the communication of the metaphysical qualities of deity to Jesus as an individual. On this view we could not speak of the humiliation of the Son of God voluntarily undertaken in fulfilment of the divine purpose of redemption, but only of God's humiliation in the universe reaching its climax in the vicarious suffering of Jesus, a vicariousness which has meaning as the revelation of a principle of kenosis in the divine nature rather than as the voluntary assumption of the penalty of human sin springing out of free and gracious love.

Errata:—p. 3, l. 20, Evangehenfrage for Evangelienfrage and su for zu; p. 5, l. 11, Εβραϊστί for 'Εβραϊσθι διαλέκτω; p. 31, l. 5, and 28, De Boer for De Boor; p. 77, l. 15, narrtive for narrative; p. 92, l. 1, γουανός for γουανός; p. 109, l. 16, Luke iii for Luke ii; p. 391, l. 10, fo sake for forsake; p. 408, l. 15, His for his; l. 27, μεγάλῃ for μέγαν; l. 32, Eli, eli for Eli, Eli; p. 418, l. 17, Book I for Book II; p. 445, l. 27, ἐκπρώται for ἐκπρώται; p. 534, col. 1, l. 11, Resh for Resch.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.



THE GOSPEL OF ST. MARK, Anglo-Saxon and Northumbrian Versions  
By REV. W. W. SKEAT, M.A. London: Rivington's (Cambridge  
Deighton,) Bell & Co. 1871.

Students of Old English and Teutonic Philology in general are especially indebted to Professor Skeat for his scholarly labors in this ever widening province. Such works as his, *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, *Principles of English Etymology*, *Moeso-Gothic Glossary*, and his various editions of the *Chaucerian Poems*, are enough in themselves to justify this indebtedness and lead us to welcome any similar publication at his hands. It is also significant to note that Professor Skeat represents that pronounced part which the English clergy have always taken in the study of our earlier language and literature.

The work now before us, published first in 1871, reveals its purpose and value in its full title—"The Gospel According to Saint Mark in Anglo-Saxon and Northumbrian Versions synoptically arranged, with collations exhibiting all the readings of all the MSS." It is, as stated in the Preface, the second portion of an edition of the Old English Gospels planned by Kemble; the first portion, St. Matthew, having appeared in 1838, representing the conjoint labor of Kemble and Hardwick. Professor Bright's recent series of the Four Gospels in West Saxon serves to renew our interest in Kemble's St. Matthew and Skeat's St. Mark. So, such an edition as Bosworth and Waring's "Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, Wicliffe and Tyndale Gospels" (1865), deepens this interest, the effort to present the Gospels to the English people in their vernacular dating in its origin as far back as the days of our venerable Bede in the latter part of the seventh century. Professor Skeat in his Preface gives us a description of the MSS.—The Corpus, the Cambridge, the Bodley, the Cotton, the Hatton, the Royal, the Lindisfarne MS. or the Durham Book, and the Rushworth.

Then follows a description of the Printed Editions from the earliest, by Day and Parker, in 1571, on through Junius and Marshall's Gothic and Anglo-Saxon Gospels, 1665; Thorpe's, 1852; Bosworth and Waring's Gothic and Anglo-Saxon Gospels, 1865; Bonterwek's "The Four Gospels in Old Northumbrian", 1857, and the Lindisfarne and Rushworth Gospels by the Surtees Society, in 1865.

The sixteen chapters of Mark then follow in regular order. On each left hand page, two Old English versions with various readings as foot-notes are given, and the Old English and Latin texts, on the right hand page, so that a comparison may readily be made both as to the original English texts and the Latin text, some critical notes at the close adding to the value of the volume.

In fine, we have in this book what Professor Skeat intended to give us, as first designed by Kemble, "this second portion of the exhaustive edition of the Anglo-Saxon Gospels, with all Variant Readings" so that every possible side light may be thrown upon the text. It is a kind of a philological commentary on the Gospel edited, as well as a valuable presentation of Old English itself and in its relation to Latin.

It is an edition for scholarly reference and use, as Bright's corresponding series is one for popular and general needs. Thus are the Gospels in their oldest English form brought into line with Middle and Modern English Versions, and the historical as well as the linguistic sequence is preserved. Theological students will not go amiss in looking into these earlier English texts of the Christian Scriptures.

Princeton.

T. W. HUNT.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

PATON J. GLOAG, D.D., LL.D. A Memoir. By ELIZABETH S. GLOAG. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1908. Crown 8vo., pp. 158.

In this little book we have a welcome record of the life of one of the most diligent Scottish Biblical students of the past century. He is chiefly known for his *Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles*, published in two volumes in 1870 (which he himself always looked upon as his chief work), and the series of volumes in which he worked out what is known as the "Special Introduction" to the New Testament books—dealing consecutively with the Pauline Epistles (1874), the Catholic Epistles (1887), the Johannine Writings (1891), and the Synoptic Gospels (1895). Besides these works, however, he was the author of quite a number of other volumes. The earliest of these were tracts on doctrinal subjects (Assurance, 1853 and 1869; Justification, 1856; Resurrection, 1862). Then came translations of commentaries from the German (Lechler's and Gerok's Acts, 1864; Meyer's Acts, 1877; Lünemann's Thessalonians, 1880; Huther's James and John, 1881). To these were added a considerable number of exegetical and practical works of his own composition, including in the one category commentaries on James (1883) and Thessalonians (1887), primary lives of Paul (1881) and John (1892), a volume of Exegetical Studies (1884) and especially the Baird Lecture on The Messianic Prophecies (1879), and in the other category two volumes made up from sermons entitled respectively *Practical Christianity* (1866) and *Evening Thoughts* (1900). The whole of this literary output is characterized by careful investigation, solidity of thought, and plain and straightforward presentation. It constitutes a remarkable mass of valuable literary work, when we consider that it was the secondary product of one of the most hard-working and successful pastors in Scotland. The revelation of the *Memoir* to those who have known Dr. Gloag only in his writings, indeed, will lie on this side of his activity. And the reader will not be able to restrain his amazement that so much labor in the pulpit and in the parish and in the study could have been carried on through so many years by one man with such a high measure of success.

The book which commemorates the life and work of this notable pastor and writer is made up of a simple narrative of the events of his quiet and laborious life, supplemented by illuminating chapters, from the hands of competent judges, who knew him well, on his parish work, his pulpit ministrations and his theological output. The whole gives a sufficient and very vivid picture of the man and his labors. His friends, of whom the writer of this notice is happy to count himself one, will meet in it again the figure they have loved and missed from their lives. Those who have known only his written words will be glad to learn from it the manner of man their old teacher and guide was. Of course, it will be recognized by all that Dr. Gloag's books belong in a sense to the past. The subjects on which he expended his most mature labors—the topics of Special Introduction and the Exposition of the Book of Acts—are precisely those which advancing knowledge requires to be treated afresh every quarter of a century. It must be admitted, too, that Dr. Gloag's quality as a writer was rather judicious balance and well-informed solidity than seer-like insight. Professor Patterson has happily touched this off when speaking of his preaching—quoting, too, Dr. Gloag's characteristically clear-eyed recognition of it himself: "I was defective in imagination," he writes in his diary, "and my discourses were addressed more to the intellect than to the feelings." As a fact he did not possess the power of vision which enables a man to realize and reproduce the colour and detail of a historical situation, nor had he the creative or combining fancy that illuminates a page with the happy surprises of metaphor, simile, and illustration." His books are therefore more informing than inspiring, and their usefulness ceases when their power of informing has died away. He was the instructor, that is to say, of his own generation, and future generations must seek other instructors. Happy will they be if they find as sane, judicious and safe guides as Dr. Gloag was to his own. It is with some sadness that we lay down a *Memoir* like this and say of the vital and vitalizing personality whose labors it records,—he belongs now to history. But our hearts are warmed as we think of the honorable place he occupies and must always occupy in the history of Scotch preaching, parochial effort and Biblical thought. Most men would be content to win in one of them only such a place as Dr. Gloag occupies in all three of these spheres of labor. And even this threefold achievement gives only a partial account of the breadth of his intellectual interests and the reach of his unresting activities.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

LA DÉVOTION AU SACRÉ CŒUR DE JÉSUS. Doctrine—Histoire. Par J. V. BAINVEL, Professeur de théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie. 1906. 12mo., pp. viii, 373.

The literature of the devotion of the Sacred Heart is already very large, and Prof Bainvel feels that he requires some justification for

adding a new book to it. He pleads that, having been called to contribute the article on the subject to the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, he has thought it well to give his work also to a wider public—fondly hoping, of course, that after all he has something new to offer, if not in what he says, yet in the way he says it. One thing at least distinguishes his book from many of its predecessors: it deals exclusively with the devotion of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. He appears to think that this also needs some justification. He would not willingly separate what God has so closely joined together as the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary. But time has been lacking. He hopes to write another book after a while on the "purest heart of Mary".

He has sought fairly to cover the whole ground in his study of the devotion of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. This devotion had its rise in the revelations of the Blessed Marguerite-Marie; but as recognized and practiced by the Church it does not rest on these revelations alone, but has theological foundations; and after it once succeeded in establishing itself in the Church it has had a remarkably wide extension. The three topics of which a full treatment of the subject demands that some account be given are therefore: (1) the devotion of the Sacred Heart according to the Blessed Marguerite-Marie, (2) the theology of the devotion of the Sacred Heart, and (3) the historical development of the devotion of the Sacred Heart. Here, then, we have the disposition of the book. To the first topic are given pp. 5-93; to the second, pp. 94-206; and to the third, pp. 207-357.

It is scarcely necessary to advert here to the historical portions of the volume. The story of the Blessed Marguerite-Marie's life and visions, and of the struggle of the devotion she set on foot to obtain a place in the Church and its subsequent phenomenal extension, is told with apparent care and exactness. What interests us most is the doctrinal examination of this devotion. The discussion here is very minute and precise. We have successive chapters on the proper object of the devotion; on its basis, historical, dogmatic and philosophical; and on the proper act of the devotion. What the author is concerned for is to preserve in his dogmatic construction all the elements of the devotion as it has developed and fixed itself in the usage of the Church. He will not say then simply that it is the love of Christ for sinners which is celebrated in this devotion and that its whole meaning is that we, His redeemed ones, adore Him as our loving Saviour. "Worship always," no doubt, "terminates on a person"; but in this case not directly and exclusively. It is the heart of Jesus which is here adored: not the heart of flesh alone and in itself, but also not the love of Jesus alone, but the heart of flesh as the emblem of this love (p. 102). "It is the loving heart that we honor. This is neither the love in itself, nor the heart in itself, it is the love of Jesus 'under the figure of His heart of flesh' as the Blessed herself said; it is the heart of flesh, but as an emblem. The proper object of the devotion is the symbolic heart, which—it cannot be too often repeated—is the real heart, not the metaphysical heart" (pp. 108-9). "There are therefore two elements

in the devotion of the Sacred Heart: a sensible element, the heart of flesh, a spiritual element, that which this heart of flesh recalls and represents, and these two elements make only one, since they make only the sign and the thing signified" (p. 117).

We do not feel called upon to enter upon any discussion of this remarkable phase of Romish devotion. With all possible readiness to see in Marguerite-Marie a poor woman seeking to recognize and honor the love of her Saviour, and in the devotion of the Sacred Heart as it has established itself in the Romish Church a passionate expression of love to Him who first loved us,—we may be pardoned if we say with Mgr. Dupauloup,—"The difficulty is that this admirable devotion is too much materialized".

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD

ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY: 1649-1702. From the Death of Charles I to the Death of William III. Four Lectures by the REV ALFRED PLUMMER, M.A., D.D., formerly Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford, and Master of University College, Durham. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1907. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp.: ix, 187. Price, \$1.00.

This is the third volume of a series, the first of which dealt with English Church History from the death of Henry VII to the death of Archbishop Parker, and the second with the succeeding period down to the death of Charles I (see this Review, Vol. IV, p. 139). The American reader to whom the names are interchangeable must not think this is a history of the Church of England. Mr. Plummer's subject is larger than that. It is rather a review of the development of Christianity in all its phases during the exciting times of the later Tudors and the Stuarts. The volume before us centers on liberty of conscience and worship, which in English history is closely related to civil liberty.

An orderly arrangement of the events of this period must be sought elsewhere. This is only a scholarly review of the outstanding events, together with some account of their hidden as well as apparent causes and effects, all well told and with frequent excellently chosen excerpts from the literature of the time.

The first lecture deals with the period of the Protectorate. Mr. Plummer calls it the *Triumph and Failure of Puritanism*, but as far as his treatment goes the word Triumph might have been omitted. Indeed, we cannot help feeling that the author does not rightly appreciate the good in the Puritan character. The failure of Puritanism in England, he tells us, was due to three things: (1) It was an alien religion, out of harmony with the English character. (2) It was greedy of power, and in the attempt to make itself absolute overreached itself. (3) It vexed the spirits and shocked the consciences of the majority by its tyranny and intolerance. The second lecture, under the caption *Restoration and Retaliation*, deals with the first part of Charles II's reign and the reaction from Puritanism. "Puritanism had



made cheerfulness a sin, and now nothing was sinful so long as it was cheerful." It touches also on the attempts at union of the Anglicans with the Presbyterians. The failure of the Savoy conference was due to a great extent to the presence in it of Baxter, who was "greater in criticism than in conciliation". The third lecture, entitled the *Struggle for Religious Toleration*, deals with the struggle between his people and Charles II during his later years, the popish plots and the influence which the noise they caused had on the public mind, how Anglican and dissenter were thrown together in the common struggle, the irenic literature, the place of James II in the struggle for toleration—his early promises to the Church of England, his attempt to introduce Romanism, the excitement caused by the trial of the seven bishops and the invitation to William of Orange. The fourth and last lecture deals with the *Latitudinarian Failure and Success*. In it Mr. Plummer would show that the revolution of 1688 was really democratic and Protestant, that from it date the independence of courts of law, the pulpit and the press. Liberty of conscience, however, was as yet only a theory with a few thinkers. The Toleration Act and the treatment of the non jurors show the general opinion on that question. But toleration of a sort became necessary because now Presbyterianism was as firmly established in Scotland as Anglicanism in England, and both under the same ruler. Hence, England became the "home of religious liberty for all who were not Papists", and William and Mary appointed Latitudinarian bishops. At the end of the chapter is a thoughtful estimate of the character and place of William III in the history of England and Europe.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

CYPRIAN: THE CHURCHMAN. By JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER, Professor of Historical Theology in Drew Theological Seminary. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. New York: Eaton & Mains. Pp. 226. Price, \$1.00.

This little volume in the "Men of the Kingdom" Series gives some account of the Church father whose name it bears on its title page. To call it a "life" of Cyprian would be incorrect; for it lacks the wanted logical and chronological continuity which such a work would have. It is rather a series of studies in the life of Cyprian and an estimate of his importance in the history of the Church. The style is popular; and, although disputed matters are referred to, the pages are not burdened with any discussions. The author has relied to a great extent, as he informs us, on the works of other scholars, such as von Schubert, Harnack, Goetz and Benson, but refers also constantly to Cyprian's own writings. The book begins with a short account of the geographical and political position of Carthage, the character of her original Phœnician inhabitants, and her condition under Roman government. Then follows an account of Cyprian's conversion, told partly in his own language. The next chapter discusses Cyprian's attitude toward heath-

enism, in which Prof. Faulkner quotes the *'Quod idola dii non sint'* as containing Cyprian's ideas, if not from his pen. The fourth chapter, entitled "A Pope", discusses Cyprian's view of the priesthood as *sacerdotal* rather than *episcopal*, and contrasts this with the views of Tertullian and the earlier Church. Then comes some account of the evils that had crept into the Church, Cyprian's attempt to cleanse it by discipline, his part in the Decian persecution (where the general question of Roman persecutions of Christians is also lightly touched), the resulting questions in discipline, particularly the treatment of the *lapsi* and the schism which was occasioned partly by this in the African Church. In this connection a chapter is added dealing with the Novation Schism in Rome. Under the title "Mercy and Help", Cyprian's charitable labors for suffering Christians and heathen are briefly related. A short chapter is given to his exposition of the Lord's Prayer. The next shows that Cyprian was a Catholic rather than a Protestant in some doctrines. The succeeding ones show that he was far from being a *Roman* Catholic, by giving some account of the controversies between him and the Bishop of Rome. The last is devoted to an account of his last days, his exile, and martyrdom. Three appendices are attached to the work. The first gives very briefly some account of the interpolations in the "De Unitate Ecclesiae". The second contains the different opinions concerning the order of the Epistles. The third is a "Select Literature" for those who desire to pursue the study further.

The standpoint of the writer is Protestant, and Methodist, and it is clear that he intends his work for edification as well as information. He does not hesitate to compare the modern with the Roman theatre (p. 31), and the debauchery of Philadelphia under the Quay ring with that of the ancient Roman towns, or to take his readers out of the historical setting and confront them with modern conditions. His not infrequent references to the early days of Methodism easily betray his sympathies.

The book may be recommended to those who wish to find in popular form a general account of the African Church in the first half of the third century, and of the forces then operating in the Church at large.

Princeton

KERR D. MACMILLAN

THE APOSTLES' CREED. ITS RELATION TO PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. By H. B. SWETE, D.D., Hon.Litt.D., Dublin; Hon. D.D., Glasgow; F.B.A.; Fellow of Gouville and Caius College, Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1905. Pp. 112.

As this scholarly little volume has been already noted in the pages of this magazine (*Pres. and Ref. Review*, Vol. VII, p. 737), it is not necessary to do more than call attention to this, the latest reprint of Mr. Swete's answer to Harnack's criticism of the Apostles' Creed.

That there has been a steady demand for the volume is shown by the fact that it has been reprinted three times since its first appearance in June, 1894.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

SYSTEM DER CHRISTLICHEN LEHRE. VON HANS HINRICH WENDT, Professor der Theologie in Jena. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Erster Teil. 1906. Pp. 230. Zweiter Teil. 1907. Pp. 251-676.

In this volume Professor Wendt attempts to give a complete and systematic statement of Christian doctrine, including both dogmatics and ethics. Part First was published in 1906, the second Part, in 1907.

After the Introduction the "System" is set forth in six "sections": 1. Prolegomena (*Prinzipienlehre*); 2. The Christian doctrine of God and His eternal purpose of salvation; 3. The Christian doctrine of the World and of Man; 4. The Christian doctrine of Jesus Christ as the Mediator of Salvation; 5. The Christian doctrine of the functions of Christendom (*Christenheit*) in mediating Salvation; 6. The Christian doctrine of divine Sonship.

The doctrines usually treated under the head of Eschatology are subsumed under section six, being regarded as the completion and perfection of divine Sonship.

Professor Wendt says that it is his task to unfold systematically the religious ideas which in their entirety constitute the religious teaching of Christianity. He makes a clear distinction between the question as to the truth of Christianity, and the question as to what is truly Christian teaching or doctrine. The former question involves such matters as the determination of moral and religious values; of the relation of the Christian view of the world to the great philosophical problems; whereas the determination of what is truly Christian teaching is a purely historical matter. The norm of what is really Christian doctrine, Wendt affirms, must be kept entirely free from everything that could make it subjective. No judgment of ethical or spiritual values, no question as to how the supposed Christian doctrine supplies a solution to the great problems of life and experience—no such questions, he says, can be allowed to affect the question of the norm of Christian doctrine. This norm is a historical quantity, and must be historically determined.

This standard or norm for the determination of what is genuinely Christian doctrine, according to Wendt, is not to be found in the Scriptures as such. This idea, he says, must be abandoned along with the doctrine of Inspiration upon which it rests. The norm of Christian doctrine, Wendt thinks, must be sought within the Scripture, but it is

not to be regarded as coextensive with the Scripture. The question, however, is not to be settled, Wendt thinks, by the distinction so often made between the divine and human elements in the Scripture, *i. e.*, by seeking to determine the "revelation content" of Scripture. In this way the element of value-judging is introduced, and hence the question as to the truth of Christianity is confounded with the question as to what is really Christian. The norm by which we determine what is Christian must be a historical quantity, Wendt says, and must be historically and scientifically determined, and determined, moreover, in such a way as to be recognized and acknowledged by non-Christians as well as by Christians. This standard the author finds in what he calls "the Gospel of Jesus" (pp. 44-54).

At this point, however, certain questions naturally arise, to which Wendt seeks to give an answer.

First of all, can there be any agreement upon this question, or any objective determination of what the "Gospel of Jesus" really is, in view of the present state of New Testament criticism? To this question Wendt answers that, in spite of differences of opinion and still open questions as to details, there is a sufficient agreement as to the great essentials of Jesus' teaching—an agreement sufficient to serve as the norm for Christian doctrine.

But even setting aside this question, a second one arises: How is this Gospel of Jesus to be determined? Wendt will not allow that all that Jesus taught can be considered as part of His Gospel or as truly Christian teaching. Jesus Himself, Wendt thinks, was limited by the ideas of His time, by certain Jewish notions which He adopted, while in certain other respects He accommodated His teaching to current opinions. In view of all this the problem becomes acute: *viz.*, How shall we determine how much of the teaching of Christ is truly Christian? Wendt's solution of this problem is a very simple one, according to his way of looking at the matter. He thinks that the general religious view of God and the world which Jesus held is to be distinguished from the rest of His teaching, and everything which does not harmonize with this general religious view is to be rejected.

Has Professor Wendt succeeded in giving an objective and historical norm for Christian doctrine? We think not. In the first place, there is not the general agreement in the sphere of historical criticism which he claims. It is not possible upon strictly objective and historical grounds to retain a merely natural and human Jesus, and to reject the admittedly supernatural and divine Jesus of the Gospels as we have them. In fact, certain tendencies in recent criticism are showing us that the stringent application of logic and of the so-called historical principles by which the Jesus of the Gospels is desupernaturalized, will result in removing Jesus altogether from the sphere of historic fact and reality. And in the second place, the norm of Christian doctrine as Wendt sets it forth is not at all free from subjective elements, nor is it kept separate from the question as to what he himself believes to be the truth. The anti-supernaturalism which has led some theologians

to attribute to Jesus' followers and to the early Christians the words of Jesus, affirming His supernatural origin and deity, has led Wendt rather to a minimizing exegesis or even to the attribution to Jesus of erroneous notions on certain subjects. This method of seeking to be rid of the supernaturalism of the Christianity of Christ and of all the New Testament writers, appears to us to be even less plausible than the resort to historical criticism, and for this reason to betray even more clearly the *a priori* and dogmatic considerations which underly each method.

Moreover, if this so-called essential element in our Lord's teaching is thus to be singled out, and all the rest considered as the human form, or ideas of the time, or merely pictorial form of expression adopted by Jesus for His hearers, then we have really adopted the distinction, which Wendt expressly rejected, between the human and divine factors in the Scripture and in the teaching of Jesus. The norm, according to Wendt, is not the Scripture as such, nor the teaching of Jesus as such; neither is it to be determined by religious values drawn from a comparative and historical study of religions. What, then, we ask, can this norm be save Wendt's philosophical opinions? This we find actually to be the case.

Accordingly, we have the following statement of Christian doctrine: God is love; He has no attribute of righteousness such as to necessitate the punishment of sin before the sinner can be pardoned. Consequently, the work of Christ aims at the moral reformation of the sinner, and bears no real relation to God, although timid sinners may suppose, as a "*Hilfsvorstellung*", that God will pardon them for Christ's sake, and thus they may be encouraged to return to God. The Nicene doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian doctrine of the Person of Christ are set aside, and Christ is held to be a man who was the "bearer" of the divine Spirit in the same way, but to a greater degree, in which all men may be said to have the Spirit of God.

In regard to the doctrines of sin and of divine grace in the Application of Redemption, the views of Wendt are virtually Pelagian.

That this is not the Christianity of Christ, not to speak of all the New Testament writers, is being more and more generally admitted by scientific and impartial exegesis, irrespective of the attitude of the exegete to the question of the authority of the New Testament writers. Consequently, the author has not succeeded in the task of setting forth a system of doctrine which from an objective and scientific standpoint can be called Christian.

On p. 45 of the first volume, W. B. Smith's book is not given its correct title: instead of "*Der zorgeschichtliche Jesus*" it should read "*Der vorchristliche Jesus*".

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

SOME RECENT PHASES OF GERMAN THEOLOGY. By JOHN L. NIELSEN, D.D., Professor in Nast Theological Seminary, Berea, Ohio. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham; New York: Eaton & Mains. [1908.] 8vo., pp. 114.



This little book consists of three lectures delivered in August, 1907, at the Bible Institute at Lakeside, Ohio, and now published at the desire of their hearers. This desire of their hearers is highly to be commended; it enables a wider public to enjoy an exceedingly good thing. Of the three lectures the first surveys the present tendencies in Biblical Studies in Germany; the second, the present state of discussion on the Person and Work of Christ, and the third gives some account of that movement which calls itself the "Modern Positive School of Theology." They are all well informed, soundly thought and admirably expressed, and together provide a very informing introduction to the study of the present state of German theological thought.

Of the three lectures the last seems to us the least full of light and leading. The author is more in sympathy with the "Modern-Positive Theology" than the reviewer is, and appears to the reviewer to feel his footing somewhat less firm than in the preceding lectures. Nevertheless, here, too, his general position is prudently taken and decisively declared, and the "Modern Positivists" are sympathized with in the right elements of their contentions. It is true that they are seeking "to show the vital relation of the Christ,—not of the man Jesus, but of Christ the Son of God—to the experience of the believer"; and that is so far good. It is another question if they are on the right path, not only for this quest, but for even higher things, as, for example, the right relation of our souls to Christ in all the reach of their relations. Meanwhile, as we say, Dr. Nuelsen throws his emphasis on the right elements which are found in even a mediating theology and duly warns us against the extremities of absorption with the subjectivities of religion. "Formerly", says he, "the philosophers busied themselves with the Christian religion; next the historians; now it is the psychologists and physicians, especially the specialists on nervous and mental disorders" (p. 101). Engrossment with religious phenomena exclusively from the subjective point of view is sure to lead to an estimate of them as little removed from morbid movements of the soul, the only thing, in point of fact, that can justify the phenomena of Christian emotions and shield them from the suspicion of morbid conditions is the nature of the object towards which they turn.

Even so slight a qualification of the appreciation with which we receive these lectures would be out of place with the former two of them. Here we have a survey and estimate of present-day tendencies of thought in Germany which are simply admirable. The hinge on which the debate as to the Bible turns, it is pointed out, is whether the Bible is to be esteemed a record of divine revelations or of human aspirations. And the drift of discussion is luminously traced from engrossment with the old literary questions to engrossment with the new *religionsgeschichtlich* questions. Whatever may be said of the state of the case formerly, it is obvious that now it is the *Weltanschauung* that rules all opinion, and the battle is on, not merely as to when this or that book was written, or by whom, but as to the source of the religious contents of the Bible—the revelation of God or the imagination of men.

The exposition culminates in the second lecture, which is a striking exhibition of the necessary issue of the methods used by the "critical" students of the Christian records in a purely human Christ: and the inevitable *reductio ad absurdum* which this result works for their methods. There is no Jesus but the Jesus of the New Testament writers: and the world cannot get along without this Jesus. This lecture should be in the hands of all that would guard themselves against the often very insidious advances of the newer unbelief. Here is one golden sentence culled out of the more general side of Dr. Nuelsen's argument, which we may in closing commend to our readers as a clue that it would be well for them to take with them whenever they adventure into the labyrinths of modern discussion: "It has ever been the mistake of rationalism to try to make Christianity acceptable to the average man by taking off the edges of its supernaturalism. It has ever been a failure, and ever will be so" (p. 72).

Princeton.

B. R. WARFIELD.

DAS GÖTTLICHE SELBSTBEWUSSTSEIN JESU NACH DEM ZEUGNIS DER SYNOPTIKER. Von Past. Lic. th. JOH. STEINBECK. Erfurt und Leipzig. A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf. (George Bohme). 1908. 8vo., pp. 61.

The very high ground which the author takes on the question of the divinity of Christ is made unmistakably clear both by his criticism of the ostensibly high view of Kaftan and also by a carefully formulated statement of his own position. Both these matters deserve notice.

Though Kaftan speaks of the 'deity of Christ', says Steinbeck, he does not mean this phrase in the ordinary Biblical and dogmatic sense. To Kaftan Jesus is, on His divine side, eternal, only in the sense that it lay in the eternal nature of God to reveal Himself in the man Jesus as His most perfect "organ". Hence Kaftan's use of the terms "Gott-heit" ("Deity") and "Wesen" ("Essence") are misleading and unjustifiable.

On the other hand, Steinbeck finds in the absolutely unique oneness with God of which Jesus is conscious an attribute which, in its very nature, can neither be conferred nor acquired, but must be an eternal possession; and which indicates divine being or essence. And this oneness, as exhibited in Jesus' consciousness of Himself as Saviour, Judge, and King, is shown to have the same soteriological value for mankind as God Himself. If the Gospel picture of Jesus is not overdrawn (against Strauss), if His claim to be Saviour, Judge, and King were really not less than His words imply (against Weinel), and if we believe that Jesus was not a self-deceived enthusiast (against Renan and O. Holtzmann), we must receive the same impression which the disciples, as represented by Peter, received, that Jesus did have the consciousness of standing, to all intents and purposes, in the place of God.

The foundation of Jesus' oneness with God is, in Steinbeck's view, Jesus' consciousness of absolute sinlessness. This he establishes from

the records, though he confesses he has considerable difficulty with the words, "Why callest thou me good?" The significance of the resurrection as a justification of Jesus is well brought out. His resurrection sealed His claim to be Redeemer and King. The author might, however, also have used the fact of the resurrection as itself making it highly probable that Jesus' claims were of a kind corresponding to the greatness of this event, as a reply to those critics who consider the words of Jesus as to His coming again to judge and rule the world extravagant. But, on the whole, his short and sharp reply to such writers as Bousset and Holtzmann, who follow the subjectivistic method and reject the evidences of a divine selfconsciousness of Jesus, is very good.

This brief treatment of a vital theme is welcome, not only because sane and fair, but also as evidence of the persistence of an attitude other than the Socinian toward the question of the deity of our Lord.

Basel, Switzerland.

H. D. DAVIS.

GOTTESGLAUBE. By PROF. D. W. BOUSSET, Göttingen. *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* V. 6. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1908. 8vo., pp. 64.

The purpose of this brochure is not to adduce grounds for a belief in God, but rather to set forth the distinctive characteristics of the Christian conception of God. These are summed up in the terse phrase, "Our God", which is intended to express at once His greatness and majesty and His nearness and approachableness. Attention is particularly paid to the latter, as showing the superiority of the Christian view of "God and the soul", as contrasted with pessimistic Indian Pantheism, Persian utilitarianism, Greek uncertainty, and Israelitish legalism. The glory of the Christian idea is its "individualism", in which God is conceived as seeking the single soul. The belief in a personal God as Father is the guiding star of Christian faith. Especially clear and satisfactory is Bousset's treatment of the question of providence and prayer. He refuses to occupy the low ground of the deistic reflex-influence theory, and declares that the Christian's range of prayer includes external as well as internal blessings, and knows no distinction between large and small.

What, however, chiefly attracts our attention is Bousset's view of the relation of faith in God to redemption, and particularly to the forgiveness of sins. The crown and climax of our Christian faith, he says, is the belief that God forgives sins unconditionally, in the strictest sense of the word, *i. e.*, without the mediation of any things or any external acts. This, he tells us, was the principal message of Jesus and is the kernel of the Gospel. It was the just office of Jesus, he tells us, to secure for us the certainty of this unconditional forgiveness,—though he fails to show that this message was much of an advance over that of the Old Testament prophets as to the mercy of God.

All this stands in full harmony with the author's teaching in his *Jesus and Wesen der Religion*. It defends a new eclectic method of

fastening upon certain parables and sayings of Jesus to the neglect of His pregnant declarations regarding the relation of His death to the blotting out of sins. And it totally disregards the utterances of one who, though he held entirely different views from Bousset on this point, yet claimed to be an inspired apostle of the Christian faith and founded the larger number of the first Christian churches on the doctrine that God does not forgive sins unconditionally, but on the sole ground of the atoning blood of Christ. The chief criticism, then, of Bousset's exposition of the Christian idea of God which presents itself is that it is incomplete and one-sided, being based upon a selected portion of our authoritative information on the subject. We shall be rather slow, in any event, to accept the inference which he would seem to desire us to draw, that the true Christian conception of God has lain buried under the lava and ashes of a "Pauline" eruption until unearthed by excavators of the twentieth century

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### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE CHURCH AND MODERN LIFE. By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. 8vo.; pp. vii, 221. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.: The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1908. Price, \$1.25 net.

The aim of this interesting and able discussion is to set forth the kind of church demanded by modern life. This is a church which shall put the emphasis on "social" rather than on individual "redemption": that is, one which shall try to save the world, and not merely to save men out of the world. Such a conception of the church will issue in a new sort of evangelism, in one whose purpose shall not terminate on the salvation of sinners, but shall conceive of this as in order to "the reconciliation of races", "the pacification of industry", "the moralization of business", "the extirpation of social vice", "the purification of politics", "the simplification of life". The result of such evangelism will be that the young men and women "called to the leadership of the church will feel that their main business is the work of church extension". This, however, while it will not ignore denominational extension, will consist rather in "the extension of the church into every department of human life". It will be analogous to what we call "university extension work". "Its aim will be to make a vital connection between the Christian church and every institution or agency by which the work of the world is done, so that the influence of the church shall be directly felt in every part of our social life. . . . It will make the church the central dynamo of the community, connected by a live wire with every home, school, factory, bank, shop, store, office, legislative chamber, employer's association, labor federation.—with every organ of the whole social organism, so that the light and power

which are in Jesus Christ shall be the guiding influence and the motive force of our civilization." This profoundly scriptural conception of the mission of the church for our times is presented with all that force and grace of style for which our author has long been distinguished, as well as with his no less characteristic and winning optimism. He charms us even when he does not convince us. And in many things he does convince us. We are sure that he puts his finger on the open sores of modern life. We are sure that he does not exaggerate them. We are sure, too, that he warns us against the popular but false remedy, and that he points out the only true one. In terms which cannot be misunderstood, he exposes the powerlessness to regenerate, or even to reform, of sociology in and of itself; and especially of "associations which should take the place of churches—in which religion should be dispensed with; in which there should be more or less of ethical instruction and of charitable cooperation, but no recognition of any connection between this world and any other". Nay, more; he makes a plea for public worship; he magnifies the power of prayer; he insists on the necessity of the presence and power of the Spirit of Christ, the Holy Spirit of God, with an intelligence and earnestness which must elicit a hearty and unqualified Amen from every believer in supernatural religion.

And yet there are blemishes in our author's work; and just because of the high excellence alluded to, it seems proper to call attention to them.

1. It is a mistake to imply that social redemption is the peculiar need of our time or that to Dr. Gladden and the many who think with him belongs the honor of discovering this need. The Calvinism which is their *bête noir*, and especially the older Calvinism which they abhor most, was characteristically and preeminently a social faith. It regarded the election of God as calling men to the life of the state and of the family quite as much as to that of the church, and it exalted Christ as King of the nation and Lord of all social relations quite as really as Head of the church. In a word, the old doctrine of the "*amplitudo regni Dei*" would seem to be brought forward as something new; and as now presented it is new in so far as this, that it is no longer explicitly connected, if connected at all, with that august conception of the divine sovereignty which renders it a rational necessity.

2. It is another mistake to hold that the church ought not to take sides in the conflict between individualism and socialism. This issue is not like that between different political parties or different forms of government. A Democrat may follow Christ as truly as a Republican, and even a despotic monarchy may be a "power ordained of God". But it is different in the case of socialism. The point of individualism is that every man has the right and is under obligation to judge of his duty and to exercise his faculties in the fear of God. The point of socialism is that every man must judge of his duty and exercise his faculties according to the will of society as expressed by the state. That is, socialism would supplant God by the state; and against any



such usurpation, of course, the church and, indeed, every Christian is bound everlastingly to protest.

3. It is a further and more serious mistake that the salvation of individuals from sin should be emphasized less than the salvation of society from the temporal consequences of sin may be emphasized more. Just here we touch the greatest error of our day. It is true that, to use the striking illustration of our author, "the foundation of Christianity is the reconciliation of individual souls to God, and the establishment of friendship between these individual souls and God; but what is the structure for which this foundation is laid? It is the establishment of the same divine friendship among men. That is the building for which the foundation calls. If the building does not go up, the foundation is worthless. If the building does not go up, the foundation itself will crumble and decay. The only way to save a foundation is to cover it with a building." But what if men are not sure that there is a foundation or that it is a stable one? Will they not then build hesitatingly and meanly, if at all? Unquestionably we do need much and careful instruction in the social ethics of the New Testament; and in insisting on this need and themselves meeting it, Dr. Gladden and his school are placing the whole church under lasting obligations to them. It is one thing to know the necessity and the way of individual salvation, and it is another thing to know how saved men ought to live. Both are essential. But the latter always depends on the former. Christian civilization becomes possible only as it is kept impressed on men that "other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ", who "loved me and gave himself up for me". The adequate motive for a Christian ethic is found only in this Christian dogmatic. Hence, to concentrate attention on the former to the depreciation of the latter is suicidal. Our author would have the church adapt herself to modern life by substituting, to a considerable extent, ethical teaching for the doctrine of individual redemption, but it is just because the church is doing this that she is unfitting herself for all life and, most, of all, for modern life. It is precisely when the church is slipping away, as she is now, from "the truth as it is in Jesus" that she needs most of all to have that truth itself presented to her. Her very life depends on it.

4. A closely connected mistake appears in our author's crusade against "orthodoxy". It is not that he protests against the identification of orthodoxy or "correct belief" with "what is generally believed to be correct", against the substitution for "loyalty to the truth" of "loyalty to a prescribed statement of truth". As to this, we are heartily at one with him. His error consists, however, in holding that orthodoxy 'restricts the right and disparages the privilege of keeping the mind open to new truth and of being free to seek it'. What orthodoxy does in this relation insist on is honesty and common sense. It does not limit the right to keep the mind open to new truth, but it does maintain that one may no longer profess adherence to the old doctrine when, in consequence of what he takes to be new light, he

has ceased to believe it. It would not curtail freedom to seek new truth, but it does affirm that the burden of proof is on those who would set aside the old. It does not claim that truth is more important than life, but it does claim that the life of Christ is impossible apart from the truth of Christ, and, therefore, that the truth as it is in Him cannot be ascertained too carefully, or held too tenaciously. To refer, as our author does, to the Greek Church as an awful example of the effect of orthodoxism is precisely as if one were to point to a corpse as the supreme argument against attention to diet.

5. The final and the radical mistake of this whole treatise, as must already have begun to appear, is its indifferentism. Our author evidently agrees with Dryden's couplet,

"For forms of faith let graceless bigots fight.

He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

Hence, he regards the Reformation as primarily a sociological rather than a theological movement; and he conceives of the religions of the world, not as being false in comparison with Christianity, but only as being inferior in adaptation to human needs. In a word, truth in his view is not so much the condition of religious life as it is its product. Of course, the church that teaches this is the church that modern life wants. It is at least an open question, however, whether what modern life wants in this respect is what it needs. To subordinate the intellect to the feelings, which is just what Dr. Gladden and his school are doing, is, to go no further, a fundamental psychological error. There are some of us also who think that it is a flat denial of the explicit statements of Romans x. 13-15, and, indeed, of the clear implications of the whole Word of God. It seems to us, therefore, that while our author has put his finger on the sores of modern life and has pointed us to the remedy, he has taught us mainly error as to the application of that remedy. It is not the gospel of theological indifferentism that is going to commend Christ to a lost world. It will be orthodoxy no less positive and uncompromising than that of Peter when he declared "Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other named under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved" (Acts iv. 12).

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

SERMONS (Gaelic and English), by the late REV. ARCHIBALD COOK, DAVIOL. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. John R. Mackay, M. A., Inverness. Glasgow: John M'Neilage. 1907. 8vo.: pp. xxxii, 315.

The Rev. Archibald Cook was one of a coterie of fervent preachers, whose voice filled all the north of Scotland with the sweet savor of the Divine love, during the first half of the nineteenth century. In a beautiful biographical sketch prefixed to this volume of his sermons, Mr. Mackay helps us to understand the man and the power of his ministry. Born in the Island of Arran at a time when it was good to be born in

the Island of Arran, and trained at the University of Glasgow, he began his laborious and strenuous ministry in Canthness in 1822. His preaching was of that pungent order best represented in our American pulpit, perhaps, by Dr. Archibald Alexander, in which the appeal is characteristically to the conscience, and the prime quality of which is searching analysis of the state of mind of the sinner lacking and the sinner under the power of Grace. While not a theologian in the technical sense, he was yet well learned in the great doctrines of grace and all his preaching was sustained and given body by the underlying evangelical system which informed it. He felt keenly what sin is and made his hearers feel its dreadful evil and power: and he pointed them with the most winning appeal to the love of the sin-forgiving God as the source of all their hope. So little was he prone to gloze the danger of sin, that fault has been found with him for dwelling too much on the terrors of eternal punishment: but the tendency of his preaching of the terrors of the lost estate was not to drive men to despair, but to God. The thing which made all his preaching acceptable and effective was the intense reality of the man. He preached no intellectual abstractions, but in the truest sense of the word vital truths. "It has been remarked," writes Mr. Mackay, "that Mr. Cook's preaching was of the experimental rather than of the doctrinal order. If by that is meant that in his preaching he described the process of the individual's salvation with minuteness and insight, the observation holds good. A purely objective presentation of doctrine found no favor with him. But it is not the case that he dwelt more upon Christ's work, by His Word and Spirit, in the saved sinner, than upon Christ's work, in his estate of humiliation and exaltation, for the sinner. One may say, if a slight variation of Dr. John Duncan's remark about Jonathan Edwards be allowed, that 'his experience was all doctrine, and his doctrine was all experience'."

The sermons which are here printed can scarcely be accepted as a fair representation of Mr. Cook's preaching. They all come from a short period of a couple of years in his old age, when he was well past the allotted three-score years and ten. And they are all the reports of the spoken discourses of their author, taken down by one of his auditors. The Gaelic sermons, which are evidently more fully wrought out than the English, we unfortunately cannot read. The thirteen English sermons are quite fragmentary, and suggest rather than manifest the power of the preacher. It is well that they have been printed: for such a preacher's memory should be kept green, and these discourses, slight as they are, are yet sufficiently touched with the fire of his fervid appeals to serve that purpose. But we should beware of estimating his power by these coals from the altar. The story of the preservation of these sermons, moreover, is affecting enough to justify their publication if for nothing but a memorial of it. A poor conscience-stricken sinner, fearing that the Father's face was averted from him forever, came under the power of this ministry. He tells us in thrilling words, how, cowering in his sense of reprobation, he first heard Mr. Cook.

Mr. Cook stood at the head of the communion table, and after a long and searching pause suddenly began by crying: "Lost, lost, lost! O poor creature here to-day with that scream in your soul. I'll tell this to thee, they are now in glory that had had that scream before. . . . *That* was it for which Christ came out of glory—to seek and to save that which was lost, and your having that scream in your soul, you have there an evidence that there is love in God." Of course, it seemed as if the message was just for him, and finding peace under such preaching, he naturally sought Mr. Cook's ministrations, and after a while fell to taking down his discourses in short-hand. Four of the Gaelic sermons he wrote out from his notes and published; and after his death the twenty-one remaining Gaelic sermons and the thirteen English sermons of this volume were found among his effects similarly written out. The volume may be accounted thus a tribute of gratitude from a soul which had derived its comfort in life and in death from this preaching.

The relatively greater number and the relatively greater length of the Gaelic sermons, as compared with the English, fairly corresponds with the place each took in Mr. Cook's work. The passage in which Mr. Mackay tells us of his ordinary Lord's day method of preaching is so interesting as an account of a Highland minister's work a half-century ago that we cannot resist the temptation to transcribe it. "In explanation of the form in which most of the English discourses appear", he says, "it may be added that at Daviot, where, with two or three exceptions, all these sermons were preached, the Gaelic services were the principal services of the day. . . . The order of the Sabbath Day's services . . . was: (1) Gaelic from twelve to two or half-past two (2) English for about one hour. (3) A short concluding Gaelic service. The same text was almost invariably the subject of consideration in both languages. The English part was, however, by no means a repetition of what had already been said in Gaelic; as a rule a division of the subject not treated in the Gaelic discourse was then taken up."

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

**LIGHT AT EVENING TIME. A Story of Conversion** By the late HENRY MOULE, M.A., formerly Vicar of Fordington, Dorchester. Edited, with a Preface, by his son, HANDLEY C. G. MOULE, Bishop of Durham. London: The Religious Tract Society. [1908.] 16mo., pp. 62.

This instructive narrative of the conversion and happy life in Christ of an aged woman, already notable for virtuous living, was written nearly sixty years ago and published in 1863 in a volume called *Pardon and Peace*, along with some other ("more briefly told") incidents of the author's pastoral work. It is now republished, partly, no doubt, for its own sake, as a striking picture of Christian experience, but partly also, we may suppose, as an object-lesson to an age in which

the contrast between natural and supernatural religion seems to be less regarded than formerly. Here is an old woman of eighty-three living in quietness and apparent peace, fulfilling her duties, including her religious duties, with care and punctuality, suddenly overtaken by a genuine conviction of sin, which ultimately gives place to the joy of salvation and a life of conscious and constant communion with her Saviour. Not others, but she herself, draws the contrast between her former life of "quietness" and her new life of peace,—a peace no longer passive, but active, a "peace that passes all understanding". Others could only look on and wonder at the new life which manifested itself through four years of outward trial and inward joy, ending with the words 'Glory, glory, glory' on the lips. Instances like this are peculiarly fitted to illuminate the distinction (say the gulf, rather) between the religious functioning of the natural heart even at its best (and at its best, it can function very sweetly and attractively: witness the good young man whom Jesus loved) and the recreative working in the soul of the Holy Ghost. Dr. Moule, commenting on this difference, remarks: "Somehow (I scarcely know how fully to analyze the reasons) the quest for conversions, for sober, deep conversions, seems to be—shall I venture the phrase?—out of fashion now in the life of the Church, taking the Church in its widest sense." That is to say,—along with a waning sense of sin, that is, of the terrible need of salvation—there is traceable in present-day religious life a waning sense also of the supernaturalness of salvation. We seem inclined to satisfy ourselves with the functioning of the natural religious sentiment; or, at least, we seem in danger of mistaking the functioning of the native religious sentiment for a sufficient response to that fundamental command of God, "My child, give me thy heart". This aged woman learned the difference between a natural religiousness and a saving experience only in the twilight of life. But she learned it well, and her case is well calculated to teach it to all who will attend to her experience.

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST IN JAPAN. By WILLIAM M. IMBRIE, D.D.  
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 8vo., pp. 122. \$1.75 net.

These four lectures have been prepared by one whose long and successful missionary labors in Japan have enabled him to speak with marked insight and special authority in reference to the development of the independent native, Japanese, Christian Church. Dr. Imbrie treats first of the environment of this Church, then of its growth, next of its methods of work, and finally of certain notable events in its history. Because of the difficult problems which have arisen in connection with the relation of this native church to the work of foreign missionary societies these lectures will be read with peculiar interest at this present time.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN



**THE CALL OF THE HOME LAND.** By A. L. PH  
Virginia, Presbyterian Committee of Pub  
Cloth, 50 cents. Paper, 35 cents.

This "Study in Home Missions" is admirabl  
mission study classes in colleges, seminaries, c  
contains instructive material, which will prove  
all readers. After a brief historical survey of  
America, the author discusses the problems of  
grant, the negro, the city, the mountaineer, a  
closing with suggestions as to Christian work at  
sounds a definite appeal to the young men and  
would yield up their lives to God at the call of  
*Princeton.*

**PASTORAL AND PERSONAL EVANGELISM.** By CH  
pastor of Calvary Methodist Episcopal C  
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company.  
\$1.00 net.

Every chapter of this book throbs with life.  
wide and successful personal experience as  
While in no wise failing to appreciate the labor:  
lists, the writer seeks to lay the burden of resp  
work upon the settled pastor, and to teach  
operation of Christian laymen in definite persor  
discussion is full of encouragement and awa  
reader. The author treats of the needed  
evangelistic services, of wise methods to be emp  
Sabbath school, of Summer services, of the d  
experience and of kindred topics which are of  
Christian workers.

*Princeton.*

**ODDS AND ENDS FROM PAGODA LAND.** By WI  
Philadelphia: American Baptist Publicati  
Pp. 277. Price, postpaid, \$1.00.

The modest title of this volume may not s  
drawn for us by Doctor Griggs of the Burman :  
whom he has labored for twelve years. We ar  
an interesting glimpse at the daily life, the  
superstitions and beliefs, of the native races of  
minded anew of the necessity and success of i  
in these distant fields.

*Princeton.*

**THE EMPIRE OF LOVE.** By W. J. DAWSON, D.I  
H. Revell Company. 12mo., cloth. \$1.00

As a tribute to the power and beauty of lov

be of interest: but it evidently essays to be more: nothing less, in fact, than a restatement of Christianity. As such it is hardly to be taken seriously. There is scarcely a line in the volume inspired by a conception of the supreme majesty and importance of the person and work of Christ. Little emerges save a suggested imitation of the human Jesus. We can agree with the author that love should be the law of life: yet we know not how it can be inspired, save by the process described by Paul, who lived by faith in a divine, crucified, living Christ, "Who loved him and gave himself for him." "The Empire of Love" will be hastened as men learn the meaning of the words "the love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus judge that one died for all," and as they manifest a consequent devotion to Christ, and are enabled by Him to live in such charity and kindness as the author advocates, and himself practises.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE FULL BLESSING OF PENTECOST. By the Reverend ANDREW MURRAY, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1908. Cloth. 16mo., pp. 158. Price, 75 cents net

The writings of Andrew Murray are so characterized by depth of spiritual insight and experience, and they have proved to be of such guidance and inspiration to his fellow Christians, that one feels a decided diffidence in expressing even a slight divergence from the positions assumed in this work relating to the Holy Spirit. There are many readers, however, who will fail to agree that "the abiding gift of the Holy Spirit as an indwelling Person", is a definite, conscious experience, separable from and subsequent to conversion, or that the reception of this "second blessing" is to be sought after one has definitely accepted Christ as Saviour and Lord; or that "it is the great work of the Gospel ministry to lead believers to the Holy Spirit". In this present volume the theory is based upon the experience of the Samaritan converts; and from this passage seems to be given some support. Most expositors, however, regard this instance as exceptional, and not typical; and understand that what the Samaritans received, through the Apostles, was not a higher spiritual experience analogous to the so-called "second blessing" of modern days; but supernatural, miraculous, spiritual gifts, the imparting of which might be delayed until long after conversion, or, as subsequently, altogether withheld. The reason for the delay was to show the unity of these converts with the church in Jerusalem, and to suggest that supernatural gifts were not essential to Christian service, and might in time disappear. If this passage is to be pressed to support the theory founded upon it, it is difficult to see how we can deny a further false conclusion, viz., that the "gift of the indwelling of the Spirit" can be received only at the hands of Apostles or other ordained men. It is more in accordance with the universal belief of the church to conclude that the typical case is that of Cornelius and his friends, who, immediately upon their acceptance of Christ,

were "filled with the Holy Spirit" This is the normal experience for every Christian. That it is an ideal not usually attained, is made quite evident by the statements of Dr. Murray. There is a need on the part of Christ's followers to be more truly "filled with the Spirit". It is possibly what the author describes as "the one thing needful". Yet the explanation of this need is not to be found in the theory of this "Pentecostal Blessing", but in the fact that we are not yielding ourselves to the guidance and control of this divine Comforter, who has His abiding dwelling-place in every believer. It is for us, not to be seeking any mysterious, mystical, personal experience, but to seek daily more and more perfectly to do the will of our Lord and to live in dependance upon Him. He will then "fill us" with His Spirit, and enable us to live "Spirit-Filled-Lives". To realizing such lives Dr. Murray is giving true help, and the difference of statement refers rather to the explanation of the experience, than to its necessity or to the method of its attainment. As to the latter, his book is full of practical suggestions, and we can hardly do better than to add this typical and pregnant sentence from his own pen: "It is as we are convicted of the defectiveness of our faith in Christ, and what he has promised to do in saving and helping us from sin, and as we understand that believing in him means a yielding up of the whole heart and life and will, to let him rule and live within us, that we can confidently count upon receiving all that we need of the Holy Spirit's power." It must be the prayer of every thoughtful Christian, that there may be more of the surrender, the faith, the devotion to Christ, to which Dr. Murray leads us, that there may be a consequent enjoyment of "the full blessing of Pentecost".

Princeton

CHARLES R. ERDMAN

THE IDEAL MINISTRY. By the Reverend HERRICK JOHNSON, D. D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. Pp. 488. Price, \$1.75 net.

It may be enough of praise to suggest that this volume is worthy of being considered the embodiment of the life-work of its distinguished author. As is well known, Doctor Johnson attained a national reputation as a preacher during his pastorates in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Troy; while during the past thirty five years he has been the inspiring teacher of the art of preaching as a professor of homiletics, first in Auburn Theological Seminary, and then in McCormick Theological Seminary. Such a successful career has fitted the writer to prepare what will be conceded, by most competent judges, the best existing handbook on homiletics. It is characterized by clearness of style, unity of structure, wisdom and practicalness of suggestion.

The first part sets forth the true dignity of preaching, and declares its supreme aim to be "Perfect Manhood in Christ": its ruling spirit, "Love", its subject matter, "The Word of God"; its preëminent business, "Preaching Christ": its central theme, "Christ Crucified"; its eternal sanctions, "Everlasting Life and Death"; its coöperating Agent, "The Holy Spirit".

The second part treats of "The Call to the Ministry", "The Student in the Ministry", "The Minister's Study", "The Law of Adaptation", "Preaching Old Doctrines in New Times", "The Method of Answering Questions", "Methods of Preaching", "Kinds of Discussion", and "Sermon Plans".

The third part deals exclusively with the Sermon, its definition, preparation, topics, qualities of style and delivery. The discussion is concluded by a chapter on the pertinent question "Why are not more souls brought to Christ by the sermon?" The "partial answer" is found in "the kind of sermons" which are being preached. A more effective kind would be in vogue, if modern preachers would heed the wise suggestions, as to the preparation and effective delivery of expository, extempore, evangelistic sermons, set forth in this admirable discussion of "The Ideal Ministry".

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN

AN EFFICIENT CHURCH. By CARL GREGG DONEY. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo., pp. 288. Price, \$1.25 net.

This book has been designated "The Psychology of a Modern Pastorale", a characterization which might suggest to some a purely speculative or theoretical discussion; quite on the contrary, the author has given us a concrete and practical discussion of the pressing problems of the modern church. Book One treats of "Religion and Life"; Book Two, of "The Congregation"; Book Three, of "The Minister", particularly his call and equipment; Book Four, of "The Message"; Book Five, of "The Method", including the problems of church attendance, the delivery of sermons, the minor parts of Public Worship, and other church services. The writer fully establishes his contention that "the minister must, consciously or otherwise, employ the principles of psychology", and by his sensible and helpful suggestions evinces his "one purpose to increase the every day efficiency of the minister".

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN

THE INFINITE AFFECTION. By the Rev. CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. Boston. The Pilgrim Press. Cloth. 16mo., pp. 174. Price, 75 cents

This volume sets forth, as the writer declares, "the theology of a young man who has hospitably submitted himself to what is termed 'modern thought'". To speak in still plainer terms, it is a cautious, concise statement of what is everywhere known as "the new theology". By accepting terms which have been familiar designations of the historic faith of the church, but which have been emptied of their meaning by the disciples of the "new thought", the writer seems quite unconscious of his wide departure from Scriptural truth. "Incarnation" is for him a "constantly repeated historic process"; the Holy Spirit "but the pantheism of the divine immanence in humanity"; the "divinity of Christ" merely a moral "divineness". The book suggests moral earnestness, and serious thoughtfulness, but a failure to appreciate the

essence of Christianity, or the Gospel of the glorious divine Lord.

*Princeton.*

THE PRESBYTERIAN DIGEST. SUPPLEMENT. 1898  
Rev. WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, D.D., LL.D., Sta-  
tural Assembly. Philadelphia: Presbyterian  
and Sabbath School Work. Cloth. 8vo., pp.

This Supplement includes the Acts, Decisions  
the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church  
general nature, from 1898 and up to and including  
Cumberland Presbyterian Church, May 1906. It  
of the General Assembly of the Cumberland Pre-  
to the Reunion. This supplement is prefaced by  
syllabus of its contents, and concludes with a con-  
*Princeton.*

PRACTICAL IDEALS IN EVANGELISM. By CHARLES  
delphia: American Baptist Publication Society.  
348. Price, 75 cents.

This is a valuable discussion of an important topic  
from a wide and successful personal experience  
observation, presents to us rational and effectual  
work. The various topics treated include "The Ideal  
Ideal Message", "The Ideal Method", "The  
"Evangelism with the Young", and "Evangelism  
*Princeton.*

THE PARABLES OF THE KINGDOM. By G. C. CARR  
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company.

He is a bold man indeed who ventures to in-  
tensive literature upon the thirteenth chapter of  
to Matthew. This exposition of the "Parables  
however, a real addition to the popular literature  
hence, is to be cordially welcomed. The introduction  
"Parabolic Method" is devoted to a forceful  
view that our Lord adopted the parabolic method  
because He had abandoned them in anger, and to  
hide His truth so that they should not see it," a  
day with greater or less variation by many teachers  
all such as are more or less of this mind Dr. Carr  
be instructive. In the second chapter, on "The  
course," certain general canons of interpretation  
canons control the discussion of the eight parables  
each of which in turn careful consideration is given  
are so simple, so sane, that the expositions are  
and usually very satisfactory. We say "usually" ver-  
it is impossible with the space at our command



agreement and disagreement and because the details of these interpretations are of necessity colored by the special views of the author on a multitude of other Scripture passages. This book is well worth careful study and deserves a more thorough preparation for the press than the publishers have taken time to give it.

*Princeton.*

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

SERMONS PREACHED IN ENGLAND. By REV. ALEXANDER LEWIS, Ph.D.  
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. 12 mo. Pp. 233.  
\$1.25 net.

As the title of the book indicates, this is a collection of sermons preached in various English Churches by the Rev. Dr. Lewis, now pastor of the First Congregational Church of Kansas City, during a year spent abroad in study and travel. It is not clear to the reviewer just what it was that caused their publication. The author in his introduction says that "many words were spoken, and letters received expressive of their helpfulness when the sermons were preached". Possibly this was the reason for their being put into more permanent form. Certainly their publication was not demanded by their intrinsic merit; for their thought is superficial and their theology confused. Excellent photographs of some of the churches in which these sermons were delivered adorn the book, while the frontispiece introduces us to the attractive personality of the author.

*Princeton.*

LEWIS SEYMOUR MUDGE.

THE REPRESENTATIVE WOMEN OF THE BIBLE. By GEORGE MATHESON, D.D., LL.D., FRSE. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.  
Crown 8vo. Cloth. Pp. 169. Price, \$1.50 net.

There is a pathetic interest attaching to the production of this volume, in that the author was engaged upon it the day before his death. The book, which was not quite complete, was designed to conclude the series on Bible Characters, of which the three preceding volumes treated of the Representative Men of the Bible. The work is not the best which the author produced, and, suggests, as did some of the other biographical studies, not the accurate interpreter of biblical narratives, but the dreamer, the poet, the literary artist. For example, as to Eve, we are told that she existed as long as Adam, and the story of her alleged creation is merely the statement of the fact that Adam at last came to appreciate the worth of one with whom he had long been acquainted, but whom he had before underrated and despised. The eating of the forbidden fruit was an act of "extravagance;" and its result was a "nobler stage" of experience. Miriam's rebellion is interpreted as being in no sense an act of ambition, but of loving solicitude for Moses, who was in danger of becoming untrue to his mission because of the influence of his Ethiopian wife; and her deed of "humility" probably "did shake the power" of that wife, and warned Moses of his peril.

Then, in the case of Mary the mother of Jesus, the "guiding" influence in his career, was not "life, but to prevent the higher life from making needs." When she found the boy Jesus in the temple, she was not the missing of Jesus but the place. "At the marriage feast of Cana" Mary is not prematurely introduced into his mission, her act was remission, designed to confine Jesus to the physical, her attempted interruption of his work at the approval of our Lord." These interpretations of their novelty, but seem to be lacking in conformity with the inspired record. However, the treatise, marked by many illuminating characters, is drawn of women who are "representative", not of Scripture, but representative of the purest *Princeton*.

QUIET TALKS ON SERVICE. By S. D. GORDON.  
Revell Company. 12 mo., pp. 211. Cloth.

Like the preceding "Quiet Talks" on Prayer, the third volume in the series met with a ready acceptance. The simple statement of familiar truths, enlivened by illustrations, proved so helpful as to make one forgive the infelicities of language. The reader was reminded of the possibilities and the joys of true Christian service.

*Princeton.*

QUIET TALKS ABOUT JESUS. QUIET TALKS  
By S. D. GORDON. New York City: A. C. McClurg & Co.  
Cloth, 12 mo., pp. 288, pp. 224. Price 75 cents.

The first of these books was disappointing in its help in the preceding volumes. The writer's statements of revealed truth; and in treating themes so important, conclusions, and frequent provincialisms, tend to obscure the serious intent and many helpful suggestions.

The second volume is more free from colloquialisms. The simple subjects in a plain, practical and interesting manner. "Quiet Talks" have brought profit and inspiration to many parts of the world.

*Princeton.*

THE DOCTRINE OF THE MINISTRY. By REV. J. D. D., LL.D., President, and Professor of Theology, the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Alliance, Chicago. New York: Fleming H. Revell

Whatever comes to us from the pen of Doctor Weidner is certain to reveal wide research, accurate scholarship and conservative views. We might, however, wish that the treatment of so important a subject had been presented to us in a different literary form and had been pursued according to a different method. The volume consists of mere "Outline Notes, based on Luthardt and Krauth". The exhaustive analyses, with minute subdivisions, are somewhat bewildering to the average reader; and the continual reference to the writers named makes us desire a fuller statement of independent views by the author. However, we should hasten to add, that the employment of such brief notes makes it possible to present in condensed form much valuable material which must have been omitted had a more usual and exhaustive method been adopted; and as to Luthardt and Krauth, the statement of the author is too modest, for the discussion includes references to a very large range of writers and embodies the results of scholarly research and careful consideration on the part of the author. We find set forth 1. The Scriptural Doctrine of the Ministry, and 2. The Church Doctrine of the Ministry. Under the latter head are considered (a) The Doctrine of the Early Christian Church, and of the Roman Catholic Period; (b) The Doctrine of Lutheran Protestantism; and (c) The Teaching of the Lutheran Church in Modern Times.

While, of course, these notes are specially designed for the use of Lutheran Theological students, they form a digest on the doctrine of the Ministry which will be helpful to members of all branches of the Christian Church.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN

THE STORY OF THE HYMNS AND TUNES. By THERON BROWN and HEZEKIAH BUTTERWORTH. New York: American Tract Society. 8vo. Pp. 564. Price, \$1.50 net.

The author has not merely combined in one volume the "Story of the Hymns" and the "Story of the Tunes" as told by Mr. Butterworth, but has added much original material, in addition to a careful revision of these smaller books which are the occasion of this more comprehensive discussion. The work is along the line of that undertaken by Dr. Duffield in his "English Hymns", by Dr. Robinson in his "Annotations upon the Hymns of Laudes Domini", by Mr. Sunderland in his "Famous Hymns of the World" and by Dr. Benson in his scholarly and exhaustive "Studies of Familiar Hymns." The volume undertakes the treatment of a wider range of hymns than any of the books just named. It includes "Christian Ballads," "Old Revival Hymns," "Patriotic Hymns," "Sunday School Hymns," "Sailor's Hymns"; together with the more usual "Hymns of Praise and Worship," "Missionary Hymns," and "Hymns of Devotion." An original and interesting chapter is devoted to the "Hymns of Wales." Of course, as the title implies, the characteristic feature of this volume is the description of the origin and composer of the tune which is most

commonly associated with each of the annotations has "not pretended to select *all* the best and most comments are necessarily brief; but the treatment to it a new touch of interest and meaning.

*Princeton.*

**STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF REVELATION.** By W. D.D., LL.D., President of Xenia Theological Seminary: United Presbyterian Board of Publication. 163. Price, \$1.00.

This volume is the last which has been issued covering practically the whole Bible, and of valuable material delivered in the form of lectures in the period in which Doctor Moorehead has served Xenia Theological Seminary. The wide scientific exegesis, the simplicity of method, and the clearness characterized the preceding studies, specially qualified the author for the difficult task of making a sane and cautious interpretation, and of presenting his conclusions in a lucid and accessible form. The author does not essay a commentary, but an analysis of the marvellous literary structure of the book. He shows, however, in how large a measure such a plan and design of the book furnishes a key to its meaning. The studies will be helpful to all Bible readers; and in a few places so necessarily condensed that they will be most fully appreciated by those who have given previous study upon the more difficult problems. One can agree with the positions or conclusions of the author, or will appreciate the spirit, and purpose, and his method.

*Princeton.*

**A HISTORY OF AMERICAN REVIVALS.** By FRANK M. S.T.D. New York: American Tract Society. 324.

The author does not aim at a technical or scientific history, but gives in a popular and brief form a review of the movements which have characterized our nation. The book was published some time ago, and has received more circulation than it has received.

*Princeton.*

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- Abbetmeyer, C., *Poems for Pastime*. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 16mo., pp. 190.
- Adams, J., *Sermons in Syntax*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons; cloth, 16mo.; pp. 228.
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- Astley, H. J. D., *Pre Historic Archaeology and the Old Testament*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1908; imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York; cloth, 12mo., pp. 314; price \$2.00 net
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- Bruce, H., *The Age of Schism*. New York: The Macmillan Co.; cloth; 16mo., pp. 278. price \$1.00 net
- Campbell, J., *Paul the Mystic*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; 1908; 12mo.; pp. 285.
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
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